

PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE
RELATING TO
THE ANGLO-SIKH WARS

GANDA SINGH

SIKH HISTORY SOCIETY
AMRITSAR-PATIALA

1955

PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE
RELATING TO
THE ANGLO-SIKH WARS

(being private letters of Lords Ellenborough,
Hardinge, Dalhousie and Gough and
of Political Assistants addressed to
Sir Frederick Currie as
British Resident at
Lahore, etc.)

Edited with an Introduction

BY

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SIKH HISTORY SOCIETY

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1955

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Dedicated to

H. H. PRINCESS BAMBA SUTHERLAND
the eldest and the only surviving daughter
of Maharaja Duleep Singh of the Panjab

PREFACE

It was on December 12, 1937, on the occasion of the Indian Historical Records Commission at Lahore that Dr. Sir Jadunath Sarkar, the father of historical research in India, at first informed me of the existence of this correspondence of Sir Frederick Currie in the Historical Museum at Satara. I was then a Lecturer at the Khalsa College, Amritsar. I availed myself of my next summer holidays in August-September 1938 to go to Satara and examine it in detail. I secured copies thereof with the assistance of Sardar (now *Subedar*) Jagir Singh. The letters of Lords Ellenborough, Hardinge, Dalhousie and Gough (Nos. 1-174, pp. 1-213) and of Captain James Abbott (Nos. 342-53, pp. 412-25) were transcribed by myself.

This correspondence formed part of the vast collection of Mr. D. B. Parasnis of Satara, the editor of the *Itihas Sangrah*, who had purchased it from a bookseller in England and made it over along with many other things to the Government of Bombay, for the Satara Museum, in lieu of a perpetual pension. It has since been transferred to the Deccan College and Post-Graduate Research Institute, Poona.

It struck me as an invaluable material for the history of the Panjab during 1847-49 when the British plan for their long-cherished occupation of the country was at last translated into a *fait accompli*. Sir Frederick Currie, to whom this correspondence was addressed, was in a very advantageous and privileged position during, and immediately before, the period covered by it. He was Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in 1845-46, a member of the Supreme Council at Calcutta from April 1847 to January 1848, and British Resident at Lahore from March 1848 to the end of January 1849. He was thus the best situated official to receive, both officially and privately, detailed news about the second Anglo-Sikh War. Among his correspondents were the highest civil and military authorities, the Governors-General of India, Sir Henry Hardinge and Lord Dalhousie, and the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Hugh Gough, and a clever team of Political assistants in different posts and theatres of war.

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The correspondence deals almost exclusively with the period of British Residency in the Panjab and the Anglo-Sikh War of 1848-49. It contains detailed information on not only how the conclusion of the Treaty of Bharowal of December 16, 1846, which made the British Resident the *de facto* ruler of the Panjab, was secured, but also how the suppression of the Multan revolt was deliberately delayed to find a pretext for annexation, how the Atariwala Sardar Chatar Singh was goaded into rebellion and how, ultimately, the Panjab was converted into a British province.

The correspondence becomes all the more invaluable in the face of the fact that the official despatches and records of the Government of India of those days are not very faithful and reliable. They do not always present a true picture of the British political transactions in this country, particularly in respect of their wars with, or conquest and annexation of, Indian kingdoms. They were at times garbled and mutilated to suit the requirements of a particular plan or person, or were entirely suppressed or destroyed if they were unfavourable to the Government or its highly placed officers. It is not proposed to enter into any lengthy discussion on this point here. It will do for our purpose to quote only a few examples of the eighteen-forties to which we are referring at present.

(i) Regarding the garbled form in which the Parliamentary Papers relating to the first Afghan war (1838-42) were issued, the well-known British historian Sir John W. Kaye writes :

"I cannot, indeed, suppress the utterance of my abhorrence of this system of garbling the official correspondence of public men—sending the letter of a statesman or diplomatist into the world mutilated, emasculated—the very pith and substance of them cut by the unsparing hand of the state-anatomist. The dishonesty by which lie upon lie is palmed upon the world has not one redeeming feature. If Public men are, without reprehension, to be permitted to lie in the face of nations—wilfully, elaborately, and maliciously to bear false witness against their neighbours, what hope is there for private veracity? ... The character of Dost Muhammad has been lied away, the character of Burnes has been lied away, both, by the mutilation of the correspondence of the latter, have been fearfully misrepresented—both having been set forth as doing what they did not, and omitting to do what they did. ... The cause of truth must be upheld. Official documents are the sheet

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anchors of historians—the last courts of appeal to which the public resort. If these documents are tampered with, if they are made to misrepresent the words and actions of public men, the grave of truth is dug, and there is seldom a resurrection. ... In most cases the lie goes down unassailed, and often unsuspected, to posterity, and in place of sober history we have a florid romance." (Quoted in Basu's *Rise of the Christian Power in India*, 814-15.)

(ii) After Sir Alexander Burnes, the Political Agent, and Sir William Macnaghten, the British Envoy, had been murdered at Kabul and a British force had been annihilated on its way back from Afghanistan, a conference was held at Jalalabad, on January 27, 1842, to deliberate on future plans. The proceedings of this 'Jellalabad parliament,' as Broadfoot named the Conference, were recorded by Henry Havelock in his capacity as General Sale's staff-officer. The record, and all the papers produced during the debates, remained in his possession until the armies of Pollock and Nott returned to India after the evacuation of Afghanistan. Archibold Forbes tells us in his *Havelock*, p. 36, that: "These documents were then taken from Havelock and destroyed, with a view to spare the reputation of General Sale."

Now about the Anglo-Sikh wars.

(iii) Sir Harry Smith, a veteran of the Peninsular war and of the battle of Waterloo, was worsted near Baddowal on January 21, 1846. Something was required to be done to cover his loss of reputation. Fullest liberty was, therefore, allowed to the imagination of the official despatch-writer who magnified an insignificant scrimmage at Aliwal into a great battle. Dr. Andrew Adams, in his *Wanderings of a Naturalist in India*, pp. 60-1, thus records the evidence of an eye-witness: —

"Aliwal was the *battle of the despatch*, for none of us knew we had fought a battle until the particulars appeared in a document, which did more than justice to every one concerned."

"But the public gulped it down," says Adams, "and like many of our Indian battles and Indian blunders, the final issue of the struggle disarmed criticism."

"... a few shots and the charge of a squadron or two, in pursuit of a host of retreating Sikhs, were magnified into a grand combat, and the plain of Aliwal has been recorded as the scene of one of India's Marathons."

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(iv) Seven weeks after the last battle of the first War, Lieutenant William Hodson wrote in a private letter on March 30, 1846, to his friend Mr. F. A. Foster:

"England, I see, is ringing with the deeds of the 'army of the Satlaj.' How would it not be roused from one end to the other were the whole truth known! Were the tissue of mismanagement, blunders, errors, ignorance, and arrogance displayed during the short but 'glorious' campaign exposed, the indignation excited by it would, I trust, be the beginning of a new era for India. The despatches are most disgraceful. The most unblushing falsehoods are put forth, both as to facts, figures, and individuals, with a coolness worthy of Napoleon. I have little hopes, however, of any improvement. Success—ultimate success—throws its cloak of charity over unnumbered errors. ..." (Trotter, *Hodson of Hodson's Horse*, 38.)

(v) Similarly Harry Lumsden, referring to the unreliability of official despatches of war recommending all sorts of honours for inefficient and undeserving old officers, wrote to his father on August 8, 1846 :

"I begin to think that luck is all in those matters, when I see old officers getting all sorts of honours for making a mess of every fight they get their heads into and sacrificing men for want of knowledge and judgement. I begin to lose faith in all despatches, as, when matters take a disagreeable turn, it seems to me that some officers do not hesitate to draw on their imaginations." (Lumsden of the Guides, 21-2.)

(vi) Lieutenant (later on Major-General Sir) Herbert Edwardes, the hero of Multan, in his private letter of October 23, 1848, complained to Sir Frederick Currie, the British Resident at Lahore, about the suppression of Edward Lake's and his own despatches by Lord Dalhousie, the Governor-General of India, saying :

"Very gladly would I believe that Lord Dalhousie has also befriended me, in order that I might feel grateful to him for it, but I cannot get over that suppression of Lake's and my despatches, as a token of his Lordship's feelings." (234/299.)

Axiomatically, there are two sides to a picture. But in the case of the Anglo-Sikh wars there are three : the official British side of the picture, the non-official side, and the Sikh side of it. The Sikh side of the picture is not available. The Panjab was finally occupied by the British in 1849. The poets and scholars of the country dared not write anything anti-British for fear of being incarcerated or exiled. The official side of the British picture is available, painted in the bright-

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est colours, in official diaries and despatches, and in English histories and biographies, mostly wrongful and misleading. The private correspondence of Sir Frederick Currie comes to the rescue of truth to a great extent and will help historians construct, with official and non-official material, a fairly reliable account of the last phase of the British occupation of the Panjab. And this is my apology for printing it in extenso.

I have in the Introduction given an outline of the plans and efforts of the British Government for the occupation of the Panjab, based on original and contemporary sources, supplemented by this correspondence. The Introduction will serve as a background to it.

For such additional information on the subject as is required to supplement or clarify a number of points raised in the correspondence, extracts from Lord Ellenborough's letters to the Duke of Wellington and vice versa, and to the Secret Committee and the Queen, have been added at the end in Appendix A. The treaties and engagements of the British Government with Maharaja Ranjit Singh, their proclamations at the commencement of the first War and the subsequent treaties, ultimately resulting in the British occupation of the Panjab, have been given in Appendix B. These will help a critical study of the circumstances that led to the extension of the British Indian frontier to the Afghan mountains and passes on the North-west. Appendix C contains three letters of Maharani Jind Kaur written immediately before and after her removal from Lahore to the fort of Sheikhpura in August 1847. They not only reveal her great manly courage and political insight, but also serve to falsify the allegations levelled against her by the British Resident at Lahore. She demanded a public enquiry before her condemnation to exile from the Panjab. This was denied to her as it was feared that in the absence of any proof against her she might be declared innocent and acquitted. A few extracts from the writings of contemporaries have been put together in Appendix D. Their authors were either eye-witnesses of the wars or had first hand knowledge of the persons and events connected with them. Their observations are of great historical importance.

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The Glossary of Oriental words in Appendix E will be of use to those who are not conversant with their meanings.

I have not interfered with the spellings of the names of persons and places mentioned in the letters, different and varying as they are. In some cases they differ from writer to writer, while in others they are different in different places in the writings of the same person. Any attempt at securing uniformity of spelling would have robbed the letters of their air of originality.

In conclusion it is my pleasant duty to record my acknowledgements. First of all I am indebted to Dr. Sir Jadunath Sarkar, Kt., C.I.E., M.A., D.Litt., who put me on the track of this correspondence in 1937 and has ever since encouraged me to publish it in the interest of historical research. I am thankful to Mr. C. N. Billard, B.A., J.P., the then Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Historical Museum, Satara, for permission to take copies of the correspondence and publish it. (Vide his letter No. III-5/37-8 of February 19, 1938.) My thanks are due to the Shromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee for providing funds for printing it. Sardar Bahadur Bhāi Jodh Singh, M.A., M.L.C., has always been a source of inspiration and encouragement to me in my literary undertakings, and I am grateful to him, and also to Lala Sita Ram Kohli, M.A., P.E.S. (Retd.), to Prof. Harbans Singh Uppal, M.A., Dehra Dun, and to Prof. Pritam Singh, M.A., of Patiala for going through the typescript of the Introduction and making several useful suggestions.

To Giani Rajindar Singh, M.A., and Sardar Jogindar Singh, B.A. (Hons.), of the Panjabi Department and to Prof. Gurcharan Singh, M.A. (History), of the Mahendra College, Patiala, my thanks are due for their ungrudging help in reading the proofs, and to Sardar Partap Singh, M.A., LL.B., for preparing the index. My stenographer S. Dhiraj Singh also deserves my thanks for his help in preparing the typescript of the Introduction.

Patiala,

GANDA SINGH

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INTRODUCTION

These private letters of the Governors-General and the Commander-in-Chief of India and the Political Assistants of the British Resident in the Panjab, supplemented by official despatches, treaties and proclamations, and the letters of Maharani Jind Kaur, and a few extracts from contemporary writings relate the story of how the British dominions in India extended to the north-western frontier of the country and how the independent kingdom of the Panjab was annexed and converted into a British province.

The Panjab story is even more tragic than that of the conquest of Sindh, having no justification, legal or moral. It was all prompted by selfish motives and the political necessity of having an effective control over the politics of Afghanistan with a view to keeping the French and Russians away from the borders of the Indian empire.

The imperialist and colonial ambitions of England have always had their worst rivals in France and Russia, and it was to guard against their designs, real or imaginary, that the English politicians not unoften tarnished the fair name of England with many an un-English act. The annexation of the Panjab was one such act whereby the young Maharaja Duleep Singh, the minor son of their friend and ally Maharaja Ranjit Singh, was cheated out of his kingdom.

RISING POWER OF THE SIKHS AND THE BRITISH

The Panjab first attracted the attention of the British politicals in 1771 when the rising power of the Sikhs came as a great relief to them. General Barker's observations were both historically and prophetically true when he said in his letter of August 19, 1771, addressed to Sardar Jhanda Singh Bhangi, that "it is clear that as long as the Khalsa army is on the watch, no one can march upon Hindustan unopposed." (CPC, iii. 868.) The Sikhs had proved themselves to be a strong check to the inroads and ambitions of Ahmad Shah Durrani in India. The great Afghan conqueror had for

a quarter of a century made relentless efforts to annex the Panjab to his kingdom of Afghanistan, but the Sikhs stood up for the independence of their country, fought for every inch of her soil and were eventually successful in freeing her from his oppressive and irksome yoke. Thus was Hindustan secured by the Sikhs from western invasions. Undisturbed from the north-west with the Sikhs as sentinals, the country could prosper in peace. But the short-sightedness and petty jealousies of the Indian princes and people had opened the way for the British to gain a strong political hold on the country.

By the end of the eighteenth century, the East India Company of traders had imperceptibly assumed the role of empire-builders. The English were naturally jealous of the native princes who wished to strengthen and consolidate their own territories. Their desire for expansion and their increasing appetite for earth knew no bounds. Wherever they met with or apprehended resistance to their schemes, they brought into play all types of Machiavellian tactics to overcome it and gain their object.

The fear of an Afghan invasion in the closing years of the eighteenth century, and of the designs of Napoleon upon India in the beginning of the nineteenth, prompted the British to conciliate the Sikhs and their rising chief Ranjit Singh, who had then appeared on the stage of the Panjab as the Coming Man, having occupied Lahore in 1799. They needed his neutrality, and active friendship if possible, to use the Sikh territories as a buffer between India and Afghanistan. To open the way for friendly negotiations, the British Government sent an agent in the person of Munshi Yusaf Ali Khan to Sardar Ranjit Singh with a friendly letter and presents valued at ten thousand rupees. The agent was received by him with due honours, presented with a *khillat* and dismissed with suitable presents for the British authorities.

TREATY OF 1806

Ranjit Singh refrained from joining Jaswant Rao Holkar against the British in 1805, and, along with Sardar Fateh Singh Ahluwalia of Kapurthala, entered into a treaty of

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friendship and amity with them on January 1, 1806. It was agreed that, as long as the Sikh chieftains held no friendly connections with the enemies of the British, or committed no act of hostility, "the British armies shall never enter the territories of the said chieftains, nor will the British Government form any plans for the seizure or sequestration of their possessions or property." (*Appendix B*, No. 1, pp. 470-71.)

TREATY OF AMRITSAR, 1809

Ranjit Singh wished to consolidate the entire possessions of the Sikhs, both to the north and south of the Sutlej, into one strong empire of the Panjab. This was in no way against the treaty of 1806. Yet the British could not see him expand his sphere of political power and influence to the south of the Sutlej.

In 1805 the policy of the British in India was to consolidate their dominions to the east of the Jamuna and not to advance to the west of that river. This underwent a change with the changing trend of the Napoleonic war in Europe. The fears of a Franco-Russian alliance in 1807 for the subjugation of India set the British athinking and their military experts held that for defence purposes the Sutlej was a better frontier than the Jamuna. It was, therefore, decided by them to move forward their frontier to the bank of the Sutlej. This meant the extension of their political influence over the territories between the two rivers, dividing the Panjab into two by a thick political line. The chiefs of Patiala, Nabha, Jind and Kaithal, and other small states, whom Ranjit Singh sought to take into his sphere of unification, were encouraged in their request for British protection. And Mr. Charles T. Metcalfe was sent to Ranjit Singh to negotiate a treaty with him to put a stop to his further expansion to the south of the Sutlej.

Ranjit Singh, too, had evidently seen through the game. To him there appeared to be no danger to his country and people from a Franco-Russian invasion; he rather feared the establishment of British hegemony on his borders and re-

sented their interference in his relations with his own people to the south of the Sutlej. He was not, therefore, very enthusiastic about continuing negotiations with the British envoy, Mr. Metcalfe, who did not look with favour upon Ranjit Singh's fresh conquests south of the Sutlej under the plea of British protection promised to cis-Sutlej chiefs. Ranjit Singh at one stage suspended his negotiations with Metcalfe, crossed the river, seized Faridkot and Ambala, levied exactions in Malerkotla and Thanesar and entered into a symbolical brotherhood or alliance with the Raja of Patiala. Closer relations between the Sikhs of the north and the south of the Sutlej could not find favour with the British who, as foreigners, could only thrive on dissension and disunity in the country. To coerce Ranjit Singh into acceptance of the proposed treaty, they ordered a body of troops from across the Jamuna in January 1809 under the command of Sir David Ochterloney, who pushed on towards Ludhiana, prepared for hostilities.

Intelligence at this time arrived from Europe that Napoleon's designs upon India had received a set-back so as to render any defensive precautions on the Indian frontier unnecessary. The British no longer felt the necessity of a friendly alliance with Ranjit Singh. Their attitude, therefore, stiffened. In spite of the treaty of 1806, which explicitly laid down that the British would not form any plans for the sequestration of Ranjit Singh's possessions, they insisted upon the restoration of his latest conquests and the retention of British troops at Ludhiana. To make their plea of the promise of protection a reality, Sir David Ochterloney issued in the beginning of February 1809 a proclamation declaring that the Cis-Sutlej states were under British protection and that any aggression of the Chief of Lahore would be resisted with arms. (Cunningham, *History of the Sikhs*, 148-9.) This not only created a discord among the Sikh people and divided them into the Majha and Malwa factions—the latter falling into the lap of the British—and placed a British cantonment directly on the Panjab frontier, but also converted the Panjab into a buffer state to bear the brunt of a French or Russian attack.

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Ranjit Singh was now helpless. He knew his limitations. He was not yet strong enough to go to war with the British who had the inexhaustible resources of India at their command. His own house was not yet in order. Only a small portion of the Panjab had been brought under his control, and that too had not been fully consolidated. It was also feared that at the time of an emergency the chiefs who had only partially accepted his suzerainty might rise in rebellion against him. There was yet another danger of the British extending offers of protection to his rival chiefs of Kasur, Jhang and Multan and entering into negotiations with the Afghan rulers of Peshawar and Kashmir.

Ranjit Singh was fully alive to the realities of the situation. An armed conflict with the British under these circumstances might have proved disastrous and deprived India of a bright chapter in its history and the Khalsa its crowning glory in the days to come. Like a practical statesman, therefore, he made the best of a bad bargain. He accepted the compromise and entered into the treaty of 1809 with the British. (*Appendix B, II. pp. 471-72.*)

EFFECTS OF THE TREATY

This treaty is known as the treaty of Amritsar and is considered to be a landmark in the history of the Panjab. With a friendly power to the north of the Sutlej, the only dangerous frontier of India, the British could successfully grapple with the Nepalese, the Pindaris, the Marathas and the Burmese. It limited the sphere of Ranjit Singh's territorial expansion to the south of the Sutlej beyond his acquisitions during his first conquests, and put an end to his intentions of consolidating the entire population of the Sikhs between the Jamuna and the Indus and knitting them together into one compact and homogeneous people. It stipulated that "perpetual friendship shall subsist between the British Government and the State of Lahore,... and the British Government will have no concern with the territories and subjects of the Rajah to the northward of the River Sutlej." And that "the Raja will never maintain in the territory occupied by

him and his dependants on the left bank of the River Sutlej more troops than are necessary for the internal duties of that territory, nor commit or suffer any encroachments on the possessions or the rights of the chiefs in its vicinity."

The treaty was not, however, without its advantages for Ranjit Singh. It secured to him his eastern frontier, leaving him free to extend his conquests to the Afghan hills on the one hand and to the Himalayas on the other. He was able to conquer Kashmir and become the undisputed master of the northern Panjab. And towards the end of his life he could rightly boast of having created a strong and well organized kingdom of the Panjab out of the jarring and discordant elements of the Hindus, the Muslims and the Sikhs.

To the south of the Sutlej the treaty recognized Ranjit Singh's absolute authority and right over the territories of 45 parganahs held by him and his dependants with the only proviso that he would not maintain there more troops than were necessary for the internal duties. The British Government were to have no concern whatever with the subjects of Ranjit Singh or his dependants in this territory.

Having once signed the treaty of Amritsar, Ranjit Singh faithfully observed its terms and maintained friendship with the British through thick and thin. "To one friendship," says Joseph D. Cunningham, "the Maharaja remained ever constant, from one alliance he never sought to shake himself free. This was the friendly alliance with the British Government." At times temptations owing to British vulnerability made apparent by military reverses were too alluring to be resisted, and provocations from the British side for political interference in his affairs were too great to be tolerated. But true to the character of an unsophisticated Jat, Ranjit Singh stood by his commitments.

In the early stages of the Nepal War (1816-8) the British armies suffered some reverses. One of their generals, Gillespie, was killed and the myth of their invincibility was exploded. Again, in the first Burmese War their armies suffered heavily in the jungles of Burma and their prestige

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was at a low ebb. But Ranjit Singh would not take advantage of their adversities to assert his claims over his co-religionists to the south of the Sutlej, of which the British had deprived him. In 1820 the Bhonsle Raja of Nagpur appealed to him for help. Four years later the Nepal Government sought his co-operation in a defensive alliance. Next year the Raja of Bharatpur asked for help. But as he had entered into a *treaty of friendship* with the British, he rejected all these requests, remaining loyal to his plighted word.

The British on the other hand did not strictly abide by the terms of friendship. To them friendship was only a matter of expediency. Like all political opportunists, they were friends as long as it suited them. While they were engaged in consolidating their power in Hindustan, they kept up the show of friendship and were all courtesy and kindness to Ranjit Singh. But no sooner did they find themselves in about 1827 to be absolutely secure in their possessions as undisputed masters of the country, with their rights none to dispute and their might none to oppose, than they turned their attention to the north beyond the Sutlej, nay, even beyond the Indus.

DISTURBANCES IN THE PATHAN-LAND

At this time occurred disturbances on the north-west frontier of the Panjab. One Sayyad Ahmad of Bareilly raised the standard of *jehad* against the Sikh rule of Maharaja Ranjit Singh on December 21, 1826. He was a British subject and had organized a regular propaganda centre at Patna in Bengal. His followers were all collected and recruited from the British territories, and, according to Sir Charles Aitchison's *Lord Lawrence*, he had "agencies in different parts of India for the levy of money and supply of arms. . . . The imperial palace at Delhi, the minor Muhammadan princes and the great cities of Lucknow and Hyderabad supplied him with funds." (pp. 9-10.) All this was done not with the passive or secret connivance of the British Government, but with their official permission formally and regularly granted

by the Lieutenant-Governor of the North Western Provinces of Agra and Oudh. Mirza Hairat Dehlvi tells us in the *Hayat-i-Taiyaba* that, in consultation with Maulana Shah Muhammad Ismail, Sayyad Ahmad informed the Lieutenant-Governor of North Western Provinces through Sheikh Ghulam Ali Reis of Allahabad that he was preparing for a *jehad* against the Sikhs and hoped that the British Government had no objection to it. The Lieutenant-Governor wrote to him in reply that as long as the peace of their territories was not disturbed, they had nothing to say, nor had they any objection to such preparations.

The above is self-explanatory. To grant official permission to British subjects for active, armed hostilities in the country of the friendly Maharaja Ranjit Singh, with men, money and arms collected from British territory, was certainly not a friendly act of the British, nor was it in keeping with the terms of the treaty of *friendship and amity* dated 25th of April, 1809, placing the State of Lahore 'on the footing of the most favoured powers.'

The *jehad* of the British subjects against Maharaja Ranjit Singh continued with full vigour for four and a half years, keeping the Sikh armies engaged and scattered on the Pathan frontier. The aim of the British encouragement to this crusade was obvious. The British were then free for fresh occupations. They evidently intended to see a storm raised on the Pathan border of the Panjab to instigate the unsuspecting Muslim population of the frontier against the Sikhs so that, if successful, it might spread eastward to the central Panjab and weaken the Lahore State, if not actually subvert it, and provide an opportunity for British intervention and occupation. At one stage the crusaders were successful in capturing the city of Peshawar from its Pathan Governor and making it a rendezvous of their power. But ultimately the Sikhs were victorious. And with the defeat and deaths of Sayyad Ahmad and Shah Ismail in the battle of Bala Kot on May 8, 1831, the *jehad* came to an end, and the Panjab heaved a sigh of relief.

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THE SINDH AFFAIR

Ranjit Singh had intended to conquer Sindh and Baluchistan which lie to the west of the Indus. The country, along with the Panjab and Multan, and Peshawar and the Deras to the west of Indus, had once belonged to Ahmed Shah Durani and his descendants from whom it had been conquered by the Sikhs, the predecessors and ancestors of the Maharaja. "It was in the fitness of things," says Sayyad Abdul Qadir, "that he should get Sindh as well," as it would help him carry his frontier to the Arabian Sea from where he could establish contacts, political and commercial, with the outside world. But this could not find favour with his British friends who had their own designs upon Sindh and Baluchistan and wanted to extend their influence towards Afghanistan.

"From about the year 1829," says John M. Ludlow in *British India*, ii, 114, "great alarm began to be entertained in England at the progress of Russia towards the south-east. Much of this was owing to the efforts of a very singular man, of whom history will, perhaps, find it difficult to say whether he was the maddest among statesmen or the most statesman-like among madmen, Mr. David Urquhart, and perhaps not a little to his personal influence over King William IV. Hence the instructions which had been sent out from home to India, to extend British influence on the Indus; hence the treaties with the Ameers of Scinde . . ."

To forestall Ranjit Singh in the occupation of Sindh, the British deputed Lieutenant Alexander Burnes, charged with a friendly letter from the King of England, to go to Lahore by the Indus and the Sutlej with the present of five horses and an English coach. The secret object of the mission in travelling by the rivers passing through Sindh and forming the boundary of the Panjab, was that 'the authorities both in England and India contemplated that much information of a *political* and *geographical* nature might be acquired in such a journey.' He had received secret instructions at Bombay that 'the depth of water in the Indus, the direction and breadth of the stream, its facilities for steam navigation, the supply of fuel on its banks and the conditions of the princes and people

who possess the country bordering it, are all points of the highest interest to Government.'

Burnes was received by the Maharaja in July 1831 with all cordiality and he left for Simla on August 21 to acquaint Lord Bentinck with the result of his mission.

"On the very day before His Highness arrived at Roopur," for the meeting with Lord Bentinck in the last days of October, 1831, says Henry T. Prinsep in his *Muha-Raja Runjeet Singh*, p. 168, "instructions had been issued to Lieutenant-Colonel Pottinger to prepare for a mission to Sindh with a view to the negotiation of a commercial treaty. . . . The object of entering upon this negotiation, at this particular juncture, was perhaps in some measure political," though the Governor-General was not prepared to acknowledge it as such, "and a commercial treaty, stipulating for the free navigation of the river [Indus], seemed to him the better form in which to open relations with the Governments and Chiefs who occupied its banks." After prolonged negotiations Pottinger was able to impose the will of the British Government upon the reluctant Amirs and the treaty of April 1832 was signed.

While, according to Joseph Cunningham, "the object of the Governor-General," in holding the meeting at Ropar, "was mainly to give to the world an impression of complete unanimity between the two States," efforts were made to keep the Maharaja in darkness about the mission of Henry Pottinger to the Amirs of Sindh.

The main aim of the British at this time was to encircle the territory of Ranjit Singh either by their own territory or by the territories of those who were subservient to their will so that they might conveniently walk into the Panjab whenever they chose to do so. The treaties for navigation or commerce were only a cover for political plans and introduction of troops and military officers. This is a secret open to all students of history. The Indus had never been closed and the countries on and beyond the Indus were always open to commerce. Commenting on the British commercial missions, Charles Masson tells us in his *Narrative of Various Journeys*

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in Balochistan, Afghanistan, the Panjab and Kalat, Vol. III, p. 432 :

"The main, and great aim of government, is declared to be to open the Indus. Was the Indus ever closed, or farther closed than by its dangerous entrances and shallow depth of water? Another object was to open the countries on and beyond the Indus to commerce. Were they also ever closed? No such thing: they carried on an active, and increasing trade with India, and afforded markets for immense quantities of British manufactured goods. The governments of India and of England, as well as the public at large, were never amused and deceived by a greater fallacy than that of opening the Indus, as regarded commercial objects. The results of the policy concealed under this pretext have been the introduction of troops into the countries on and beyond the river, and of some half dozen steamers on the stream itself, employed for warlike objects, not for those of trade. There is, besides, great absurdity in commercial treaties with the states of Central Asia, simply because there is no occasion for them. From ancient and prescribed usage, moderate and fixed duties are levied; trade is perfectly free; no goods are prohibited and the more extensive the commerce carried on the greater advantage to the state. Where, then, the benefit of commercial treaties?"

The truth of Charles Masson's observations came to be verified later on by Lord Ellenborough's despatch of October, 1842, to the Queen, wherein he said :

"Lord Ellenborough looks forward to the Indus superseding the Ganges as the channel of communication with England, and to bringing European regiments and all military stores by that route to the North-Western Frontier." (*Appendix A, 11, p. 457.*)

The duplicity and intriguing nature of the British politicals in India had so shaken the faith of Ranjit Singh in their honesty and truthfulness that he was compelled to express his disgust openly to an old Christian missionary, Rev. Dr. Joseph Wolff, who was on a visit to Lahore in 1832. "You say," said Ranjit Singh, "you travel about for the sake of religion; why, then do you not preach to the English in Hindustan, who have no religion at all?" And it is remarkable that when Dr. Wolff, on arriving at Simla, informed Lord William Bentinck of this observation of Ranjit Singh, he said to Wolff, "this is alas! the opinion of all the natives all over India." And in reply to a question of Dr. Wolff, "How may one come nigh unto God?" which corresponded to the Christian

enquiry "How may one be saved," the Maharaja politely, but humorously replied, "One can come nigh unto God by making an alliance with the British Government as I lately did with *Laard Nwab Sahib* (i.e., 'Governor-General') at Roopar." (*Travels and Adventures of the Rev. Joseph Wolff*, D.D., LL.D., p. 375.)

THE QUESTION OF SHIKARPUR

Finding his way to the conquest of Sindh blocked, Ranjit Singh turned his attention to the town of Shikarpur. The British could have no reasonable objection to his occupying it. It lay to the west of the Sutlej-Indus, and, according to the treaty of 1809, they had agreed not to interfere with his affairs in trans-Sutlej territories. The Maharaja had already crossed the river Indus and conquered Peshawar and the Deras—Dera Ismail Khan and Dera Ghazi Khan—and had established himself there. He had occupied the forts of Rojhan and Ken and his supremacy over the Sindhian tribe of Muzaris had been virtually recognized. His intended occupation of Shikarpur was, therefore, in no way a departure from any terms of the treaties of friendship and amity with the British. But the British had their own eyes upon Sindh, including Shikarpur. "The views of the British authorities with regard to Sindh," says Cunningham, "were inevitably becoming political as well as commercial." "With regard to Ranjeet Singh," he continues, "the English rulers observed that they were bound by the strongest considerations of political interest to prevent the extension of the Sikh power along the course of the Indus, and that, although they would respect the acknowledged territories of the Maharaja, they desired that his existing relations of peace should not be disturbed; for, if war took place, the Indus would never be opened to commerce." And we know, as Charles Masson has told us, that the opening of the Indus was only a cover for the extension of British political influence to the borders of the Panjab and beyond. Against all rules of perpetual friendship and amity the British came and stood between Ranjit Singh and Shikarpur and told him that he could not be permitted to extend his power even along the western bank of Indus where

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he already had his territories. The Maharaja stood aghast at this peculiar demand of the British. But they "would not listen to reason; nor did an appeal to the provisions of the thirty year old treaty of friendship have any effect upon them." Intoxicated with power, they appeared to be prepared for anything. "Ranjit Singh was urged by his chiefs not to yield to the demands of the English, for to their understanding it was not clear where such demands would stop." Raja Dhian Singh, his Prime Minister, was very angry and wished him to fight the English in defence of his rights. But Ranjit Singh was a far-sighted statesman. To him the British appeared to be provoking him to hostilities. Their hands were then free and they were ready to grapple with the Sikhs or the Afghans whosoever accepted the challenge. He refused to fall into their trap. He knew his limitations. His borders had been occupied by them both on the south and south-west. They were also then in correspondence with Amir Dost Muhammad Khan on the west. And the Amir was only looking for an opportunity to pounce upon Peshawar. He would readily join hands with the British in the case of hostilities. Surrounded on three sides by hostile enemies, with no friend on the fourth, Ranjit Singh did not wish to run the risk of a war with the British on several fronts. It is true that he had a formidable army and a strong park of artillery. But his resources were limited—less than 20 per cent of those of the British with the whole of Hindustan at their command. Ranjit Singh could expect no reinforcements from any quarter. The brave Telingas, the sturdy Marathas, the valiant Rajputs and the soldierly Jats and Ruhillas had all fallen one by one and lay prostrate before the British. They were all then at the beck and call of the *Ferrangis*, ready to fight for them against their countrymen. They had done so in the past. Ranjit Singh had seen them do it during his own life time. And, as subsequent history knows it, they did it again in 1843 when Sir Charles Napier occupied Sindh, and in 1845-46 when the last independent kingdom—the Panjab—was struggling for its life, pitched against the British with a powerful army and a formidable park of artillery. While the

native soldiers from all over British India attacked the Panjab from without to enslave it for their foreign masters, Commander-in-Chief Tej Singh, an easterner from beyond the Jamuna in the service of the Panjab, turned a traitor and betrayed the cause of the Panjab from within.

Circumstanced in this wise, Ranjit Singh was left with the only alternative of giving up his claim to Shikarpur.

FEROZEPORE

The British Government had by various acts of omission and commission recognized before 1835 the sovereignty of Maharaja Ranjit Singh over Ferozepore. But it was a place of great strategic importance, particularly in their plan of hemming in the territory of the Maharaja by erecting a ring of forts all along the Sikh frontier and of walking into the Panjab immediately after his death. "The capital of Lahore," wrote Murray, "is distant only 40 miles with a single river to cross, fordable for six months in the year. The fort of Ferozepore from every point of view, seems to be of highest importance to the British Government whether as a check on the growing ambition of Lahore or as a fort of consequence." "His [Ranjit Singh's] very existence is now precarious," said Dr. M'Gregor, "and may be extinguished by a repetition of paralysis. When such an event does occur, there will be plenty of bloodshed before the British can even reach Lahore. To prevent the chance of this, it appears advisable to have a force as near that capital as possible." (*History of the Sikhs*, i. 263.)

The British attitude towards Ferozepore, therefore, underwent a change. The city was occupied by them in 1835 upon the death, without heirs, of Sardarni Lachhman Kaur, and converted into a military cantonment in 1838.

INTERFERENCE IN PESHAWAR AFFAIR

Amir Dost Muhammad Khan saw a ray of hope of recovering Peshawar from Ranjit Singh in the flames of the funeral pyre of Sardar Hari Singh on the battle-field of Jamrood, where that great general was killed on April 30, 1837. But

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the precipitate retreat of the Afghans on the arrival of Sikh reinforcements discouraged all his plans. The ever-watchful British now tried to exploit the situation to win over the Amir to their side. Ranjit Singh "had scarcely vindicated his supremacy on the frontier, by filling the valley of Peshawar with troops, when the English," according to Cunningham, "interfered to embitter the short remainder of his life and to set bounds to his ambition on the west, as they had already done on the east and south. . . . It was wished that Ranjit Singh should be content with his past achievements." "It was made known," Cunningham continues, "that the British rulers would be glad to be the means of negotiating a peace honourable to both parties, yet the scale was turned in favour of Afghans by simultaneous admission that Peshawar was a place to which Dost Mahomed could scarcely be expected to resign all claim." But, according to Maharaja Ranjit Singh, the issue had already been decided by the retreat of the Afghans from Jamrood. The Afghans had been defeated in their attempts to dislodge the Sikhs from Peshawar and its territories. Beyond the death of a brave General, killed in the field of battle, the Sikhs had suffered no material loss. They still held the field of battle and also the city and district of Peshawar. The Afghans were no longer in the field and had returned to their homes without achieving anything. The Sikhs on the other hand had then a much stronger hold on the Khyber, having laid the foundation of a regular fort at Jamrood at the mouth of the pass. And complete peace had been restored. With the liquidation of the Afghans and with the Sikhs in undisputed possession of Peshawar, there was no dispute to call for any negotiations of peace of which the British had offered to be the means. Ranjit Singh could not, therefore, entertain, much less accept, the offer of his friends.

HOSPITALITY ABUSED

The marriage of the Maharaja's grandson Kanwar Nau-Nihal Singh was celebrated at Atari (in the district of Amritsar) on March 4, 1838. The Maharaja had invited Lord Auckland, the Governor-General of British India, Sir Henry

Fane, the Commander-in-Chief of the British forces, and Sir Charles Metcalfe, the Governor of Agra, to be present on the occasion. The prince was wedded to a daughter of Sardar Sham Singh Atariwala. Of the English invitees Sir Henry Fane alone was able to attend. But instead of appreciating the friendship and hospitality of the Maharaja, he used this opportunity for collecting information from a military Commander's point of view with an eye to the conquest of the Panjab. "That able Commander," says Captain Cunningham, "was ever a careful observer of military means and of soldierly qualities; he formed an estimate of the force which would be required for the complete subjugation of the Panjab." (*History of the Sikhs*, 227.)

THE TRIPARTITE TREATY

Failing to prevail upon Ranjit Singh regarding Peshawar, the British lost the good-will of Amir Dost Muhammad Khan whose preference to a Persian and Russian alliance was made a pretext for removing him from the throne of Kabul and placing the fugitive Shah Shujah on it. The British sought Ranjit Singh's co-operation in this venture and invited him to a triple alliance with Shah Shujah as the third party. Ranjit Singh could not be very enthusiastic about it. He could clearly see that the installation of the puppet Shah under the shadow of the British bayonets would not only place the British in supreme authority in Afghanistan but would also strengthen their chain of encirclement on the west and north-west of the Panjab. But when he learnt that they were determined to carry out their project even without him, he was judicious enough to change his attitude. He could not allow them to have the sole credit of making Shah Shujah the king of Afghanistan and use him later in their aggressive designs against the Panjab. He signed the Tripartite treaty of June 26, 1838, and co-operated with the British in placing the Shah once again on the throne of Afghanistan. At times he went beyond the terms of the treaty to comply with the wishes of the British agent Colonel Wade for men and munitions of war in spite of the occasional disagreement with his officers and grandson Kanwar Nau-Nihal Singh.

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THE SIKH POLICY OF FRIENDSHIP CONTINUED

After the death of the Maharaja on June 27, 1839, his son and successor Maharaja Kharak Singh followed the same policy and maintained the old friendly relations with the British. It was reported to him on July 23, that Diwan Sawan Mall of Multan had issued orders to his people not to sell any grain to British officers. (*The Panjab in 1839-40*, p. 101/334.) Evidently, the British were trying to purchase grain from his district without his permission and were causing some other annoyances. The Maharaja issued a letter to the Diwan on August 19, 1839, saying that "he and local officers should not object to the purchase being made by them. (*Ibid.*, 117/150.) When differences between General Ventura of the Sikh Service and Col. Wade of the East India Company were reported to the Maharaja, he "ordered him to be advised to make up matters with Col. Wade, if possible, otherwise to remain with Kanwar Nau-Nihal Singh. (*Ibid.* July 26, 1839. 107-8/349-50.)

Maharaja Ranjit Singh had not for obvious reasons, permitted the passage of the main British army of invasion through the Panjab on their way to Afghanistan. His own son Maharaja Kharak Singh, however, granted that permission at the time of their return, saving them a long circuitous journey and a considerable amount of money in expenses.

The courtiers represented to him on or about October 18-20, 1839, "that the passage of the British troops through the Punjab would be very expensive to the State, but the Maharaja said that the alliance between the two Governments admitted of such expenses." (*Ibid.* 145/301.)

According to the *Punjab Intelligence, Lahore*, dated 12th April, 1840, Sardar Lehna Singh represented to Kanwar Nau-Nihal Singh in darbar that the British Government had taken possession of the Kahloor territory on the left bank of the Sutlej and requested permission to annex the dominions on the right bank. "He was ordered to wait till the Vakeel has consulted the Political Agent at Ambala."

All this was done in good faith by the Lahore Government in spite of very strong rumours and suspicions, then current among the people, that the British had administered some kind of poison to Maharaja Ranjit Singh mixed with liquor during the entertainments held in the Shalamar Garden at Lahore in honour of Lord Auckland in the last days of December, 1838.¹

The intentions of the British regarding the Panjab on the other hand were as suspicious as ever and it was feared that they were strengthening the cantonment and fort of Ferozepore with some ulterior motives. Faqir Shah Din, the *Vakil* of the Lahore Government at Ferozepore, reported in the second week of July 1840 that "Captain Lawrence was engaged night and day in strengthening the fort and that guns were being provided for it. The Sardars suggested that it would be prudent to construct a fort at Kussoor [as a precautionary and defensive measure]. Fakeer Azeezodeen remarked that the British Government was a Government of strict good faith. Futteh Singh Maun replied that there was no doubt upon the subject, but it behoves every wise *Raj* to avoid being taken unawares." (*Ibid.* July 13, 1840; 231/554.)

The news reported to Maharaja Kharak Singh on July 5, 1840, tells us that Diwan Sawan Mall, the Governor of Multan, had commenced the construction of a small fort at Mithan Kot. This again was evidently a precautionary measure against the British advance from the side of Sindh. (*Ibid.* 22/533.)

With the death of Maharaja Kharak Singh on November 5, 1840, and his son and successor Kanwar Nau-Nihal Singh on the same day, came a temporary state of uncertainty when Maharani Chand Kaur held the reins of the kingdom from November 6, 1840, to January 17, 1841. She was succeeded by Maharaja Sher Singh, the second son of

1. These rumours and suspicions have been referred to by Giani Gian Singh in his *Tawarikh Guru Khalsa*, part III, *Raj Khalsa*, 1st edition (1894), p. 982/448, and expressed very strongly by Jafar Beg in his *Baintan Sarkar Ranjit Singh Kian* (No. 7, 8, 9). Vide *The Panjabi Dunia*, Patiala, June 1952.

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Maharaja Ranjit Singh, on January 18. There was no change of policy in his relations with the British. He steadfastly adhered to the terms of the treaty of friendship and amity.

CO-OPERATION IN THE AFGHAN WAR

"The ill-conducted attempt of the British upon Afghanistan" miserably failed for reasons which need not be narrated here, "and it deserved to fail," says Colonel Maleson in his *History of Afghanistan*. After two years of British occupation their envoy in Kabul was murdered on December 23, 1841, and their retreating army was worsted and massacred in the Afghan passes. A second British Army of Revenge then marched upon Afghanistan under the command of General Pollock, and Maharaja Sher Singh, true to the treaty of friendship, co-operated with them with not fewer than 15,000 men in April, 1842, in forcing open the Khyber Pass. In spite of occasional differences and disagreements between the officers of the two governments, mostly due to the overbearing attitude and suspicious nature of the British officers, Maharaja Sher Singh's contribution was fifty per cent more than double of his stipulated share. "The Sikhs were only bound to employ a contingent of 6,000 men," wrote Henry Lawrence to Mr. J. C. Marshman on April 11, 1842, but they did the work with not less than 15,000, leaving the stipulated number in position, and withdrawing the rest to Jamrood and Peshawar, where they remain ready to support those in the pass, if necessary." (*The Life of Henry Lawrence* by Edwardes and Merivale, i. 363.)

Without going into other details of the operations, it may be mentioned that at the entrance to the Khyber there were two branches, one seven miles long, the other fourteen—the two uniting at Ali Masjid. While General Pollock chose on April 5 the shorter route of Shadi Bagiari for himself, he assigned the longer one of the Jubha-ki defile to the Sikhs who had naturally to encounter greater obstacles. Through a very narrow entrance they carried the heights in good style and held the crests all night, moving up to join General Pollock next day at Lala Chand, one and a half miles east of

Ali Masjid. The British, fighting only seven miles, arrived at Ali Masjid at 2 p.m. on the 6th, while the Sikhs fighting fourteen miles through a very much narrower defile came up, as they had started, an hour or two later. Yet they were accused, of course for political and selfish reasons, of "holding discreetly back." "What 'holding discreetly back' was there in this?" asks Major-General Sir Herbert Edwardes. (*Ibid.* i. 358.) "What would have been the condition of the British columns if the Sikh force had not made a diversion in their favour and drawn off large numbers of the enemy?" he asks again. Perhaps, another defeat and disaster. Not only this. General Pollock, the Commander of the force, conveniently omitted even the formal courtesy of making mention in his despatch of the 6th April of the part played by the Sikhs in so difficult an assault of the pass. Lord Ellenborough, the Governor-General, however, thus repaired the General's omission in his *Notification* of April 19, and said:

"The Governor-General deems it to be due to the troops of the Maharaja Sher Singh to express his entire satisfaction with their conduct as reported to him and to inform the army that the loss sustained by the Sikhs in the assault of the Pass which was forced by them is understood to have been equal to that sustained by the troops of Her Majesty and of the Government of India. The Governor-General has instructed his agent at the court of the Maharaja to offer his congratulations on this occasion, so honourable to the Sikh arms."

Writing to the Queen in England from Benares on April 21, Lord Ellenborough said:—

"The Sikh Army co-operated with that of India by a second pass leading to Ali Masjid, and there is no reason to doubt the good faith of the Sikh Government." (*Appendix A*, 7, p. 455.)

Later on June 31, a Sikh contingent of 5,000 men marched from Ali Masjid for Jalalabad under the command of General Gulab Singh Pohoovindia and arrived there on the 10th. A smaller detachment of theirs went up to Kabul, while others formed posts of communication at Neemla and Gandamak. But according to Henry Lawrence's letter of 16th September written from Kabul, the tide of prejudice in the British camp against the Sikhs was so strong that they were 'given very little opportunity of doing much.'

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Col. Richmond, who commanded the rear at Tazeen, felt it "just to notice the useful assistance afforded by the men of the Sikh contingent under Captain Lawrence," and General Pollock in his despatch of the 14th September honourably confirmed this testimony, saying:

"The Lahore contingent under the able direction of Captain Lawrence has invariably given the most cheerful assistance, dragging the guns, occupying the heights and covering the rearguard. While ascending the Huft Kohtal, and at Tezeen, their long jezails told effectively in keeping the ground. (*Life of Henry Lawrence*, Edwardes and Merivale, i. 407.)

But, O ingratitude, thy name was the British Government in India in the eighteen forties. While a Sikh army of 15,000 was fighting their battles in the blood-thirsty defiles of the Khyber Pass, and its detachments were cheerfully covering the rearguard of the second British Army in Afghanistan, occupying the difficult hill heights of their passage and dragging the guns for them, the British Government in India was assembling a third army of "reserve at Ferozepure on the frontier of the Panjab to keep the Sikhs in check"—prepared for hostilities and ready to march into the country of Maharaja Sher Singh, their faithful friend.

PLANS FOR OCCUPYING THE PANJAB

Plans for the occupation of the Panjab, however, appear to have been made much earlier. In April-May, 1841, when the British had been in Afghanistan for some eighteen months, fully secure in the saddle, Mrs. Henry Lawrence had written to Mrs. Cameron from Subathoo on May 26, 1841.

"Wars, and rumours of wars, are on every side and there seems no doubt that next cold weather will decide the long suspended question of occupying the Punjaub; Henry, both in his Civil and Military capacity, will probably be called to take part in whatever goes on.

And again on June 5:

"Nothing is yet promulgated; but H[enry] supposes the army for the Punjab will be divided into three columns—the main body accompanied by Mr. Clerk, our *Chief*, and the others by H. and Mr. Cunningham, an Officer of Engineers now acting at Ferozepoor." (*Edwardes and Merivale, Henry Lawrence*, i. 216-7.)

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In October 1841 the British proposed to march into the Panjab under the pretext of restoring peace and order. "The British Agent on the Sutlej had proposed," says John Ludlow (*British India*, ii. 141), "to march on Lahore with 12,000 men to restore order. The Calcutta papers teemed with plans for conquering the Punjab." And Henry Lawrence, then on sick-leave at Subathoo, in his letter to the Agent, Mr. George Clerk, dated the 29th October, 1841, offered his services for operations in the Panjab.

But then came a bolt from the blue and the British plans were shattered by the disaster in Afghanistan, and they were driven to the necessity of begging for Maharaja Sher Singh's help. "True to his word," says John Kaye, and true to the traditions of his father and brother, "the Maharaja at once despatched instructions to Goolab Singh to co-operate heartily and steadily with General Pollock and Captain Mackeson" in their expedition to Afghanistan.

EFFORTS TO SEDUCE THE PANJAB OFFICERS

But the British politicals were blinded by self-interest. They were lost to all sense of honour and gratitude. While Maharaja Sher Singh was unreservedly extending his helping hand of friendship, with hearty and steady co-operation, they were planning to stab him in the back by corrupting his officers with alluring promises of territories sliced out of his kingdom and winning them over to their side against the interests of the Maharaja.

After his first interview on the other side of the Indus with Raja Gulab Singh, whom Maharaja Sher Singh had detailed for duty to help the British army proceeding to Afghanistan, it occurred to Henry Lawrence in January 1842, says his biographer, Major-General Sir Herbert Edwardes, that "a consideration should be offered to the [Dogra] Rajahs Dhyani Singh and Goolab Singh, for their assistance, they alone in the Punjab being now able to give aid." "We need such men as the Rajah and General Avitabile, and should bind them to us," said Lawrence, "by the only tie they recognise—self-interest." "The Rajahs, secured in their terri-

tory, even with additions, General Avitabile guaranteed our aid in retiring with his property, and any other sirdars aiding us cordially be specially and separately treated for," continued he. And at last, apparently on January 29, 1842, he proposed "that on the terms of efficient support we assist Raja Goolab Singh to get possession of the valley of Jellalabad and endeavour to make some arrangement to secure it and Peshawar to his family." (*Ibid.*, 326-7.)

This was the active beginning of the British intrigues in the Panjab in buying the chiefs of the State against its ruler who, on his part, was unsuspectingly helping them in good faith in their expedition to Afghanistan. This intrigue not only encouraged the Dogra brothers Raja Dhian Singh and Gulab Singh in the dismemberment of the Panjab kingdom but also in their treason for the subversion and liquidation of the ruling family. This also opened the way for secret British intrigues, later on, with the Poorbia soldier of fortune Sardar Tej Singh and Sardar Lal Singh of Rohtas who so treacherously betrayed the cause of the Panjab to the British in the first Anglo-Sikh war of 1845-46.

While Henry Lawrence proposed to buy off the Panjab chiefs, "Mr. Clerk [the political Agent on the Panjab frontier] repaired to Lahore to support 'the only man in the Punjaub, who really desired our success'—Maharaja Sher Singh himself—against his own Prime Minister." [*Ibid.*, 329.] This was an act of instigating the servants of the State against their sovereign and of setting the sovereign against his chiefs. And this may be said to be ultimately responsible for the murders of Maharaja Sher Singh and his young son Pratap Singh at the instigation of Dhian Singh, and of Dhian Singh himself at the hands of the Sandhanwalia Sardars.

LORD AUCKLAND RECALLED

The war in Afghanistan was very unpopular both with the fair-minded people of England and the Board of Directors of the East India Company. It was an unholy creation of some ambitious and unscrupulous men who surrounded Lord Auckland. And in the words of John Ludlow, "a more shame-

less outrage upon the laws of nations never was perpetrated.” (ii. 118.) It not only lowered the military prestige of England but also humbled its people in the eyes of the world. Lord Auckland was, therefore, recalled and Lord Ellenborough was appointed to succeed him.

EXPANSIONIST POLICY OF LORD ELLENBOROUGH

Ellenborough was no less a war-monger than his predecessor. His ambition, according to Lord Colchester, was to become a “great Military Statesman,” and his great defect, according to Hugh Murray, was “his fondness for military display.” He was a ‘forward-policy’ man and his desire for territorial expansion knew no limits. He was desired to follow a peaceful policy but was never free of war. He pushed on the war in China. Instead of withdrawing from interference with Afghanistan, he sanctioned Sir William Nott’s *withdrawal* from Kandahar via Ghazni, Kabul and Peshawar, actually advancing into Afghanistan for some 500 miles. General Pollock’s Army of Revenge forced its way through the Khyber Pass to Kabul and evacuated it in October-November, 1842. He took possession of Sindh and interfered in the affairs of Gwalior. He occupied the forts of the Raja of Jytpur in Bundelkhand and annexed the Sikh state of Kaithal.

All this was, evidently, done under a studied plan “to confiscate, . . . as opportunities may offer, the territories of the princes of India.” “And in pursuance of the same policy, and by virtue of the same pretensions,” says John Sullivan, “we have commenced upon the extirpation of a race of princes.” The plea for it was that with added territories and revenues, “we shall be the richest power that ever existed in India.” And the right for it was of “having the better sword.”

BRITISH PLAN FOR ATTACKING THE PANJAB

Regarding the Panjab, Lord Ellenborough continued the schemes of his predecessors to take possession of it as early as possible. Within a few days of his nomination as the Governor-General of India, he turned his active attention to preparing for a campaign against it. On the recommendation of Lord Fitzroy he took as one of his aides-de-camp Lieute-

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nant (afterwards Sir Henry Marion) Durand of the Bengal Engineers and wrote to Field-Marshal the Duke of Wellington on October 15, 1841, saying, "I have requested Lord Fitzroy to employ him at once in obtaining all information he can with respect to the Punjab and making a memorandum upon the country for your consideration. I am most anxious to have your opinion as to the general principles upon which a campaign against that country should be conducted." Having sent Durand's Memoir to the Duke on October 22, he wrote to him four days later on October 26 :

"At present about 12,000 men are collected near Ferozepore to watch the Sikhs, and act if necessary.

What I desired, therefore, was your opinion, founded as far as it could be upon imperfect geographical information which could be given to you, as to best mode of attacking the Panjab."

PREPARATIONS—PONTOONS

In addition to several measures suggested for military operations against the Panjab, when necessary, the Duke of Wellington desired Lord Ellenborough in his letter of April 2, 1842, to collect boats for the formation of a bridge on the Sutlej for the British Army to cross into the Panjab. Referring to an advanced position at Ranage pole (Rani ke Pul), the Duke said :

"This position would be an excellent one from which you could with facility move on an offensive plan. I would recommend you to add to the equipment of the army pontoons for the formation of a bridge. . . . It might be desirable to pass the river on a defensive plan of operations at short notice and it would be desirable to avoid the delay of collecting boats to form a bridge."

PESHAWAR

The Duke of Wellington was very anxious to have Peshawar in British possession in spite of its being the territory of the friendly State of the Sikhs. Writing to Lord Fitzgerald from London on April 6, 1842 (when the Sikhs were forcing open the most difficult defiles of the Khyber Pass for the British), he said :

"I am glad to see such good accounts of the Sikh Government. It must be very desirable to maintain its existence in the Punjab. But

this I must say, if we are to maintain our positions in Afghanistan, we ought to have Peshawar, the Khyber Pass, Jellalabad and the passes between that post and Cabul."

And Peshawar belonged to the Sikh Government. It could not be had by the British without occupying a part of their territory. But they observed few scruples in the matter of territorial aggrandizement. They only believed in the right of their might. Lord Ellenborough, therefore, commenced his preparations in right earnest and informed the Duke on June 7, 1842 :

ASSEMBLING OF AN ARMY

"I have, after communicating with the Commander-in-Chief, issued an order for the assembling of an army of reserve in the division of Sirhind (that is, either at Karnal or Ferozepore) in November. It will consist of twelve regiments of infantry, of which four will be European, or five regiments of regular cavalry (including the 16th Lancers) and of 2 regiments of irregular cavalry. There will be four troops of horse artillery and three batteries of foot artillery. The total force will be 15,000 men

JALALABAD

Lord Ellenborough also encouraged the Lahore Government to occupy Jellalabad, when the British left it, with a view to placing the Sikhs between the Afghans and themselves, with the central Panjab at their mercy.

"We shall have placed," Lord Ellenborough continued, "an irreconcilable enemy to the Afghans between them and us, and hold that enemy to the Afghans, occupied as he must be in defending himself against them, in entire subjection to us by our position upon Sutlej, within a few marches of Amritsar and Lahore." "They will be obliged," he said on October 18, "to keep their principal force in that quarter, and Lahore and Amritsar will remain with insufficient garrison, within a few marches of the Sutlej, on which I shall in twelve days, at any time, be able to assemble three European and eleven native battalions, one European regiment or cavalry, two regiments of native cavalry and two of irregular cavalry and twenty-four guns.

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"The State of the Panjab is therefore under my foot."
(*App. A.*, p. 457.)

The Sikhs, however, did not embroil themselves with the Afghans in Jalalabad and escaped the trap laid for them by the British.

BRITISH OCCUPATION OF SINDH

With the return of the British army from Afghanistan, Ellenborough was free to turn his attention to Sindh which was occupied by Sir Charles Napier in February-March 1843 in blatant violation of the treaties that the British Government in India had entered into with the Amirs.

"The real cause of this chastisement of the Amirs," says John Kaye, "consisted in the chastisement which the British had received from the Afghans. It was deemed expedient at this stage of the great political journey to show that the British could beat some one, and so it was determined to beat the Ameers of Sindh, . . . A few more victories were required [after the reoccupation of Afghanistan] to re-establish our reputation and the Governor-General resolved that the Ameers . . . should be the victims of this generous policy."
(*Cal. Rev.*, Vol. 1, 232; *Selec. from Cal. Rev.*, i. 70.)

An ex-Political in his *Dry Leaves from Young Egypt* tells us on the authority of a dozen men, some of them of high official rank—men whose integrity has never been called in question—"that the Amirs of Sindh were foully wronged, that their country was taken from them on false evidence. . . . We know it. We saw this wrong committed with our own eyes—we heard it with own ears—and what is more, can prove it."
(*Preface*, X-XI.) According to R. Bosworth Smith, the author of the *Life of Lord Lawrence*, "the annexation of Scinde remains, and will always remain, one of the deepest blots on our national escutcheon." (i. 180.)

One object of the outrage upon Sindh was to take possession of the country on both sides of the Indus to be able to push up British and Indian regiments and military stores to the frontiers of the Panjab for operations against it from towards the south-west as well as from the south.

THE SINDHIA OF GWALIOR

After the Sindhians came the turn of Sindhia. The two had no affinity with each other beyond the names sounding alike. The Sindhias of Gwalior had always had a strong Maratha army, and Lord Ellenborough wanted "the disbandment and disarming of a disaffected portion of the Gwalior army," because "the existence of an army of such strength in that position must very seriously embarrass the disposition of troops we might be desirous of making to meet a coming danger from the Sutlej." Sindhia's dominions were, therefore, invaded and a new treaty was concluded by which Sindhia became a feudatory of the British Government.

THE ANNEXATION OF KAITHAL

On the death on March 15, 1843, of Bhai Udai Singh, without leaving any male heir, the British Government occupied the Sikh State of Kaithal (38 miles west of Karnal) as a lapse to the paramount power. This was against all canons of law and justice. The term *lapse* could not in the first place be applied to Kaithal. The State had not been originally granted to its chief by the British. How could it then lapse or revert to them? Secondly, the right of adoption belonged by Hindu law to the issueless chief or his widow. This had been recognized by the British Government.

On a point being raised in 1825 as to a Prince's right of adoption to the prejudice of a collateral heir, the question was submitted to a tribunal of Pandits, and they having pronounced that the adoption of a son was valid against the claims of collateral heirs, the British government came to a formal resolution that :

"Sovereign Princes in their own right have, by Hindoo law, a right to adopt, in failure of heirs male of the body, to the exclusion of collateral heirs and that the British Government is bound to acknowledge the adoption, provided that it be regular and not in violation of the Hindu law."

"In accordance with this resolution, no less than fifteen instances of succession by adoption," says John Sullivan, "were recognized by the British Government between the years 1826

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and 1848, seven of which were made by reigning princes, seven by the widows or mothers of the deceased princes and one by election of the leading chiefs of the principality." (*Are We Bound by Our Treaties*, 17-8.)

Not only this. According to the Sikh custom, a widow could succeed her husband. Maharani Chand Kaur of Lahore had held the reins of the kingdom of the Panjab in her own right and name for some time after the death in November 1840 of her husband Maharaja Kharak Singh. Similarly had Rani Lachhman Kaur held in her undisputed right the Cis-Sutlej Sikh State of Ferozepore up to 1835.

In spite of all this, the State of Kaithal was forcibly occupied by British troops and annexed to the British dominions in April 1843.

BOGEY OF FRENCH INTRIGUES

The Duke of Wellington had at this time started, evidently with a view to prejudicing the minds of Englishmen against the Sikhs and preparing them for the news of the invasion of their country, the bogey of French intrigues with the Sikhs. Referring to the return from leave of General Ventura of the Sikh service from Europe to Lahore, the Duke wrote to Lord Ellenborough on February 4, 1843 :

"The French Government have always had connections with the Sikhs. An Italian Officer, who was heretofore in the service of Buonaparte, and has since been in the service of Runjeet Singh, but had returned to Europe, has within the last three months taken leave of Louis Phillppe previous to his return to Lahore. His course should be observed. The religion, the social state, and the politics of the Sikhs render them by far the most appropriate allies for the French of any in that part of Asia, and if once they could establish themselves on the Indus you would have them allied with the Sikhs, their officers in the Sikh army, the politics at Lahore under their direction.

"I strongly recommend to you, therefore, to watch carefully the mouth of the Indus." (Appendix A, 18/460.)

Lord Ellenborough caught the hint and established a friendly contact with General Ventura. After his return to the Panjab the General carried on correspondence with the British Governor-General and kept him informed of the political developments in the country. One should not be sur-

prised if the General acted as a secret agent of the British in connection with Mr. Clerk's offer to help the Maharaja against his minister Dhian Singh.

THE MURDER OF MAHARAJA AND THE MINISTER

Having now nothing else on his hands Lord Ellenborough turned all his attention and energies to creating such a position on the Panjab frontier, and also in the country itself, as to give him an easy pretext to move his armies into the Panjab.

As we have seen above, the English had set the Dogra brothers against the interests of Maharaja Sher Singh and had offered to help the Maharaja against his Prime Minister Dhian Singh. General Ventura also at this time appeared to be dancing to their tune. Things in Lahore began shaping themselves as desired and anticipated by the Political Agent at Ludhiana and the murder of Raja Dhian Singh seemed close at hand. According to Lord Ellenborough's letter of May 11, 1843,

"General Ventura is with the Maharajah Sher Singh and it is clear to me that, relying on his support, the Maharajah will take the first occasion of cutting off his Minister Dhian Singh. This Dhian Singh knows, and is prepared for. The break up of the Punjab will probably begin with murder."

At this time the Sandhanwalia Sardars Atar Singh and his nephew Ajit Singh came in their hands as ready tools. They had both fled to the British territory on January 18, 1841, immediately after Maharaja Sher Singh came to the throne. Ajit Singh had been to Calcutta to enlist the support of the British in their designs against the Maharaja. Mr. George Russel Clerk, the British Political Agent at Ludhiana, however, became actively interested in the Sandhanwalias in March-April 1843 and prevailed upon the Maharaja to permit them to return to the Panjab and restore to them their confiscated jagirs and property. This was done in early May 1843. Sardar Lehna Singh Sandhanwalia and Kehar Singh (son of Atar Singh) Sandhanwalia were set at liberty from imprisonment. They all fell an easy prey to intrigues for the murder of the Maharaja. The British politicals were, evi-

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dently, in the know of the details of this conspiracy. Writing to the Duke of Wellington from Calcutta on August 12, 1843, Lord Ellenborough said:

"The affairs of the Punjab will probably receive their *denouement* from the death of Sher Singh."

Again on September 20, 1843, he said:

"The Maharajah of Lahore is pulling his house down upon his head; the catastrophe was nearly taking place three weeks ago, but it is deferred."

The catastrophe took place on September 15, 1843, when Maharaja Sher Singh and his son Prince Partap Singh, as well as Prime Minister Dhian Singh, were murdered by the Sandhanwalia Sardars. The news must have been on its way when His Lordship wrote the above letter. It had to travel some eleven hundred miles with a halt at Ludhiana.

Referring to these murders at Lahore, the *British Friend of India*, published in London, wrote in December 1843:

"We have no proof that Company instigated all the king-killing which has been perpetrated in the Punjab since Runjeet died. . . . We must say we smell a rat."

The references and letters quoted above, which provide the proof, had not then come to light. The *Life of Henry Lawrence* by Sir Herbert Edwardes and Herman Merivale and the *History of Indian Administration of Lord Ellenborough* by Lord Colchester were published in 1872 and 1874 respectively.

DIVISION OF THE COUNTRY—THE DOGRAS

The murders of the Maharaja, the heir apparent and the Prime Minister, raised the hopes of Lord Ellenborough for an early opportunity for the British to become the masters of the Panjab, either directly by occupation or indirectly through 'protection.' On the basis of a communication from General Ventura, a copy of which was sent to the Queen in England, His Lordship wrote to Her Majesty on October 20, 1843:

"...it is impossible not to perceive that the ultimate tendency of the late events at Lahore is, without any effort on our part, to bring the plains first, and at somewhat later period the hills, under our protection or control."

Naturally the plains were the first to be occupied. In the hills there was Raja Gulab Singh with whom they were in secret alliance and who had been encouraged by them to strengthen himself there. The correspondence of Lord Ellenborough at this time was so diplomatically worded as to prepare the Home authorities for the eventual invasion and occupation of the plains of the Panjab and the transfer of the hills (of Jammu and Kashmir) to Gulab Singh. Writing to His Grace the Duke of Wellington on the same day, he entered into greater details and said:—

“Heera Singh [the son and successor of Dhian Singh] has no real authority. His best adviser has been Ventura, but he is threatened now. Gholab Singh remains in the Hills, either in sickness, in grief, or in policy. He is securing himself there. Heera Singh will probably soon fly to Jummoo. Then a pure Sikh Government will be formed in the plains and a Rajpoot Government in the Hills, and Mooltan may perhaps break loose all connection with the Sikhs. Ventura anticipates a long anarchy, from which the only ultimate refuge will be in our protection. I agree with him. . . . The time cannot be very distant when the Punjab will fall into our management and the question will be what we shall do as respects the Hills. . . . I should tell you, however, that there is, as there long has been, a great disposition, even in quarters not military, to disturb the game.”

Did Lord Ellenborough refer in the last sentence above to some scrupulous and honest Englishmen whom he accused of *disturbing his game* by exposing his secret warlike preparations?

Lord Ellenborough again and again impressed both upon the Duke and the Queen the separateness of the hills from the plains of the Panjab so that he might have no difficulty with the authorities at home in his dividing the two as a result of his invasion of the country, and transferring the hills to a Rajput ruler. He informed the Duke on December 18:

“The territories of Runjeet Singh seem to be breaking into two parts, the Hills and the Plains and the latter must soon experience a new revolution.”

And he wrote to the Queen the next day, December 19:

“The territories which formed the dominion of Runjeet Singh might be considered as already divided between the Sikhs of the plains and the Rajpoots of the hills.”

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Lord Ellenborough gave the Home authorities a clear hint of the person on whom the Hills of the Panjab kingdom were to be bestowed. He was Gulab Singh, whom Henry Lawrence had selected as the person to be offered 'a consideration' for his assistance to the British. He was one of the two persons (the other being General Avitabile) who were needed the most by the British and were to be bound to them "by the only tie they recognize—self-interest." He and his brother Raja Dhian Singh, since murdered, were to be "secured in their territory, even with additions." Thus secretly encouraged by the British, Gulab Singh had availed himself of every opportunity to add to his power and resources in the hills. And Lord Ellenborough in his despatches made pointed references to his power and importance to bring him to the notice of the Home authorities for future use. As we have seen above, His Lordship had told His Grace on October 20, 1843, that "Gholab Singh remains in the Hills either in sickness, in grief, or in policy. He is securing himself there." On February 16, 1844, he wrote to the Queen:

"In the Hills, Raja Gholab Singh is extending his power with usual unscrupulous disregard of the rights of others and of the supremacy of the State he pretends to serve. This conduct, however, makes him very odious to the Sikhs at Lahore."

While Gulab Singh was strengthening himself in the hills, his nephew Raja Hira Singh, son of Raja Dhian Singh, was trying to have a strong hold on the plains. Duleep Singh, the new Maharaja, the youngest son of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, was a young boy. Born on October 6-7, 1838, he was hardly five years old when he was raised to the throne. All power had therefore passed into the hands of the Minister Hira Singh who had an ambitious design to "eventually succeed to the throne of Ranjit Singh." "All these murders," says Alexander Gardner, "were brought about directly or indirectly by the Dogra brothers, Dhyan Singh and Gulab Singh, for the eventual aggrandizement of their family, in the person of Hira Singh." (*Memoirs*, p. 213.)

Raja Gulab Singh helped his nephew keep firm in the saddle at Lahore, and at one time, at his earnest entreaty, "brought a large body of hillmen from Jummoo who for a time overawed the Khalsas." On his return to the hills, Gulab Singh carried off, 'with the connivance of his nephew, large sums of money from the treasury.'² This was not unusual with him. He had already helped himself to all the money and valuables belonging to Maharani Chand Kaur, and the accumulated treasure of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, in January 1841, when Sher Singh had come to the throne. Syad Muhammed Latif tells us in his *History of the Panjab*, pp. 506-7:

"Raja Gulab Singh carried away all the money and valuables belonging to the Maharani Chand Kaur under pretence of keeping it safely for her. The night after the treaty was signed, the Dogra forces vacated the fort. Raja Gulab Singh carried off the accumulated treasures of Ranjit Singh which were in the fort. Sixteen carts were filled with rupees and other silver coins, while 500 horsemen were each entrusted with a bag of gold mohurs, and his orderlies were also entrusted with jewellery and other valuable articles. The costly *pash-minas*, and rich wardrobes, and the best horses in Ranjit Singh's stables, were all purloined by Gulab Singh on the occasion of his evacuating Lahore."

And it was a part of this money that he paid to the British in his bargain for Jammu and Kashmir in 1846.

The overbearing attitude of the power-mad Hira Singh and the arrogance of his evil-genius Pandit Jalha soon alienated the sympathies of the Queen mother Maharani Jind Kaur, popularly known as Rani Jindan, and the leading Sikh Sardars. There was consequently a state of uncertainty and confusion in Lahore. Sardar Lehna Singh Majithia, instead of taking at this stage, in March 1844, some bold step in the interests of the kingdom, quitted the Panjab in disgust on the pretence of a pilgrimage.

NO HOSTILITY FROM LAHORE

Throughout this time, Lord Ellenborough was steadily preparing for operations against the Panjab, while there was

2. *History of the Punjab*, (W. H. Allen & Co.), ii. 289-90.

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not the slightest indication of any hostility towards the British in the country. His Lordship himself acknowledged it more than once in his Home despatches. He wrote to the Duke on September 20, 1843:

"There does not seem to be any feeling against us. They are only quarrelling amongst themselves apparently; nor do I see the least show of hostility to us anywhere."

Two months later, on November 20, 1843, he wrote to the Queen in the same strain:

"The Sikh army, intent only on obtaining more pay, has remained tranquil, and no indication has been given of the least desire to provoke the resentment of the British Government."

He also said the same thing to the Duke in his despatch of the same date:

"There is no movement against us, nor is there any prospect of any, unless a complete break up should send plunderers against us."

This pacific appearance continued throughout the remaining period of his administration. "In the Punjab there is more of pacific appearance than at any time since the murder of Sher Singh," he wrote to the Duke on July 2, 1844. And writing to the Queen twelve days later, on July 14, he said:

"There is much less apprehension than there has been at any time since the death of the Maharaja Sher Singh that this tranquility will be disturbed on the side of the Punjab."

DATE FIXED FOR OPERATIONS

Yet without any provocation or show of hostility from anywhere in the Panjab, Lord Ellenborough was eagerly looking forward to and preparing for marching his armies into the country. If he had not so far overrun and occupied the Panjab like Sindh, Gwalior, Kaithal and Jytpur, it was not because of any lack of will or determination on his part but because the army was not fully equipped and prepared, and because suitable officers for higher commands were not available. He was doing his best to equip and raise the army to the required standard. On his part, he had actually fixed a date—the 15th of November, 1845—on which he hoped to be ready for any operations in the Panjab.

Writing to the Secret Committee under No. 12 G. G. (Home Department), on February 11, 1844, twenty-two months before the war, when there did 'not seem to be any feeling against' the British, he said:

8... "I must frankly confess, that when I look at the whole condition of our Army I had rather, if the contest cannot be further postponed, that it were *at least postponed to November 1845.*"

9... "Let our policy be what it may, the contest must come at last and the intervening time which may be given to us should be employed in unostentatious but vigilant preparation."

On February 15, he wrote to the Duke saying:

"I earnestly hope that we may not be obliged to cross the Sutlej in December next. *We shall not be ready so soon.* The army requires a great deal of setting up after five years of war. I am quietly doing what I can to strengthen and equip it. ... I know it [the war] would be of a protracted character. I should be obliged to remain at Lahore myself more than a year."

Ellenborough was so sure of the means he was adopting for creating the war and of the efficiency of his secret agents and agents provocateur that he was able to give an assurance to Field-Marshal the Duke of Wellington of securing certain success beforehand.

"*Depend upon it I will not engage in such an operation hastily or unnecessarily, and I will do all I can beforehand to secure certain success if ever I should be obliged to undertake it.*"

The words "I will not engage in such an operation hastily" leave no doubt that the time for *engaging* in this operation was to be determined according to the convenience of Lord Ellenborough and his army. His next letter of April 20, 1844, in which he asks the Duke for eighteen months' time to prepare for the war is very significant. He says:

"I earnestly hope nothing may compel us to cross the Sutlej, and that we may have no attack to repel *till November 1845.* I shall then be prepared for anything. In the meantime we do all we can in a quiet way to strengthen ourselves. ...

"We are altogether very ill-provided with officers for the higher commands. The whole army requires a great deal of teaching, and I am satisfied the *eighteen months I ask* are not more than enough to make it what it ought to be."

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"Does it not show conclusively the deep scheme of the British in bringing on the war with the Sikhs?" asks Major Basu.

While describing his brisk preparations for the war, to be fought with the Sikhs nineteen months later, Lord Ellenborough wrote to the Duke in his letter of May 9, 1844:

"The destruction of Soocheyt Singh has had the effect of entirely separating the Hills, under Gholab Singh, from the Plains, still ruled in a manner by Heera Singh. *Everything is going on there as we could desire, if we looked forward to the ultimate possession of the Punjab. . . .*

"Sir Charles Napier will endeavour to raise two local battallions in Scinde, and he thinks he shall succeed.

"*In November 1845 the Army will be equal to any operation but I should be sorry to have it called into the field sooner.*"

The whole thing went on in the Panjab, evidently through agents provocateur, according to the schedule prescribed by Lord Ellenborough and his successor, and it was within a month of the date fixed by him that the war came on in the middle of December, 1845.

ATAR SINGH SANDHANWALIA AFFAIR

There are strong reasons to suspect that Sardar Atar Singh Sandhanwalia's attempt to capture Lahore by a surprise in which the Sardar himself, Bhai Bir Singh, Prince Kashmira Singh, etc., were killed at Naurangabad on May 7, 1844, was instigated by the British Political Agent on the Panjab frontier. Sardar Atar Singh, as we know, was a brother of Sardar Lehna Singh and uncle of Sardar Ajit Singh Sandhanwalia who had murdered Maharaja Sher Singh, Prince Partap Singh and Raja Dhian Singh. After these murders Atar Singh had sought shelter in the British territory and had been living at Thanesar, between Karnal and Ambala. It was from Thanesar that he went to the Panjab with the permission of the British Political Agent who knew, as Lord Ellenborough admits, that the Sardar was going there with the object of acting against the Lahore Government. We give below an extract from the letter of His Lordship

addressed to the Queen dated the 10th of June 1844 wherein he said:

"It is much to be regretted that Uttur Singh should have been permitted to move from Thanesir to the Sutlej with the known object of acting against the Lahore Government. This error of the British Agent renders it impossible to protest against the violation of the strict letter of the treaty which was committed by the Sikhs, whose troops were sent to the left bank to intercept Uttur Singh; and, under all the circumstances, it has been deemed expedient to make no representation upon the subject, but to allow the whole matter to be forgotten." (*Hist. of Ind. Adm. of Lord E.*, p. 129.)

THE RECALL OF LORD ELLENBOROUGH

Having created dissension and disorder in the Panjab and assembled a large force on its borders Lord Ellenborough returned home disgusted at having lost the opportunity of planting the British flag on the fort of Lahore. He was recalled by the Directors of the East India Company because of his ultra-aggressive policy and arrogant disregard of the wishes of his masters.

"There can be no doubt," says Edward Thornton, "that Lord Ellenborough's Indian administration disappointed his friends. . . . He went to India the avowed champion of peace and was incessantly engaged in war. . . . The desire of military glory thenceforward supplanted every other feeling in his breast. . . . He might without dishonour have averted war in Sinde, and possibly have averted hostilities at Gwalior, but he did not. . . . War and preparation for war absorbed most of his hours." (*History of British Empire in India*, 2nd Edition (1859), p. 608.)

He had also Egypt on his programme of war and conquest. Charles Viscount Hardinge tells us in his father's biography that:

"It was a dream of Lord Ellenborough to bring about its [Egypt's] occupation by British troops; and there is a letter from him in existence in which he expresses the desire to have Sir. H. Hardinge as Commander-in-Chief in India, so that they might conjointly carry out such project." (*Viscount Hardinge*, p. 56-7.)

"His passion for military glory," says Nolan in his *History of India*, "offended the East India Company. Ever since

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the system sprung up of nominating a peer to the general government of India huge military enterprises had been carried on at a ruinous expense to the company. The English cabinet had a strong temptation to countenance Indian wars; they entailed no expense upon the English exchequer, gave immense patronage to the crown through the board of control and the governor-general afforded support to a large portion of the royal army, and increased the prestige of English power in Europe. Great was the indignation of the holders of Indian stock with the wars of Lord Ellenborough, all of which were rashly waged, and that in Scinde aggressively, rapaciously, and unrighteously to a degree revolting to the minds of peaceable and just English citizens." (*Div. IV*, 644.)

Much against the wishes of the Directors, says John Ludlow, . . . "He did but continue that unscrupulous policy which Lord Auckland's underlings forced upon the latter [Auckland]." (p. 135). "Lord Ellenborough and his military favourites, found or made for themselves new opportunities for victory." (p. 133.) In his dealings with the Court of Directors, he "thwarted and snubbed them in almost every conceivable way" and treated them as if they were his servants. Therefore, in spite of the opposition of the Board of Control and the protests and threats of the British cabinet, they exercised their prerogative and recalled him and appointed Sir Henry Hardinge in his place. Sir Henry arrived at Calcutta in the last week of July 1844.

SIR HENRY HARDINGE

Sir Henry Hardinge was a great soldier, a veteran of the Peninsular war. His passion for military glory was as great as that of his predecessor. Both were close friends. Sir Henry was, in fact, a kinsman by marriage of Ellenborough. Both generally agreed in their political views. There was, therefore, not going to be any change of policy in India in spite of whatever instructions the Court of Directors might issue. Lord Ellenborough knew it. Writing to Major George Broadfoot, the would-be Political Agent on the Panjab frontier, His Lordship informed him on June 17, 1844:

You will have heard that the Court of Directors have thought fit to recall me. My successor will carry out all my views. He is my most confidential friend, with whom I have communicated upon all public subjects for thirty years.

The only thing on which his views yet remained to be translated into action was the conquest and annexation of the Panjab which had been under discussion for some time both in England and India.³ The ground had been prepared for it by Lord Ellenborough and his political agents both in the Panjab and in the British dominions. It was reserved for Sir Henry Hardinge to march into the Panjab after the *eighteen months asked for* by Ellenborough and fly the Union Jack on the fort of Lahore. "Without doubt," says his son and Private Secretary in India, "the selection of a distinguished soldier, who also possessed the experience of a cabinet minister, rather pointed to the anticipation of war." And the parting words of the Chairman of the Court of Directors, Captain Shepherd, addressed to Sir Henry Hardinge at a farewell banquet of the Court, June 1844, also conveyed a similar indication:

"It has always been the desire of the Court that the government of the East India Company should be eminently just, moderate and conciliatory; *but the supremacy of our power must be maintained when necessary by the force of our arms.*"

It may be safely said that in his subsequent policy towards the Panjab Sir Henry Hardinge carried out almost literally the views of his predecessor and the instructions of his masters.

On his arrival in India, "he found the attention of Lord Ellenborough had been turned seriously towards the North-Western Frontier; that all towns from Delhi to Karnal were filled with troops; that the Commander-in-Chief had already surveyed the whole extent of the Protected States with a view to make choice of Military positions, and that the ad-

3. Sir Robert Peel referred to it indirectly in his letter of August 1, 1844, to Sir Henry Hardinge. *BRC.*, 682. Also see Murray, *Hist. of Br. India*, 692.

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vanced posts of Ludhiana and Firozpur had been strengthened." (*Viscount Hardinge*, 74-5.)

ADDITIONS TO THE ASSEMBLED FORCE

Sir Henry Hardinge, during the sixteen months that he had, considerably added to the strength of the army assembled on the Panjab frontier. As the following comparative table would show, the number of men was raised from 17,612 left by Lord Ellenborough to 40,523 and of guns from 66 to 94, exclusive of Hill stations.

Post	Strength as left by Lord Ellenborough		Strength at first breaking out of war		Increased preparation made by Lord Hardinge	
	Men	Guns	Men	Guns	Men	Guns
Firozpur ..	4596	12	10472	24	5876	12
Ludhiana ..	3030	12	7235	12	4205	0
Ambala ..	4113	24	12972	32	8859	8
Meerut ..	5873	18	9844	26	3971	8
Whole of frontier, exclusive of Hill Stations which remained the same ..	17612	66	40523	94	22911	28

"The above return, which was drawn up by the Governor-General at the time, speaks for itself. He landed in India in July, 1844. On the 23rd August of that year he addressed the Commander-in-Chief on the distribution of the force in Bengal. On the 8th September, five Native regiments were placed at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief for distribution between Meerut and the frontier. On the 11th of the same month, confidential orders were sent for the construction of two barracks at Firozpur, to accommodate a regiment

of European infantry and two batteries of artillery. The two European regiments at Sabathu and Kasauli were also added to the garrison. In January, 1845, the Bombay Government was requested to send up H.M.'s 14th Light Dragoon to the frontier, and batteries in the Sirhind Division were raised from 90 to 130 horses. As the result of these measures, the British force at and above Ambala was augmented from 13,600 men and 48 guns in January, 1844, to 32,500 men and 68 guns in December, 1845; while total force at and above Meerut, including Delhi and the Hill Stations, which had been only 24,000 men and 66 guns, now amounted to 45,500 men and 98 guns." (*Viscount Hardinge*, 76-7.)

THE BRIDGE OF BOATS

Under instructions from the Duke of Wellington Lord Ellenborough had ordered the collection of pontoons at Ferozepore for transporting troops and military supplies and for the formation of a bridge over the Sutlej for the British army to cross into the Panjab when required.

Writing to the Duke from Calcutta on May 9, 1844, Lord Ellenborough said:

"I expect that by the end of December there will be on the Sutlej seventy boats of about thirty-five tons each, all exactly similar and each containing everything necessary for its equipment as a pontoon. These will bridge the Sutlej anywhere, and when not so used they will convey troops up and down, and save us an enormous charge for the hire of boats.

"Besides these, fifty-six pontoons will be ready for use in Scinde. All these are in hand at Bombay. We shall besides have, by the end of this year, I hope, two steamers drawing very little water on the Sutlej."

These fifty-six pontoons were brought up to Ferozepore by Hardinge's order. They were to form a part of the equipment of the assembling army. But their object was to be kept secret from the Lahore Government so that they might not have a cause for suspicion or complaint against the British. The Governor-General's Private Secretary, who was also his (Governor-General's) son, wrote in a confidential letter

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to Major Broadfoot, the British Political Agent, on February 20, 1845:

"It is not desirable that the purpose to which these boats can be applied should unnecessarily transpire. . . . But if any inquiry should be made hereafter, your answer will be that this flotilla of boats is not at present required on the lower Indus, that our commissariat arrangements do require the employment of boats between Ferozepore and Sukkur for the supply of the latter place with grain, and that these are purposely adapted for military as well as trading purposes and form part of our Military means and establishment on the Indus applicable to any purposes for which they may be required either on that river or on the Sutlej; to which you may add several iron steamers which it is convenient to the Government to employ on these rivers for the conveyance of troops, stores and supplies; and, of course, available for offensive as well as for defensive objects, not unnecessarily entering into these explanations, but stating the truth, if explanation be proper." (*Career of Major Broadfoot*, 284.)

SUPPLY DEPOT AT BASIAN

While the British army was being assembled at different stations on the frontier, a supply depot was established at Basian, ten miles to the south-east of Jagraon and about four miles to the north-west of Raikot. This was purely a war measure. Otherwise, there was no sense in collecting supplies at a place which was neither a grain market nor the headquarters of the Political Agent with a military cantonment attached to it.

CHANGES AT LAHORE

The unpopularity of Minister Hira Singh and his friend Pandit Jalha had reached its limit in December, 1844. They feared the Khalsa would no longer tolerate them. Therefore, they decided to fly away to the hills of Jammu with whatever remained of the royal treasure at Lahore. But they were intercepted within a few miles of Lahore on the morning of December 21, 1844, and were killed in the scuffle.

Raja Gulab Singh was invited to become the minister of the Lahore kingdom but he did not think it in his interest to accept the offer. Sardar Jawahar Singh, brother of the Queen-mother, was therefore nominated to this office. But he was not strong enough to check the conspiracies of Raja

Gulab Singh whose agents, Mian Pirthi Singh and others, soon worked his ruin through the army. He was killed on September 21, 1845. There were now three candidates for ministership, Missars Tej Singh and Lal Singh and Raja Gulab Singh. The first was a Poorbia Brahmin from Ekri in the district of Meerut in the British dominions. He had come to the Panjab during the days of Maharaja Ranjit Singh and had gradually risen from a humble position to eminence. The second, Lal Singh, a Brahmin of Rohtas, had also been originally employed in a low capacity and had become a Sardar through the intrigues of Raja Dhian Singh. The third, as we know, was a Dogra Rajput of Jammoo. They were all men of power and influence and it was difficult for the Maharani to take a decision. The lots were, therefore, drawn by the young Maharaja and Lal Singh became the Prime Minister. But he was not very popular with the army. The Maharani, therefore, decided to take greater interest in the administration of the State. This happened towards the end of September, 1845.

THE QUEEN-MOTHER

The Maharani Jind Kaur was recognized by her contemporaries as a person of outstanding accomplishment.

She was particularly skilful in the use of her pen. "The Rani," said the author of the *History of the Punjab* (1846), "was a person of some accomplishments for a Sikh lady, being skilful in the use of her pen, whereby, it is supposed, she was able to arrange and combine the means of Hira Singh's overthrow." (vol. ii. 311.) Writing to the Duke of Wellington on November 20, 1843, Lord Ellenborough had said :

"The mother of the boy Dhuleep Singh seems to be a woman of determined courage, and she is the only person, apparently at Lahore who has courage." (*App. A*, 27, p. 464.)

Lord Dalhousie, referred to her in January 1849, as "the only person having manly understanding in the Punjab," and insisted on keeping her in exile away from the Panjab and refused to allow her to return to her country.

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BROADFOOT BROUGHT TO THE PANJAB FRONTIER

Sir Henry Hardinge wanted a more warlike diplomat to replace Col. Richmond as Political Agent on the Panjab frontier. Major George Broadfoot had applied for the job during the time of Lord Ellenborough. Having served in the Afghan war with Generals Sale and Pollock in the Khyber and beyond it, he knew of the warlike preparations against the Sikhs and wished to avail himself of the opportunity for greater honours and quicker rise in life. His plea was that his health had given way in the peaceful atmosphere of Tennaserim in Burma and could only improve in the field of action on the Panjab frontier. In his letter of December 13, 1843, from Mergui he had written to Lord Ellenborough :

"Rest, or a change to military service with the climate of northern India, would speedily restore me. ... Had my health not given way, I could not have ventured to make this request, greatly as Your Lordship knows I desire to serve again in the field, especially during Your Lordship's government. ... I could not recover if the the army were in the field and I an idler elsewhere."⁴

Broadfoot was known to be "too prone to war" and a favourite of Ellenborough. His Lordship wrote to him on February 1, 1844 :

"If there should be at any future time a prospect of our having more important operations to carry on, I will, if possible, have you with me."⁵

Before his departure from India Lord Ellenborough recommended Major Broadfoot to his friend and successor, Sir Henry Hardinge.

The preparations for military operations on the Sutlej were then in full swing. Sir Henry Hardinge, therefore, transferred Col. Richmond to Lucknow and brought Major Broadfoot to the Panjab frontier to see them through. The arrival of the new soldier-political at Ludhiana in October, 1844, added fresh vigour and speed to the assemblage of troops whose number, as we saw in the comparative table above,

4. Broadfoot, 202-3.

5. *Ibid.* 202-3.

gradually rose to over 40,500. "Boats for bridges, and regiments and guns, the provocatives to a war," says Hugh Murray, "were sufficiently numerous; but food and ammunition, and carriage and hospital stores, such as were necessary for a campaign," slowly pouring in from Delhi and Agra, added to the apprehensions of the Sikhs across the river.⁶ "The Sikhs not un-naturally feared the aggression of their powerful neighbour and viewed with apprehension the British advance to the Sutlej," says Lt.-Col. R. G. Burton. "This advance," he continues, "had been carried out contrary to the policy of 1809. . . . Ludhiana had, indeed, been occupied . . . and Subathu garrison was the sole outpost of the advancing empire . . . in 1838. . . .; a reserve was posted at Ambala in 1842. The occupation of Sindh in the meantime threatened Sikh territory at Multan and a bridge of boats was thrown across the Sutlej near Ferozepore, while small steamers plied on the river. The Sikhs then had come to think their independence menaced and war inevitable."⁷

Major Broadfoot had come to the Panjab frontier for military service for reasons of health. The war with the Sikhs was to come soon after November, 1845, the date fixed for it by his patron Lord Ellenborough. As Agent to the Governor-General on the frontier, he was to see to it that everything came about according to the time-table, not very much beyond the eighteen months asked for by him.

THREE ARCH-TRAITORS

But before the actual operations came on, Broadfoot was also 'beforehand to secure certain success' of which an assurance had been given to the Duke of Wellington. This could only be done if he had won over the high-ups and chiefs of the Lahore kingdom so that they danced to his tune when the time came for it. For this purpose Raja Gulab Singh, the Governor of Jammu, Missar Tej Singh, the Commander-in-Chief, and Missar Lal Singh, the Prime Minister of

6. *History of British India*, 695.

7. *The First and Second Sikh Wars*, 9.



MAHARAJA GULAB SINGH

Born :
Katik 5, 1849 Bk.
October 18, 1792.

Died :
Sawan 25, 1914, Bk.
August 7, 1857.

Made Maharaja by the British
March 16, 1846

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Lahore, came in very handy and acted as the agents and spies of the British Government.

RAJA GULAB SINGH

Raja Gulab Singh had already been won over with promises of territory in the hills. Like a brazen-faced traitor he had forgotten all the patronage and favours he had received from Maharaja Ranjit Singh and become an easy tool in the hands of the British for carrying out their designs on the Sikh *Raj*. As Henry Hardinge described him to Sir Charles Napier, "Gulab Singh was the most thorough ruffian that ever was created,—a villain from the kingdom down to a penny."⁸

"If a painter," wrote Henry Havelock in 1846, "sought to employ all the smooth cunning of Asiatic intrigue in one face, he would throw away his sketches as soon as he saw that of Gulab Singh, cease to draw on his imagination and limn the features of Rao Sahib, as the Lahore people call him, with fidelity."⁹

Encouraged by the British he had consolidated his power in the hills in the hope of carving out a principality for himself when they occupied the Panjab.

With the arrival of Major Broadfoot, who had been known to him since the Afghan War, Gulab Singh felt further encouraged in his intrigues with the British. In October 1844, he sent a complimentary letter to Broadfoot with a messenger who assured him of his master's devotion to the British and hoped to receive their help against the Lahore Darbar. He again sent a messenger to the Agent in January, 1845, to seek British protection on the strength of the service he had rendered during the Afghan War. In August of the same year he placed his own services and those of the other hill chiefs at the disposal of the British and offered to attack the Sikhs and to so divide the Lahore Government, the army and the people as to enable the British to march into the

8. Ludlow, *British India*, ii. 145.

9. Forbes, *Havelock*, 71. .

Panjab and occupy its capital without firing a shot.¹⁰ This last promise he fulfilled to its very letter and received from the British as a reward the kingdom of Jammu and Kashmir.

SARDAR TEJ SINGH

Sardar (Missar) Tej Singh was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Panjab forces in September, 1845, when Lal Singh became the Prime Minister after the death of Sardar Jawahar Singh. He was not a son of the Panjab; he was neither loyal to her nor to his masters. He was a foreign adventurer. With his home and near relations in the British dominions at Ekri in the pargannah of Sardhana, in Meerut district, he easily became a willing tool in the hands of the British. A mere soldier of fortune, he was ready to do anything for the glittering gold. He entered into correspondence both with George Broadfoot, the Agent at Ludhiana, and Peter Nicholson, his Assistant at Ferozepore, and kept them informed of the movements at Lahore. It was due to his planned treachery that the British escaped a disaster at Ferozeshahr and were able to win the final victory at Sobraon.

SARDAR LAL SINGH

Missar (Raja Sardar) Lal Singh, a Brahmin of Rohtas, was a chip of the same block. He and Sardar Tej Singh were

10. See. Cons. (National Archives, Delhi) III, 115 of April 14, 1845, 46 of 25th October, 1845, and 215 of 26th December, 1846, quoted in Kumar's *Indian Administration Under Lord Hardinge* (MS.), 209-10.

According to Gough and Innes in *The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars*, "Gholab Singh judiciously persuaded the soldiers to allow him to return to Jammu, from whence he sent offers to the British of co-operation to enable them to march on Lahore, if they would guarantee him the North Eastern Provinces as an independent ruler." (p. 59.)

Again, "Gholab Singh sent a messenger affirming positively that the Sikhs were determined on war and offering to throw in his lot with the British." (pp. 60-61.)

On the eve of the war, when the Lahore army was about to move to the Sutlej, "Gulab Singh," says Charles Viscount Hardinge, "was ready to treat, saying that he would carry out whatever orders might be given by the British Government. Bhai Ram Singh was also deputed by him to negotiate with the British." (*Viscount Hardinge*, 81.)

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closely allied in their planned intrigues with the British in the first Anglo-Sikh War. Intriguing by nature, he had been picked by Raja Dhian Singh to be set up in opposition to Missar Beli Ram *Toshakhania*. After the death of his patron, he intrigued alternately with and against the Dogras, Gulab Singh and Hira Singh, and acquired considerable weight in the scale of rival parties. He became the prime minister of the kingdom after the death of Sardar Jawahar Singh and was won over by the British to assist them in their occupation of the Panjab. But not satisfied with the reward, he turned against them and their protege Gulab Singh, and was exiled and imprisoned in the territory of British India.

“Two more contemptible poltroons than the two generals of the Khalsa army—Lal Singh and Tej Singh, both Brahmans—never breathed,” says Alexander Gardner in his *Memoirs*, p. 263.

“Their desire,” in intriguing with the British, according to Cunningham, “was to be upheld as the ministers of a dependent kingdom by grateful conquerors, and they . . . assured the local British authorities of their secret and efficient good will.” (Murray, 697.)

BRITISH PROVOCATIONS

(i) The assemblage of British troops on the Panjab frontier was the first indication of the unfriendly intentions of the British Government and was the earliest provocation to the Lahore Government to be prepared to meet the impending invasion of their country.

(ii) Added to this was the collection of pontoons near Ferozepore for a bridge-of-boats across the Sutlej for the troops to march into the Panjab.

(iii) The establishment of a grand supply depot at Basian near Raikot was an unmistakable sign of the readiness of the British to undertake the threatened operations at an early date.

“Thus boats for bridges, and regiments and guns—the provocatives to a war—were sufficiently numerous,” says

Hugh Murray in his contemporary *History of British India*. (p. 695.) "Food and ammunition and carriage and hospital stores, such as were necessary for a campaign" soon poured in from Delhi and Agra to complete the preparations.

With the knowledge of the British policy of expansion in India, by which they had become masters of the country during the previous century, and having seen the unprovoked invasion of Afghanistan beyond the Indus, the unjust occupations of Sindh and Kaithal and the unwarranted interference in the affairs of Gwalior during the past five years, the only inference the Sikhs could draw from the assemblage of British troops, guns and provisions on their frontier was that the British meditated an early invasion and occupation of their country. There could be no greater provocation to them than this menace to their independence. But in spite of it the Sikhs maintained a complete restraint and order at Lahore and did not give the British the slightest cause for complaint.

Writing to Lord Ellenborough in England on January 23, 1845, Sir Henry Hardinge said :

"Even if we had a case for devouring our ally in adversity, we are not ready and could not be ready until the hot winds set in, and the Sutlej became a torrent. Moderation will do us no harm, if in the interval the hills and the plains weaken each other; but *on what plea could we attack the Punjab*, if this were the month of October and we had our army in readiness?

"Self-preservation may require the dispersion of this Sikh army, the baneful influence of such an example is the evil most to be dreaded, but exclusive of this case, *how are we to justify the seizure of our friend's territory who in our adversity assisted us to retrieve our affairs?*" (BRC., 868.)

The Sikhs continued to behave like friends up to the last. On October 23, 1845, just a month and a half before the war, Hardinge wrote to Ellenborough :

"The Punjab must however be Sikh or British. ... The delay is merely a postponement of the settlement of the question, at the same time *we must bear in mind that as yet no cause of war has been given.*" (BRC., 868.)

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(iv) *Broadfoot interferes in Cis-Sutlej territories of the Panjab.*—Broadfoot had also evidently known that the Sikhs were not likely to give any cause for hostilities. A man of boundless ambition, he had come to the Panjab frontier for active military service. He could not be satisfied with that state of affairs. The Sikhs must be *provoked* to hostility, he thought. With that end in view, he started up machinations and began irritating them. He was personally hostile to them. According to George Campbell, "he had some differences with the Sikhs when he marched up to Afghanistan and he was not inclined to be conciliatory to the Lahore Durbar." Against the terms and spirit of the treaty of 1809, Broadfoot started interfering with the Cis-Sutlej territories of the Lahore kingdom. He "not only acted," says Campbell, "as if the Lahore territories, Cis-Sutlej, were entirely under his control, but, as I now learn for the first time from his biography, he seems to have set up a formal claim to such a control,¹¹ and asserted that this Lahore territory was just as much under his 'jurisdiction,' as he called it, as any of the small protected states His biographer says that the Government accepted this view but does not give the text of that acceptance. *I can only say that I cannot find a word in the treaties or agreements of any kind to support it, and in all my connection with the office never saw anything to justify it.* Broadfoot admitted that his immediate predecessor in the agency, Col. Richmond, had taken an opposite view." (*Memoirs*, i. 75.)

Sir George Clerk, the predecessor of Col. Richmond, "when he heard what was going on, sent to the Governor-General a memorandum expressing strong views on the subject." But Broadfoot had no respect for Clerk's opinion. He

11. "It has been said," says Dr. W. L. M'Gregor, "that the cession of the Sikh States belonging to the Lahore government on the left or the British side of the Sutlej had been demanded and that such a proposition had given dire offence. If the proposal were really made, it might have been expected, that a force capable of taking possession of the States in question would have been in readiness in case of refusal." (*History of the Sikhs*, ii. 253.)

had come for war and war he must have at any cost. He adopted an 'arrogant and overbearing' attitude towards the officials of the Lahore Darbar who came for the internal administration of their Cis-Sutlej territories. As George Campbell writes in his *Memoirs*, i. 76,

Broadfoot "interfered more than we ever did in a protected State. He avowed that he had arranged to occupy the Lahore territory, Cis-Sutlej, in case anything should happen to Duleep Singh who was then ill. And he forbade the Durbar to send any troops over for any purpose whatever."

This is confirmed by Cunningham in the *History of the Sikhs* saying:

"One of Major Broadfoot's first acts was to declare the Cis-Sutlej possession of Lahore to be under British protection equally with Putteeala and other chiefs and also to be liable to escheat on the death or deposition of Maharaja Dalip Singh. This view was not formally announced to the Sikh Government, but it was notorious and Major Broadfoot acted on it when he proceeded to interfere authoritatively, and by a display of force in the affairs of the priest-like Sodhees of Anund-poor Makhawal." (pp. 295-96.)

It is not proposed to go into the details of British aggressions and interferences referred to above. One example would suffice.

One Lal Singh *Adalti*, a judge in Lahore service, crossed the river Sutlej at Talwandi in the Lahore territory for official duty. Broadfoot, who happened to be near, "roughly and very peremptorily ordered the Sikh party back over the river. Lall Singh, not willing to risk a collision, obeyed, returned to the river and embarked his men. But Broadfoot, not satisfied with this, followed them in person ...insisted on capturing them. At least one shot was fired...The Sikh leaders were captured and detained. The shot then fired has been described as the first in the Sikh War." (Campbell, *Memoirs*, i. 76-7.)

This event has been described as follows by Robert N. Cust, the assistant and companion of Major Broadfoot:—

"Good Friday fell on March 21 [1845], and on the day following the news reached us at Zirah, on the high road between Ferozpur and Ludhianah, that a party of Sikhs had crossed the Satlaj at Talwandi, not far from us. We sent word to them to go quickly back; in the

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meantime we collected our forces; H.M. 62nd were encamped close to us, and on Easterday, 1845, as the Sikhs had not crossed back, we started at daylight with 160 infantry and 300 sabres. The sight was pretty one (I copy from my journal): 'Broadfoot and I rode in advance; on arriving at Talwandi we found that the party had retreated, but had refused to pay for the damage, which they had done; on this Broadfoot and I dashed on with the Cavalry. Arriving at the bank of the Satlaj we espied the party at some little distance attempting to cross the deep stream in boats; on we went and caught the last boatful which we knew by the standards to contain the Chief of the party, Bhai Bishan Singh; these we seized with their horses and camels; one man was shot in confusion. The scene was very pretty, just the junction of Beas and Satlaj.'

"This was the first shot of the great Sikh War." (*Or. and Ling. Essays, part V, 43-4.*)

"The affair," says George Campbell, "gave rise to great irritation. Broadfoot seems to have felt that he could hardly justify the making prisoner of a Lahore judge on Lahore soil; he put it on the ground that in decamping they had not paid the villagers for the supplies they had and the damage they had done. He made them pay for that, and finally let them go. Even from his own point of view, viz., regarding the Lahore territory south of the river as a protected State, *such a proceeding was wholly unjustifiable*. In a petty matter of supplies we never should have dreamed of interfering between a Protected Chief and his subjects." (*Memoirs, 77.*)

(v) *Suchet Singh's Treasure*—Raja Suchet Singh, the youngest brother of the Dogras Dhian Singh and Gulab Singh, had secretly deposited at Ferozepore a large quantity of coin and bullion worth about fifteen lakhs of rupees. After his death the Lahore Government claimed the treasure both as escheated property of a feudatory without male heirs of his body and as the confiscated property of a rebel killed in arms against his sovereign. Legally and morally the treasure belonged to the Lahore kingdom. "Vattel lays it down," says Joseph Cunningham, in his *History of the Sikhs*, p. 279, "that a stranger's property remains a part of the aggregate wealth of his nation and the right to it is to be determined according to the laws of his own country. (Book II, Chapt. viii. Sects. 109 and 110.)

"The oriental customary laws with regard to the estates and property of Jagheerdars (feudal beneficiaries) may be

seen in Bernier's *Travels* (i. 183-87). The right of the Government is full and it is based on the feeling or principle that a beneficiary has only the use during life of estates or offices, and that all he may have accumulated, through parsimony or oppression, is the property of the State. It may be difficult to decide between the people and an expelled sovereign, about his guilt or his tyranny, but there can be none in deciding between an allied State and its subject about treason or rebellion. Neither refugee traitors nor patriots are allowed to abuse their asylum by plotting against the Government which has cast them out and an extension of the principle would prevent desperate adventurers defrauding the State which has reared and heaped favours on them by removing their property previous to engaging in rash and criminal enterprises." (*Ibid.*, 279.)

But the British Government refused to hand over the treasure to the Lahore Government. This caused great irritation to the Sikhs, who made several demands for it. The British paid no attention to these. After the war, however, they were pleased to recognize the traitor Gulab Singh heir to the money to help him make payments to them for the territories of Jammu and Kashmir.

(vi) *The Village of Moron*—A village named Moron in the Nabha territory had been given by Raja Jaswant Singh of Nabha in 1819 to Maharaja Ranjit Singh who, in turn, had bestowed it on one Sardar Dhanna Singh. Twenty-five years later, in 1843, Jaswant Singh's son Raja Devindar Singh became displeased with the Sardar and resumed the gift. Not only this. His soldiers wantonly plundered the property of the Sardar. This was absolutely illegal and high-handed. The gift had not been made to Sardar Dhanna Singh by Raja Devindar Singh to give him any right to resume it. It had been made by Maharaja Ranjit Singh, the ruler of the Panjab. The Raja of Nabha had nothing to do with it. The British, whose protection the Raja of Nabha had accepted, however, upheld his action against the protests of the Lahore darbar, who naturally felt aggrieved. The Raja of Nabha, thus played, unsuspectingly or otherwise, the game of the British politicals in irritating

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and provoking the Lahore Darbar and its troops to come to an early decision of war with the British.

(vii) *Occupation of an island*—"The year before the war broke out," says Major G. Carmichael Smyth in his *History of the Reigning Family of Lahore* (1847), "we kept the island between Ferozepore and the Punjaub, *though it belonged to the Seiks*, owing to the deep water being between us and the island." "And I only ask, had *we* not departed from the rules of friendship first"?¹² And he quotes the following passage from Prinsep's *Runjeet Singh*, p. 203, in support of his opinion that the island belonged to the Sikhs and that its occupation by the British was a *breach* of the rules of friendship.

"Claims to islands in a river flowing between two manors, and to alluvions are determined by what is called *Kuch-much* or *Kishtee-bunna*, which practice or rule assigns the land to the proprietor of the bank, or main, upon which the alluvion is thrown, and from which the water has receded."

(viii) *British menace from Sindh side*—"Nor did the Sikhs seem to be menaced by their [British] allies on one [Sutlej] side only," says Cunningham. "In the summer of 1845 some horsemen from Mooltan crossed a few miles into the Sindh territory in pursuit of certain marauders. The boundary of the two provinces between the Indus and the hills is nowhere defined, and the object of the few troopers was evident; but the governor, Sir Charles Napier, immediately ordered the wing of a regiment to Kushmor, a few miles below Rojhan, to preserve the integrity of his frontier from violation. The Lahore authorities were indeed put upon their guard, but they did not admit the sufficiency of the reasons given, and they looked upon the prompt measure of the conqueror of Sindh as *one more proof of the desire to bring about a war with the Punjab*."¹³

(ix) *British Propaganda*—In addition to what Major Broadfoot was doing to provoke the Lahore government to

12. *Introduction*, XXII.

13. *History of the Sikhs*, 297-298.

hostilities and to plant agents provocateur in that country, the British officials and press had been carrying on propaganda against the Sikhs with a view to preparing the people of India and England to hear the news of an Anglo-Sikh war and covering up their warlike preparations. Major G. Carmichael Smyth says in his contemporary work entitled *The Reigning Family of Lahore*:

“With the Seiks for several years past, in fact ever since the death of Runjeet Sing, we have been playing the fable of the Shepherd Boy and the Wolf. The papers and the politicals had constantly been crying out “*The Seiks are coming!*” until at last we would not believe them.”

He also refers to a speech of Sir Charles Napier published in the *Delhi Gazette* stating that the British were going to war with the Sikhs and says:

“The Seiks had translations of Sir Charles Napier’s speech (as it appeared in the *Delhi Gazette*) stating that we are going to war with them.”¹⁴

This was enough to provoke them to warlike preparations for the defence of their country. And “it behoves every wise *Raj* to avoid being taken unawares,” said Sardar Fateh Singh Man.

(x) *Spies and Agents Provocateur*—An entry in the confidential Persian Office Diary of George Broadfoot at Ludhiana reads as follows:

26th March, 1845.

“Having been sent for, Genda Singh the *Mu’tamad* of the Raja of Nabha came to the presence of the Exalted Gentleman [Major George Broadfoot]. During the interview the *Sahib* said to him, ‘You go to Lahore as the *Mu’tamad* of the Raja, stay there and inform us in detail about the state of affairs there, spread hatred and discord in that State in whatever way it can be done and suggest the entry of the British Government [in the country], and also send us a genealogical table of the Sarkar of Lahore. The *Sarkar* [the British Government] shall bestow favours upon you and consider it as an act of great loyalty of the Raja of Nabha.’

“He [Genda Singh] wrote out the genealogical table, but he refused to go to Lahore and stay there. At last the Exalted Gentleman, being

14. *Introduction*, XXII-XXIII.

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very much displeased, wrote to the Raja of Nabha that Genda Singh had been dismissed with a robe. The Sahib complained against him for disobedience and desired him to be punished; and, informing him [the Raja] of the order issued and disobeyed, desired him [the Raja] to prepare for the purpose his [Genda Singh's] son, who is a shrewd person."

This was reported to the Government of Lahore by their *Vakil* at Ludhiana and they felt much disturbed over the secret activities of their British neighbours for the subversion of their state.

It may casually be mentioned here that the refusal of the Nabha *Mu'tamad* Genda Singh to act as a British spy and agent provocateur at Lahore was one of the causes of Major Broadfoot's displeasure towards Raja Devindar Singh of Nabha who was heavily fined, deposed and exiled by the British Government after the war.

(xi) *Seduction of Dewan Moolraj*—While Sir Charles Napier exhibited an attitude hostile to the State of the Panjab, of which Multan was a province, George Broadfoot, the Governor-General's Political Agent was tampering with the loyalty of its governor, Diwan Mulraj. According to Cunningham, "It was generally held by the English in India that Major Broadfoot's appointment greatly increased the probabilities of a war with the Sikhs; and the impression was equally strong, that had Mr. Clerk, for instance, remained as agent, there would have been no war. That Major Broadfoot was regarded as hostile to the Sikhs, may perhaps almost be gathered from his own letters. On the 19th March, 1845, he wrote that the governor of Mooltan had asked what course he, the governor, should pursue, if the Lahore troops marched against him, to enforce obedience to demands made. The question does not seem one which a recusant servant would put under ordinary circumstances to the preserver of friendship between his master and the English. Major Broadfoot, however, would appear to have recurred to the virtual overtures of Deewan Mool Raj, for on the 20th November, 1845, when he wrote to all authorities in any way connected with the Punjab, that the British Provinces were threatened with

invasion, he told Sir Charles Napier, the complete soldier, armed at all points, that the governor of Mooltan would defend *Sindh* with *his* provincials against the Sikhs!—thus leading to the belief that he had succeeded in detaching the governor from his allegiance to Lahore.” (p. 297, footnote.)

(xii) *The Traitors at work*—“Several accounts agree,” says George Campbell, “that in the period immediately preceding the war when matters were becoming very serious and army had for the most part taken affairs into their own hands, they maintained for a while wonderful order at Lahore and through their *punches* exercised an almost puritanical discipline in the military republic. . . . The immediate collision was, however, I think hastened by imprudence on the part of the British Frontier Agent Major Broadfoot. I knew of some things done by him which it would be difficult to defend. But he paid the penalty by his death in the actions which followed.”¹⁵

A democratic revolution had come about in the Sikh army after the death of Sardar Jawahar Singh. Of this the new opportunist leaders of the Lahore Government, Tej Singh and Lal Singh, were very much afraid. Referring to this Sir Henry Hardinge wrote to the home authorities on September 30, 1845:

“Their personal interests endangered by the democratic revolution so successfully accomplished by the Sikh army may induce those chiefs to exert all their efforts to compel the British Government to interfere.”

“While they [the army] declared that they desired peace, there was a strong party clamorous for war.”

“The Chiefs Lal Singh and Tej Singh urged them on to war.”¹⁶

They were evidently doing this at the bidding of the British politicals. Both of them, had been won over by the British; they were at this time in correspondence with Major Broadfoot and his Assistant, Captain Nicholson, and were

15. *Memoirs*, 72-3.

16. Burton, 12, 8, 10.

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acting as their spies and agents provocateur at Lahore. It was in keeping with their assurances to the British that they were egging the army on to war.

The Queen-mother Maharani Jind Kaur was not in favour of war but "the advice of the Ranee and many of the Sardars was disregarded," says Dr. McGregor.¹⁷ "The Sikh Sardars disapproved and objected," says General McLeod Innes in his *Sir Henry Lawrence*, "but they were patriotic and joined the Khalsa."

As there was all peace on the Lahore side and the Sikhs were not making any hostile movements against the British, Reynell Taylor wrote in the middle of September, 1845, that "there is no apparent likelihood of war;" and on September 19: "Everything looks peaceable."¹⁸

The Sikh army was, however, getting alert at this time. They were unsuspectingly taken in by the instigations of Lal Singh and Tej Singh. "They declared, however," wrote Major Broadfoot to the Secretary to the Government of India on September 26, "that they desired peace, but if the troops marched from our [British] stations to Ludhiana and Ferozepore they would march too; if not, that each power should keep its own territory in peace."¹⁹

But the British had by this time completed their preparations. The month of November, 1845, fixed for military operations by Lord Ellenborough and confirmed by Sir Henry Hardinge was coming to a close. The Governor-General was "prepared for anything;" and the British army of over 40,500 men assembled on and near the Panjab frontier "was equal to any operation." Raja Gulab Singh had fulfilled his promise "to divide the Lahore Government, the army and the people." The Sikhs had been sufficiently provoked and irritated. The Commander-in-Chief of India, Sir Hugh Gough, was already near the frontier with his headquarters at

17. *History of the Sikhs*, ii. 39.

18. E. G. Parry, *Reynell Taylor*, 48.

19. Burton, *The First and Second Sikh Wars*, 13.

Ambala. There was nothing more to be done than to give the Sikhs the final provocation by marching British troops to Ludhiana and Ferozepore so that they might as well march and cross the Sutlej to protect their territories south of that river.

WITH THE KNOWLEDGE OF BROADFOOT

"Had the shrewd committees of the [Sikh] armies observed no military preparation on the part of the English," says Cunningham, "they would not have heeded the insidious exhortations of such mercenary men as Lal Singh and Tej Singh," who goaded them to move to the Sutlej evidently with the knowledge, if not under the instructions, of Major Broadfoot.²⁰ This view receives considerable strength from the letter of Captain Peter Nicholson, the Political Assistant at Ferozepore, addressed to his chief Major Broadfoot on November 23, 1845:

"Knowing that the [Lahore] Durbar and our government were in friendly relation—at least, that I had never been told the contrary—and in spite of that relation finding the head of the Durbar [Prime Minister Lal Singh] consenting to a hostile march against its allies and those [Tej Singh and Gulab Singh] supposed to be friendly to us the most active in bringing that march about, *the doubt did occur to one* (not knowing anything of any cause of difference between the governments) *whether the Durbar might not be consenting to the march of the army against us with your knowledge....*"

HARDINGE ORDERS THE MOVEMENT OF TROOPS

A close and critical study of the dates of the movements of British and Sikh troops from the middle of November to that of December, 1845, would reveal that the Sikhs decided to move their troops only when they learned that the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief were moving up to their frontier to direct the operations of war and when orders had been issued by the Governor-General "that the force should be held in readiness to move" at the shortest notice. The actual movement of British troops also took place a week be-

20. *History of the Sikhs*, 300; *BRC.*, 872.

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fore the Sikhs crossed the Sutlej, and that too into their own territory and not into the British. As such, the Sikhs could neither be said to have violated the British frontier and to have invaded the British territory, nor to have broken any treaty or rules of friendship. Charles Macfarlane tells us in his *History of British India*, p. 592:

"Sir Henry Hardinge . . . has explained his reasons for not ordering the Umballa force to take the field sooner than it did; he, however, had ordered, so early as the 20th November, that the force should be held in readiness to move, and it actually did march on the 11th of December, before the Sikh army had commenced crossing the Sutledge, which it did about six or seven miles from Ferozpur on the 12th December, but the passage of the artillery was not completed till the 16th December."

In his despatch to the Secret Committee dated 31 December, 1845, the Governor-General Sir Henry Hardinge writes:

"The army had, however, been ordered to be in readiness to move at the shortest notice; and, on the 7th and 8th December, when I heard from Lahore that preparations were making at a large scale for artillery, stores and all the munitions of war, I wrote to the Commander-in-Chief, directing His Excellency, on the 11th to move up the force from Umballa, from Meerut and some other stations in the rear.

"Up to this time no infantry and artillery had been reported to have left Lahore, nor had a single Sikh soldier crossed the Sutledge. Nevertheless I considered it no longer to delay the forward movement of our troops....

"Up to the morning of the 12th, the information from Lahore had not materially varied but by the reports received on that day, the general aspect of affairs appeared more warlike. Still no Sikh aggression had been committed, and no artillery had moved down to the river.

"On the 13th I first received precise information that the Sikh army had crossed the Sutledge, and was concentrating in great force on the left bank of the river.

"The Umballa force at that time had been in movement three days. On this date I issued proclamation, a copy of which is enclosed."

According to Robert Cust, who had accompanied the British force from Ambala, it had left that station on December 6 and had been in movement for a week when His Lordship issued the proclamation.

Here one may pause to compare the patience and forbearance of the two Governments. Lord Ellenborough had been assembling a force on the Panjab frontier and collecting guns and other munitions of war at Ferozepore (within five miles of the Sikh territory) and other places for over two years, while plans for military invasion and occupation of the Panjab had been prepared in 1841 and were being discussed since his arrival in India. His successor Sir Henry Hardinge had gradually, during the past sixteen months, increased the military strength here from 17,612 to 40,523 men and from 66 guns to 94, with considerable additions to some of the near stations. The Sikhs patiently saw and bore all this, and made no active preparations or movements against the British beyond diplomatic protests. The British, on the other hand, could not tolerate even a fortnight of half-hearted preparations at Lahore, with *their own men* at the helm of affairs there. Not a single soldier had crossed the Sutlej up to December 11, 1845. Yet the Governor-General, on the advice of his too-prone-to-war Political Agent Major Broadfoot, who was eager to give the final provocation in response to the Sikh declaration, directed the Commander-in-Chief on the 6th to move up the force from Ambala, Meerut, etc., towards Ludhiana and Ferozepore. The Sikhs had declared that "they desired peace but if troops marched from our [British] stations to Ludhiana and Ferozepore, they would march too." Broadfoot would not lose any opportunity to bring things to a head. And Sir Henry Hardinge implicitly accepted the advice of his Political Agent and adviser in ordering the movement of British troops.²¹ This was a severe challenge to the 'Sikhs' forbearance and national pride. Yet they kept calm and showed a wonderful spirit of self-control in face of grave provocation. They came, they crossed the river but they stayed in their own territory, without indulging in any aggressive or warlike activity.

21. "In regard to the war...if it could at all be imputed to him that the war was unnecessarily hastened, it could only be said that he perhaps too implicitly accepted the assertions of his official representative and adviser on the frontier." (Campbell, *Memoirs*, 70.)

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HARDINGE'S PROCLAMATION

Immediately on hearing that the Sikhs had crossed the river, but regardless of the fact that they were encamped in their own territory and had committed no act of aggression, the Governor-General issued his historic proclamation of December 13, 1845, declaring war on the Sikhs and confiscating and annexing to the British territories the coveted possessions of Maharaja Duleep Singh on the left bank of the Sutlej. The text of the proclamation is given in Appendix B, No. III, pp. 472-74. In it the Governor-General makes the following assertions:

1. 'The British Government has ever been on terms of friendship with that of the Punjab.'
2. The conditions of the treaty of 1809 'have always been faithfully observed by the British Government.'
3. 'Friendly relations have been maintained with the successors of Maharaja Runjeet Singh by the British Government up to the present time.'
4. The British took 'precautionary measures for the protection of the British frontier,' their nature and cause having been fully explained to the Lahore Durbar.
5. 'Many most unfriendly proceedings on the part of the Durbar.'
6. 'Utmost forbearance' shown by the Governor-General.
7. Governor-General desired to see a strong Sikh Government in the Panjab.
8. The Sikh army marched from Lahore by the orders of the Durbar for the purpose of invading the British territory.
9. No reply was given to the British demand for explanation.
10. 'The Sikh army has now, without a shadow of provocation, invaded the British territories.'

OBSERVATIONS ON THE PROCLAMATION

In the light of unimpeachable contemporary evidence, it is difficult to endorse the statements and assertions of Sir Henry

Hardinge that British Government had 'ever been on terms of friendship with the Panjab,' or that the conditions of the treaty of 1809 had 'always been faithfully observed by the British Government,' or that friendly relations had been maintained by them with the successors of Maharaja Ranjit Singh. British friendship had all along been a matter of political expediency. The British were friends as long as it suited them, but no sooner did their interests clash with those of their friends than they threw away all old friendly commitments to the winds and acted in a manner calculated to best serve their selfish ends, no matter how contrary it was to their moral and political obligations. Fearing a Franco-Russian invasion they sought the friendship of Ranjit Singh, but when their military and political experts held that the Sutlej was a better frontier than the Jamuna, they came up with a strong military force in 1809 to put a stop to his expansion and consolidation to the south of that river. They maintained a show of friendship while they were busy in other parts of India, but as soon as they were free they not only connived at but also actually encouraged British subjects to create and continue disturbances in the north-western districts of Ranjit Singh's Panjab. British interference in Sindh, Shikarpur and Ferozepur affairs was not at all a friendly gesture. Their offer to become the means of negotiations regarding Peshawar after the battle of Jamrud in 1837 was a hostile diplomatic move to make friends with the Afghan enemies of the Panjab. Sir Henry Fane's collection of information from a military commander's point of view, when he was invited to the Panjab by Maharaja Ranjit Singh on the occasion of his grandson's marriage, and forming an estimate of the force required for 'the complete subjugation of the Panjab' was a flagrant abuse of the hospitality of the unsuspecting Maharaja, and could not by any stretch of imagination be called an act of friendship.

It cannot be denied by any honest student of history, that after the death of the Maharaja, the British dream of conquering the Panjab had acquired clearer and more definite lineaments and that they had set in train an elaborate political

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and diplomatic conspiracy for its realization. Memoranda and plans were drawn up; the country was surrounded on the south-west and north-west; armies were assembled on the Panjab frontier; guns, stores and other munitions were collected; officers of the Lahore Government were seduced and won over and spies and traitors were set to work to create conditions favourable to a successful occupation of the country; and yet Sir Henry Hardinge had the audacity to proclaim that he desired to see a strong Sikh Government in the Panjab and that utmost forbearance had been shown to the Sikhs.

The British demand for explanation from the Lahore Durbar for their military preparations at their capital was only a diplomatic move designed to counteract the charges levelled against them by the Lahore Government in respect of warlike preparations on the Panjab frontier, the assemblage of British troops and Broadfoot's unfriendly proceedings against them. It was only an apparent fulfilment of a diplomatic legality before breaking formal relations and starting the war. Otherwise, the Lahore Vakil, Rai Kishan Chand, had written to his Government for a reply and was waiting for it. But Broadfoot was in a hurry. Everything now being ready, he could not see the British declaration of war delayed. He gave the Sikh Vakil a few hours' notice and asked him, at the same time, to leave his camp. With the means of communication available in those days it was physically impossible for the reply to come within the prescribed time. Broadfoot could not have been ignorant of it. Evidently, he wished to break political relations with Lahore and used the failure of the Sikh reply as an excuse for it.

In face of the Governor-General's own repeated admission that no aggression was committed by the Sikhs up to December 12, 1845, a day before the issue of the proclamation, the talk of 'many most unfriendly proceedings on the part of the Durbar' or 'of precautionary measures for the protection of the British frontier' was meaningless and nothing more than a camouflage for their own schemes. That the Sikh

army marched from Lahore to invade the British territory and that the 'Sikh army has now, without a shadow of provocation, invaded the British territories' were false allegations belied by facts.

The above observations are based on reliable contemporary evidence of the most competent authorities—men on the spot and directly connected with these affairs, the integrity and the veracity of whose statements have never been called in question. Robert N. Cust was the personal assistant of George Broadfoot in the Political Agency and was with him up to the last moment of lowering him into the grave on the battlefield of Ferozshah. His *Linguistic and Oriental Essays*, published in a series of volumes, contain a number of chapters and sections on the *History of the Conquest of the Panjab*, with particular reference to the first Anglo-Sikh war, of which he was an active eye-witness. Major G. Carmichael Smyth was an officer employed in the North-Western Agency and was a personal friend and admirer of Major Broadfoot to whose memory he has dedicated his book *A History of the Reigning Family of Lahore*, 1847. Mr. (later on Sir) George Campbell, a scholar and political observer of outstanding merit, was a civilian officer employed in the Cis-Sutlej territory in charge of the district of Kaithal. He spent a considerable portion of his official life in this area. His *Memoirs of My Indian Career* is a very valuable original source of historical material on Cis-Sutlej territories.

The mature opinions and observations of these British officers on the first Anglo-Sikh War, based on personal knowledge, have the weight of unchallengeable authority.

WHO PROVOKED, AND WHO BROKE THE TREATY? — WHO WAS THE AGGRESSIVE INVADER?

G. Carmichael Smyth says:

"Regarding the Punjab war; I am neither of the opinion that the Seiks made an *unprovoked attack*, nor that we have acted towards them with *great forbearance*;if the Seiks were to be considered entirely an independent State in no way answerable to us, we should not have provoked them!—for to assert that the bridge of boats brought

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from Bombay, was not a *causa belli*, but merely a defensive measure, is absurd; besides the Seiks had translations of Sir Charles Napier's speech (as it appeared in the *Delhi Gazette*,) stating that we were going to war with them; and as all European powers would have done under the circumstances, the Seiks thought it as well to be first in the field. Moreover they were not encamped in our territory, but their own.

"...and I only ask, had *we* not departed from the rules of friendship first? The year before the war broke out, we kept the island between Ferozepore and the Punjab, though it belonged to the Sikhs, owing to the deep water being between *us* and the island.

"... But if on the other hand the treaty of 1809 is said to have been binding between the two Governments, then the simple question is, who first departed from the rules of friendship? I am decidedly of the opinion that we did." (*Reigning Family of Lahore*, XXI-XXIII.)

Sir Henry Hardinge was himself not convinced of the justification of the war against the Sikhs up to December 18, 1845, the day of the battle of Mudki, five days after the issue of his proclamation. Robert N. Cust writes in his Journal:

"December 18th—...I rode behind the Governor General and we sat under a tree to await the infantry. The Governor General remarked: "Will the people of England consider this an actual invasion of our frontier and a justification of war?" (*Part V*, 46-7.)

Referring to a manuscript copy of his *A Chapter in the History of the Conquest of the Panjab*, he says:

"The transcript gives an account of the first *British invasion of the independent kingdom of the Panjab*, and the capture of Lahore. I had accompanied the army from Ambala, December 6, 1845, to the River Satlaj." (*Series V*, 1041.)

Looking at the dead body of his chief Major George Broadfoot before it was buried, Cust said:

"There lay he, the prime mover, by many considered the cause, of this war now commencing." (*Part V*, 49.)

Again, when he mentions the crossing of the Sutlej by the British army, he says:

"Tuesday, February 10th—The Governor General returned to Ferozepur to superintend the completion of the Bridge across the Satlaj, and the Reserve Force at Attari was ordered to cross that very night to the opposite bank, which action meant the 'Invasion of the Panjab.'"

According to George Campbell in his *Memoirs*;

CORRESPONDENCE—ANGLO-SIKH WARS

"The immediate collision was, however, I think hastened by imprudence on the part of British Frontier Agent, Major Broadfoot, I knew of some things done by him which it would be difficult to defend." (i. 73.)

"It is recorded in the annals of history, or what is called history, which will go down to posterity, that the Sikh army invaded British territory in pursuance of a determination to attack us. And most people will be very much surprised to hear that they did nothing of the kind. They made no attack on our outlying cantonments, nor set foot in our territory. What they did do was to cross the river and to entrench themselves in their own territory" (p. 78.)

THE WAR, 1845-46

It is not proposed to give here details of the military operations of any of the battles. They are available in a large number of books on the subject, especially in *The War in India—The Despatches of Viscount Hardinge, Lord Gough and Harry Smith*, 1846; Gough and Innes' *The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars*, 1897; and Burton's *The First and Second Sikh Wars* (compiled for the General Staff, India), 1911. Here we will confine ourselves to political aspects and to secret methods employed by the British Indian Government to secure success in the war and to take possession of the Panjab.

FEROZEPORE NOT ATTACKED BY TRAITORS

Immediately after the Sikh army had crossed the river Sutlej and were entrenching themselves in their own territory for defence against the advancing army of the British, the traitor Vizir Lal Singh, who had been for some time carrying on treasonable correspondence with the British Political Agent, wrote to Captain Peter Nicholson, the Assistant Agent at Ferozepur:

"I have crossed with the Sikh army. You know my friendship for the British. Tell me what to do."

Nicholson answered:

"Do not attack Ferozepore. Halt as many days as you can, and then march towards the Governor General."

Lal Singh did so and Ferozepore was saved. "Had he attacked, our garrison of 8000 men would have been destroyed and the victorious 60,000 would have fallen on Sir Henry

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Hardinge, who had then but 8,000. So utterly unprepared were we, that even this treachery of one of our enemies scarcely sufficed to save us." [Ludlow, *Br. India*, ii. 142.]

This has been substantially confirmed by Col. Mouton of the Sikh service in his *Rapport Sur Les Derniers Envenements du Panjab*, Paris, 1846, in which he says:

"Raja Lal Singh rushed up and robbed the ardour of Sikes a great deal by assuring them of the defection of 4 Indian battalions in the English army which would surely join them. Meanwhile he hastened to send an urgent message to Captain Nicholson, 'Charge d' affaires' at Ferozepour, telling him that it was without the order of his government that the army had crossed the river, and that the generals had been dragged against their wishes; that sixty thousand men were going to march on Ferozepour, which had not even six thousand to defend itself and ended by requesting the captain to advise him in the matter. Nicholson replied suggesting to Raja Lal Singh to detach from the army a corps of twenty five thousand men which he should bring to meet the Commander-in-Chief, who was arriving by the route of Ambala, and that probably these twenty five thousand men would be defeated—the rest of the army crossing the river in disorder."

"This treason saved the English from a sure defeat."²²

To cover up his traitorous plan, Lal Singh made an excuse 'that he wanted to fight the commander-in-chief and considered any one else below his notice.'

"Had the Sikh leaders been as resolutely bent on the defeat and extermination of their opponents as the faithful Khalsa were, it may well be doubted," says Murray, "if all the heroism of this isolated division of the British army would have saved it from destruction." (*History of British India*, 700-01.)

MUDKI—December 18, 1845

Acting on the advice of Captain Nicholson, Lal Singh waited for the British Commander-in-Chief Sir Hugh Gough to come up with his main army and then advanced with his full force to meet him with the sinister object that, as planned, 'the British might have a full and fair opportunity of destroy-

22. Translated from French, p. 5.

ing them.’²³ ‘Lal Singh headed the attack, but, in accordance with his original design, he involved them [his men] in an engagement and then left them to fight as their undirected valour might prompt.’²⁴ Deserted by their commander, the Sikh force was repulsed. “The first engagement at Mudki was won by the British,” says Pearson, “because Lal Singh, according to plan, took no interest in the battle after issuing the order to attack.”²⁵

FIROZSHAHR—December 21, 1845

At Firozshahr again Lal Singh commanded the Sikh force, assisted by Tej Singh. Evidently under the impression that with their *own men* on the other side, the British army would have an easy walk over, Sir Hugh Gough opened an attack on the Sikhs on the evening of December 21, 1845, just an hour before sunset. But the Sikhs stood manfully to their guns and poured so deadly a fire into the advancing division of Sir John Litler that they not only checked its progress but also sent the attackers reeling back with heavy loss. Great was the havoc and confusion caused in the British army, with the descending darkness of night, when Sir Harry Smith’s right was driven back by the Sikhs.

The stiff resistance offered by the Sikhs and the heavy loss suffered by the British were far beyond the calculations of Sir Henry Hardinge, and the English spent a very anxious night on the battlefield of Firozshahr. Despair hung over their camp. Some suggested a retreat on Ferozepur, while other counselled an unconditional surrender. In fact Captain Lumley, the officiating Adjutant General, issued a direct

23. M’Gregor, ii. 81.

24. Cunningham, 306.

25. *Hero of Delhi*, 79.

“It was sufficiently certain and notorious at the time that Lal Singh was in communication with Capt. Nicholson, the British Agent at Ferozepore, but owing to the untimely death of that officer, the details of the overtures made and expectations held out cannot now be satisfactorily known.” (Cunningham, 304.)

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order to Sir Harry Smith 'to collect every soldier and march direct to Ferozepore.'

But for the treachery of Lal Singh at night, and of Tej Singh the next morning, it was all up with the British, and, according to Robert Cust's following entry of December 22, 1845, in his journal, they were concerting measures to make an unconditional surrender to the Sikhs.

"December 22nd. News came from the Governor General that our attack of yesterday had failed, that affairs were desperate, that all state papers were to be destroyed, and that if the morning attack failed, all would be over; this was kept secret by Mr. Currie and we were concerting measures to make an unconditional surrender to save the wounded, the part of the news that grieved me the most." (*Linguistic and Oriental Essays*, VI, 48.)

This was, perhaps, for the first time in the history of their rule in India that the British thought of thus surrendering unconditionally to their enemies in the field of action. In spite of the great courage and coolness shown by the Governor-General and the Commander-in-chief on the battlefield of Firozshahr, the position of the British was desperate, and Sir Henry himself feared a disaster on the following morning and was prepared for the worst. According to *The Career of Major Broadfoot*:

"In case of disaster, which was far from impossible, the Governor General sent orders to Mudki, where Mr. Currie was in charge of official papers of the Government of India, and Mr. Cust of the records of the Agency, for the destruction of all State papers. Sir Henry's son, Charles, who was his private secretary, being a civilian, was ordered off the field." (p. 395.)

General Sir Hope Grant says:

"Sir Henry Hardinge thought it was all up and gave his sword—a present from the Duke of Wellington and which once belonged to Napoleon—and his Star of the Bath to his son, with directions to proceed to Ferozepore remarking that 'if the day were lost, he must fall.'" (*Life*, ed. H. Knollys, p. 72.)

("Even in England the first news of actual victory," says Trotter, "was received by some of our leading statesmen with more of consternation than rejoicing. Peel himself was among the croakers at a council meeting in which the old Duke of

Wellington had been taking a somewhat listless part. At Peel's reference to our Pyrrhic victory and the perils which beset our Indian Empire, the old warrior flashed out: 'Make it a Victory; fire a salute, and ring the bells. Gough has lost a good many men; but what of that? You must lose officers and men if you have to fight a great battle. At Assaye I lost a third of my force.' ") (*John Nicholson*, 55.)

"Had they [the Sikhs] advanced during the night," says William Edwards, "the result must have been very disastrous to us, as our European regiments were much reduced in number, and our ammunition, both for artillery and small arms, almost expended."²⁶

"Perhaps neither the incapacity nor the treason of Lal Singh and Tej Singh," Cunningham truly observed, "were fully perceived or credited by the English chiefs, and hence the anxiety of the one on whom the maintenance of British dominion intact depended." (309 f.n.)

True to his arrangements with Captain Peter Nicholson, Lal Singh quietly disappeared from the field of action with most of his men and guns during the night when victory was within his grasp. Early in the morning of 22nd the remnants of his force were easily put to flight. Tej Singh then had a fresh reserve force under his command. With the approach of this second wing of the Sikh army, the wearied and famished English saw before them a desperate and a useless struggle. The zealous Sikh soldiers had urged upon Tej Singh to fall upon the English at day-break. But the traitor would not risk a victory for his troops, and being fully apprised that the British army was at his mercy, he fled away to oblige the friends he was in league with. Thus was the battle of Firozshahr finally lost by the Sikhs, and the British heaved a sigh of relief.

Soon after the battle, Tej Singh went to the British camp and had an interview with the Governor-General. No record is available of the secret talks between the two chiefs. Sir

26. *Remin. of a Beng. Civ.*, 97.

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Henry Hardinge is said to have refused to enter into any negotiation until the British troops occupied the capital of the Sikh kingdom. This Tej Singh apparently promised to bring about.²⁷

PROCLAMATION OF THE XMAS DAY, 1845

To outdo his officers, Broadfoot and Nicholson, who had bought over traitorous courtiers like Lal Singh and Tej Singh, the Governor General, with a view to inducing wholesale defections and enticing away the Poorbias from the Sikh army, issued the following proclamation on December 25, 1845, the Christmas day, offering to deserters assurance of present reward and future pension and, above all, an *immediate decision of any law suits in which they might be involved in British provinces.*

PROCLAMATION IN HINDUSTANI

"Whereas the English Government is anxious to reward the bravery and fidelity of the Poorbeas, by raising a Regiment of them—it is hereby proclaimed, that any non-commissioned officer or soldier of the Lahore Government who shall present himself before His Excellency the Governor General, shall be immediately rewarded with the accustomed liberality, and shall have the benefit of invalid pension; and, if engaged in a law suit in a British Court of Justice, his case shall be immediately decided before any other. In fact, every opportunity of favour and cherishment shall at all times be kept in sight by the Government. However, it is reported that Tej Singh has given out, that if any sepoy of the Lahore army go over for service to the English Government, the officers of this Government will cut off their noses and ears and kill them. This is altogether an infamous falsehood—for the customs of this Government were never of such a description, and never will be—therefore let such a falsehood not enter their heads; but let them feel assured that if they come here they will be well rewarded."

(A True Translation)

H. MARSH, Bt. Captain,

Interpreter and Quarter Master, 3rd Cavalry.

27. *His. of Panj.* (Allen & Co.), ii. 344.

BADDOWAL—January 21, 1846

There was now a lull for full one month. Evidently the traitors had conspired with the British to give the latter time for further preparations. Sir Hugh Gough was not then in a position to assume the offensive until reinforced with fresh troops, guns, and ammunition. Practically all ammunition had been expended, and the troops were exhausted.' Tej Singh and Lal Singh knew it, but they would not do anything to worry the British in their difficult situation. At this time Sardar Ranjodh Singh Majithia,²⁸ loyal to the Sikh Standard, crossed the Sutlej and, with the help of Sardar Ajit Singh of Ladwa, burnt a portion of the cantonment of Ludhiana. While Sir Harry Smith was proceeding to relieve Ludhiana, he was surprised and worsted by the Sardars at Baddowal with a heavy loss of life, baggage and hospital stores which fell into the hands of the Sikhs. The situation was, however, saved, to some extent, by the timely assistance of Brigadier Cureton.

ALI WAL—January 28, 1846

Sir Harry Smith was, eventually, able to retrieve his position and regain his reputation when, a week later, on January 28, he is said to have inflicted a 'crushing defeat' upon Sardar Ranjodh Singh. The fact is that no battle worth the name was fought at Aliwal. It was only a small scrimmage. But something was required to be done for Harry Smith to cover his loss of reputation at Baddowal. An old companion of Sir Henry Hardinge, he was a veteran of the Peninsular War and had taken part in the battle of Waterloo. Fullest scope was, therefore, allowed to the fertile imagination of the author of the official despatch to magnify and enlarge this insignificant scrimmage into a great battle.

According to Dr. Andrew Adams:

28. "Ranjodh Singh was, if anything, superior to the other leaders of the Sikh army, if leaders they can be called... but he was no traitor. He had no confidential agents in the British camp as Raja Lal Singh had, nor did he, like the Raja, pray for and labour for the triumph of the English."—*Panjab Chiefs*, (1865), 88.

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"Much has been said of Aliwal, but candid witnesses give a far different account from that written at the time.

"I wandered over the field with one who had been present at the engagement; he assured me, and his testimony has been corroborated by many others, that a fruitful imagination was at work when the official account was drawn up. His words were :—

"*'Aliwal was the battle of the despatch, for none of us knew we had fought a battle until the particulars appeared in a document, which did more than justice to every one concerned.'*

"But the public gulped it down, and, like many of our Indian battles and Indian blunders, the final issue of the struggle disarmed criticism.

"As an Irishman would say, 'We gained a disadvantage at Budiwal,' by the baggage of the army falling into the hands of the enemy; *that* no exaggeration could well turn into a victory; but shortly afterwards, a few shots, and the charge of a squadron or two in pursuit of a host of retreating Sikhs, were magnified into a grand combat, and thus the plain of Aliwal has been recorded as the scene of one of India's Marathons." (*Wanderings of a Naturalist in India*, 60-1.)

SOBRAON—February 10, 1846

Sobraon was the last battle of the first Anglo-Sikh war. Treasonable treachery of their Dogra and Poorbia agents was made full use of by the British in securing success not only in the field of battle but also in taking possession of the capital of the Panjab. Lal Singh had played a leading part in the battles of Mudki and Firozshahr. It was now the turn of Tej Singh and Gulab Singh.

During the cessation of hostilities, the clever opportunist Gulab Singh appeared on the scene, ostensibly on behalf of the Lahore Darbar, and entered into negotiations with the British. Sir Henry Hardinge welcomed these. He knew he could not immediately annex the Panjab to British dominions. According to Cunningham:

"The English, therefore, intimated to Golab Singh their readiness to acknowledge a Sikh sovereignty at Lahore after the army should have been disbanded; but the Raja declared his inability to deal with the troops. . . . the speedy dictation of a treaty under the walls of Lahore was essential to the British reputation; and the views of the either party were in some sort met by an understanding that the Sikh army should be attacked by the English, and that when beaten it should be openly abandoned by its own government; and further that

the passage of the Sutlej should be unopposed and the road to the capital laid open to the victors. Under such circumstances of discreet policy and shameless treason was the battle of Sobraon fought." (p. 321.)²⁹

"The conditional terms of a negotiation thus mutually agreed upon by belligerent leaders, preparatory to once more appealing to the arbitration of battle, are probably unparalleled in the history of ancient or modern warfare. They suffice, however, to show the singular footing on which our vast Eastern empire rests." (Murray, *History of British India*, 713.)

These treasonable negotiations and secret understanding with the British took place in the first week of February, 1846, when the Governor-General was encamped at Ferozepore waiting for the arrival of his heavy guns. They began pouring in on the 7th February. The same day, says William Edwards, "emissaries from Rajah Lal Singh arrived [in British camp] and gave us valuable information respecting the enemy's position."³⁰ This, for all practical purposes, meant handing over to the enemy the Sikh plan of war. Could treachery go further? And how could the Sikhs hope for any success in war with such traitors as their commanders?

Not only this. Gulab Singh went a step further than Tej Singh and Lal Singh. He would not send rations and supplies to the army. Living upon parched gram and raw carrots for three days, the soldiers sent a deputation to Lahore to wait upon the Queen-mother. In answer to complaints of great hardship to which the army was then exposed, she said that Gulab Singh had forwarded vast supplies. "No, he has not," roared the deputation; "we know the old fox; he has not sent breakfast for a bird (*chiria ki haziri*)."³⁰ At last the deputation said, "Give us powder and shot." At this the Rani flung a woman's garment at them and shouted: "Wear that, you cowards! I will go in trousers and fight myself." After a moment's pause, during which the deputation stood stunned, a unanimous shout arose, "Dalip Singh Maharaja, we will go and die for his kingdom and the Khalsaji!" The deputation dispersed and

29. cf. Adams, *Epi. of Ang. Ind. Hist.*, 208.

30. *Rem. of a Bengal Cwn.*, 99.

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returned to Sobraon to rejoin the army. "The courage and intuition displayed by this extraordinary woman under such critical circumstances," says Colonel Alexander Gardner of the Sikh service, popularly known as *Gardauna Sahib*, "filled us all with as much amazement as admiration." (*Memoirs*, 272-73.)

Gulab Singh "persuaded the Durbar," says William Edwards, "to allow him to garrison the fortress at Lahore with these [his] men, while the Sikhs then occupying it were ordered to proceed to join their brethren on the Sutlej.... Gulab Singh urged the army not to attempt attacking the British until he joined them, and this he evaded on one pretext or another, knowing full well that in due time the British would attack and capture the position at Sobraon."³¹

February 10, 1846, was the day fixed by the British for the battle of Sobraon. Tej Singh and Lal Singh knew it. It was, perhaps, done with their consultation. At this time Sardar Sham Singh Atariwala had joined the Sikh camp with a desperate determination to win or die. Tej Singh felt nervous lest Sham Singh's patriotism and bravery should upset their treacherous plans. He counselled him to fly with him on the first attack of the British the following morning. Sham Singh refused with scorn, on which, as Griffin tells us, Tej Singh angrily said, "If you are so brave, you had better take your oath about it, for I know and believe you will come with me after all." Sardar Sham Singh called for a *Granth* (the Sikh Bible) and solemnly swore that should the Sikhs be defeated he would never leave the trenches alive.³² And he faithfully stood by his oath.

Early next morning the British took the offensive. When the fighting was at its thickest and three successive British attacks had been repulsed, Tej Singh and Lal Singh, in fulfilment of their understanding with the British, fled from the field deserting their troops to be destroyed by the enemy.

31. *Reminiscences*, 104.

32. *Panjab Chiefs* (1865), 63-64.

Assailed on all sides and deserted by the commander-in-chief, with no hope of reinforcements, the grey old warrior Sham Singh, clad in white and riding a white mare, called upon his few devoted followers to rush to the front to stem the tide of the advancing Farangis. Fighting valiantly at the head of his men, he met with a hero's death—a true martyr to his country's independence. His body riddled with seven bullets lay covered by a thick heap of his dead and dying countrymen. Thus saw the battlefield of Sobraon the basest treachery of the opportunists on the one hand and the shining heroism of noble patriots on the other.³³

Soon after Tej Singh had found his way down to and across the bridge on the Sutlej, followed by fifteen or twenty horsemen in waiting upon him, "he ordered up eight or ten guns and had them pointed on the bridge as if ready to beat it to pieces or to oppose the passage of the defeated army."³⁴ The bridge was then, 'by previous consent' with the enemy, broken down by Lal Singh and Tej Singh, to effect, as far as possible, the annihilation of the Sikh army.³⁵

33. "Tij Sinh, it is true, filled up the measure of his treachery by taking to flight, and... sinking a boat in the middle of the bridge of communication.

"Then the venerable Sham Sinh prepared to fulfil his vow. Clothing himself in white garments of martyrdom, and encouraging all around him to fight for the guru, he animated the defence with a new impulse until he fell at last, on a heap of his dead and dying countrymen." (Adams, *Ep. of Ang. Ind. Hist.*, 211.)

34. Smyth, *Reigning Family*, 183-84.

35. "The Sikhs made a gallant and desperate resistance but were driven towards the river and their bridge of boats which, as soon as the action had become general, their leaders Rajah Lall Singh and Tej Singh, had, by previous consent, broken down, taking the precaution first to retire across it themselves their object being to effect, as soon as possible, annihilation of the feared and detested army." (Edwards, *Rem. of Beng. Civr.*, 100.)

"The Sikh troops, basely betrayed by their leaders, who had come—so it was said, and not without some appearance of truth—to a secret understanding with us, fought like heroes." (Smith, *Life of Lord Lawrence*, i. 188.)

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"A British defeat," says Hesketh Pearson, "was again turned into a victory by the convenient flight of Tej Singh who damaged the bridge of boats over the Sutlej on his way and so helped to drown a large number of his countrymen."³⁶

THE BRITISH OCCUPY LAHORE

The same night, February 10-11, 1846, the reserve British force at Atari near Ferozepore was ordered to cross the Sutlej to the opposite bank, which action, according to Robert Cust, meant the "Invasion of the Panjab." In fact the Panjab had been invaded by the British on December 13, 1845, when the Governor-General declared war on the Sikhs and proclaimed the confiscation of the territories of Maharaja Duleep Singh to the south of the Sutlej. The Sikhs, as we knew, had up to that time committed no act of aggression against the British and were encamped in their own territories, watching the assemblage of British troops on their frontier and preparing to meet the obvious danger of the British invasion of the Panjab.

According to the secret understanding with the Governor-General, no opposition was offered to the British troops marching upon the Sikh capital. On February 20, the British army arrived at Lahore, and two days later a portion of the royal citadel was garrisoned by English regiments.

TREATY OF LAHORE, March 9, 1846

On the 9th of March was signed the treaty of Lahore imposed by the British upon the young Maharaja Duleep Singh, aged seven years and a half. The text of the treaty is given in Appendix B, No. V, pp. 475-80. By this treaty

1. (a) the British annexed the Jullundur Doab to their dominions ;
- (b) in lieu of part payment of the expenses of war, they took possession of the entire hill country between the Beas and the Indus, to be alienated to Gulab Singh in independent sovereignty to be recognised by Maharaja Duleep Singh ;

36. *The Hero of Delhi*, 80.

- (c) 50 lakhs of rupees were to be paid to the British on or before the ratification of the treaty.
2. The Sikh army was to be reduced to 25 battalions of infantry (800 each) and 12,000 cavalry;
3. all guns used in war were to be surrendered to the British;
4. British troops were to be allowed free passage through the Panjab when necessary.

TREATY of March 11, 1846

On the third day, March 11, 1846, was another agreement dictated to the Lahore Darbar, ostensibly at their solicitation, to lay a stronger hold on the country. For the terms of the agreement, see Appendix B, No. VI, pp. 480-82. It provided that:

1. an adequate British force shall be stationed at Lahore for a period of one year, with full possession of the fort and the city;
2. the British Government shall respect the bonafide rights of the Jagirdars in the Lahore territories; and
3. the British Government shall be at liberty to retain any part of the state property in the forts in the ceded territories, paying for it at a fair valuation.

In addition to the Maharaja, who was only a helpless child of seven years and a half, both of these treaties were signed by seven chiefs, the first of whom, Bhai Ram, Singh, had been an agent of Raja Gulab Singh in his negotiations with the British, and the next two were the notorious Lal Singh and Tej Singh. The British recognized the two arch-traitors as chief men of the State, and invested them with responsibility and authority in the Panjab. The other four were associated with them to keep up the appearance of the representative character of the signatories.

*JAMMU AND KASHMIRE GIVEN TO RAJA
GULAB SINGH*

On March 15, 1846, Gulab Singh was formally invested with the title of *Maharajah*. "And by a very questionable

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policy which had been arranged beforehand," says the biographer of Lord Lawrence, "and which has brought woes innumerable on the unhappy Kashmiries ever since, we handed it [the hill country of Jammu and Kashmir] over to the Dogra Rajpoot Golab Singh, who paid us down at once in hard cash which he had stolen from the Lahore Durbar. He was an unscrupulous villain, but an able ruler, amenable to our influence to aid us in checking any further ebullition of Khalsa fury." (p. 189.)

This was done by the treaty of March 16, 1846, concluded between the British Government and Maharaja Gulab Singh who was recognized as a separate sovereign in reward of his services to the British. "The transaction scarcely seems worthy of the British name and greatness," says Cunningham, "and the objections become stronger when it is considered that Golab Singh had agreed to pay sixty-eight lakhs of rupees (£680,000), as a fine to his paramount, before the war broke out, and that the custom of the East as well as of the West requires the feudatory to aid his lord in foreign war and domestic strife. Golab Singh ought thus to have paid the deficient million of money as a Lahore subject, instead of being put in possession of the Lahore provinces as an independent prince." (p. 332.)

Lord Ellenborough, like many others, 'questioned the policy of rewarding what he termed Ghulab Singh's treachery to the Lahore state,' and he was told in reply:

"When the invasion took place, he remained at Jammu and took no part against us, and tendered his allegiance on condition of being confirmed in the possession of his own territories....

"Were we to be deterred from doing... what had been previously determined upon...?

"He had been told by Major Lawrence on the 3rd of February [1846] in a written document that we appreciated his wisdom in not having taken up arms against us, and that his interests would be taken into consideration"... (Hardinge, 135-36.)

Henry Lawrence who had been mostly responsible for the negotiations with Raja Gulab Singh from the very beginning and had secured to him the territories of Jammu and Kashmir

was grieved to hear of his dissatisfaction expressed in several of his *parwanas*. In one of these he said, "If I am to have only the Kohistan, then I shall have nothing but stones and trees." Lawrence wrote to him on April 11, 1846:

"I am grieved that such complaints as I have alluded to should have been uttered, for it seemed to me and to all India, and will doubtless appear to all in England, that your Highness had cause only of thankfulness, in that you had received much in return for very little; and I, in belief of your wisdom and forethought, was a party to the above arrangement." (*Life of Sir Henry Lawrence*, 62-3.)

The grant of Jammu and Kashmir was welcomed both by Lal Singh and Tej Singh because it removed from the field of Lahore politics one of their most serious rivals. Lal Singh was raised to his old office of chief ministership, while Tej Singh was the next man to him. "These ready instruments of our policy" and "the betrayers of their country," wrote Sir Claud Wade, "were not representing the nation." Yet it suited the British authorities to place them in privileged positions.

The elevation of Gulab Singh to sovereignty, however, excited the ambition of Sardar Tej Singh who, perhaps, thought that, owing to greater services rendered to the British during the war, he had a stronger claim to a similar reward. Knowing his own wealth and being fully persuaded of the potency of gold, he offered a sum of twenty-five lakhs of rupees to the British for a princely crown with some other slice of the Sikh territory to rule over. Sir Henry Hardinge was then in the capital of the kingdom. He no longer felt the necessity of making any more bargains of this type. Tej Singh was, therefore, chid for his presumptuousness. He must have then realized that the British had not come to the Panjab for giving away in charity or reward the country which they had long set their hearts upon for the extension of their Indian empire to the borders of Sindh and Afghanistan.

ANNEXATION DIFFICULT

Sir Henry Hardinge had made up his mind to annex the Panjab. "In anticipation of the annexation, on which he had determined, Sir Henry Hardinge," says Bosworth Smith, "had written sometime before to Thomason, the distinguished

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Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces, asking him to send up John Lawrence for a high executive appointment in the Cis-Sutlej States which had been already annexed." On his arrival, however, he was appointed Commissioner of the newly annexed Jullundur Doab.

The wholesale annexation of the Panjab was not found to be easy. The large force required to garrison it was not available. The Sikhs, though defeated, were yet strong enough to rise and strike for their independence. It was necessary, therefore, to weaken 'this warlike republic' before it could be converted into a British province.³⁷ The alienation of Jammu and Kashmir and the annexation of all territories up to the river Beas on the borders of the British possessions were carried out with the same object in view. John Lawrence went a step further. He would reduce the Sikh Sardars to mere peasants and tillers of land. "Why not let them gradually fall in, and let the descendants of these conquerors return to the plough whence their fathers came?" he wrote to Frederick Currie on October 17, 1846.

RAJA LAL SINGH EXILED—December 1846

When installed as chief minister of the Panjab, Raja Lal Singh changed his attitude towards the transfer of Kashmir to Gulab Singh and instigated its governor, Sheikh Imam-ud-Din, not to hand over the valley to the new Maharaja. Henry Lawrence had himself to proceed with troops to dislodge the Sheikh and install the Dogra. Imam-ud-Din submitted to Lawrence proofs that he had acted under the Raja's instructions. Lal Singh was tried in open court at Lahore, found unanimously guilty on December 4, and was immediately exiled to the British territories with forfeiture of his jagirs.

37. "I shall demand one million and a half in money as compensation; and if I can arrange to make Ghulab Singh and the Hill tribes independent, including Kashmir, I shall have weakened this warlike republic. Its army must be disbanded and re-organised. The number of artillery must be limited."—Sir Henry Hardinge's letter from Kasur, dated February 1846. (*Hardinge*, 123-4.)

TREATY OF BHAROWAL—December 16, 1846

It had been stipulated in Article 1 of the Agreement of March 11, 1846 (Appendix B, No. VI, p. 480) that "the British force left at Lahore till the close of the current year, A.D. 1846 . . . shall not be retained at Lahore beyond the expiration of the year." The Lahore Darbar, therefore, had begun to concert measures for the new arrangement to be made for the government of the country after the British force had been withdrawn. This was against the real intentions and plans of Sir Henry Hardinge who wished to maintain a strong British force in the Panjab and hold the country in a tight grip. The Queen-mother Maharani Jind Kaur was also in favour of the retention of British troops under the terms of the then existing treaty that "the British Government will not exercise any interference in the internal administration of the Lahore State—but in all cases or questions which may be referred to the British Government, the Governor-General will give the aid of his advice for the furtherance of the interests of the Lahore Government."

But she was soon disillusioned about the intentions of the Governor-General who aimed at giving to the British Resident at Lahore "unlimited authority in all the matters of internal administration and external relations," which, for all practical purposes, meant the end of the independence of the Panjab. There was, therefore, a marked change in the attitude of the Maharani and the chiefs of the Darbar. According to Henry Lawrence's report to the Government, dated December 17, 1846:

"During the last day or two her whole energies have been devoted to an endeavour to win over the Sirdars of high and low degree, and unite them all together in a scheme of independent government of which she herself was to be the head. In this her chief aid and counsellor had ostensibly been Dewan Dena Natta, ever ill-disposed to the English, and now probably contemplating with alarm the possibility of our becoming the guardians of the young Maharaja." (*Life of Sir Henry Lawrence*, ii. 85-86.)

But Sir Henry Hardinge was determined to assume full powers to place his Resident on the footing of a Lieutenant-Governor of a British province.



MAHARANI JIND KAUR

Born, 1817

Died at Kensington in England
August 1, 1863.

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The Durbar was not willing to agree to the new arrangements contemplated by the British Government. Sir Henry wrote on December 10, 1846:

"The coyness of the Durbar and the Sirdars is very natural, but it is very important that the proposal should originate with them, and in any document proceeding from them this admission must be stated in clear and unqualified terms, our reluctance to undertake a heavy responsibility must be set forth." (Pr. Cor., 13|12-3.)

The Governor-General would not go about his plans in a straight-forward manner, making the proposal to the Lahore Darbar himself for the retention of British troops in the Panjab and for unlimited control over the country. He wanted to show that he was reluctantly agreeing to the new arrangement at the express request of the Lahore Durbar. The Durbar, however, could not easily be brought round to making the request. Sir Henry, therefore, desired his Secretary, Frederick Currie, on the 12th to

"Persevere in your line of making the Sikh Durbar propose the condition or rather their readiness to assent to any conditions imposed as the price of the continuance of our support. In the preamble of the supplementary Arts., this solicitation must clearly be their act." (Pr. Cor., 14|15.)

In the Queen-mother the Governor-General and his political Agent at Lahore saw a wide-awake and strong opponent to their plans and intrigues. Sir Henry Hardinge had, therefore, written to Currie from his camp at the bridge across the Beas on December 7, 1846, that "in any agreement made for continuing the occupation of Lahore, her deprivation of power is an indispensable condition." On the 10th he had questioned the right of the Maharani to be the Regent of her son Maharaja Duleep Singh. "I am not aware", he said, "by what formal proceedings the Ranee became Regent—I presume by the unquestioned and natural position in which she stood as the mother and the guardian of the Prince." He suggested:

"If the Sardars and influential chiefs, and especially the Attaree-wala family, urge the B. Govt. to be guardian of the Maharaja during his minority, the Ranee's power will cease silently and quietly, the admission being recorded that the Br. Govt., as the guardian of the Boy and administering the affairs of the State, is to exercise all the

functions and possess all the powers of the Regent acting on behalf of the Prince." (Pr. Cor., 13|13.)

To win the assent and adhesion of the chiefs to the conditions to be imposed on the Government of the Panjab, Sir Henry Hardinge guaranteed to the Chiefs and Sardars the continuance of their *Jagirs* and wrote to Currie on December 14, from Camp Bhyrowal:

"The guarantee to the chiefs of their Jagheers by British occupation must, I should think, be powerful stimulus to ensure their adhesion to the conditions imposed." (Pr. Cor., 15|16.)

This, coupled with the fear instilled in their minds by the banishment of Raja Lal Singh during the previous week as punishment for his opposition to the British plans, had the desired effect on some of the Sardars. To make a show to the Darbar that the British troops garrisoned at Lahore were on the move, Sir Henry Hardinge had on the 12th issued instructions for certain pretended movements. "My object", said he, "is to give the Lahore Durbar a hint that the garrison is on the move. ...If this hint should be unnecessary by the temper of the Chiefs to assent to our views, it will not be made." (Pr. Cor., 14-15/15-16.)

In the meantime some of the Sardars had yielded to the pressure of Henry Lawrence and Frederick Currie. Sardar Sher Singh Atariwala had been put in charge of the royal palace in the fort of Lahore. Sardar Tej Singh, who had been made a *Raja* by the British, was their own man. They, like other friends of the *Farangis*, did not support the proposal of the Maharani being placed at the head of the State, while Diwan Dina Nath, who continued to be loyal to his country and sovereign, favoured the elimination of British control. There was a sharp division between the two groups. Apparently, as a compromise, it was agreed to ask the Governor-General to permit the Agent with two battalions to continue for some months, and a letter to that effect was written on behalf of Maharaja Duleep Singh to Frederick Currie, Secretary to the Government of India, then at Lahore, on Maghar 30, 1903 Bikrami, corresponding to December 14, 1846.

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Sir Henry Hardinge was much upset to hear of the above from Frederick Currie and replied to him the same evening, December 14, at 5 p.m., saying:

"It is my positive determination not to employ a British garrison in carrying on a native administration in the Panjab ...

"The proposal made of the aid of two Regts. of Inf., one of Cav. and one Battery or Artillery is so absurd that I consider it as equivalent to a desire to undertake the management of their own affairs, without our intervention. ...

"I am the best judge of what force I consider it prudent to retain at Lahore, and you may rest their rejection of my conditions on the preliminary question of the number of troops for the occupation." (Pr. Cor., 16|17-8.)

With a strong British force at Lahore the Governor-General was then in a position to dictate his terms to the Lahore Darbar. Armed with the positive determination and views of Sir Henry Hardinge, Frederick Currie held a conference of the chiefs and sardars of the state on the morning of December 15, 1846, and read out to them a paper which contained "the only conditions" which the Governor-General proposed to be imposed on the Lahore Government.

Without much discussion all agreed. Dissentient voice there was none to be. The assent of the leading chiefs and sardars had previously been manoeuvred. If there were any opposition to come, it was from the Regent, the Queen-mother, Maharani Jind Kaur. But she had been studiedly ignored in the matter of consultations and negotiations which were to shape the future of her son Maharaja Duleep Singh and the Government of Lahore. Diwan Dina Nath at one stage proposed adjournment of the conference in order that they might take the opinion of the Maharani, but Fred. Currie informed him that "the Governor-General was not asking the opinion of the Queen-mother but of the Sardars and Pillars of the State." This stern and strong hint from the Secretary to the Government of British India was enough to indicate to the assembled chiefs and sardars the attitude of the British and to silence the dissentient voice. And thus was the *Treaty of Bhyrowal* concluded and signed on the following day, December 16, 1846.

EFFECTS OF THE TREATY OF BHAROWAL

The treaty of Bharowal gave to the British Resident at Lahore "full authority to direct and control all matters in every Department of the state," which he was to exercise through an efficient establishment of British assistants. The Council of Regency, nominated by the British Government and composed of men selected by the British Resident himself, with their own man Sardar Tej Singh at its head, was nothing but a set of puppets removable at pleasure, and maintained to do his bidding. No change could be made in the personnel of the Council without the consent of the British Resident who was to have "full authority to direct and control the duties of every department" of administration conducted by them.

For the declared object of preserving the peace of the country, the Government of India were to maintain a British force of such strength and numbers and in such places as they might think fit, with liberty to occupy with British soldiers any fort or military post. The Panjab Government were to pay twenty-two lakhs of rupees per annum for the maintenance of this force and to meet the expenses incurred by the British Government.

The Queen-mother was to be given an annual pension of one lakh and fifty thousand rupees.

This treaty was to have effect during the minority of Maharaja Duleep Singh and was to terminate on his attaining the age of sixteen years on September 4, 1854.

Thus the British Resident, for all practical purposes, became the real ruler—an all-powerful king of the Panjab. The Council of Regency were only executive officers to carry out his orders. Henry Lawrence, the Agent to the Governor-General, was appointed the first Resident.

In the words of the Governor-General:

"The Treaty gives to the Government of India, as represented at Lahore by its Resident, full power to direct and control all matters in every department of the State....It is politic that the Resident should carry the Council with him, the members of which are however

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entirely under his control and guidance, he can change them and appoint others, and in military affairs his power is as unlimited as in the civil administration; he can withdraw Sikh garrisons, replacing them by British troops in any and every part of the Panjab."

It was not merely the unlimited political power that was conferred upon the British by the treaty, but, according to the construction put upon it by the Governor-General, it also made him the sole guardian of the person and property of the infant Maharaja Duleep Singh. And he was soon exercising the functions of the guardian and appealing to the treaty as his warrant for the assumption of this role.

Thus the British took upon themselves the entire responsibility of running the administration of the Panjab and maintaining peace in the country during the minority of the Maharaja. And in the words of Sir Herbert Edwardes, "the beginning of the year 1847 thus found Henry Lawrence in peaceful possession of viceregal authority over the province."

The treaty of Bharowal was so humiliating to the Darbar and the people of the country, and was forced on them in such a way as to give an impression of imperious high-handedness calculated to irritate and provoke them to hostilities. Writing to Sir Henry Hardinge on April 29, 1847, Henry Lawrence observed, "the national independence of the Sikh character may dictate an attempt to escape from under foreign yoke; for however benevolent be our motive and conciliating demeanour, a British army cannot garrison Lahore, and the fiat of a British functionary cannot supersede that of the Durbar throughout the land without our presence being considered a burden and a yoke." (BRC., 888.)

SARDAR TEJ SINGH MADE A RAJA

After the banishment of Lal Singh from the Panjab, Sardar Tej Singh was the chief henchman of the British. He had rendered signal service to them during the war, and was now the right-hand man and the chief adviser of Henry Lawrence. In recognition of his services Lawrence wished to confer upon him the title of *Raja*. The 7th of August, 1847, was fixed for the ceremony to be performed in the *Takhtgah*, the throne-hall, in the fort at Lahore. All went off well on the occasion

except that the young prince, Maharaja Duleep Singh, "with a spirit which is worthy of all praise," says John Sullivan, "flatly refused to be the medium of conferring the title of *Rajah* upon the Sirdar Tej Singh, whom all Lahore abhorred as a traitor." When Henry Lawrence failed to persuade him to make the saffron mark or *tika* on the forehead of Tej Singh, and Sardar Sher Singh Atariwala leant forward to request the Maharaja to comply, he folded his arms and shrank back into his chair with a determination considered foreign to both his age and otherwise gentle disposition. The Resident then called upon Bhai Nidhan Singh, a member of the Council of Regency, to officiate for the purpose and the ceremony was thus gone through, without the *contretemps* being observed by most of the chiefs and sardars present.

Henry Lawrence, just before the ceremony, had casually observed to his assistants, and Brigadier Campbell, "that His Highness evinced more intelligence than most English children of equal age would do."

THE QUEEN-MOTHER MAHARANI JIND KAUR IMPRISONED IN THE FORT OF SHEIKHUPURA

Henry Lawrence held the Queen-mother responsible for the Maharaja's refusal to put the *tika* or *tilak* on Tej Singh's forehead. The Maharani, of course, knew that Tej Singh was being created a *Raja* by the Resident for his services to the British and treachery to the kingdom of Lahore. She could certainly not, therefore, allow such a traitor to be anointed by her son whose cause he had so basely deserted and betrayed. Raja Tej Singh's patron, Henry Lawrence, was at this time acting as his guardian-angel. He interpreted the Maharaja's refusal as an affront to the British Government and, in exercise of his unlimited powers, ordered the Queen-mother to be immediately confined to the Samman tower of the Lahore fort, from where she wrote a stirring letter of protest to Henry Lawrence. (*Vide* App. C, First Letter, pp. 488-90.)

In this letter Maharani Jind Kaur challenged the bonafides of the British Resident and accused him of malfeasance in condemning her to public disgrace and imprisonment with-

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out any judicial or other enquiry, and without producing any documentary or other evidence or proving any allegations against her. She said that she had trusted the *Sahib* and that her trust had been betrayed. She called for an enquiry and appealed for justice, but she was denied both. She complained of the non-payment of her allowance of one *lakh* and fifty thousand rupees as laid down in the Treaty of Bharowal and told him that she had been reduced to the necessity of selling her ornaments to meet her expenses. "Even food and water are not allowed to come in," she said. She protested against the rudeness and misbehaviour of Bishan Singh and Gulab Singh, men appointed by the Resident to accompany the Maharaja to Shalamar Garden, and felt concerned about his safety in consequence of their frightening attitude towards him. The words, "What shall I do if something happened to him through fright," were indicative of the feelings of the mother for her young son. She clearly foresaw in this affair the ultimate intentions of the British Government when she said, "Why do you take possession of the kingdom by underhand means? Why don't you do it openly?" There was not the least doubt in her mind that three or four traitors were dancing to the tune of the Resident and working the ruin of the independent *Raj* of the Panjab. She at the end said, "Preserve three or four traitors and put the whole of the Panjab to the sword at their bidding."

Henry Lawrence could no longer tolerate the presence of the Maharani in Lahore. Her influence with the people, her shrewd understanding of local politics and secret British plans, her skilfulness in the use of her pen, her amazing ability 'to act with energy and spirit', and, above all, her intense patriotism were qualities which, in the eyes of the British, constituted grave menace to their authority in the Panjab. To give her an ill name before removing her from Lahore, she was accused, merely on presumption, of cognizance of a conspiracy for the murder of Tej Singh. But in the absence of any positive proof against her, it was not deemed expedient by the Governor-General to act against her on that ground. He, however, met the wishes of the Resident by authorizing

him to remove the Maharani from Lahore on political grounds.³⁸

On the morning of August 19, 1847, the young Maharaja was sent away to the Shalamar Garden at a distance of about three miles from the palace in the fort. Between 8 and 9 p.m. the Maharani was removed from Lahore under a strong military escort and was incarcerated in the fort of Sheikhupura in the early hours of Friday, August 20, 1847.

The removal and imprisonment of the Queen-mother not only gave the British an opportunity to educate and mould the young Maharaja in their own way, but also gave the Resident a much stronger hold over the Council of Regency, whose members were too frightened to challenge his will in the future.

In the letters addressed to the Acting Resident, Mr. John Lawrence, from the fort of Sheikhupura (App. C, pp. 490-93), she referred to the helpless plight of the Maharaja at Lahore and expressed her grief and indignation at having been separated from her son. "It is a matter of sorrow," she wrote to the Resident, "that you did not weigh things before accusing me. You have exiled me on the instigation of traitors... The treatment that you have given to me is not given even to murderers."

38. "Herewith are enclosed translations of the depositions taken in the case [of the Preyma conspiracy]. They are very unconnected, and afford no conclusive evidence against even the Maharani." *Resident to the Secretary with the G.G., August 9, 1847*

"...would not amount to proof that the Maharani was actually a party in this conspiracy." (*Remarks on the case by Mr. John Lawrence.*)

"It would not be advisable, however, in his Lordship's opinion, to found any formal proceedings against Her Highness, such as sending her out of the Punjab, on depositions which, on the whole, are not sufficiently conclusive against her. ...

"There is, ... in the Governor General's opinion, a sufficient justification, on political grounds, for separating the Prince from his mother at the present moment." (*Secretary with G.G. to the Resident at Lahore, August 16, 1847.*)

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Referring to the proclamation issued by the Resident on August 20, 1847, the day following her removal from Lahore, she said:

"How far you look to the welfare of the Maharaja is now well known all over the world. Weeping, he was torn away from his mother and taken to Shalamar Garden, while the mother was dragged out by her hair. Well has the friendship been repaid. ...

"You had been kept for the protection of our honour and dignity. But the traitors have deprived us of these also. Whatever you have done has earned a 'good' name for you! I have lost my dignity and you have lost regard for your word."

ENQUIRY AND JUSTICE REFUSED

Finding herself helpless and seeing no prospect of either an enquiry of the allegations against her or of justice at the hands of the British politicals in the Panjab, she sent an agent, Sardar Jiwan Singh, to represent her case to the Governor-General at Calcutta. He seems to have arrived there in December, 1847, and submitted a representation to the Secretary to the Government of India on January 2, 1848, complaining of the "cruel and unworthy treatment under which she now suffers; to demand of British justice a full and impartial investigation of the charges (but imperfectly known even to herself) under which she has, by British authority, been condemned to incarceration; and request that the restraint to which she may be subjected, pending that investigation, may be such as becomes the widow of one Sovereign Prince and the mother of another; such as is compatible with the safety of her person and such as will not deprive her of that intercourse with her friends and advisers which is necessary for bringing the truth of her cause to light."

But the Governor-General declined to recognize Jiwan Singh as her *Vakeel* and directed "that all her communications must be made through the Resident." This amounted to complete denial of justice to the Maharanee, contended Sardar Jiwan Singh, and he appealed to the Secretary to the Government of India on February 23, 1848, for modification of the Governor-General's resolution.

"The confinement in which the Ranee is now kept, is of the most close and rigid description. She is shut up in the fort of Sheikhupura,

formerly used as a gaol for common felons, under the custody of those Sirdars from whose dangerous machinations against her own life, and that of her son, she first solicited the protection of a British force stationed at Lahore; all intercourse with her friends and advisers or even with the ministers of her religion, is strictly prohibited, and the only attendants allowed her are a few female servants, not of her own selection, but appointed by her keepers. So penal is the nature of the treatment she undergoes, that she is not allowed even the privilege of choosing her own diet.

* * * *

"The friends of the Ranee now in Lahore, are so much intimidated that they dare not call the attention of the Resident to the hardships which she suffers.

* * * *

"And, on the same behalf, I further request that the Resident at Lahore be directed to institute an investigation into the charges under which the Ranee has been imprisoned, and to take down, and transmit to his Lordship in Council, the evidence of all witnesses which may be produced, in support, or in rebuttal, of the accusation. His Lordship, in directing such investigation, will, no doubt, order that, under all precautions which may appear to him prudent, or necessary to prevent an abuse of the privileges, the Ranee shall be allowed such intercourse with her friends and advisers as will enable her to plead her cause effectually."

But all this was of no avail. The Government did not find it safe, for political reasons, to institute an enquiry which might have resulted in establishing her innocence and led to an exposure of the intentions and policies of the British. As early as August 9, 1847, the Resident at Lahore, when recommending "her expulsion from the Punjab for ever," had written to the Secretary with the Governor-General, "I do not disguise for myself, nor do I wish the Governor-General to be ignorant of the fact, that the Maharanee is the only effective enemy to our policy that I know of in the country."

MAHARANI EXILED FROM THE PANJAB

To add to her misfortunes came the Multan rebellion which began with an attack on Mr. P. A. Vans Agnew and Lieut. William Anderson at Multan on April 19, 1848. Here again the hidden hand of the Maharani, closely imprisoned in

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the fort of Sheikhupura, was supposed to have been working, although there was nothing to prove it. "There is no proof," writes the Resident to the Secretary to the Government of India on May 16, 1848, "though there is some ground for suspicion that the Maharanee was the instigator of the late violence in Mooltan; but it is certain that, at this moment, the eyes of Diwan Moolraj, of the whole Sikh army and military population, are directed to the Maharanee as the rallying point of their rebellion or disaffection. Her removal from the Panjab is called for by justice, and policy, and there is no time for us to hesitate about doing what may appear necessary to punish state offenders, whatever may be their rank and station, and to vindicate the honour and position of the British Government."

The logic of calling a person 'State offender' when 'there is no proof' of his or her offence was only understood by the astute contrivers of British policy. The Maharanee was removed from the fort of Sheikhupura on the afternoon of May 15, 1848, to spend the remainder of her life in exile far away from the land of her birth and the kingdom of her son—the Panjab—which was taken possession of by the British within ten months of her deportation.

PANJAB NOT INTENDED TO BE INDEPENDENT AGAIN

Though the formality of annexing the Panjab was reserved for his successor, Sir Henry Hardinge had, during his own regime, succeeded in making the British the *de facto* overlords of the country. The treaties of Lahore, March 1846, and of Bharowal, December 1846, were so worded as to reduce the State of the Panjab to a subject province. What could not be openly accomplished with the force of arms was brought about by the soldier-diplomat by a clause or two inserted in the treaty. The Maharaja was left with no power and the Darbar, the chiefs and officers, with no authority for independent action. On October 23, 1847, Sir Henry Hardinge wrote to Henry Lawrence to conduct the affairs of the Panjab, taking it for granted that it was not intended to be an independent State again. He said:

"In all our measures taken during the minority we must bear in mind that by the Treaty of Lahore, March 1846, the Punjaub never was intended to be an independent State. By the clause I added, the chief of the State can neither make war or peace, or exchange or sell an acre of territory or admit of a European officer, or refuse us a thoroughfare through his territories, or, in fact, perform any act without our permission. In fact the native Prince is in fetters, and under our protection, and must do our bidding." (*Edwardes and Merivale*, ii. 100-1.)

LORD DALHOUSIE AND SIR FREDERICK CURRIE

Lord Dalhousie arrived at Calcutta as the new Governor-General of India on January 12, 1848, and Lord Hardinge sailed for England on the 18th, accompanied by Henry Lawrence who was going home on sick-leave. Frederick Currie was appointed to take Lawrence's place as British Resident at Lahore.

Lord Dalhousie was a young and vigorous man, very ambitious to win distinction for himself. Frederick Currie was exactly the man required by him to create opportunities for the realization of his personal and political aspirations. He was an out and out annexationist and his views regarding the future of the kingdom of the Panjab were well known. As early as January 19, 1845, eleven months before the first war broke out, he had, as Secretary to the Government of India (Foreign Department), written to the famous war-monger, Major George Broadfoot, the British Political Agent on the Panjab frontier:

"It would be madness in us to think of expending blood and treasure to bolster up the puppet Duleep Singh, or to set up such a government as could be formed out of the elements that now exist at Lahore which must owe its continuance henceforth to our power alone. . . .

"I imagine we shall be forced across the Sutlege sooner or later, and you will see that we are sending up troops to be ready for what ever may turn up. We must not have a Mahommedan power on this side the Attock. The Rajpoots of the hills could not hold the Panjab; and if it can't be Sikh, it must, I suppose, be British." (*Broadfoot*, 269-70.)

Such were the views of the person who was appointed Resident at Lahore with "full authority to direct and control all matters in every department of the State . . . with the Bri-

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tish force of such strength and numbers and in such positions as the Governor-General may think fit . . . at liberty to occupy with British Soldiers any fort or military post in the Lahore territories." The Governor-General was a new man. He had no previous knowledge of the Panjab and its people. He was to be guided in his plans and policies by the British Resident at Lahore. The determined views of the Resident on the Panjab that 'if it can't be Sikh, it must . . . be British' coincided with Lord Dalhousie's ambitious ideas. Having served as Foreign Secretary to the Government of India from 1842 to 1847, during which period a number of independent States had been taken possession of, Currie had become an expert in planning provocations and hostilities with a view to ultimate occupation of Indian territories. The practical experience he had gained in the political schools of Auckland and Hardinge proved very useful to him in the Panjab.

THE RESIGNATION OF MOOLRAJ ACCEPTED

A succession fee of 30 lakhs of rupees had been demanded from Moolraj on the death of his father Sawan Mall, the Governor of Multan, and on the arrival of the British in the Panjab in 1846, troops were sent under the command of Wazir Lal Singh's brother, Bhagwan Singh, to coerce him to pay. The troops were defeated. The district of Jhang was, however, wrested from Moolraj and transferred to Bhagwan Singh. The British Resident confirmed Moolraj in the Government of Multan and proposed to increase the amount of revenue from Rs. 19,71,500 to 25 lakhs at a first renewal and Rs. 30 lakhs at a second, as according to Henry Elliott's *Note on the Revenue and Resources of the Panjab*, of December 1, 1847, his tribute was "a very light one."

Diwan Moolraj, however, felt it otherwise, and, apparently, on getting an inkling of the proposed increase in his tribute, came to Lahore in December, 1847. John Lawrence was then acting as Resident for his brother Henry, who had left the Panjab for British India to proceed on leave. It appears that with the demand of a succession fee, the loss of a district, the call for rendering old accounts and other vexations to which

he was subjected, Moolraj's position had become so intolerable that he was compelled to resign his charge on December 18. John Lawrence, however, dissuaded him from this step. Although, in that moment of vexation, Moolraj persisted in his determination, he returned to Multan, requesting the Resident "to keep his resignation a profound secret from the Darbar." To this John Lawrence consented and it was understood that Moolraj would retain his government for another year.

The situation underwent a complete change with the arrival on March 6, 1848, of the new Resident, Frederick Currie. Currie had evidently been sent to Lahore with some new plans and fresh instructions by the Government of India. Writing to his brother Henry, sometimes in January or early February, 1848, John Lawrence said:

"Government has just written to me to do nothing about Multan till Currie comes. Thus six weeks are lost. In two months I would have assessed all Multan."

"Had John Lawrence been allowed to have his way in the matter," says Bosworth Smith, "he would have sent Arthur Cocks to Mooltan in January and the Second Sikh War, with its unaccountable blunderings and Cadmean victories, might possibly, have never taken place at all."³⁹

But Currie had not been sent with peaceable intention. "He was perhaps appointed to the Residency at Lahore," says Major Basu, "to provoke the Sikhs to hostilities and thus hasten the annexation of the Panjab."

Immediately on his arrival at Lahore, Currie sought to replace Moolraj with a number of British officers. Elliot in his *Note* had compared Multan with the British Division of Benares, together with three districts of Allahabad, with a

39. Bosworth Smith, *Lord Lawrence*, i. 246.

John Lawrence in his letter of December 27, 1847, addressed to Henry Elliot, proposed "to depute two assistants, one of whom to be permanently located in Multan and have the charge of the province. A Sikh should accompany, to command the troops under him."

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view to introducing their own system of administration and had recommended for its civil control,

- 2 Commissioners,
- 7 Judges and
- 9 Collectors.

These functionaries were, of course, to be all British, directly under the control of the Resident with full authority to interfere in and direct the duties of every department. The governor's plight under the contemplated arrangements could better be imagined than described. Therefore, when Currie exhumed the resignation of Moolraj, which John Lawrence had promised to bury deep as a profound secret, he was left with no alternative but to ask to be relieved of his charge.

"Moolraj," according to J. C. Marshman, "had always been regarded by the British authorities, and particularly by Mr. John Lawrence, as a fair specimen of an Asiatic ruler, and Mr. Agnew remarked, on his arrival, that the quiet aspect of Multan had not belied the accounts which he had heard of its excellent order and arrangement." (*Cal. Rev.*, Dec. 1843, p. 241; BRC, 803.)

But unmindful of the promise of John Lawrence, and of the 'excellent order and arrangement' at Multan, the resignation of Moolraj was accepted, and a new Governor, Sardar Kahn Singh Man, accompanied by two British officers, Mr. P. A. Vans Agnew and Lt. W. A. Anderson, was sent to take his place. General Kahn Singh, said Mr. Currie in his letter of April 6, 1848, to Henry Elliot, "will be almost nominal and the administration will be really conducted by the British Agent [Mr. Agnew], though in the name and through the instrumentality of the General and his subordinates."

THE BEGINNING OF THE TROUBLE AT MULTAN

The British officers and Sardar Kahn Singh arrived at Multan on April 18, 1848. The fort was quietly handed over to them by Moolraj on the following morning, the 19th, when his men were withdrawn and replaced by Gurkha soldiers of the Lahore regiment. Moolraj, the British officers and the new governor were coming out of the Sikki [?] Gate

and were about to cross the bridge over the fort ditch, when events took an unfortunate turn. According to poet Sobha of Multan, in his *Multan di Var*, the horse of Moolraj was pushing forward at a quicker pace when the Englishman (Mr. Agnew) raised his whip and it took to gallop. A soldier struck the Englishman with a spear and escaped.⁴⁰ Gian Singh tells us that the horse of Mr. Agnew kicked Sepoy Amir Chand who struck Mr. Agnew with a spear and threw him off his horse.⁴¹ The accounts of the incident in the depositions of witnesses examined during the trial of Moolraj vary considerably and are so conflicting that it is extremely difficult to get at the truth. According to the statement of Ibrahim Khan, who was a servant of Lieut. Anderson, "A sepoy of Mool Raj's was sitting in the first gate. Mr. Agnew was then on horse back, and Keshowram, the peon, who was following him, gave the man a push and said, 'why do you not get up and make a salute when a Sardar is passing?'—whereupon the sepoy started up and made a thrust at Mr. Agnew with a small spear which had been lying by his side."⁴²

It is not improbable that seeing the horse of Moolraj going ahead, Mr. Agnew struck his own with his whip which might have also hit Amir Chand standing nearby, or his startled horse might have kicked Amir Chand who, in quick return, in a bewildered state of mind, struck Mr. Agnew with a spear, in trying, perhaps, to hit his horse. He then quietly disappeared from the scene by jumping into the ditch.

Sardar Kahn Singh, who was with Mr. Agnew, immediately jumped off his horse and protected him from further injury. He mounted him on an elephant and took him to their camp at the Idgah. Seeing the Political Agent wounded, Moolraj spurred his horse and returned to his residence. At the same time Lieut. Anderson too galloped off, but he was pursued by some horsemen and wounded severely. Moolraj

40. *Prachin Jang Name*, 267-68.

41. *Tawarikh Guru Khalsa*, 1st edition (1894), part III, 1039 (505).

42. No. 2301-02, week ending Dec. 30, 1848, *Punjab Govt. Rec.* quoted by J. Mahajan.

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and Ram Rang, a relative of his, made several efforts to go to the Idgah to see the wounded British officers, but his excited troops would not permit them to do so. They, in fact, wounded Ram Rang and fired a couple of shots on the messengers sent by Mr. Agnew. The insurgents then called a council of their chiefs. The Mohammadans swore on the Quran and the Sikhs on the *Granth* to stand by Mulraj and invested him with leadership of the revolt by fastening on his wrist a *kangna*, or bracelet, of war. As a contemporary balladist Hakim Chand tells us, the mother of Mulraj played a great part in persuading him by taunts and curses to accept the leadership of the insurgents. All this took place on April 19, 1848. On the 20th morning, messengers from Mr. Agnew to endeavour to stop the cannonade on the Idgah from guns near the fort and the *Ām-Khās* were repelled by the insurgents. The fire from Multan side was answered by the Lahore guns, as a result of which the son of a Mazhabi Sikh was killed. This became the ultimate cause of the murder of the Englishmen.

Towards the evening it was arranged with a deputation from Mr. Agnew that 'the whole of the Lahore force should leave the Multan territory and that the cattle plundered from the Lahore army should be restored to enable them to march off.' At this time, a number of Lahore troops deserted their camp and joined the Multan insurgents. This encouraged an angry crowd, irritated by the death of the Mazhabi boy, to rush upon the Idgah Camp and murder Agnew and Anderson. Thus did Moolraj, driven by circumstances rather than acting on his volition, come to be placed at the head of the revolt of Multan.

CHANGE IN CURRIE'S ATTITUDE.

According to the treaty of Bharowal, the British were responsible for 'the preservation of the peace of the country'. Frederick Currie, the Resident at Lahore, received on April 21, Mr. Agnew's letter giving the first information of the happenings of the 19th and decided to send help at once. But a couple of days later, when the news of the murder of the British officers and of the desertion of their escort reached

Lahore, he changed his mind. He saw in it an opportunity which could be exploited for the annexation of the Panjab. The approaching hot weather was, therefore, used as an excuse, first by the Resident and then by the Commander-in-Chief and the Governor-General, for not sending British troops to Multan for the suppression of the revolt. Their real object, of course, was to allow the trouble to spread to warrant the despatch of big British armies under the command of Major-Generals and of the Commander-in-Chief himself, and to give it the appearance of a general war, with the usual sequel of honours, titles, promotions, allowances and prize money. The people of India, and of England, would in the meantime forget about the obligations and responsibilities of the British under the treaty and would be prepared to hear the news of the extinction of the independent *Raj* of the Panjab.

PROMPTNESS OF EDWARDES

A copy of the message of Mr. Agnew dated April 19 addressed to Fr derick Currie had also been sent to General Cortlandt of the Sikh service and Lieut. Edwardes, Assistant Political Agent, at Bannu. Edwardes received the message at Dera Fateh Khan on April 22, and, within two days, he made the necessary preparations, raised new levies from the border tribes, called Cortlandt from Bannu, and crossed the Indus on the 24th. But as Moolraj's brother Sham Singh had advanced as far as Leiah to oppose him, he crossed back to the right bank. He did not of course sit idle. He took possession of Dera Ghazi Khan and raised fresh troops for the coming struggle. He urged the Resident to quick action to confine Moolraj to the fort of Multan. The Nawab of Bahawalpur, was, in the meantime, persuaded to cross the river Sutlej with a view to advancing on Multan and co-operating with Edwardes, who had crossed the Indus on June 14 and the Chanab four days later. The opposition of the Multan troops was brushed aside in the battle of Kineyri, and by the end of June Edwardes had reached Surajkund, about four miles to the south of the town and fort of Multan. Here he was joined by the Lahore troops, about 4000 strong, under the

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command of Sheik Imam-ud-Din, Jawahar Mall and Raja Sher Singh. No British troops were sent along with them. Pressed hard by Edwardes, Currie had sent General Whish who arrived at Multan on September 3.

POLICY OF DELAY

By this time the revolt had spread to some of the north western parts of the Panjab as well. Sardar Chatar Singh Atariwala, the governor of Hazara, was, by the misbehaviour of his British adviser Captain James Abbott, compelled to take a hostile attitude. There were also revolts in Bannu and Peshawar. The banishment of the Queen-mother, Maharani Jind Kaur, from the Panjab added fuel to the fire. Finding the honour of his family at stake, Raja Sher Singh also left the British side. This was all the result of the deliberate delay in sending British troops to Multan.

Lieut.-General J. J. McLeod Innes tells us in his *Sir Henry Lawrence* :

"Such steps were thus deliberately avoided as might have crushed the outbreak at its start, as Henry Lawrence had done with the Kashmir attempt. Obviously the outbreak was assumed to be a premeditated Sikh movement, putting aside all idea of the continuance of a friendly Panjab. And the Government practically elected to run the risk—many held it to be the certainty—of the flame of insurrection spreading over the Province; of rousing afresh that spirit in the Khalsa. ...

"Many held it to be so obvious that there could be no other result, that they refused to believe that the coming struggle was not deliberately desired and determined by the Commander-in-Chief and the Government." (p. 98-9.)

Writing to his father, Harry Lumsden said on May 3, 1848,

"We are not to do anything against Multan till after the rains which I consider is a great mistake, ... should the people once take it into their heads that we cannot act in the hot weather, we shall soon have lots of summer campaigns." (*Lumsden*, 50-1.)

"It is difficult, also," says Sir William Hunter, "to refrain from censure of the inability to move which the Commander-in-Chief betrayed during that period, in spite of the two great camps of nine thousand men apiece at Lahore and Ferozepure—camps standing in readiness to march at a day's notice." (*Marquess of Dalhousie*, 74.)

A small force sent to Multan immediately after the murder of Agnew and Anderson would have settled the whole affair easily and quickly. This would also have served as a check on future risings in the country. The man on the spot, Herbert Edwardes, was urging upon the British Resident and, through him, upon the Commander-in-Chief and the Governor-General, to rush troops to Multan. Writing to Major Wm. Hodson on May 24, 1848, Edwardes expressed his conviction that Sir Frederick Currie had "made a mistake beyond all present calculation in yielding to the Commanders-in-Chief's wish to postpone hostilities for five months. Postpone a rebellion! Was ever such a thing heard of in any Government?...

"Give me two of all these prophesied brigades, and Bahawal Khan, and I will fight the campaign for you while you are preparing behind *tatties* in Lahore... Action, action, action! Promptitude! These are the watchwords which constitute *ikbal* (prestige), and not the pussillanimous prudence and calculating indignation... Clearly you are under the thumb of some awful traitor whose interest it is to keep you in dark." (*Hodson*, 71-3.)

But action and promptitude were not at this time in keeping with the strategy of either Frederick Currie or his Chief, the Governor-General. "The preservation of the peace of the country" was the responsibility of the British Government who, according to the Treaty of March 16, 1846, received twenty-two lakhs of rupees from the Lahore Government. But they had never meant to abide by their obligations. Instead of suppressing this small localized revolt, if revolt it could be called, the Governor-General wanted it to be given the appearance of a prolonged war, spread all over the country. He also wanted to make out that the rebellion was led not only by a non-Sikh civilian far away from the capital but also by some leading Sikh Sardar, a kinsman of the Maharaja. At the same time he wished to see the final battle fought either near the capital or on the way to it, so that the dust flying from the hoofs of the Sikh cavalry could blind the vision of the unsuspecting people and the critical politicians of England.

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"There can be no doubt," says Major General Innes, "that he [Henry Lawrence] felt it to be certain that for every British soldier whose life would have been risked by an immediate hot weather movement against Mulraj, tens or fifties would be lost in the war that was sure to ensue, and, in his heart, he thought with others, though he could not say so openly, that a sweeping war in the following winter and the conquest of the Panjab formed the *real aim* of new rule [of Lord Dalhousie] in India." (*Sir Henry Lawrence*, 73.)

Herbert Edwardes, however, did say so openly in his letter of May 24, 1848, to Major Hodson, the Political Assistant of the British Resident.

"You express a hope in your letter that the British Government will act *for itself*, and *not prop up a fallen dynasty*. In other words, you hope we shall seize the opportunity to annex the Panjab. In this I cannot agree with you, for I think, for all that has yet happened, it would be both unjust and inexpedient. The treaty we made with the Sikh Government and people cannot be forfeited by the treachery of a Gorkha regiment in *Multan*, the rebellion of a discharged *kardar* or the treasonable intrigues of the queen-mother, who has no connection with the Sikh Government of her son." (*Hodson*, 73.)

The secret intentions and plans of the British Government to put an end to the independent *Raj* of the Panjab and annex it to the British dominions had leaked out and had reached not only the camp of Raja Sher Singh, who was helping Edwardes against Moolraj, but also several other parts of the country, with the result that people's minds were very much agitated about the future of their land. Referring to this, Herbert Edwardes wrote to Currie at Lahore on June 29, 1848, "I am afraid considerable mischief has been done by an *idea of annexation getting abroad*." "It is my opinion," he said, "that you are certainly running a great and unnecessary risk in waiting for the cold weather, and giving the Sikh army the temptation to rise, when by a mere march the rebellion would now be settled." (p. 226.) He repeated the same opinion eleven days later saying, "I think it will be most culpable supineness if we allow a rebellion, which may be settled by a brigade or two, to rise again into a meet foe for the British army." (*Pr. Cor.*, p. 231.)

The excuse of hot weather was meaningless. No government ever postpones the suppression of a rebellion for reasons of weather. The mutiny of 1857 began on May 10, just when the Indian summer is at its worst. Was the despatch of troops to different centres of the Mutiny postponed for a more comfortable season? According to European officers at Multan, the weather was quite pleasant. Writing to Currie, Edward Lake said on August 14, 1848, "As for the weather, nothing can be more agreeable and pleasant than it is now. The nights are really quite cold and the days are not disagreeable." (p. 395.) "The weather is very pleasant and cool. The thermometer never above 100 and fine cool breeze at night," said Robert Napier on August 15. (p. 340.) On August 29, the same gentleman wrote to the Resident at Lahore, "the force here seems to be in good health and spirits. I have found the climate very pleasant, cool nights, no such warm days as we had at Lahore. My health and strength are much improved from that at Lahore." (p. 346.)

In point of fact, the conquest and the annexation of the Panjab having been decided upon, the senior officers of the army wished to use the Multan affair as an opportunity for honours and rewards for services in a protracted war, in cold and comfortable weather, brought to a victorious close with themselves in command of divisions and brigades. Says Herbert Edwardes:

"Napier does not state Lord Gough's reasons for still deferring operations, nor can I conceive any, for I hold his Lordship to be superior to the selfish wish which the regular army may be supposed to entertain for an easy campaign in comfortable weather, against a place sufficiently weak to give them trouble, and sufficiently distinguished to entitle them to C. B. ships, mural medals, and six months' batta." (Edwardes to Currie, July 10, 1848, p. 231.)

"Three months later, on or about October 6, he says the same thing a little bluntly:

"I fancy the dodge is that all these senior officers want to come marching up themselves at the end of Brigades and Divisions and don't care two brass farthings whether Whish is able or unable to maintain his position." (p. 287.)

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There was nothing very unnatural in such a wish lurking in the minds of the officers to whom there appeared no chance in the near future for military honours after the conquest of the last independent kingdom of the Panjab in India.

THE BANISHMENT OF THE MAHARANI

The banishment of the Queen-mother Maharani Jind Kaur from the Panjab not only gave to the people an indication of the impending occupation of the Panjab by the British but also disturbed the minds of the Sikh soldiers in the camp of Raja Sher Singh at Multan, where he had gone on behalf of the Council of Regency, at the desire of the British Resident, to help Lieut. Edwardes suppress the rebellion of Moolraj.

It is true that the Maharani was opposed to the interference of the British in the internal administration of the Lahore kingdom as visualized in the treaty of Bharowal. But she had done nothing criminal to deserve imprisonment or exile. She had asked for an open enquiry, but none was held. "A formal trial of Maharajah's widow would be most unpopular and hurtful to the feelings of the people," said the British Resident. "This regard for 'the feelings of the people' was all a pretext," says John Sullivan. "No formal trial was necessary," he continues, "all that was required was, that the charges against her should have been communicated to her in writing, and that she should have been called upon to give a written answer to them; but no such fair dealing was dreamt of by British authorities." "A cart-load of assertions, and a good deal of abuse, was allowed to stand in the place of proof." "And it was determined to banish, imprison and plunder her without any trial at all!" (*Koh-i-Noor*, 59-60.)

During her imprisonment and exile, the Maharani was subjected to a most humiliating treatment—so disgraceful that it moved Amir Dost Muhammad of Afghanistan to protest against it saying that "such treatment is objectionable to all creeds, and both high and low prefer death." (*Punjab Papers*, 1847-49, p. 512.)

"Is it surprising that this treatment of 'the mother of their sovereign, and of the widow of Runjeet Singh, should have

exasperated the people'?" asks John Sullivan. But that is what the British evidently wanted. They wished the rebellion of Multan to assume the appearance of a popular rising to give them the pretext of occupying the country. But meeting with little success in this object, the British Resident and his Political Assistants resorted to other stratagems and tactics.

SARDAR CHATAR SINGH'S REQUEST

While the Resident ordered the Corps of the Guides to take possession of the fort of Gobindgarh at Amritsar (occupied on July 29, 1848) and sent out detachments of troops to the eastern districts in search of political suspects, his assistant Captain James Abbott instigated the Muslims of Hazara against Sardar Chatar Singh Atariwala, the Sikh governor of the place. Technically Abbott was only an adviser to the Governor on behalf of the Resident, but he soon assumed the airs of a super-governor and started interfering in matters which were strictly outside the scope of his powers and responsibility. But he had a purpose in this. He was goading a leading Sardar of the State, the would be father-in-law of the young Maharaja, into rebellion. So far the trouble had been confined to the non-Sikh governor of a far flung Muslim district in the south-western corner of the kingdom, far away from the capital and from the centre of the Sikh population. It could be called a popular rising against the British only if all sections of population and leading chiefs of the country took part in it. This is what Abbott was trying to bring about in the north-west.

Sardar Chatar Singh was very popular with people of all classes and he would have been an automatic choice of the chiefs of the State for the position of Prime Minister if the British had not nominated their own favourite to this office. The only other Sardar who enjoyed such universal esteem was Sardar Lehna Singh Majithia. This is confirmed by no less an authority than John Lawrence. Writing to his brother Henry on August 28, 1846 (when John was acting as Resident at Lahore), he said, "I think he [Minister Lal Singh] will be assassinated some day, and perhaps this would be the best

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thing that could happen for the Punjab, for the chiefs would then set up Sirdar Lena Singh or Chutter Sing." (Smith, 218.)

Since the British Government had decided upon pulling down the structure of the independent kingdom of the Panjab Sardar Chatar Singh, whose daughter had been engaged to Maharaja Duleep Singh, could not be allowed by them to gather greater strength by the proposed matrimonial alliance of the House of Atari with the Royal family. The changed attitude of Abbott was a clear indication to the Sardar of the intentions of the British and his mind was filled with anxiety for the future of the State and of his own family. He, therefore, asked the British Resident to fix a date for the wedding of his daughter to the Maharaja. This was what the Resident least desired. He delayed and evaded the matter. This only confirmed Sardar Chatar Singh's doubts. The Sardar, therefore, wrote to his son Raja Sher Singh at Multan for consultation. In the course of his private interview with Lieutenant Herbert Edwardes on the evening of July 27, 1848, the Raja impressed upon him the urgency and seriousness of the question. The Jats, and especially the Sikh Jats of the Panjab, are very sensitive and touchy in respect of the marriage of their sisters and daughters. The marriage of a daughter is considered to be the sacred responsibility of the father, who wishes to see it performed before he dies. Lieutenant Edwardes in his official letter of July 28, 1848, from Camp Tibee, near Multan, conveyed the following substance of his talk with Raja Sher Singh regarding the wishes of his father Chatar Singh:

"Two things remain for him to do in this world, one to perform the prescribed round of pilgrimage, and the other to celebrate the marriage of his daughter. The latter duty he considers to have the first call upon him, but the event is dependent upon the wishes of the British Government. If it is not your intention that the nuptials of the Maharajah should be celebrated some time within the next twelve months, the Sardar would wish to be allowed to lay aside his duties of his Hazara Government, and proceed on pilgrimage for two years; if, on the contrary, the marriage is to take place this year, the Sardar would suggest that, with your sanction, the Durbar should appoint astrologers on the part of the Maharajah to fix an auspicious month and day...

"The above is the substance of the Raja's conversation and he earnestly requested me to procure him an answer from you within ten days." (*Punjab Papers*, 1847-9, p. 270-71.)

There was nothing strange in the wishes of Sardar Chatar Singh to proceed on pilgrimage or to celebrate the marriage of his daughter at an early date. He was an old man and his anxiety, especially in the matter of his daughter's marriage, was understandable.

EDWARDES SNUBBED BY LORD DALHOUSIE

As the secret intention of the British Government to annex the Panjab as a result of the rebellion had leaked out, Lieutenant Edwardes thought that the request of Sardar Chatar Singh might be a feeler to get at the truth about it. He, therefore, said:

"The request seems strange at the present moment. The secret motives of men are difficult to divine; but there can be no question that an opinion has gone very prevalently abroad, and been carefully disseminated by the evil disposed, that the British meditate declaring the Punjab forfeited by the recent troubles and misconduct of the troops."

Edwardes therefore suggested that:

"it would, I think, be a wise and timely measure to give such assurance of British good faith, and intention to adhere to the Treaty, as would be involved in authoritative preparations for providing the young prince with a Queen. It would, no doubt, settle men's minds greatly." (*Ibid.*, 271.)

Little did Edwardes know that his superiors, the Governor-General and the Resident, could not, in view of their ultimate objective, be persuaded to give any such public assurance of British good faith. Lord Dalhousie was upset to read the above suggestion and, among other things, wrote to Sir Frederick Currie on August 22, 1848: "It would be a friendly act if you or some of his well-wishers would point out to him that for an assistant to the Resident to transmit to his Government a *volunteer* opinion that they would be guilty of breach of faith if they adopt a particular policy, which the Government of India, Her Majesty's Ministers, and the Secret Cee., all contemplate as probable, is hardly discreet, quite unbecoming and altogether unnecessary . . . I don't intend to

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take any notice of this and mention it privately to you because I wish well to Mr. Edwardes." (No. 56, p. 89). Edwardes felt cut up at these remarks of the Governor-General and wrote to Currie on September 10:

"In taxing me with indiscreet, unbecoming and unnecessary conduct in describing as *breach of faith* a policy which the powers that be contemplated adopting, His Lordship presupposes that I was privy to their design, whereas I have had no knowledge of Lord Dalhousie's opinions since his resumption of the Government, than those of the Emperor of China.

"It would be gross insolence indeed were I to animadvert upon any policy which the G. G. had openly espoused, and declared wise and honest. Whatever I might think of the integrity or nullity of the Treaty, I should certainly not be so hardy as to say it was unbroken, should Lord D. assert it to be broken.

"You may believe me when I say that my opinion came involuntarily from my heart to my pen." (209/267-8.)

SHER SINGH DECIDES TO JOIN HIS FATHER

Sir Frederick Currie was also of the same opinion as Lord Dalhousie in respect of the future of the Panjab. He had, therefore, given a very stiff and evasive reply to Lieutt. Edwardes on August 3, regarding the Maharaja's nuptials, saying, "nothing can be done in this case without the concurrence and approbation of the Resident." (Pb. P., 271.) Sardar Chatar Singh and Raja Sher Singh, father and son, were both greatly disappointed at the British attitude and saw in it the doom not only of their proposal but also of the kingdom of the Panjab. The British intentions were now well known, and had upset the Sikh soldiers who were deserting the camp of Raja Sher Singh in large numbers and were going over to Moolraj.

Raja Sher Singh, who had so far been under the impression that he was fighting in defence of the State of the Panjab, was himself shaken in his faith. At this time, the second week of September 1848, came the disturbing news from the north that his father Sardar Chatar Singh had been compelled by the British Political Assistant, Captain Abbott, to give up the governorship of Hazara and move towards the north-west. Raja Sher Singh was then left with no alternative but to leave

the British and join his father and fight for the defence of his country and the honour of his family.

Raja Sher Singh was one of the staunchest friends of the British and had given them no chance to doubt his fidelity. He had withstood all temptations to desert them at Multan when Edwardes was almost all alone, with no immediate prospect of the British army coming to his aid. He had taken part in the fight against the troops of Multan, stood in the way of the Charyari troops going over to Moolraj (190/244), enfiladed Moolraj's positions on September 1, 1848 (205/263), made a severe attack on him (281/348), and was prepared to pitch into his father (206/264), and had actually blown from his own gun one Sujan Singh who was said to be 'the ring-leader in the disaffection of the Raja's camp.' (194/250, 332/400.) He had incurred the displeasure of the *Panth* for the sake of the British and estranged himself from his own people. Herbert Edwardes, who was the man on the spot, had full faith in him up to the last.

There should have been something very extraordinary to drive such a man to rebellion. Writing to Sir Frederick Currie on September 22, Robert Napier said, "I think however that the time of Sher Singh's defection must have been decided by some important intelligence he may have received from the north." (289/356.) In addition to the disturbing intelligence from his father in the north, he was, evidently, disillusioned about the good faith of the British.

ABBOTT PERSECUTES SARDAR CHATAR SINGH

To turn to Hazara. Captain Abbott was a man "of a very ready disposition," says Currie, "to believe the reports that are brought to him of conspiracies, plots, and treasons—a suspicion of every body, far or near, even of his own servants, and a conviction of the infallibility of his conclusions, which is not shaken by finding, time after time, that they are not verified." "It is very much to be regretted that Captain Abbott has, for the last three months, resided at such a distance from the Nazim and has been thus shut from all personal communication from him . . . , [otherwise] I am sure this state

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of things would never have arisen." (*Punjab Papers*, Resident to G.G., August 15, 1848, pp. 285-86.)

"The constant suspicion with which Captain Abbott regarded Sirdar Chuttur Singh, seems to have, not unnaturally, estranged that chief from him," wrote the Resident to G.G. on August 12. (*Ibid.*, 279.)

"It is a pity to say," wrote Edwardes to Currie on July 31, 1848, "so brave and chivalrous a man as Abbott turning Quixote with a fevered imagination, and seeing giants in every wind-mill." (192/247.)

Abbott levelled a false charge against Sardar Chatar Singh that he "is at the head of a conspiracy for the expulsion of the English from the Punjab and was about to head a crusade against the British forces at Lahore." This, according to the Resident's opinion, conveyed to the Governor-General in his official despatch of August 12, 1848, "is altogether incredible."

But Abbott did something worse. He excited the religious sentiments of the Muslim population and, promising them an opportunity of revenge, called upon them to harass and drive out the Sikh governor. Abbott wrote to the Resident on August 19:

"I, on my part, assembled the chiefs of Hazara; explained what had happened, and called upon them, by the memory of their murdered parents, friends and relatives, to rise, and aid me in destroying the Sikh forces in detail. I issued purwannas to this effect throughout the land and marched to a strong position." (*Punjab Papers*, 311.)

According to a Muslim correspondent of Sir Charles Napier, 'Captain Abbott wrote to the Hazarees, that if they will drive Chuttur Singh out, three years' revenue should be remitted.' (*Chas. Napier*, iv. 129.)

On August 6, 1848, the Hazara Muslims "assembled in great numbers and surrounded the town of Haripur" where the Governor lived. In self-defence, Sardar Chatar Singh directed the Lahore troops, "stationed in the town for its protection, to bring their guns, and encamp in the open space,

under the protection of the guns from the fort." Commandant Canora, an American artillery officer in the Sikh service, who was evidently in league with Captain Abbott, "refused to obey the Sardar's orders, unless backed by Captain Abbott. The Sardar repeated his orders, saying that Captain Abbott could not know the peril they were in, from the threatened attack of the armed population, who would easily seize guns where they were, and that he would take the responsibility of the movement on himself. The *Commedan* refused obedience; and placing himself between his two guns, which he had loaded with grape, threatened to fire on any one that approached him." (Resident to G.G., August 12, 1848, *Punjab Papers*, 279-80.)

Sardar Chatar Singh was thus left with the only alternative of asking the Colonel of the infantry to enforce his orders. At this, Canora ordered one of his havildars to fire upon the infantry. Upon the Havildar's refusal to do so, Canora attacked him and cut him down on the spot. He then applied the match himself, but the gun missed fire. Canora then whipped out his pistol, and shot down two Sikh officers. The Sardar then "repeated his orders to the Colonel, and the *Commedan* [Canora] was shot with musketry and the guns brought to the place appointed by the artillerymen." (*Ibid.*, August 15, 1848, p. 287.)

The conduct of Commandant Canora was a great military crime and deserved the punishment that he received. But Captain Abbott made political capital out of it. He called Canora's death "an atrocious deed," and "a cold-blooded murder," and accused the Sardar of having previously "determined upon the murder" of the Commandant as a link in the chain of his supposed conspiracy with members of the Lahore Darbar.

The Resident, Sir Frederick Currie, did not agree with Captain Abbott in his opinions and accusations and wrote to him on August 19, 1848:

"I cannot at all agree with you as to the character you assign to this transaction. Sardar Chuttur Singh was the Governor of the province, military and civil, and the officers of the Sikh army were

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bound to obey him, the responsibility for his orders resting with him. Taking the worst possible view of the case, I know not how you can characterize it as a 'cold-blooded murder'." (*Punjab-Papers*, 313.)

Again, on August 24, he said:

"I have given you no authority to raise levies, and organize paid bands of soldiers, to meet an emergency, of the occurrence of which I have always been somewhat sceptical... You have judged of the purposes, and feelings, and fidelity, of the Nazim and the troops, from the reports of spies and informers, very probably interested in misrepresenting the real state of affairs." (*Ibid.*, 316.)

Writing on August 8, to the Secretary to the Government of India, the Resident said:

"I hope, and I think, that Captain Abbott is wrong in his opinion as to the treachery of the Chiefs, and of the complicity of Sirdar Chuttur Singh Attareewalla, the Nazim of Hazara." (*Ibid.*, p. 274.)⁴³

On August 15, the Resident wrote to the Commander-in-Chief:

"It will be seen that Lieutenant Nicholson, judging from the result of enquiries made on the spot, and without any knowledge of my views, has come to the same conclusion as myself, relative to the origin of the outbreak, viz., that Sirdar Chuttur Sing adopted the course he has pursued under the impression of alarm, distrust and suspicion, as to Captain Abbott's purpose in raising the Mahomedan population. ...

"There is no sign, hitherto, anywhere, of the conspiracy or combination among the chiefs, or any parties, at Lahore, as believed by Captain Abbott, or of any complicity on the part of any one connected with the Durbar in the present outbreak." (*Ibid.*, 286-87.)

Sir Frederick Currie was fully convinced that the initiative in the Hazara affair was taken by Captain Abbott and that the Sardar or his troops had done nothing until Haripur was surrounded and threatened by the armed Muslim population instigated by him. The Resident wrote to Captain Nicholson on August 19, 1848:

43. "I entirely disbelieve Abbott's news that the disaffection and signs of conspiracy which the Sikh Army has shown at its several stations, is organized by the Sikh aristocracy and is assisted by the King of Cashmere." (Lieut. Edwardes to Resident, August 10, 1848, *Punjab Papers*, p. 276.)

"But we must bear in mind that, whatever may have been supposed to have been the purpose of the Pukli brigade and the Sirdar, no overt act was committed by either, until the brigade was surrounded in Gahundia, and Hurripur was threatened by the Mahomedan tribes, of whose purpose no notice had been given, by Captain Abbott, to Sirdar Chuttur Singh, the Governor of the Province. The initiative was clearly taken by Captain Abbott."⁴⁴ (*Ibid.*, 312.)

SARDAR CHATAR SINGH'S LAST STEP

Getting an inkling of the storm being deliberately raised around him by Captain Abbott, Sardar Chatar Singh had evidently made up his mind to resign his government of Hazara and to get away from the Panjab on the excuse of a pilgrimage. Before he did so, he wished to know if the Resident would agree to the celebration of the Maharaja's marriage to his daughter. Towards the end of July 1848, he had written to his eldest son Raja Sher Singh asking him to secure, through his friend Lieutenant Edwardes, an early answer from the Resident. Currie was the last man to give a clear answer, particularly when the Government of Lord Dalhousie had set in motion a conspiracy for the annexation of the Panjab. Edwardes, as we know, received an undeserved snub from Lord Dalhousie in this bargain.

Abbott, on the other hand, would not let an opportunity of his own military and political glory slip out of his hands. He had, therefore, hastened to lay a trap for Sardar Chatar Singh before any reply could be received from the Resident.

44. Captain Abbott was known for his suspicious and injudicious nature. The Resident at Lahore [Henry Lawrence] had in his official despatch of August 2, 1847, reported to the Governor-General that "Captain Abbott... is too apt some times to take gloomy view of questions. I think that he has unwittingly done Dewan Jowala Sahae injustice." (*Punjab Papers*, 30.)

Similarly, Resident Currie wrote to the Government of India on September 5, 1848, about Captain Abbott, who had accused Sardar Jhanda Singh of disobedience and mutiny:

"I explained to Captain Abbot, that if Sirdar Jhunda Sing's disaffection rested on the facts he had mentioned, it was without due foundation; for that Sirdar had, closely and scrupulously, obeyed my orders in every step he had taken after leaving Hazara." (*Ibid.*, 328.)

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This resulted in the death of Commandant Canora and led to further complications.

Although the Resident did not agree with Captain Abbott's opinions or concur with his activities against Sardar Chatar Singh, he did nothing to remove him from his post or prevent him from pursuing his hostile designs. On the other hand, he approved of his subsequent measures and allowed the affair to assume an awkward turn, and confirmed and ratified Captain Nicholason's suggestion of punishing the Sardar with forfeiture of his government and *Jagirs*. Surrounded by bloodthirsty Hazaras and persecuted by Abbott himself, and having no hope of justice and succour from the Resident, who would not give him the permission even to resign his post and proceed on pilgrimage, Sardar Chatar Singh wrote to his son Raja Sher Singh, about the 23rd of August, "complaining bitterly of Abbott, whose suspicions and treachery (*Munsoobah*) had driven him to adopt military measures to guard his life and honour." (201/58.) This was followed by further similar communications calling upon the Raja to join him in defending the honour of his family and the independence of his country. At last, on September 13, 1848, Raja Sher Singh decided to throw in his lot with his injured father and went over to Moolraj on the following day, September 14.

SHER SINGH MARCHES AWAY

Sher Singh was sadly disappointed at the suspicious attitude of Moolraj who looked upon his movements with distrust and refused him admission into the fort of Multan. He was also deserted by his two colleagues Sardar Atar Singh Kalianwala and Sardar Shamsher Singh Sandhanwalia. Moolraj's suspicions were deepened by a chit addressed to Raja Sher Singh by Herbert Edwardes and intended to fall into the hands of Moolraj through a spy named Bhamboo. In disgust Sher Singh marched away from Multan on October 9 to join his father.

Immediately after his departure from the British camp at Multan, Raja Sher Singh Atariwala issued the following manifesto on September 15, 1848:

"It is well known to all the inhabitants of the Punjab, to the whole of the Sikhs, to those who have been cherished by the Khalsajee, and, in fact, to the world at large, with what oppression, tyranny and undue violence, the feringees have treated the widow of the great Maharajah Runjeet Singh, now in bliss, and what cruelty they have shown towards the people of the country.

"In the first place, they have broken the treaty, by imprisoning and sending away to Hindustan the Maharanee, the mother of the people. Secondly the race of the Sikhs, the children of the Maharajah (Runjeet Singh), have suffered so much from their tyranny. ...By the direction of the holy Gooroo, Raja Sher Singh and others, with their valiant troops, have joined the trusty and faithful Dewan Moolraj, on the part of Maharajah Duleep Singh, with a view to eradicate and expell the tyrannous and crafty feringees. The Khalsajee must, now, act with all their heart and soul. ..." (*Punjab Papers*, 362.)

This had a fairly encouraging response from the old soldiers who flocked to Sher Singh's standard at Jhang and other places on his northward journey.

Sardar Chatar Singh, in the meantime, had left Hazara and moved towards Hassan Abdal and Attock. This encouraged revolts at Bannu and Peshawar on October 20 and 24. Sardar Chatar Singh entered Peshawar on October 31, and in the end of November moved down to Attock which fell to him on January 3, 1849. He was now free to reinforce the army of Raja Sher Singh on the Jhelum. But fate willed it otherwise. He was still on his way when the battle of Chelianwala took place (January 13). He could only take part in the final struggle at Gujrat (February 21, 1849) which sealed the fate of the State of the Panjab and converted it into a province of the British Indian empire.

THE LONG LOOKED FOR CRISIS

The Hazara affair, into which a leading Sardar of the Panjab, Chatar Singh Atariwala, had been dragged, followed by his son Raja Sher Singh, provided Lord Dalhousie with the long looked for *cause belli*, however feeble. This the Resident had been trying to bring about by his delaying tactics during the summer season. The disaffection having spread wide enough and the cold season being at hand, Lord Dalhousie decided to move to the north and joyfully announced in his high-flown rhetoric at a public banquet at

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Barrackpore (Calcutta) on October 5: "Unwarned by precedents, uninfluenced by example, the Sikh nation had called for war, and on my word, Sirs, they shall have it with a vengeance." Three days later, on October 8, he wrote to Sir Frederick Currie at Lahore:

"The rebellion of Raja Sher Singh, followed by his army, the rebellion of S. Chuttur Singh with the Durbar army under his command, the state of the troops and of the Sikh population everywhere, have brought matters to *that crisis I have for months been looking for*, and we are now not on the eve but in the midst of war with the Sikh nation and the kingdom of the Punjab.

"The result of this mad movement to the people and the dynasty of the Sikhs can be no longer matter of discussion or of doubt.

"... I *have* drawn the sword, and have thrown away the scabbard, both in relation to the war immediately before us, and to the stern policy which that war must precede and establish." (64/100.)

NO DECLARATION OF WAR

The British Resident at Lahore was a good deal puzzled on receipt of the Governor-General's official letter No. 376 of October 3, 1848, saying in paragraph 5 that "the Governor-General in Council considers the State of Lahore to be, to all intents and purposes, directly at war with the British Government." He wrote to His Lordship in a private letter on October 12:

"Now if that be the case, I with my assistants, am in an anomalous position, as superintending and aiding the administration of the Lahore State; and if I were to withdraw from the Government and to declare the Treaty violated and all amicable relations between the two States at end, we should have the whole country up at once as one man to destroy us, if possible. There is no doubt that all, with a very few exceptions, are, at this time, chiefs, army and people, inimical, aye hostile, to us in their hearts, and desire to get rid of us."

Currie also at the same time pointed out that although, for all practical purposes, Maharaja Duleep Singh had been reduced to a nonentity by the treaty of March 16, 1846, "yet he has been recognized as the nominal and *de jure* sovereign by them and this Government [with the British Resident as the *de facto* ruler] is still carried on in his name." He, therefore, suggested that:

"This declaration [regarding the State of Lahore being 'directly at war with the British Government'] should not be made till the Commander-in-Chief is in a commanding attitude at Lahore. ... I think the declaration to be made by the Government should be to the purport... setting forth that the British Government will now occupy the Punjab Province, ... that all consideration will be paid to the interests of the Maharaja Duleep Singh who, from his tender years, cannot be held personally responsible for the misconduct of the Lahore State. ...

"I think in the first instance nothing more explicit of the Government intentions need be proclaimed, and that this proclamation should not be made till we are in circumstances to follow it up. ... I think we may quietly annex the Punjab districts to the British Provinces, making a suitable provision for the state and comfort of Maharaja Duleep Singh." (65/103-105.)

Referring to the same paragraph No. 5 of the Government letter No. 376 of October 3, mentioned above, Sir Frederick Currie wrote in the same strain to the Commander-in-Chief in his private and *confidential* letter of October 13, saying:

"Now we are not in a position for me to make known to the State of Lahore the opinion of the British Government. As at present, I and my assistants and the British garrison, are here for the purpose of aiding by superintendence, advice and protection, the maintenance of the Lahore State and its administration. We cannot continue to protect and maintain a state which we declare to be at war with us; and we are not in that commanding or strong position here which would enable us to take the steps, which a declaration would render necessary." (66/108.)

Lord Dalhousie, however, was not the person to worry himself about the propriety of political conduct, international ethics, or the rules of war. He, therefore, wrote to the Resident at Lahore on October 16:

"I think you had very much better remain at Lahore. You are there not only a representative of the B. Govt. but a sort of impersonation of it; and anomalous as your position necessarily is at present, I think you should by all means continue there, rather than go on with C.-in-C." (68/111.)

On the 18th he wrote:

"I have already said to you that as our resolve is now taken, no compromises should now take place and as little reference to the future condition of the state of Lahore to be made as possible, until

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the Government of India shall declare publicly its intentions." (69/112.)

Again on November 3, he said:

"I am sorry you should have felt any perplexity in consequence of the passage in the letter No. 376 to which you advert. ...

"You have taken a perfectly correct view of the line of policy to be observed at present and have rightly concluded that the intentions of the Government, whatever they may be, should not be declared until the preparations of the C.-in-C. are completed. ...

"In the interval the position of yourself and your assistants must necessarily remain anomalous, as indeed it has long been. ...

"The subsequent destiny of the Sikh dynasty and Sikh nation will be pronounced upon when the objects, above mentioned [of 'defeating, disarming and crushing all forces' of the Sikhs] are accomplished." (71/115-16.)

It is something unique in history that without issuing a declaration of war, the Panjab State was considered 'directly at war' by the British, while its own officers were controlling and directing, with full and final authority, all matters in every department of that State, its ruler, a minor, being, by treaty, their ward.

BRITISH ARMY MOVES INTO THE PANJAB

The season and circumstances having become favourable for 'war' in the Panjab, the Commander-in-Chief moved down from his headquarters at Simla in the third week of October; and, true to the predictions of Herbert Edwardes, senior officers of the army, Brigadiers and Major-Generals, also came leisurely 'marching up themselves at the head of Brigades and Divisions.' The grand army of the Panjab was constituted and assembled at Ferozepore early in November 1848; and, with it, the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Hugh Gough, crossed the Sutlej on November 9, arriving at Lahore on the 13th. After three days' halt at the Sikh capital, he marched on (November 16) to the Chenab, on the right bank of which Raja Sher Singh was then encamped, waiting for the Bannu troops.

In the absence of any declaration by the British Government, 'it was not till after leaving Lahore that he [Lord Gough]

knew the definite decision of the Governor-General that the war was to be against, and not in support of, the Durbar.' "I do not know," he wrote on November 15, "whether we are at peace or war, or who it is we are fighting for."⁴⁵

The Commander-in-Chief came up to the advanced brigades at Nawala near Ramnagar on the 21st, and at once ordered Brigadiers Campbell and Cureton to drive the Sikhs from their post on the left bank and capture their guns, if any. But the Sikhs, with their main troops and guns, had crossed to their camp on the opposite bank before the British troops arrived. In the consequent scrimmage that followed with some small parties (November 22, 1848), the attackers suffered a heavy loss of life. Among those killed were Brigadier-General Cureton and Lieutenant-Colonel Havelock. "It served no useful purpose," says Lieutenant-Colonel Burton.⁴⁶ A division of the British army then crossed the Chenab at Wazirabad to contact Raja Sher Singh, who gave them a surprise at Sadullapur on December 3, 1848. He, however, withdrew to fall back to a stronger position on the Jhelum where the battle of Chelianwala was fought on January 13, 1849, between Raja Sher Singh and Lord Hugh Gough.

THE BATTLE OF CHELIANWALA—January 13, 1849

Sher Singh had made excellent strategic arrangements. "It is impossible not to admire," says Adams, "the military capacity which the Sikh leader displayed in all his movements and the skill with which he chose and fortified his ground."⁴⁷ And without coming to grips with Raja Sher Singh--and only hearing the reports of the movements and tenacity of the Sikh army, of which he had a good deal of experience during the first war with them--the British Commander-in-Chief felt nervous and stuck for over five weeks to his camp, about ten

45. *Life and Campaigns of Hugh, Viscount Gough*, ii, 178. Cf. Gough to Currie, 31st Oct., 1848. "Up to this time he [the Governor-General] has never distinctly stated to me that we are at war with the Punjab." (159/203.)

46. *The First and Second Sikh Wars*, 84.

47. *Epi. Anglo-Ind. Hist.*, 225.

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miles from the Sikh army. It was a period of inaction on both sides. Raja Sher Singh was waiting for his father who was delayed at Peshawar and later at Attock. The last place fell to him as late as January 3, 1849. According to Burton (p. 91), "Lord Gough", who had been preparing for this 'war' for over eight months, "was himself of opinion that he was not strong enough, and that it would be best to await the fall of Multan, which would release the troops there engaged, before attacking the Sikhs." The news of the fall of Attock was received on January 10, and on that day Major Mackeson, the Governor-General's Political Agent with the Commander-in-Chief, urged him to attack Sher Singh before he was reinforced by his father. On the morning of the 13th, Lord Gough moved up to attack the Sikhs and was received with artillery fire at about 2 p.m.

Chelianwala was one of the hardest fought battles. So close was the contest that each side claimed victory. "But the advantages gained were altogether on the part of the Sikhs," says Nolan. More than once the British troops were hurled back in confusion with heavy loss and Brigadier Pope's cavalry was put to flight in a manner that made him, like a bad workman, quarrel with his tools.⁴⁸ The British loss amounted to over two thousand men, six guns and several stands of colours.

There was a feeling of consternation, both in British India and in England, over the battle of Chelianwala which was considered to be a disaster worse than that in Afghanistan. "Chillianwala was not a victory," says Adams. "When the news of Chillianwalla reached England, the nation was stricken with profound emotion. A long series of military successes had ill fitted it to hear with composure of British guns and

48. "His defence was that he did his best to rally his men in vain, that they were generally light small men, mounted upon light small horses; whereas the cavalry immediately opposed to them were not only much more numerous, but cuirassiers, powerful heavy men, with long superior swords, and admirably mounted. The Colonel complained of bad manufacture of English weapons, which bent against the swords or cuirasses of the Sikh cavalry." (Nolan, *History of Br. Empire, Division IV*, 661-2.)

British standards taken, of British cavalry flying before the enemy, and of a British army scarcely able by the most desperate exertions to snatch a victory from a wild Indian people. It was felt that our fame and influence in India had undergone a heavy blow; and the disaster was attributed very generally to the blunders of the Commander-in-Chief."⁴⁹ *The Times of London* woefully declared that "Lord Gough was playing with the lives of our soldiers." Sir John Hobhouse, the President of the Board of Directors, observed on March 7, 1849, "The disaster has thrown the successes into the shade and the impression made upon the public mind is stronger than that caused by the Kabul massacre. The result has been that, in eight-and-forty hours after the arrival of the mail, it was determined to send Sir Charles Napier to command the Indian army."⁵⁰ Even the eighty-year old Duke of Wellington offered to go out to India to fight against the Sikhs, if Napier hesitated. He said to the latter, "If you do not go, I must."

The battle of Chelianwala paralysed Lord Gough, and Lord Dalhousie lost his confidence in him. Writing to Brigadier Mountain on February 13, 1849, he said:

"I have been made more anxious today than I have yet been by receiving a letter from the C.-in-C. in which he appears to me to shew that he has lost almost all feeling of confidence in himself.

"I trust to the army, to you and such as you, to make an effective job of your next action.

"No British army ever fought a *Great* battle with less odds or with greater appliances and means of victory." (127/168.)

To Sir John Hobhouse he wrote on February 21:

"If he [Lord Gough] disregards in his obstinacy these means again, if he again fights an incomplete action with terrible carnage as before, you must expect to hear of my taking a strong step; he shall not remain in command of that army in the field."⁵¹

In the meantime Multan had fallen and Moolraj had surrendered to General Whish on January 22; and the situation

49. *Ep. of Anglo-Ind. Hist.*, 228-29.

50. Rait, *Life of Lord Dalhousie*, i. 211.

51. Rait, i. 211-13.

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was saved for Lord Gough by the battle of Gujrat, February 21, which recorded an overwhelming victory for him.

SURRENDER OF MOOLRAJ—January 22, 1848

The first siege of Multan had been raised after the defection of Raja Sher Singh in September, 1848. Lord Dalhousie was not in favour of forcing immediate fall of Multan. He wished to prolong the affair for some months so that he could have 'a perfect right' to occupy the country after the British army had been called up to take the field against Moolraj. (50/72.) "Whatever turns up, give no terms to Moolraj," wrote Lord Dalhousie to Frederick Currie on May 17, 1848, (46/58.) He became very stiff in his attitude and, writing eleven days later in his private letter of May 28, he said:

"I regret to be obliged to add that I altogether dissent from the opinion you have expressed to Lt. Edwardes that he has done quite right in the negotiations he has entered into with the Dewan Moolraj with a view to induce that rebel to surrender himself and to come in.

"I object altogether to Lieut. Edwardes having taken upon himself to enter into any such negotiation...committing his Government...and in all probability *seriously embarrassing its future proceedings*...

"If, however, the Dewan Moolraj should still be in rebellion when this letter and the accompanying despatch reach you, I have to request that no terms whatever shall be made with this man...In the meantime *no anxiety should be shewn to settle matters by negotiation*. ...

"In the event of any sudden conclusion of this insurrection being brought to pass, I request that you will not enter into any negotiation with the Durbar and decide on anything regarding the reparations to be made to the British Government." (47/59-61.)

Lord Dalhousie was, however, very glad to receive the Resident's letter of June 6, saying that nothing had come of Lieutt. Edwardes' negotiations. "I have been heartily glad to perceive," said His Lordship on June 27, "that nothing has come of Lieutt. Edwardes' communication with Moolraj through Mustapha Khan, and consequently no harm has been done. . . . If the Diwan's cause should melt in the air, or if Lieutt. Edwardes and the Nawab of Bahawalpore should

with their troops beat him or catch him, it will make the Government and all of us look rather small." (49/66-67.)

"If the British army should be required to take the field against the Dewan Moolraj," wrote Dalhousie to Currie on July 13, "our right to do what we please with the Punjab will be beyond cavil or dispute. ... Suppose that either from fear of Lt. Edwardes' army or from internal dissensions the fort of Multan should fall and the insurgent force should disperse, our policy would be greatly more doubtful and perplexing. ... At present the State of Lahore is a flagrant offender. ... But if the Dewan's force shall now surrender or fly, they surrender to or fly before General Cortlandt's and Lt. Edwardes commanding the troops of the Darbar, in which case the Durbar will have obeyed our call and will have acted against the rebel to his end.

"...The Durbar will contend that General Cortlandt's are their troops, the new Pathan levies are made in their name, enlisted under their colors and paid with their money. And if there was any ambiguity about it, Lt. Edwardes in his letter of 21st had effectually removed it, for he has there officially informed the Bahawalpore General that the two corps are fighting for the Maharaja, for the restoration of Maharaja's rights and that the guns captured from the rebels belong neither to him, nor to the British, but to the Maharaja." (50/74-5.)

It was, evidently, for these reasons that Lord Dalhousie objected to Lieutt. Edwardes' negotiations with Moolraj and was opposed to early termination of the Multan insurrection which he wanted to use as an excuse for the movement of British troops into the Panjab for its conquest. Edwardes was ignorant of these hidden intentions and secret designs of the Governor-General, and "felt keenly the most unkind and unjust reproach of Lord Dalhousie." "I asked and expected nothing for it [his conscientious service at Multan]," he wrote to Currie on June 29, 1848, "but I certainly did not expect to be insulted, and the cold heartless sneer penned by his Lordship under a *Punkah* in his palace 1000 koss from dangers, through which I am struggling, has made a deep and lasting impression upon my mind. He may command my services to their fraction, but to his censure and praise I feel indifferent for the future." (182/224-25.)

Under pressure from Herbert Edwardes, the Resident sent General Whish to Multan. On the twelfth day of his arrival Raja Sher Singh left the British camp (September 14), and

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Whish had to raise the siege (September 16), which could not be effectively resumed for several weeks for want of reinforcements. The long-expected Bombay column arrived on December 22 and the suburbs of the town were occupied (December 27, 28 and 29). On the 30th Moolraj's principal magazine in the citadel containing some 400,000 lbs. of gun-powder was blown up by a shell from one of Whish's mortars. The city was carried by an assault on January 2, 1849. Moolraj was now helpless. Without gun-powder, he could not hold out much longer. He, therefore, opened negotiations with the besiegers.

At this time Sir Henry Lawrence returned to India and arrived at Multan. He halted there for two or three days and left for Lahore on January 8. 'Lord Dalhousie had heard—it is not known from whom—that Sir Henry—so much given to theatrical exhibitions!—had contemplated some 'pretty stage effect' of his own at Multan, including a personal surrender of Mulraj to himself.' His Lordship, therefore, wrote to him:

"There are strong rumours current that if you should arrive anywhere near Multan before the operations against that fortress are renewed and completed, the Dewan Mulraj means to surrender himself to you. I have no doubt whatever that you would not receive him, or act in any public capacity whatever, at present. ... I have to inform you that I will grant no terms to Mulraj, nor listen to any proposal but unconditional surrender." (*Sir Henry Lawrence*, 160-7.)

Similar instructions had also been sent to General Whish who refused to entertain any negotiations or grant any terms. With no other alternative open to him, Moolraj surrendered unconditionally on January 22, 1849.

LORD DALHOUSIE SNUBS HENRY LAWRENCE

Sir Henry Lawrence took charge of his office as Resident on February 1, 1849, and prepared, by Lord Dalhousie's wish, a draft of proclamation to be issued after the final defeat of the Sikhs. It was couched in a language in keeping with the practice, policy and tone of Sir Henry Hardinge's days. Dalhousie could not tolerate to see a document addressed to a fallen foe worded in a temperate language of friendliness and sympathy. Unmindful of the feelings of his veteran subordi-

nate, just returned to his duties in the Panjab, Lord Dalhousie disapproved of it, on February 1, in a most harsh and unbecoming language.⁵²

It appears that his Lordship wished to impress upon Henry Lawrence, in the very beginning, that his government had decided upon the occupation of the Panjab and would brook no opposition from any quarter. 'Unjust' or 'impolitic', he had decided upon it, and he must see it through. Fairplay and political morality had no place in the Indian policy of Lord Dalhousie.

Henry Lawrence, however, replied on February 5 to Lord Dalhousie's severe letter of disapproval with dignity and reiterated his views in the following terms:

"I feel grateful for the kindness and unreservedness with which your Lordship has honoured me, and beg to repeat the assurance that as long as I am your agent, you will find me act with faithfulness and without reserve. My own opinion, as more than once expressed in writing to your Lordship, is against annexation. I did think it unjust; I now think it impolitic. It is quite possible I may be prejudiced and blinded, but I have thought over the subject long and carefully."⁵³

THE BATTLE OF GUJRAT—February 21, 1849

Sardar Chatar Singh at last joined Raja Sher Singh at Chelianwala on January 16. His plan was to provoke Lord Gough by warlike movements and to draw him out of his strong position. But in the absence of any move on the part of the British C.-in-C., he set out for the Chenab on February 13.

52. His biographer, R. S. Rait, tries to justify the harshness of Lord Dalhousie saying:

"Sir Henry Lawrence...prepared a proclamation intended to be thrown out as an olive branch to the Sikh insurgents. It has been shown...that Henry Lawrence had taken decided line during his absence in London. Hobhouse had repeated to the Governor-General Lawrence's impression that the danger in the Panjab was exaggerated, that Multan would be captured without difficulty and the spread of the rebellion be stopped. It was as notorious that the Resident opposed annexation as it is that Lord Dalhousie saw no other alternative." (*Life of Lord Dalhousie*, i. 213.)

53. Edwardes & Merivale, ii, 123-5; Innes, *Sir Henry Lawrence*, 109-11; Rait, i. 214-16.

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His objective was either to check Whish's force coming from Multan or to move upon Lahore. But Whish had already placed his guards on the fords. The only alternative left for the Sikh force was to march to Gujrat where it was met by the British for a final struggle on February 21, 1849. Here the Atariwalas were defeated, and the Panjab passed into the British possession for the next ninety-eight years.

Sardars Chatar Singh and Sher Singh surrendered at Hurmuk to General Gilbert on March 10; and, four days later, on the 14th, at Rawalpindi, the Sikh soldiers, with tears in their eyes, kissed their swords and laid them down never to see them again, exclaiming, with choked throats: *Ajj Ranjit Singh mar gaya*—'Today is Ranjit Singh dead!'

THE FINAL TRANSACTION—March 29, 1849

The British Resident, Sir Henry Lawrence, was strongly opposed to the annexation of the country. Lord Dalhousie, therefore, selected his Foreign Secretary Henry M. Elliot as his agent for the final transaction. Under instructions from his Lordship Mr. Elliot saw the members of the Council of Regency privately, in the first instance, and made it clear to them, on March 28, "that any reluctance on their part would be a great mistake, that the Maharaja as well as themselves would be sufferers from it, that the decision of the Governor-General would in any case be carried out, the only difference being that if they with the Maharaja gave their formal assent, the advantageous position they then held would be guaranteed to them, while, if they refused, they would lose everything which the British Government chose to resume."

With British troops in complete occupation of the Panjab, the members of Regency had no choice but to helplessly sign the fatal document which put an end to the independence of the Panjab. It was then for the first time that they realized that the British Government had, throughout the past year, been acting in violation of the treaty of December 16, 1846, which provided for the protection of the Maharajah and the preservation of the peace of the country... during the minority of His Highness the Maharaja Duleep Singh up to the

4th of September, 1854. (App. B, No. VII, pp. 482-85.) Sir Frederick Currie had proclaimed to the people of the Panjab on November 18, 1848, soon after the arrival of the C.in-C. with his army at Lahore, that British army "has entered the Lahore territories, not as an enemy to the constituted Government, but to restore order and obedience," but it had proved a meaningless declaration. It was intended only to serve as a camouflage for the hidden intentions of Lord Dalhousie. The Lahore Darbar had placed all its available troops and resources at the disposal of the British Resident for the suppression of the Multan rebellion and had been, throughout, under the impression that the British army had been called in "for the preservation of the peace of the country", "and to restore order and obedience," in fulfilment of the terms of the treaty of Bharowal, December 16, 1846, and of the proclamation of November 18, 1848. They were completely disillusioned when they discovered that the British force had in fact entered the Panjab as an army of occupation to usurp her independence.

Early in the morning of March 29, 1849, a darbar was held at the palace in the Lahore fort and the Maharaja was, under compulsion, called upon to affix his signature to the document of terms drawn up by the British robbing him of his crown and kingdom. (App. B, No. VIII, pp. 486-7.)

PROCLAMATION OF MARCH 29, 1849

This done, Henry Elliot read aloud the proclamation issued by Lord Dalhousie to justify his policy and action. But it was a most artful piece of speciosity full of misleading and wrongful statements. It said:

"The British have faithfully kept their word and have scrupulously observed every obligation which the treaties imposed upon them.

"But the Sikh people and their Chiefs have, on their part, grossly and faithlessly violated the promises by which they were bound.

"Of their annual tribute no portion whatever has at any time been paid and large loans advanced to them by the Government of India have never been repaid. . . .

"Finally, the army of the state, and the whole Sikh people, joined by many of the Sirdars in the Punjab, who signed the treaties, and

led by a member of the Regency itself have risen in arms against us and have waged a fierce and bloody war, for the proclaimed purpose of destroying the British and their power."⁵⁴

BRITISH RESIDENT—THE DE FACTO RULER

It is true that the British Government scrupulously observed the terms of the treaties which either tightened their hold over the Panjab or weakened the State and its army and the chiefs. By the treaties of March 8 and 11, 1846, they had taken possession of the richest districts of the Panjab to the south and north of the Sutlej, had transferred the hill territories to their friend Raja Gulab Singh and carried away a large number of Sikh guns. They had disbanded a large portion of the Sikh army and so reduced its strength as to render it absolutely helpless even for the purposes of internal peace and order. The Panjab troops had been removed from within the city of Lahore, and the British force placed in full possession of the fort and the city, with the Maharaja and the Queen-mother at their mercy.

There were only two terms in these treaties which to some extent went in favour of the kingdom of the Panjab. By Article 15 of the Treaty of March 9, 1846, the British had promised that "the British Government will not exercise any interference in the internal administration of the Lahore State," and Article 1 of March 11, 1846, had laid down that "the [British] force shall not be detained at Lahore beyond the expiration of the current year." But the British Government abided by neither of these conditions. They not only interfered in every department of administration of the kingdom but also exercised full control over it. They retained, in violation of the treaty of March 11, their troops in the Panjab beyond the expiration of the time limit (1846) and towards the end of the year manipulated things in such a way as to create an opportunity to add to their force and impose the most humiliating treaty of Bharowal (December 16, 1846) upon the Panjab. This treaty, as we saw in the foregoing

54. Arnold, *Dalhousie's Administration*, 202-4; Latif, *History of the Panjab*, 572-3.

pages, gave to the British Government, through its representative, the Resident, "full authority to direct and control all matters in every Department of the State." (Art. 2.) The Lahore Darbar could make no changes in the mode and details of administration nor in the persons nominated by the British Government to the Council of Regency who were to act under the control and guidance of the British Resident. (Art. 4-6.) A British force of such strength and numbers and in such positions as the Governor-General thought fit remained at Lahore and had the liberty to occupy any fort or military post in the Lahore territories. (Arts. 7 and 8.) Thus the British became the virtual rulers of the Panjab. The chiefs and Sardars of the Council of Regency were nothing more than executive officers to carry out the orders of the British Resident.

Armed with these powers, the British Resident assumed complete control of the civil and military administration of the Panjab through a batch of British political assistants and a strong British force occupying the town and fort of the capital. The Maharaja was a virtual prisoner in the hands of the British. All state orders, or official *parwanas*, whether relating to policy or details of administration, were issued, with or without the seal of the Maharaja and/or of a member of Regency, only under the orders and with the approval of the Resident. John Kaye tells us in his *Sepoy War*, Vol. 1, p. 6, that when Prime Minister Lal Singh was disgraced and ordered to be removed from the Panjab (December 4, 1846), the Maharaja's seal was taken possession of by the Resident, who thenceforth used it in whatever way he wished. The henchmen of the British were honoured with titles and grants. The queen-mother, Maharani Jind Kaur, who tried to bring the chiefs and sardars of the State together for maintaining the independence of the country, was, by the orders of the Resident, and with the approval of the Governor-General, disgraced, imprisoned and exiled. Political suspects were hanged under his instructions. The governors of provinces were removed and appointed at will; and Sikh forts were occupied with British troops whenever and wherever the Resident

wished. The Resident remained in the capital of the Panjab, undisturbed, throughout the rebellion; his orders were fully and faithfully obeyed by the officers of the Lahore Darbar who gave to him fullest co-operation in the suppression of the rebellion.

FULL CO-OPERATION OF THE LAHORE DARBAR

The evidence of the *Akhbar-i-Darbar-i-Lahore* and the *Akhbar-i-Multan* quoted below from a paper published in the *Proceedings of the Indian Historical Records Commission* (1944 Udaipur Session), Vol. xxi, pp. 43-46, conclusively proves that the Lahore Darbar remained scrupulously faithful to the terms of the treaties entered into with the British Government and that "up to the eve of the annexation, it was under the impression that the British troops were engaged at Multan and other places in the suppression of the rebellion of Diwan Mulraj and others on their behalf in the performance of their duty for the 'preservation of the peace of the country' 'during the minority of His Highness Maharaja Duleep Singh' as agreed upon in articles 7, 8 and 11 of the treaty of December, 1846 and for which an annual amount of 22 lakhs of rupees was paid to them according to article 9."

It says that:

"It was in obedience to his [Resident's] orders that the Lahore Darbar issued instructions on August 23, 1848, for the recall of Sardar Chatar Singh Atariwala, the governor of Hazara, and his son Sardar Avtar Singh, and for the appointment of Sardar Jhanda Singh to officiate in his place in accordance with the wishes and advice (*bamutabiq marzi-o-salah*) of Captains Abbott and Nicholson, with instructions to Col. Bhup Singh, Col. Bahadur Singh, Col. Budh Singh, Babu Pandey, Col. Nur-ud-Din, General Sultan Mahmud and other military officers 'to be faithful and obedient to the aforesaid *sahibs*.'" (Akh. Lah., August 23-25, 1848.)

"As desired by the Resident, the Lahore Darbar issued parwanas to their military and civil officers to send reinforcements to Herbert Edwardes at Multan and to pay the salaries of the men under his command. (Akh. Lah., 28. 8. 1848.)

"Throughout the period, the Darbar kept the Resident fully informed of the happenings at Multan, Hazara and other places. The Lahore chief Raja Tej Singh regularly sought his advice and acted upon it. The other members of the Council also occasionally saw him and assured him of

their faithful adherence to their engagements with the British, kept him in touch with the political situation in the country and suggested to him measures for the suppression of the rising.

"As desired by the Resident, the various Sikh forts, including the fort of Govindgarh at Amritsar, were evacuated by the soldiers of the Darbar and made over to the British to be occupied and held by their troops.

"Diwan Mulraj and, later on, Sardar Chatar Singh and his sons Sardar Avtar Singh and Raja Sher Singh, and their friends like Sardar Lal Singh Muraria, Surat Singh Majithia, etc., who had taken up arms against the British in the Panjab, were looked down upon and declared as *mufsids*, or mischief-makers; their houses were searched by the officials of the Darbar and their property confiscated to the state. (*Akh. Lah.*, Oct., 1-3, 4-9, 1848; and also *ibid.*, Nov. 1, 1848, for other confiscations.) A *parwana* was issued on November 1, to General Cortlandt of the Sikh service, then commanding a section of the Lahore troops at Multan against Mulraj, to send in the names of all those Sikhs who had gone over to the rebels, so that their houses and property might be confiscated.

"At the suggestion of the Darbar, the Resident appointed two of his Assistant Political Officers to take charge of the *ilaqas* and *jagirs* of the recalcitrant Sardars of Gujranwala, Ranghar-Nangal and Murara, and administer them according to the wishes of their chief. (*Akh. Lah.*, Oct. 4-9, 13-15, 1848.) One of these officers, on arrival at Ranghar-Nangal, set fire to the houses of the Sardars. (Oct. 13-15, 1848.)

"Rewards in cash and kind were granted by the Darbar, on the recommendations of the British Resident to civil and military officers, and subordinates and other ranks, for services rendered by them in the cause of the British. (*Akh. Lah.*, Dec. 12, 1848.)

"Food and fodder were regularly supplied by the servants of the Darbar to the British regiments moving from their cantonments into the Punjab for the suppression of the disturbances in the country. (*Akh. Lah.*, Oct. 21-24, 1848.) The Darbar and their agents advanced money to the British officers, like John Nicholson and others, whenever they stood in need of it, for the expenses of the detachments and men placed under their command. (*Akh.*, Oct. 30, 1848.)

"The bodyguard of Maharajah Duleep Singh consisted of a cavalry regiment of the East India Company which formed a part of the British garrison of Lahore. (*Akh. Lah.*, Oct. 30, 1848.)

"The Lahore Darbar ordered Sardar Gulab Singh, son of the 'rebel' Sardar Chatar Singh, to convey personally to his father a copy of the Governor-General Lord Dalhousie's letter saying that if any harm came to the lives of the British officers in Peshawar and

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Hazara, it would be avenged with the blood of the sons of the Sardar, one of whom, the above Sardar Gulab Singh, was then in Lahore. (Nov., 1848.)

"Under the orders of the Resident it was proclaimed by beat of drum in the city of Lahore on November 1, 1848, that all the Sikh employees of the Lahore kingdom, and of the chiefs residing in the capital, should obtain passes signed by Captain Bowring; these passes they were always to carry with them, as without them they would not be permitted to enter the city or reside therein.

"On the arrival of the British Commander-in-Chief at Lahore on November 13, 1848, Maharajah Duleep Singh and the Chiefs of the Lahore Darbar received him with all the usual friendly formalities and presents, and fired a salute of 17 guns in his honour. In the course of conversation, Sir Hugh Gough told the Resident that their object was the protection and management (*hifazit-o-bandobast*) of the kingdom of the Maharajah, in addition to the encouragement of his friends and supporters and the suppression of the rebels. (*Akh.*, Nov. 13, 1848.)

"On November 15, the Lahore Darbar, as desired by the Resident, ordered two of its officials, Sardar Boor Singh and Diwan Kishan Lal, to accompany the Commander-in-Chief and his force to Ram Nagar (against Raja Sher Singh), to look after their comforts and supply them with food and fodder. (*Akh.*, Nov., 16-17, 1848.)

"On the 27th of November, 1848, after Sher Singh's two documents (letters addressed to the G.G.) had been received and discussed with the members of the Darbar, the Resident ordered Sardar Atar Singh Kalianwala, Khalifa Nur-ur-Din, Diwan Ajudhia Prasad and Wazir Nihal Singh to remain with the Maharaja throughout day and night. This order was literally obeyed by these officials of the State. (*Akh. Lah.*, Nov. 27, 1848.)

"As desired by the Resident, the Lahore Darbar fired 21 guns to celebrate the victory of Multan, and issued orders to Faqir Shamas-ud-Din, the commander of the Gobindgarh fort at Amritsar, to do the same. Khalifa Nur-ud-Din was sent to convey to the Resident congratulations on behalf of the Darbar (January 25, 1849)."

In the light of the above it is obvious what a travesty of facts the British proclamation of March 29, 1849, accusing the Sikhs of non-co-operation and violating the treaty-promises, was. It was, in fact, the British—the Governor General and the Resident—who faithlessly and blatantly violated the promise by which they were bound to preserve the peace of the

country and protect the Maharaja.⁵⁵ They deliberately and studiously avoided suppression of the rebellion in time to create a pretext for the annexation of the country and usurped the kingdom of Duleep Singh who was under their protection.⁵⁶

PAYMENTS BY THE LAHORE DARBAR

It is a gross misrepresentation of truth to say that no portion of the annual tribute was paid by the Lahore Darbar. It is contradicted by the report, dated February 23, 1848, of the Resident himself, to the Governor-General, wherein he says: "*The Durbar have paid into this treasury gold to the value of Rupees 13,56,837-0-6 By this payment they have reduced their debt to the British Government from upwards of forty lakhs of rupees to less than twenty seven.*" (*Punjab Papers*, 110-111.)

If the state was not in a position to make the payment in full, it was no fault of the Council of Regency. They had no power left in their hands. The British Resident was the real ruler. He had effected reforms of customs and land-tax which involved a sacrifice of some fifteen lakhs of rupees of annual revenue. On the other hand, he had increased the expenditure of the State in several ways not fully favoured by the Council. "There was neither evasion nor violation," says Major Evans Bell in his *Retrospects and Prospects of Indian Policy*, p. 167. "The only cause of the subsidy having fallen into arrears," he continues, "was that the Resident, in the

55. Referring to the promises broken by the British, Lutfullah in his *Autobiography* mentions the observations of Mir Nur Muhammad during his talk with Captain Eastwick, saying: "Mir Nur Mohamed first observed in Biluchi, to his two colleagues 'cursed be he who puts reliance upon the promises of the Feringees,' and then addressing himself seriously to the British representative, he spoke thus in Persian: 'Your treaties, I believe, are changeable at your pleasure and convenience; is this the way to treat your friends and benefactors?'" (pp. 204-6; BRC, 817.)

56. "By the well-founded report, which Edwardes tells us prevailed, that it was our settled determination to make these outbreaks the pretext for the confiscation of the Punjab." (Sullivan, *Koh-i-Noor*, 62.)

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plenitude of his powers, had thought fit to lessen the receipts of the State and to divert the expenditure into other channels." These measures were "entirely the Resident's work, approved by the Governor-General, reluctantly accepted by the Durbar." (Cf. Sullivan, *Koh-i-Noor*, 62.)

RISING OF THE ARMY AND PEOPLE ?

As regards the army of the State and the whole Sikh people rising in arms for the destruction of the British and their power, it may be stated that only a small fraction of the army deserted to Mulraj and to the Atariwala Sardars in the far-flung south-western and north-western Muslim populated districts of the State. Even there, the troops commanded by General Cortlandt, Sardar Fateh Singh, Missar Sahib Dyal, Diwan Jawahar Mull, Shaikh Imam-ud-Din, Sardar Jhanda Singh, Colonel Bhup Singh, Col. Bahadur Singh, Col. Budh Singh, Babu Pandey, Col. Nur-ud-Din, General Sultan Mahmood, and other military officers remained faithful and obedient to Lieutenants Edwardes and Lake and Captains Abbott and Nicholson in accordance with the orders of the Lahore Darbar. As late as November 15, when the British Commander-in-Chief, Lord Gough, had entered the Panjab territories and was encamped at the capital of the state, the Lahore Darbar, as desired by the British Resident, ordered two of its chief officers, Sardar Boor Singh and Diwan Kishan Lal, to accompany and guide the Commander-in-Chief and his force to Ram Nagar (against Raja Sher Singh), to look after their comforts and supply them with food and fodder.

There was no rising either of the army or the people in the central Sikh districts of the State; not a single British officer was attacked or molested. The British Resident continued to stay at the capital of the kingdom, issuing orders to the Council of Regency, the Darbar, and receiving their fullest co-operation. Only one member of the Regency, out of eight, had joined the rebels and another was only *suspected*. The remaining six were perfectly faithful and obedient. In addition to the great majority of the army who took no part in the revolt, "at least 20,000 subjects of the Lahore State," ac-

according to Major Bell, "enrolled in its service, fought on the side of the Government, and assisted in suppressing the rebellion," not knowing that at the end of it their country would be annexed and permanently occupied by the British Government. They had trusted the good faith of the British Government and relied upon the treaty of December 16, 1846, which was to 'have effect during the minority of His Highness Maharajah Duleep Singh, and . . . cease and terminate on His Highness attaining the full age of sixteen years, or on the 4th September, 1854.' But five years and a half before the due date, when their ward, the Maharaja, was yet a minor, being only eleven years of age, Lord Dalhousie broke his faith and cheated him out of his kingdom.

TREATIES VIOLATED BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT

John Sullivan says: "Though the State of Lahore had remained faithful to its engagements with the British Government, that Government had violated its own engagements with the Lahore state." (*Koh-i-Noor*, 66.)

"Having conducted the administration of the Lahore State," says Major Bell, "for two years and three months, . . . by means of his own Agent and his own nominees, in the name of his Ward and Ally, the Maharajah, under a treaty which he up-holds and enforces to the last—he [Lord Dalhousie] turns round, when the rebellion is over, declares the Treaty to have been violated, and therefore null and void, and explains that the successful campaign, ostensibly carried on for the suppression of a rebellion against the Government of Maharajah Duleep Singh, really constituted a war against the Maharajah and the State of Lahore, by which the British Government has 'conquered' the Punjab." (*Retros. and Pros. of Ind. Policy*, 157-8.) But "during the period prescribed by the treaty for the Maharajah's minority, no crisis, no second struggle, could absolve the British Government from the obligations of Guardianship and management, so long as it professed to fulfil those duties, and was able to do so without interruption." (*Ibid.*, 152-3.) Lord Dalhousie has, as such, "violated Treaties, abused a sacred trust . . . and [made] an

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MAHARAJA DULEEP SINGH

Born :

Bhadon 23, 1895 Bk.
September 6, 1838 A.D.

Died :

October 22, 1893.

Deposed by the British
March 29, 1849

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acquisition as unjust as it was imprudent. . . . This, I believe, will be the verdict of posterity and history, upon the transactions which have just passed under our review." (*Ibid.*, 179.)

"This is perhaps the first instance on record in which a guardian has visited his own misdeeds upon his ward," says John Sullivan. "The British Government was the self-constituted guardian of the Rajah, and the regent of his kingdom; a rebellion was provoked by the agents of the guardian, it was acknowledged by the guardian to be a rebellion against the government of his ward, and the guardian punished that ward by confiscating his dominions and his diamonds to his own use!" (*Are we Bound by our Treaties*, 52.)

"The duty of a Lord Paramount is to protect, and we assume this title with a view to destroy. We are bound by treaties to 'protect' the states, which we are now employed in annihilating. (p. 54.)

"The verdict against us must be, that in matters Oriental this nation has no conscience."⁵⁷ (*Ibid.*, 78.)

According to John M. Ludlow:

"Dhuleep Sing was an infant; his minority was only to end in 1854. We were his declared protectors. On our last advance into his country, we had proclaimed (18th Nov., 1848) that we came to punish insurgents, and to put down 'all armed opposition to constituted authority.' We fulfilled that pledge by annexing his whole country within six months. . . . In other words, we 'protected' our ward by taking his whole territory from him. . . . But having once recognised and undertaken to protect Dhuleep Sing, it was a mockery to punish him for the faults of his subjects. As between us and him, in putting down insurrection, we were simply fulfilling our duty towards him. No such act on the part of his subjects could give us any title against him. Fancy, if you can, a widow lady with a houseful of mutinous servants, who turn out and attack the police. The police knock them on the head, walk into the house and kindly volunteer to protect the mistress against any violence on their part. A quarrel again breaks

57. "The confiscation of the Punjab is a thing done," says John Sullivan, "and if I could make it transparent as the sun, that the act was a wanton violation of the most solemn duties which we had imposed upon ourselves, it would not be undone; still it may be useful for the purposes of history and of morality to trace the steps by which the acquisition was made." (*Koh-i-Noor*, 69.)

out, the truncheons are again successful, and the inspector now politely informs the lady that her house and the estate on which it stands are no longer her own, but will be retained in fee simple by the police; that, on turning out, she will receive an annuity, equal to about one and six pence in the pound of her rental; and that she must hand over for the use of the chief commissioner her best diamond necklace. Is this an exaggerated version of our conduct towards that innocent boy Dhuleep Sing, now grown into a Christian gentleman?" (*British India*, ii. 166-7.)

Lord Dalhousie, perhaps, never realized to what a pitiable condition he had reduced a ten-year old innocent fatherless boy, Maharaja Duleep Singh, forcibly separated from his mother at the age of nine and heartlessly driven out of his kingdom, until, with the death of his wife, his own children were rendered motherless, though not fatherless and homeless. Writing to Col. Mountain in the last week of June, 1853, after the death of Lady Dalhousie on the 13th, he said:

"God, and those on whom he places it, alone can tell how heavy it is and how hard to bear this burden and every circumstance both to me and to her poor children that could sharpen the anguish of such a lash has been added. I try to submit and I hope I may.

"God's ways are not as our ways. It is no right of ours to enquire his reasons. If we had such right, I should be quick to admit that he had abundant cause, if it seemed to him good, to inflict this punishment and chastisement upon me." (134/172.)

SUGGESTIONS REGARDING PATIALA AND JIND

Annexation, on every possible opportunity, of every Indian state in the midst of British territories was the policy of Lord Dalhousie. "I cannot conceive it possible," wrote he in 1848, "for anyone to dispute the policy of taking advantage of any just opportunity for consolidating the territories that already belong to us, by taking possession of states which may lapse in the midst of them." "I take this fitting opportunity of recording," he wrote again, "my strong and deliberate opinion that in the exercise of a wise and sound policy, the British Government is bound not to put aside or to neglect such rightful opportunities of acquiring territories, or revenue, as may from time to time present themselves." These were the pronouncements of policy made by Lord Dalhousie during the first year of his office. Encouraged by these pronounce-

INTRODUCTION

ments, Robert Napier, very subtly suggested the inclusion of the Protected Sikh States, and of Patiala, in the annexation and occupation plan of the Government. Writing to the Resident on October 6, 1848, he said:

"I hear rumours of excitement in the *Protected States* and of Patiala, but hope they are not true. The fort of Bahadurgarh may be a temptation, as every fort is to an oriental." (295/363.)

John M. Ludlow in his *British India* has also the following quotation making a similar suggestion:

"The 'petty intervening Principalities' of Patiala and Jheend are surely, in the midst of the present mutiny, a very effective 'source of strength for adding to the resources of the public treasury!' (Vol. ii, 156.)

But somehow or other these States escaped Lord Dalhousie's attentions.

SUPPRESSION OF THE LEADING PEOPLE

The wholesale suppression of the leading people of the Panjab was a necessary corollary of the annexation of the State by Lord Dalhousie.

In his letter of October 3, 1848, Robert Napier had written to Sir Frederick Currie, "I think we ought, if we take the Punjab, to reduce entirely the aristocracy. The people without heads are nothing." (294/361.) "There never can be easy guarantee for the tranquility of India," wrote Lord Dalhousie in his despatch addressed to the Court of Directors, "until we shall have effected the entire subjection of the Sikh people and destroyed its power as an independent nation." "When I am fairly convinced that the safety of our own State requires us to enforce subjection of the Sikh nation," he continued, "I cannot abandon that necessary measure because the effectual subjection of that nation involves in itself the deposition of their Prince." To Lord Dalhousie, reference to Maharaja Duleep Singh as an innocent minor ward of the British government, was born of 'a feeling of misplaced and untimed compassion for the fate of a child.' (Arnold, *Dalhousie's Administration*, i. 205-19; Hunter, *Marquess of Dalhousie*, 81-83.)

'Lord Dalhousie was not content with disarming the people,' writes William Hunter, 'he determined that the chiefs and fief-holders of the Punjab should be effectively deprived of the power of doing mischief. . . . Lord Dalhousie resolved . . . to destroy the status of the class . . . [and] insisted upon the absolute dismemberment of the Sikh confederacy.' (*Dalhousie*, 98-100.) To the utter disappointment of Sir Henry, John Lawrence agreed with the policy of Lord Dalhousie who selected the latter to carry it out and appointed him the Chief Commissioner of the Panjab while the former was transferred to Rajputana. Not long afterwards, men who had been generals and colonels in the Sikh army, as well as those who had held high civil positions in the State before annexation, were seen reduced to most difficult straits.

ULTIMATE OBJECT ATTAINED BY THE BRITISH

While the Panjab lost her independence and her people were forced, like others, to be helpless subjects and impoverished mercenary soldiers of the British in India, the British were able to push forward the boundaries of their empire to the natural frontiers of the Pathan mountains in the north-west and to the farthest ranges of the Himalayas in the north. "The addition of this territory (over fifteen thousand square miles) brought us to the natural boundary of India, the hills beyond the Indus," says George Campbell in the *Modern India*. "Our next neighbour is now Afghanistan, a hill country of small resources and of little aggressive military power." (p. 147-148.)

"We now only require Cashmere and the Jammoo hills to round off our dominions in this quarter, and they must be ours", said R. W. Bingham in his *General Gilbert's Raid to the Khyber*, 1850. "When his [Gulab Singh's] dominions lapse to us (which they to a certainty will do), we shall have, to the North and North-west, one of the most magnificent boundaries which an empire could desire." (p. 113.) The occupation of Jammu and Kashmir was planned, some years later, by a scheme of colonization of the valley by some three million Englishmen to be imported from England or by Anglo-

INTRODUCTION

Indian settlers from the Eastern provinces. But it was given up as politically dangerous to the British power and supremacy in India, as it was feared that, like the early English colonists of America, these Englishmen might in due course of time become rivals to the British trade in this country, and might in their new adopted homeland strive, like the Americans, for political freedom from under the yoke of England.

The annexation of the Panjab had an economic aspect too. The cotton of the Panjab was one of the chief attractions to the British who foresaw in the land of the five rivers a favourable market for the consumption of their goods. While Amritsar offered the prospects of an *enterepot* for the Panjab and the hill territories of Jammu and Kashmir, Multan and Peshawar promised to become advanced depots for British trade in Afghanistan and in regions beyond the Oxus.

The Panjab also offered vast opportunities of employment for a large number of British civilians and politicals with handsome salaries, allowances, furloughs and pensions. It also offered facilities of extensive cantonments and mountainous training-grounds for the British troops.


The British had stirred up the frontier Muslim tribes against the Sikhs and their government. They could only retain their sympathies and attachment by the subversion of the Sikh kingdom and occupying the country themselves to be able to reward them. For a whole century the Muslims of the Western Panjab served as henchmen of the British against all progressive movements in the country and were, in the end, richly rewarded by their patrons with the grant of Pakistan in 1947.

And, above all, with the Sikhs removed from the Panjab, the British, sitting at the mouths of the Afghan passes, could with greater ease and facility watch the politics of Afghanistan, move up their armies when necessary, and strengthen their defences against the dreaded Cossacks of Russia.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

In the end it has to be admitted that the British succeeded in the Panjab not only because of their superior skill and training in diplomacy but also because of the lack of national spirit and territorial loyalty in the chiefs of the country. While the people and soldiery of the Panjab were highly patriotic in the struggle, the so-called pillars of the state (the Prime Minister, the Commander-in-Chief, etc.) subordinated the interests of the country to those of self and became willing tools in the hands of the British. Leave alone the Poorbias and the Dogra hill-chiefs who were only soldiers of fortune and not the sons of the soil, the Sandhanwalias also played an equally ignoble part in the weakening of the state. It is also a pity that the leading Sardars of the country—the Atari-walas, the Majithias and the Sandhanwalias—could not rise to the occasion and stand as one man against the enemies of the Panjab to save it from the impending doom. But this, alas ! was common to the whole of the sub-continent of India.

GANDA SINGH



PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE

RELATING TO

THE ANGLO-SIKH WARS

PART I

FIRST ANGLO-SIKH WAR AND AFTER

(i) LETTERS OF LORD ELLENBOROUGH

1. *From Lord Ellenborough to the Hon'ble Mr. J. H. Maddock, Allahabad.*

Agra, May 1, 1843.

My dear Mr. Maddock,

The Calcutta Hindoos are silly fellows indeed, if they thank me for encouraging Hindooism. If they should go any further in the matter you could show them the instructions to Major Leech.

It is quite enough for the English to make fools of themselves in this matter without our Hindoos following their example. . . .

What do you think of my going to Scinde? It is hardly possible to say yet whether it will be better for me to go to Scinde or to Gwalior and Bundelcund in November.

One advantage of going to Scinde is that untile the beginning of January, I shall be on the Sutlej and Nally things look more shaky than ease in the Punjab and Mr. Clerk's temporary retirement will be like striking away a leg from the Maharaja's Chair. He wants me to go up to the hills now, and I think I should if I could house myself at Kussowlee or Subathoo.

Colonel Sutherland seems to me a good deal better. If he were well he would be in Shahgurh by August.

I have offered to Lt. Richmond the officiating appointment in Mr. Clerk's place. I could make no arrangement at short notice, and at this season quite satisfactory. I hope this may answer.

2. *From Lord Ellenborough to Frederick Currie.*

Calcutta, Sept. 28, 1843.

My dear Mr. Currie,

I was very glad indeed to receive last night your letter accepting the Foreign Office.

I do not know yet whether the late affairs at Lahore will produce any change in Mr. Clerk's plans. I should not think they would — on the contrary I believe he will be only the more disposed to go away and so avoid seeing the probable anarchy of the Punjab.

If Mr. Clerk goes on the 15th of November, as he intended, Mr. Thomas ought to be on the spot on that day to take the Govt. and it would be more convenient certainly that there should be as short an interval as possible between his departure from Calcutta and your arrival.

Perhaps as soon as you learn that Mr. Clerk certainly goes on the 15th of November, you could get a month's leave and come down to Calcutta.

3. *From Lord Ellenborough to Captain Grahm, 55th N.I.*

Camp Gwalior, January 7, 1844.

My dear Sir,

I have to thank you for your memorandum on Buhawulpore which I have read with much interest.

I greatly regret that your impaired health should make it necessary for you to quit your appointment.

I am perfectly satisfied with your conduct and I hope the Government will again at some future time have the benefit of your services.


4. *From Lord Ellenborough.*

London, March 10 (18 ?), 1847.

My dear Currie,

Many thanks for your letter and for the statement of the proposed disposition and expected strength of the several corps upon the Sutlege and Jumna when the reductions are effected. I gave a copy of the statement to the Duke.

I congratulate you on Lal Singh's treachery which has given you an opportunity of falling upon your legs. I have





VISCOUNT (Sir Henry) HARDINGE

Governor-General of India

(July 1844, to Jan. 1848)

Born :
March 30, 1785.

Died :
September 24, 1856.

no objection to make the present arrangement at Lahore except that I doubt the peculiar fitness of Col. Lawrence and of the other officers employed to carry it out. You should have induced Mr. Clerk at any price to undertake the duty.

... ..

5. *From Lord Ellenborough.*

Eaton Square [London], May 29, 1858.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I think it would be desirable that the Court should address a letter to the G. Genl. expressing the opinion that the Government should exercise the powers it has over the Press to prevent the publication of invectives against the disarmed sepoys and of threats against them of various modes of extreme punishment. Unless the whole tone of the English Press with respect to the natives is rendered more temperate and polite, we shall never be able to have real tranquility for we shall never have the people without fear.

Will you bear this all in your mind?

(ii) *LETTERS OF LORD HARDINGE*

6. *From Lord Hardinge.*

Camp Moodkee, Dec. 20th, 1845.

My dear Currie,

It gave much pain and cause for anxiety to have you as my comrade in the midst of fire of Artly. and musquetz by which so many of my personal friends have been sufferers when the Sikh attack on our camp was so gallantly repulsed. You conducted yourself so coolly that I should have the greatest reliance on your prudence, but it is not right that valuable servants of the state whose abilities and acquirements are most important to the Public Service, should be exposed to risks, which you ought not professionally to incur. In my position here I would not carry on the Govt. without your aid, and in every point of view I consider that there is a public and moral obligation which must restrain me from consenting to be accompanied by you tomorrow.

We may have some very sharp work, and as other Public offcs., Civil and Mily., have been directed to remain here, I shall be pained if I see you in the field exposed to be the victim of courage misapplied. On personal grounds of friendship, I also feel most desirous that you should not be liable to be severely exposed. The affair will be over tomorrow and I shall have the satisfaction of having you again by my side the day after tomorrow.

I must therefore request and insist that you remain here tomorrow and rejoin me the day after.

F. Currie Esq.,
Chief Secy. to the Govt.

Ever, my dear Currie,
Yours very sincerely,
H. Hardinge.

7. Notification by order of the Right Hon'ble The Governor General of India, issued by F. Currie, Secretary to the Government of India, with the Governor General.

Foreign Department, Ferozepore,
December 25th, Christmas Day, 1845.

The Governor General has the heart-felt satisfaction to announce to His Honor, the President in Council, to the army and to the People of India, the repulse of the Sikh Forces in their attack on a portion of the British army near Moodkee on the night of the 18th instant and the capture on the evening of the 21st and morning of the 22nd of their entrenched Camp with 70 pieces of Cannon, defended by 60,000 men near the village of Pheroshuhur—upwards of 90 pieces of the Enemy's Artillery have been taken in these two operations.

These, events, so glorious to the British arms, have been followed by the precipitate retreat of the enemy towards the Sutlej, his pride abated, and the unprovoked aggression on the British Territory signally avenged.

The Governor General cordially congratulates the Commander-in-Chief General Sir Hugh Gough, Bart., G.C.B., on the entire success of his Excellency's rapid and energetic operations in which the troops both British and native have displayed, under circumstances of long continued fatigue since the 11th instant, their accustomed discipline and order.

The Governor General will rejoice in recording the gallant exploits of the Army during this important Campaign

by decorating the breasts of the Victors with a medal as the report of these operations shall be received from the Commander-in-Chief.

Incessantly engaged in sharing with his brave troops their fatigues, and showing by his personal example at the head of the troops the value of enduring privations with patience, it has been impossible for his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in the midst of so many occupations to furnish to the Governor General a detailed report of these brilliant successes.

The Governor General, however, cannot refrain from notifying to the Honorable the President in Council, to the army and to the people of India, these results so honorable to the British arms, and he directs that this notification be carefully made known to all the troops by being read at their Parades and communicated to all the Departments of the Government, Civil and Military, and that a salute of 21 guns be fired from this Fort of Ferozepore, this day at 1 O'clock, and at every principal station of the army as soon as the Notification shall be received.

These grateful and heart-felt acknowledgements to the army for its services, cannot be closed without humbly remembering that our thanks are due to Him who is the only Giver of all Victory and without whose aid the battle is not to the strong.

The Governor General therefore invites every British subject at this station to return thanks to Almighty God, this day at 11 O'clock, for the mercies He has so recently vouchsafed us, by assembling at the Governor General's tent when Prayers and thanks will be read by the Governor General's Chaplain.

8. *From Major H. Mackeson C. B., with the Governor General.*

Camp near Sutlej,
29th Jany. 1846.

Sir,

I have much pleasure in communicating to you for the information of the Right Hon'ble the Governor General

a decisive victory gained by Sir H. Smith with the troops under his command over the Sikh Force opposed to him on the 28th instant. The Enemy was completely dispersed and driven across the Sutlej with the loss of his guns, camp equipage, baggage and baggage animals.

Sir H. Smith's Force moved towards the enemy from Buddowal at daybreak. During the day and night of the 27th reports had been received that the enemy intended to move the next morning either west of Jugraon or to Nooyrar.

On our march scouts came in with intelligence that the enemy was moving and their tents being struck. On arriving at the village of Poorain eight miles from Buddowal the enemy came in sight at a distance of three miles apparently moving towards us in force. It has been subsequently ascertained that his intention had been to march upon Jugraon when he was arrested in his progress by our troops coming in view.

On reaching Poorain Sir Harry Smith drew up his force in line, between Poorain and the villages of Bhutta-rawa, Aliwal and Boondree was a fine hard plain. We advanced steadily on, the enemy came towards us—a heavy cannonade opened on us from all parts of the enemy's line and was returned from howitzers and 9 prs. and other guns. He had possession of Aliwal from whence it was determined to dislodge him and this was gallantly done at the charge of the bayonets by H.M.'s 31st, 24th N.I., 47th, the Nusseri Battalion and the 36th N.I. who on nearing the village formed upon the right of the right brigade. The enemy's left was turned by this operations and our Cavalry being brought up from the right charged in upon him. Our whole line then advanced and the enemy was driven back on his right as he had been on his left.

The exact number of guns is not yet known. It cannot, I think, be less than 50 including 3 spiked on the right bank of the Sutlej.

The fords at Boondri and the heavy sand on this side the river alone saved him from annihilation, as it was, his loss has, I have no doubt, been heavy and many must have been drowned in crossing the river.

Our loss was, I hope, not very heavy. The Lancers have suffered the most; they have two officers Lts. Swelenham and

Williams killed, and 4 or 5 wounded with about half that number wounded among the men. Our artillery have not suffered much. A number of boats are moored on the opposite bank of the river which we shall either destroy or get possession of tomorrow.

Owing to some mistake of the camp followers our baggage is not yet up; but we shall be alright tomorrow.

The action lasted from 10 A.M. to 1¼ P.M. It was sharp and decisive. A steady advance and no hesitation, both European and native behaved admirably and the Cavalry, especially the 16th Lancers, as will be seen from their Casualties, did good service, the fighting men of the enemy have been estimated at 22,000 with 70 pieces of artillery, among them some heavy pieces and mortars.

9. *From J. D. Cunningham to Henry Lawrence.*

Camp near Boondree, January 29, 1846, 4½ A.M.

My dr. Lawrence,

I sent you a pencil note yesterday afternoon telling you of the very complete victory which the troops under Major General Sir Harry Smith had gained over the Sikhs, and I now write again to assure you of our success. We must have the whole of their artillery so far as we can at present see. We took their camp as it stood, and many bullocks and camels, as well, perhaps, as some grain may yet be secured for the use of the army. The enemy succeeded in getting two or three of their guns to the other side, but the river was crossed and the guns were spiked. Many of the fugitive Infy. and Cavalry got across the river in small parties here and there, yet many have been drowned.

From spies we had learnt about sunrise that the enemy proposed marching on Jugraon that morning and this was confirmed by a European named Brown in the Sikh Service who was made prisoner. This man says that our advance from Buddowal was wholly unexpected.

The Sikhs were drawn up in advance of their entrenched position with their left supported by the village of Aliwal and their right resting on Boondree. Intermediately they had the shelter in several places of the bank of a dry channel. The advance of our troops was regular and imposing and

village Batteries and Battalions were speedily carried or broken.

The Sikhs, including their reinforcements received the day before the Battle, may have mustered 18,000 or 22,000 fighting men, and credible accounts give them from 60 to 70 pieces of Artillery. Our force numbered 8,900 Infy., 2700 Cavalry and 32 guns.

P.S.

Every day there were reports of designed movements of the Sikhs, east, west or south. The intention however of going to Jugraon seems to have been serious.

Our losses on the whole have been very small. The 16th Lancers seem to have suffered the most severely.

10. *From The Agent to the Governor General, N. W. Frontier [H. M. Lawrence] to F. Currie Esq., Secretary to the Govt. of India, with the Governor General, Foreign Department.*

Dhurmnote, 29th January 1846, 9½ P.M.

Sir,

In obedience to the verbal orders given to me yesterday by the Right Hon'ble the Governor General I left the Army Head Quarters Camp at Midday and joined Brigdr. Taylor C. B. this place Dhurmnote, at 4 P.M. On my way I demi-officially reported to you from Esa Khan ke Kote and again at 8 P.M. a few minutes after which hour the news of Major General H. Smith's victory arrived when I immediately sent on the original letters by Captains Becher and Baggot.

2. Brigadier Taylor C. B. with his Brigade retraced his steps to Head Quarters this morning. When I proceeded to Sir H. Smith's camp, I found the country between Dhurmnote and General Sir H. Smith's camp in a disturbed state. The villages were all more than usually barricaded and in one Indgurrh was a newly raised and loop-holed Tower full of men who made no reply to my challenge. At Tahara and Sidhum the Zamindars and Traders flocked to me begging for protection. Both places belong to the Alloowallie Sirdar.

3. At 11 A.M. on my arrival at Boondree I found Genl. Sir H. Smith's camp pitching, the army having lain on the Battle ground 2 miles distant during the night.

4. During the day I saw about 25 of the captured cannon, the largest being a 12 pounder. Among them are 2 Ornamented six pounders given by Lord W. Bentinck to the late Maharaja Runjeet Sing. Other guns were being dragged by the soldiers into camp. Major Lawrence Comdg. Artillery told me he thought that the total number captured would probably amount to 50. A European deserter by name Potterahis Brown whom I examined said that about 70 guns were in the field, but I think he exaggerated the number, for it is not clear that any guns escaped and no one says that more than 3 got over the river and these were spiked by Captain Holmes of the Irregular Horse.

5. Sir H. Smith estimates his loss at 150 killed and about 200 wounded. H.M.'s 16th Lancers, H.M.'s 50th and the 3rd Lt. Cavalry were the principal sufferers.

6. Sir H. Smith says he can supply himself with small arm ammunition from Loodiana and that he has already made known his wants for Artillery ammunition and tomorrow will send to Bussian for all he requires. The General states that his supplies have been separated from the main convoy which will not be impeded.

7. I regret to say that the Fort of Gungrana, tho' invested by the Putteeala Troops, was evacuated last night. It is the intention of General Sir H. Smith to destroy it (Gungrana), Buddowal and some other forts.

8. I made known to Major General the desire of the Governor General that ferries and fords should be closely watched so as to prevent the recrossing in force of the Sikhs above Hurreekee.

9. The enemy were commanded by Sirdars Runjoor Singh, Urjun Singh, and Lall Sing Morari, all of whom fled; the former as well as many small bands down this (the Ferozepore) road. The Cavalry of the army are reported not to have fought more than they could help—simply defending themselves. The Infantry and Artillery fought in earnest.

10. I shall return to Ferozepore via army Head Quarters tomorrow. I left General Smith's camp at 4 P.M. and reached this place at 8 P.M.

11. *From Lord Hardinge*

Camp Kurtarpoor, Dec. 6th (1846), 1 o'clock.

My dear Currie,

I received your letter of the 4th this morning at 9 o'clock and I am well satisfied that all your proceedings have been regulated by prudence, justice and sound policy.

You were quite right to place Sir John Littler and Col. Golding on the Enquiry, and of the 3 modes which were open to you of constituting the Court you chose the best, in fact the only one which practically would have worked well.

The guilt of the Vizier being established, strengthens the necessity of our refusing to have British troops in Lahore under a native Govt. The intrigues of a Vizier against the British Govt. which protected him and which alone enabled him to live in safety is a perfect strongly illustrative of the insecurity and impolicy of such a system exclusive of those which belong to the Subsidiary system. The forbearance in not holding the state responsible for the act of its Vizier is a proof of sincerity of our intentions and a useful prelude to the discussions now about to take place.

I will tell Edwards to send you a copy of my letter to the S. Cee.

I told Mrs. Currie to say yesterday that I approved of all that had been done, but was so occupied with my English letters that I had not time to write, and at dinner she told me the *Dak* had left the camp at 4 o'clock, and had prevented her from delivering my message.

I am glad you took two days giving full time to the Raja to propose his defence; anything like precipitancy would have been mischievous. Your manner of disposing of his person was judicious. I suppose I shall receive your official report tomorrow morning.

The troops move this day to Kupur Thulla, and tomorrow towards the Brigade. We ride in at once tomorrow morning.

I hope you found Lawrence none the worse for his exertions. I could ill afford to lose so able and energetic an officer. My best regards to the 2 brothers.

12. *From Lord Hardinge.*

Camp at the Bridge across the Beas, 7th Decr. 1846.

My dear Currie,

You have summed up so ably that I consider you entitled to be the Lord Chief Justice and Lawrence holding the great seal as the Lord Chamberlain of India.

I think you have overcome all the difficulties, and I can perceive no flaw, unless the splitters of hairs infer that the Durbar are [not] concerned, by the futile verdict of acquittal in certain cases "not proven."

As to the disposal of the Raja I have merely said that he must be handed over to our Pol. Offs. at Ferozepore, and thence to some place in the interior.

If the Ranees are disposed to share his fortunes, there will be no difficulty in making a moderate provision for support, but in any arrangement made for continuing the occupation of Lahore, her deprivation of power is an indispensable condition.

Lena S. Mujitia as the Tutor and Superintendent of the Prince's education with the first place amongst the natives in the Durbar, would be a useful ingredient.

I am in daily expectation of the Eng. letters—they may continue a whig scheme of Policy—but I hardly think there has been time. I shall congratulate Mrs. Currie on the dangers you have escaped.

Your letter only reached this camp at 11 this morning and had been to Julundhur and elsewhere!

In a judicial case I have not ventured to convey thanks for the service performed; but I feel you have managed this affair ably and justly and I anticipate a most satisfactory conclusion of the negotiation.

13. *From Lord Hardinge.*

Camp Bhyrowall, Dec. 10th, 1846.

My dear Currie,

I have received your letters of the 6th and 8th and I hope at least that our communications will exceed $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles an hour which has hitherto been the average speed.

I agree with you it will not be proper to accumulate political offices on Lawrence's brothers, although I am quite ready to take his brother's services into consideration, as well on his own as the Lt. Coll.'s acct.

I think you will agree with me that we must not exalt the importance of Lal Singh by escorting him to Benares and leaving him in charge of a Field Officer specially delegated for the purpose, whilst we have another major on the spot who has in reality very little to do, and that exerted in the wrong direction.

I would send Lal S. off to Ferozpoor in charge of Lt. Wroughton and thence to Agra in the first instance.

Major Carpenter might put a wrong construction on the paper which Lal S. has received from Lawrence recognizing his services during the last Campaign and upon the whole I think Agra *at first* would answer better than Benares.

If we are to occupy Lahore, a Pol. Offr. will be required at Peshawar, and if McGregor was not married, he ought to be sent there. I intend to appoint him to Benares when Major C. retires.

Captain Postans is seriously ill and unable to proceed with the work. Is Captain Lawrence fit for this duty?

I will not enter upon the important question to which your letter of the 8th refers as you state it your intention to write more fully on the subject.

I have not a doubt upon the subject. You are the person best qualified to ensure the success of a British administration under novel and difficult circumstances in the Punjab and in such case I should place you on the same footing as the Lt. Govr., but I await your further explanations, merely adding that your own reputation must be raised by your undertaking the task.

I have a very high opinion of Lawrence and next to yourself I prefer him.

I observe Col. Richmond has arrived at Calcutta. I do not imagine he intends to resign.

The papers relating to the works at Bhurtpoor are at Simla and Edwards' has sent for them.

I shall hear from Mr. Thomson [in] less than a week on the state of Col. Sutherland's mind.

The coyness of the Durbar and the Sirdars is very natural, but it is very important that the proposal should originate with them, and in any documents proceeding from them this admission must be stated in clear and unqualified terms; our

reluctance to undertake a heavy responsibility must be set forth. The delay of a few days is not important as I may hear from Sir John Hobhouse by the mail hourly expected.

I am not aware by what formal proceedings the Ranee became Regent — I assume by the unquestioned and natural position in which she stood as the mother and guardian of the Prince.

If the Sirdars and influential chiefs, and especially the Attareewala family, urge the B. Govt. to be Guardian of the Maha-Raja during his minority, the Ranee's power will cease silently and quietly, the admission being recorded that the B. Govt. as the Guardian of the Boy and administering the affairs of the State is to exercise all the functions and possess all the powers of the Regent acting on behalf of the Prince.

The family of the betrothed infant, by being introduced into the *Durbar* or Council, will represent the interests of the infant, and the more Singhs you have the better.

Lena S. Mujitia ought also to be invited, and I presume the simplest construction of a Govt. will be, that each member will be in charge of a Department reporting to the Br. Resident or Minister and taking his orders on all occasions when he may deem it his duty to interfere.

Tej S. to be continued as C. C. and probably Dewan Dina Nath for the present. He is able enough to thwart and disturb the measures of the Govt., and the powers of effecting changes in the Council must rest with the British Government and Resident.

I omitted to mention that I have permitted Col. Steinbach to proceed to Cashmeir. I told him I was averse to allow any British Offr. to be employed who by his Commission in the E.I.C. service could not give me a guarantee for the propriety of his conduct whilst in the employment of a Native Power obliged by Treaty to have the G.G. permission. But that he had already been in the Sikh service and was personally known to Goolab S. I would not oppose his going to Cashmeir, at the same time that I would give him no aid or recommendation and that he was clearly to understand, I should, if I saw fit, require Goolab S. to order him to leave his service. He has therefore set off without any letter or notification or my permission to Goolab S. and I beg Law-

rence will write to the Maha-R. saying I have no objection to his being employed, that H.H. will act as to him seems best, but that as I do not intend to have any B. Offr. for the purpose of superintending the discipline and drill of his army, I have no objection to his employing Col. Steinbach.

I hear from all quarters that nothing would exceed the admirable manner in which you conducted the whole proceedings.

As to Col. Goldie, I have reported his name to the Chairman and recd. his answer, as well as Maddocks, that he is probably as good a milty. auditor Genl. as I would find and when Melvill's case was before me I mentioned his name to you, Stuart and Benson.

It is an affair long ago decided upon, and Wood's letter was written before the trial was closed.

The Mofussilite seems to have very good information from Lahore.

John L. has set off this morning to bring up his wife from Jullundhur.

He is stout against annexation.

Let me know the arrival of this letter. The Suwar will start at 11 precisely.

P.S.

I have omitted to say I shall be delighted to see Lawrence if you think it will be politic that he should be away from Lahore at the same time with you. You are the best judge of this from the temper of the people you have to deal with.

I suppose Diwan D. Nath is at the bottom of the affair.

14. *From Lord Hardinge.*

Camp Bhyrowal, Dec. 12th, 1846,
11 o'clock A.M.

Date the *hours* in your letters.

My dear Currie,

I have received Lawrence's official letter of the 10th and yours of the 11th transmitting it at 8 o'cl. this morning. It is quite shameful the slovenly manner in which this *Dak* duty is performed. My letter of the 10th appears to have taken 18 hours instead of 8 or 10 hours. I have not private letter from you of the 11th.

I send this by express to desire that the Regt. of N.I., the 2 guns and the Irreg. Cav. escorting Lal Singh may *not return to Lahore.*

These troops will cross the Sutlege and encamp at Ferozepoor till further orders, and the troops ordered from Ferozepoor to Kussoor will be countermanded.

My object is to give the Lahore Durbar a hint that the Garrison is on the move.

I also authorise you to send away another Regt. of N. Inf. from Lahore to Ferozepoor, there to encamp till further orders and not to be relieved by any other Regt. from Ferozepoor.

H.M. 80th Regt. will receive orders to be ready to march for Meerut at any moment. H.M. 10th are at Ferozepoor ready to relieve them, but will not move up till ordered, nor will it transpire that they are intended to relieve the 20th. These announcements will be made *to accelerate the Durbar decision.*

In selecting the 2nd Regt. of N.I. which is to march on Ferozepore, the move ought to be made by the Regt. which has the longest march into the interior of Hindostan.

I send you a copy of a letter from the C.C. on this subject, but I have no list of the stations to which the Lahore Regts. are proceeding when they cross the Sutlege.

I enclose a note from Lord Gough which you will send with a note from yourself in case you deem it expedient to send away a second Regt. not forgetting that these 2 Regts., Cavy. and Artly., sent from Lahore are not to be relieved *at present* from Ferozepoor.

I recommend that Lal S. should not loiter at Ferozepoor, but proceed at easy stages with a Cavalry escort to Agra, consulting the Raja's convenience, travelling by Kurnaul, etc., so as to avoid Umballa and any of the great stations.

I am afraid your *private* letter to me has not been sent or has been lost.

Edwards met the Camel Sowars, took the Despatches and opened them, but there was no private letter for me.

Persevere in your line of making the Sikh Durbar propose the condition or rather their readiness to assent to any conditions imposed as the price of the continuance of our support.

In the preamble of the supplementary Arts. this solicitation must clearly be their act. I entirely approve of Lawrence's letter just received.

I have my little to say—you are at the receipt of customs.

15. *From Lord Hardinge.*

Camp Bhyrowal, Dec. 14th, 1846, 12 o'cl. A.M.

My dear Currie,

I have this morning received your note of the 13th.

I propose to move on Thursday to Soorkhpoor on the high road from Umritsar to Kupurthulla and about 5 coss higher up the River.

If you meet Mrs. Currie at Umritsir on Wednesday, you can breakfast with me on Thursday, returning to Lahore Friday or Saturday.

This day and tomorrow will enable you to form a pretty accurate judgment of the progress you are likely to make.

I authorize you to desire Sir John Littler to move all the troops out of Lahore the end of the week, on the day you may judge to be the most expedient (except the 80th) encamping them as near as may be convenient to the Citadel. If this hint should be unnecessary by the temper of the Chiefs to assent to our views, it will not be made.

If your early return to Lahore should be desirable, which it probably will be, I will ride early on Thursday morning to *Jundialah* and meet you there, sending a breakfast first and a troop of the Body-Guard the night before. In the evening I can move on Soorkhpoor, and be there to dinner whilst you return to Lahore.

The ride will do me good, and in this Camp my movements need not be known. I shall consider this plan as settled, unless I hear good reasons from you for changing it on Wednesday morning.

At any rate this Camp will move on Thursday morning.

The guarantee to the Chiefs of their Jagheers by British occupation, must I should think be a powerful stimulus to ensure their adhesion to the conditions imposed.

The British Govt. must insist on the immediate disband-

ment of all Sikh forces, exceeding 32,000 fixed by Treaty. The Irregular Cavalry and Van Courtlandt's men, and also Lal Singh's Affghans must be got rid of in any event.

Was there any Public act by which the Ranee was recognized as Regent?

The Billings-gate in which she was indulged, the anti-English side she has taken, and the scandalous profligacy of her conduct, as the mother of all the Sikhs, ought to induce the chiefs to have no compunction in depriving her of power.

I need not enter upon these matters with which you are so familiar.

The mail was due today at Bombay.

I fear some accident has delayed the steamer.

16. *From Lord Hardinge.*

Camp at the Bridge of Bhyrowal, Dec. 14, 1846.

5 o'clock. P.M.

My dear Currie,

I have received your letter of 8 o'clock this morning.

The Durbar and Chiefs, acting for the interests of the Maha-Raja and the welfare of the people, must exercise their own judgment and foresight in deciding upon the course which they may deem it to be most safe and wise to adopt at the present conjuncture.

It is my positive determination not to employ a British Garrison in carrying on a Native administration in the Punjab, of which we have recently experienced so many instances of inefficiency, injustice and intrigue. I therefore will not consent to lend the aid of British Troops to support a system on which no reliance can be placed.

The responsibility of the consequence which may result by the withdrawal of troops will rest upon their heads.

The proposal made of the aid of two Regts. of Inf., one of Cav. and one Battery of Artillery is so absurd, that I consider it as equivalent to a desire to undertake the management of their own affairs without our intervention.

The Chiefs are the sole judges in this affair. I am ready to withdraw every man in faithful observance of the Treaty, and altho' I do not say that modifications in the instructions may not be sanctioned by me, after a full and deliberate

hearing of the reasons which the Chiefs may have to allege in favour of any alteration, nevertheless I will not consent to a force less in amount than 9 Battns. of Inf. with the present force of artly. and cavly. remaining at Lahore.

I am the best judge of what force I consider it prudent to retain at Lahore, and you may rest their rejection of my conditions on the preliminary questions of the number of troops required for the occupation.

The 9 Battns. may be reduced at the same time with other portions of the Inf. force to 800 r. & f. each, but those details are not dependent upon their consent. The sum to be paid will be independent of the number of men to avoid all cavil and the force will be kept up or not to 10,000 men as the British Govt. may from time to time determine.

I would recommend you to take up your ground on the amount of force and the amount of money to be paid by the Lahore Govt. for its expense before you enter into other matters.

I have written to you without an instant of hesitation as to the course to be pursued, and I authorize you to leave Lahore if on these two points you cannot receive satisfactory answers.

17. *From Sir Henry Hardinge.*

Camp Bhyrowal, Dec. 16th (1846),
3 o'clock P.M.

My dear Currie,

I have received your letter of the 15th in the morning written *before* the conference with the Sardars, and the translated copy of the Persian Paper which you laid before them, containing the conditions, and I have also received your letter of the 15th written *after* the meeting with the Sirdars which reached me at 8 o'cl. this morning.

The result deserves my most unqualified approbation, and I shall be happy to record another instance of the approved ability, zeal, temper and judgment you have shown, aided by the local experience, reputation and well established influence of Lt. Col. Lawrence, whenever I receive your official report. It is quite impossible to have brought this affair to a more satisfactory conclusion.

Your intimate knowledge of my sentiments and the concurrence of our views in Punjab politics, have enabled you most successfully to realize all the objects I had in view, not only in the substance of the arrangements made, but in the form of the proceeding, for you have conducted this matter so judiciously that the truth and the sincerity of the policy cannot be brought into doubt or the honor of the British Govt. suffer any impeachment. This Hindoo state has another opportunity afforded to it of re-establishing its Govt. and at the same time of securing by honourable means the tranquility of this Frontier and, I may hope, of all India.

The moral effect of the Sikh Chiefs entreating the British Govt. to become the Guardian of their Prince, by the continuance of a British Garrison at Lahore and our consent to undertake the responsible Charge, must be felt throughout Asia in raising the reputation and extending the influence of the British character.

Personally I may regret that it has not been my fate to plant the British standard on the banks of the Indus. I have taken the less ambitious course, and I am consoled by the reflexion that I have acted right for the interests of England and of India.

Be the judgment what it may, as far as I am concerned the struggle between military feeling and political duty is over, and I will refer to matters of business.

I quite concur in the trifling reduction to which you very properly consented in the sum to be paid for the troops.

The point which may admit of some discussion relates to the disposal of the Ranee.

It is quite proper and agreed upon between us that the Lady should no longer exercise any power as Regent.

The question is limited to the amount of the sum to be given for the suitable maintenance of the Maha-Raja's mother and the place of her residence.

The diminished revenue of the state must be considered in apportioning the sum, and this can be adjusted by the chiefs at once.

As to her residence, there is an objection to separate her from her son on the ground of her political intrigues, counteracting the measures of the new Govt., as it may be said (and

obtain sympathy) that she is punished in anticipation of any political offence which she has committed.

I am of opinion that she will be more harmless at Lahore than in any other part of the Punjab. If she should become troublesome and her expatriation be justified, she must be sent across the Sutledge, in which case she might perhaps be domiciled in the Raja of Ladwa's House and occasionally see her son. As Runjeet's wife, and the mother of the Prince of *all the Sikhs*! I am disposed to act with caution, altho' the notoriety of her profligacy by itself would form a strong case of justification. I don't think she would find an Alderman Wood to conduct her in triumph through the streets of Lahore.

I have just seen John Lawrence. He seems to be of opinion that the new arrangement might be signed by the Maha-Raja coming to this Camp and seeking me, followed by my paying him in return a friendly visit at Umritsir or Lahore. I would prefer this course, because I should like with Sir J. Littler and Lawrence to visit the works at Lahore and make an arrangement better calculated to keep the Sepoys and the Town's people separated. I am disposed to give up the gates except three or four in each flank of the Citadel, occupying the Anar Kullee lines with 4 or 5 Regts., the Europ. Regt. and 3 Regts. of N.I. holding the walls, with Sikh police at each gate.

In the long run, depend upon it, the town's people will like us the better, the more we are kept separate and distinct from them.

I shall order up the 2nd Europeans from Jullundhur to this camp and take them with me either to Umritsir or Lahore with the 73 N.I., the Body-Guard and 6 guns.

The 2 Infantry Regts. could be relieved by 2 from Lahore, 1 European, the other Native, and 6 guns, about half way, and I should be glad to afford in my own case a practical proof of the tranquility of the Punjab by not taking with me a larger force.

If there should be any feeling that the distance is too great or the submission of signing the Treaty in the British territory an act of indignity, I am quite ready to go to Umritsir, but after the Cashmir affair; I rather think the

meeting here is the most politic course. Settle it as you think best after consultations with the Chiefs, &c.

I have no desire to go to Noorpoor and a permanent bridge across the Beas higher up is out of the question. The expence is estimated at $2\frac{1}{2}$ lacs, with great uncertainty as to its being able to withstand the floods.

I shall under existing circumstances not move my Camp to the other side of the Nallah and shall hope to see you and Lawrence Friday or Saturday.

As to my ride to Jundialah, I proposed it to save you 30 miles, writing in reply to a letter of yours in which you say, "I shall wish to see you before the arrangements are definitely settled, and I propose to ride over by Umritsir, &c."

I write today to the C.C. to say that you will apprise him when the 10th Europ. and the Regts. of N.I. and Cavly. and Artillery may move from Ferozpoor on Lahore. If you refer to the C.C. letter which I sent you, you will find that the 2nd Divn. will not be ready to move on Lahore till the end of January, the 1st Divn. immediately.

Having sent away 2 Regts. of N.I. you must bring up the 7th and 51st which will make up our number of 8 Regts. of N.I. after the discussion on the sum to be granted, I prefer having the Regts. on the spot, intending eventually to reduce every req. Regt. of N.I. to 800 r. & f. including those at Lahore.

The 54th N.I. would also be brought away, as it is intended for Lahore provided a Regt. from Lahore be left to do the duty.

I shall also pay the C.C. the compliments of asking H.E. to cross the river to be present at the signature of the new articles of arrangements, with a flying camp and half a dozen officers.

Sir John Littler I beg may be invited.

Inform His Lordship of your intended movement and the decision whether the Maha-Raja comes on only to Umritsir or to this Camp.

I will confer with you when we meet as to my future movements after matters have been settled with the Sikhs.

As Mrs. Currie is sure to see Umritsir in any case, I shall dissuade her from meeting you at Umritsir.

Again, my dear Currie, let me express the cordial and affectionate regards for all the valuable services you render to me and above all to the state.

In closely examining this piece of diplomatic work I can not find that you have omitted a single point.

Remember me kindly to Lawrence, I rather think his brother would be well placed at Peshawar, from his knowledge of Affghans and the respect in which he is held by them.

18. *From Lord Hardinge.*

Camp Hurdwar, March 10th, 1847.

My dear Currie,

The mail came in last night an hour after we rejoined the camp having had a very successful shooting excursion, one large fighting tiger about 10 ft. long which charged my elephant twice and wounded him and a smaller one the next day besides a bear and 20 deer, hog, &c.

A gallant tiger is certainly the finest sport in the world and after 9 hours a day in the *howdah* and the sun I feel as anxious as ever to play truant and escape from the Boxes.

Hobhouse's private letter is very complimentary, but pointing more decidedly to eventual annexation, and in the same breath acknowledging that the increase of the army and the expenditure is *awful*, and trusting that I shall be able to reduce both very extensively and govern the Punjab with the smallest possible force of Sikhs. It appears to me that his letters each mail abound more in verbiage without any fixed plan or defined principle except this, that a Sikh Govt., "'ust he chose impossible." He may be right but if we give the govt. 8 years for deliberations, acquire in the interval an intimate knowledge of the real state of things, get rid of an annual deficit and prove to the conviction of the reluctant President that the system is safe, honourable and economical, I think his Govt. will have no reason to complain of the result.

The Outram affair is again before, the only difference being that the former letter, censuring O. together with the present letter desiring that G.O. may be issued, are both to

be sent to Napier and Outram. The G.O. will be simultaneously published without any censure, and we shall then see whether the order fettering Napier from replying to O. and giving him to public satisfaction will be accepted by him as an honourable termination of the controversy, I have taken every possible pains to open Hobhouse's eyes and that with Napier's Scinde G.O., the appointment of Sir W. Cotton to Bombay, and the G.O. I am about to issue and Napier's shattered health, I anticipate that he will shortly retire.

The Whigs will get through the session. Peel with an increasing number of supporters will give them all the assistance they require. The opposition led by the Jockey and the Jim will even sink into utter contempt, and if Johny Russell keeps clear of Organic changes and Radicalism, he will probably have Lds. Lincoln, Dalhousie, Sidney Herbert and the best of Peel's friends joining the Whig Govt. and by Peel's conservative friends and his own personal influence, forming a strong Govt. by an amalgamation of the best men of all parties.

Lawrence has written a very good despatch, but I have not heard from him.

Tomorrow I march for Deerah taking a couple of days shooting on route and I shall reach Simla about the end of March.

Lady Currie and Children are quite well. Your cousin goes on with me, he mangles the climate and the camp very well and is an eager sportsman.

The next mail bring the Govt. despatches acknowledging the Lahore Treaty. I shall be at Calcutta early in December. The quarterly has a short note, stating the number of troops at each of the Frontier stations in July 1844 and 1st Decr. 1845.

As to Lord Gough I have now before me a case which proves that he has utterly lost any power of memory which he may have ever possessed.

Edwardes is unwell and left the Camp this afternoon. I have just had a large dinner, and tomorrow we separate.

I am glad to find *at last* that Prince Waldemar has been made a G.C.B.

19. *From Lord Hardinge.*

Private

Camp, one march from Subathoo, 24th March, 1847.
My dear Currie,

I need not advert to the official despatch approving the Lahore Treaty. Hobhouse knew the reasons why we could not extract larger contribution from the Sikh State, but he takes care to notice it as an exception to the approval.

In the Govt. Paper, the *Times*, the same is animadverted upon. The *Chronicle* and the *Globe* both carp at the arrangement and are Whig Papers.

In his letter to me he says the proper thing has been done at the proper moment but he regrets that an official letter of Oct. had not been received before the Treaty had been concluded. That letter was of no importance but I interpret the meaning to be: I wish I could say that your proposal had received our sanction before the Treaty was settled.

Very different is Peel's language. He says moderation, forbearance and good faith have given us every advantage which the most successful spirit of aggrandizement could have secured. That we possess the respect and confidence of those who have invited our assistance, by making the British Government ruler over grateful friends instead of discontented enemies, and he is quite sure the British people will appreciate what has been done as the crowning triumph of a wise and honest policy.

Jas. Hume writes me words that he thought I was right last year not to annex, but that the measure concluded this year gives us all the advantages without the inconveniences of annexation and is a new subsidiary system without the injustice of the preceding systems. Sir Jas. Hogg writes in strong terms of approbation, and the measures of Septr. then sketched out have been fully realized. Other correspondents praise the measures as an honourable and satisfactory solution of a difficult question.

You will observe that the G.O. in the Outram-Napier affair has been launched. I don't think the arrangement will satisfy Napier. He intends to go home in the Spring of '48.

Lawrence writes that the Ranee is disposed to be trou-

blesome. Diwan Dina Nath is in high favour. He (Lawrence) has paid off latterly 6000 Cavly. and 3000 Inf. but this outlay and sending 2 m. pay to Peshawar has drained the Treasury. A double demand is difficult to meet. It is however a temporary drain.

You will see by my last offl. letter to the S. Cee the abstract of the Sikh force which he intends to keep up, 15000 Inf. and 10,000 Irreg. Cav. exclusive of 6 or 7000 paid by the Diwan of Moultan.

Lawrence's health is the great point which remains to be moved, and on that point I hear nothing.

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...

...

Ever, my dear Currie,
Yrs. very sincerely,
Hardinge.

20. *From Lord Hardinge.*

Simla, April 9th, 1847.

My dear Currie,

The Lahore Treaty seems to be universally approved. Hobhouse has sent an official letter conveying separately H.M. approbation, and in his private letter he says he is instructed by Ld. John Russell and the Cabinet to express their entire approbation of the arrangements made under circumstances of difficulty.

I have also received a charming letter in H.M. own handwriting.

I have informed Hobhouse that I shall expect to be relieved the end of Decr. or beginning of Jany. and begged him to lay my prayer before H.M.

By my private letter, the two persons named as being the most likely to succeed me are Sir James Graham and Ld. Normantz who since the quarrel with Ginzet cannot remain, it is said, in Paris. The first is by far the best man.

My letters of January had not been received by Sir John but the Indian mail had him telegraphed.

By the last mail I wrote officially to Hobhouse urging that the decoration of the Bath should be conferred on you, and requesting him to use the letter or act as he deemed

most advisable in promoting its success. I also recommended Lawrence. The application to the same effect which I made on the 21st Feby. was not official and I thought it better to leave him no excuse in the point of form.

My last official despatch and Lawrence's letter will give you the pith of the Punjab reports. It never was so quiet in the memory of men.

Col. Stewart, it is said, speaks confidently of being the provisional member of the Council. I have no hint of any kind.

21. *From Lord Hardinge.*

Simla, April 24th, 1847.

My dear Currie,

I have received your letter of the 13th and am glad you do not feel the change of climate.

The mail went out the day before yesterday.

I recd. a letter from Ld. John Russell requesting me to continue in the Govt. of India, and that the longer I remained the better the Govt. would be pleased. Hobhouse writes in the same strain. The private letters are everything I could wish and I have answered them in the same friendly spirit, but repeating my request to be relieved *without fail* the end of Decr. or beginning of January.

My immediate master is for annexation direct and immediate, altho he has not said so, I believe the majority of the Govt. against it, but I have no authority for the surmise. The Russian night-mare still haunts certain persons in spite of the Affghan war, and I have written at length to Lord John on that subject.

I believe a selection will be made of the public documents and laid before Parliament. We shall see how the selection will be made.

As when you left us, every thing is quiet in the Punjab.

Lawrence proposes to go to Cashmire the end of May or beginning of June.

I am about to write to him on his project of *disarming* the population of the Punjab! The policy is doubtful, and the power of doing so is not unlike Genl. Frazer's attempts to clear the Nizam's territories of mercenary Troops. You

may take them away, but what is to prevent their return if their employers desire to have them? So you may take away arms, but the worst portion of the population will obtain other arms, and those who obey the order will be at the mercy of those who do not.

I have a letter from Lord E. much disposed to take up Durand's case.

I shall leave Simla the end of Oct. and be at Calcutta the end of Novr. or first week in December.

... ..

Napier is far from well.

22. *From Lord Hardinge.*

Simla, May 20th, 1847.

My dear Currie,

I wrote without reserve to Sir J. Hobhouse on the Despatch to which you referred and you will find I have answered the insinuations conveyed in an official despatch, alluding to Lord A. suggestion to Clerk in 1841 to make our ally's Vizier independent of his master, and who was Golab S. brother.

L. letter of the 20th April is imprudent. I have written to him. He has served in the E. Artly. and has not a good opinion of N. troops and had received hints that 2 of our Regts. had been successfully tempered with, which is by no means the case. His pen is like a weather-cock and his impulses depend on an Easterly wind or on the state of his digestion, for I am sure he has too much sagacity and firmness to be gutted beyond 48 h. with such rumours.

They will however do harm at Home, and I never will interfere by suggestions to urge the Pol. agent to trim his Pol. Reports according to the policy or wishes of the G.G. After that despatch it will be difficult to pass the summer at Cashmeir, I have told him so.

His great merits cover many piccadillies. We are endeavouring to make him attend to his Finance and his Judicial arrangements, but order and method are not his strong points.

... ..

23. *From Lord Hardinge.*

Simla, June 10th, 1847.

My dear Currie,

Our express went off last night and was a very long one. Lahore, Hyderabad, and Kutmundoo required to be reported upon.

Lawrence having on the 29th April written an Offl. Despatch calculated to alarm the Home Govt. by forebodings of future events, without giving any facts on which his impressions of evil intentions were founded. I required him to explain and this in a great degree had led to the importance of the Preema plot of last Feby., the conspirator having been seized and examined, but the evidence is so vague and indecisive by Lawrence's acct., that nothing can be done, unless two other men supposed to be implicated be seized and their evidence be of any importance.

The examination of the witnesses has disclosed the alleged participation of the Ranee in the plot as well as a Fakir, and L. seems to think both are really concerned, but no evidence has been sent, and I doubt whether it will be satisfactorily proved that H. H. has interfered.

With her loose reception of people around her and particularly Fakirs, it is no difficult matter to compromise her and every vagabond, when detected, in policy desires to save his own neck by plausibly pretending that he received his instructions from her. If we would fairly get rid of her, it would give the little Boy a better chance of being well educated.

Lawrence remains at Lahore. You will find two demi-offl. letters of his and one of mine, which I have sent Home as he alluded to them in his offl. letter. He is, as you know, a man of *impulse*, but I expect when this plot has blown over, he will be more cautious. The fact is he has not great confidence in our Sepoys, and was in the first instance apprehensive that they had been *tempered* with. This ought not to *transpire*, and I have therefore not sent Home *that* letter. He will write about disarming the Punjab, and I hope in 2 months we shall have the financial statements he promises. The whole country is *wonderfully* quiet.

As to M. Genl. Frazer's proceedings, you will observe, I think, he has acted most imprudently—the truth is he has

not reported all that has passed between him and the Diwan which I have reqd. to have.

24. *From Lord Hardinge.*

Simla, June 25th, 1847.

Confidential

My dear Currie,

The day before our express went over, Lawrence wrote a private note to Elliot saying his health was worse than last year and that in September he should, he feared, be obliged to leave Lahore, and requesting to have John L. with him in August, should the case of necessity then occur.

I wrote a short note to L. saying that he ought to consider his safety and that he might come up here or go to Cashmere, as he preferred.

In the last letter from Sir J. Hobhouse of the 7th May, he observes "as to Sir F. Currie, I will do what I can, but you know that in respect of seats in Cl. the Cl. of D. are the sole masters. If Mr. Clerk should be tired of Bombay, perhaps you might send him to Lahore in the event of the retirement of L."

This question is of course confidential between you and me. It was written in reference to my expression of surprize in a letter of March to Hobhouse commenting on his letter and one from Hogg in which both gave an adverse opinion of your vacating Council for Lahore, unless you served on the same salary as L., which I of course said was impossible, even if Council were to follow.

On the 23rd June, I wrote to say that my anticipation of the dilemma in which the Govt. would be placed had nearly arrived, and I enclosed to Hobhouse the note L. had written to Elliot.

I told Hobhouse I might officially address the Secret Committee, expose the necessity of the case, strongly give my advice and throw the responsibility of the rejection of my advice on the Home authorities; but that I would not thus act, considering the confidential terms on which I wrote to him—that if an actual vacancy took place before the end of Sep. when I could receive his answers, I should address you to be prepared to come up to Lahore to take charge of the Govt. of

the Punjab. If the answer from Home was an assent to my recommendation you wd. be on the spot. If it were a final refusal, you would return to your post as I was aware I could not dispose of the services of a member of Council appointed by the Ct. and that I must make another arrangement. I did not notice Hobhouse's allusion to Clerk.

This is in few words the state of affairs. I would recommend you not to mention what has occurred to any one. Edwards, who does not know what has passed between me and the Home authorities but is aware of L. state of health and his note written to Elliot, talks as a matter of course of your coming up here. I have only spoken to Lady Currie when I met her at Mr. Thomason's on Tuesday, and yesterday at my house.

I shall not hear from Sir John till the end of Sep. and it is useless to speculate upon what may happen in matters of health during the next 3 m. In a letter of mine of May to L. I observe that the alarm which his letter of April 29th may excite puts it out of question his leaving Lahore for Cashmeer as he had intended to do the end of June, various diaries from ordinary men being sent to me, *officially* tending to show that Golab S. was going on ill, all of which as usual I have sent home, for I can conscientiously affirm that during the last three years every scrap of intelligence, favourable or unfavourable, has always gone Home. But the instant I heard of L. illness, confirmed by a note from the Lahore Edwardes to Charles that he had been too long in India, I gave him *Carte blanche* to go and do what he considered most conducive for his health.

He is over-worked and his zeal knows no bounds.

The real amount and objects of the Preema conspiracy remain as they did before, except that I hear the Umritsir Brahman has absconded, but his retreat being known, there is no miracle or dark forebodings of an inspired Regenerator of his country's wrongs who is to re-appear and drive the Feringees into the Sutlege.

Everything is going on most peaceably, and a firm, strong and judicious hand will soon consolidate all the objects which the late Treaty was intended to accomplish.

I can give you a very good account of Lady Currie. Feudall

is growing fast and I am rejoiced he and the girls are going home.

Maddock's account of his lameness is most unsatisfactory and threatens to be a permanent injury.

25. *From Lieut. Col. Henry Lawrence, C. B., Resident of Lahore to The Right Hon'ble Lord Hardinge, G.C.B., Governor General of India.*

Dated Lahore, July 5th, 1847.

My Lord,

My brother tells me he will have finished his circuit work by 20th instant, but I have replied that it will do very well if he is here about the first of August. I will then stop with him as long as the Doctor will allow me. I believe that at last the seat of one of my diseases has been discovered, though the Doctors would not believe me when I told them three years ago that my left side was enlarged. I have now had leeches applied and am going to be blistered but I am told that nothing but a trip to sea will avail me permanently. I am therefore very anxious to know if I can get leave to England for ten months without vacating my office.

Col. Sykes wrote two months ago to Edwardes that new Regulations had passed the Court of Directors and that they allowed leave without detriment to staff appointments for 12 months on private affairs and for 18 months on medical certificate. There seems to be some hitch however at the Board of Control, but in my case I conceive that if your Lordship should think proper to recommend my getting leave from March till December 1848 that it would at once be conceded.

The case stands thus: I could get leave for two years to the Cape and draw half my staff pay but I am quite willing and anxious to get to England for 9 or 10 months without any pay at all.

I confess I am desirous to hold to my present office but I hope it from no abstract love of office, for on the score of obtaining political employment in India after even two or 3 years absence, I should have little fear, but my heart is with my work here and I would prefer working out the present policy on the Frontier to obtaining a seat in Council. I am

moreover very doubtful of the advantages of a sea voyage and my mind sympathizing with my body I am sure that I should gain more in 10 months at home than in twenty elsewhere. I should also have the benefit of the best advice, and by hearing every fortnight, I could, if required, give my opinion to the Home authorities and could, if necessary, come out again in October, instead of in December. I have no sort of wish for a day's longer absence than is necessary and believe that if I am pronounced fit to return to India at all, I shall be as fit in ten months as in twenty.

Of course it would be a satisfaction to me both publicly and privately to leave my brother John if your Lordship thinks fit to recommend him to your successor. But go, the Doctors tell me, I must somewhere next year whatever arrangements are made.

I have told your Lordship my story plainly and only hope that in bringing forward my own private affairs you will not suppose I have presumed upon the kindness you have always shown me.

P.S.

I have written my reply to your Lordship's memo on the location of European troops in bed because I did not wish to delay the matter.

I enclose Col. Sykes' letter. It contains opinion on the Punjab Policy that will please your Lordship.

26. *From Lord Hardinge.*

Simla, July 15th, 1847.

My dear Currie,

I received yours of the 5th July yesterday and I immediately wrote a letter to Lawrence in answer to one from him of the 5th instant, a copy of which I send you and also L. letter to me.

You will observe his application to me is a *feeler* and that he does not propose to go home till March 1848, and that his going at all is perhaps contingent on my answer. This is a very different state of things from that described by L. himself in his letter to Elliot, which I sent to Hobhouse and which caused me to write to you on the 25th June. At that time he was considered in danger and Lt. Edwardes' report

was (I suppose from Dr. H. Smith's statement to him) very decisive that he must go home immediately.

When a meritorious officer's health will allow him to passage to England for 8 months, that is till march, and founds his application on the Furlough Regn. which will probably be published before the end of the year, it is difficult to pin him against the wall by exacting an absolute surrender of his office if he goes home for a year. On the other hand this is one of those appointments to which the Regn. ought not to apply, for in 1848, when he proposes to return, the Govt. has no guarantee that his health will stand the climate in 1849.

However he now knows the intentions of the G.G. as to his successor, and in anticipation of his health giving away, he is aware of what has passed between you and me and also between me and Hobhouse. In fact as I say in my letter to L. "You were informed by me shortly after your appointt. that if anything happened to you, I could not pay you a better compliment than by appointing Sir F. Currie to be your successor" or words to that effect. He may now alter his plans of going home altogether. The instant I receive his answer I shall apprise you of its contents. Hobhouse's answer may be expected the end of Sepr. I shall by the next mail inform him of what has passed. You must however recollect that any day may suddenly change the present aspect of the affair. Lawrence believes himself to be much better on the 5th July than he was in June, and between this date and the end of September he will be severely tried unless he comes up here immediately when he might discuss the whole question with me. I could secure him a lucrative appointment by keeping Nagpoor open. But his is an honourable ambition to acquire distinction, where the spirit is willing but the body is weak.

Untill I receive his answer, you had better consider the affair in suspense.

As to your being secondary to Lt. Govr., I could not think of such a thing. I was not aware until lately that he constantly receives from L. all his letters and diaries to the Govt. but never sees the Govt. decisions. It is bad in every public point of view, and nothing renders it tolerable but Mr. Thomason's prudence of character.

I have no intention of placing the Sikh protected states

and Jullundhur under the Lt. Governor. The whole ought to be taken in the hands of the G.G. in Cl. as long as the Lahore arrangement has to run. The 2 Commissioners reporting to the Govt. and to the Resident; although I do not see necessarily that the detailed management of these territories would strengthen your authority. In your case I would be ready before I go to make the arrangement such that your position should be that of a Governor of a Presidency rather than of a Resident, and if desirable include the ceded territory.

I do not hear who my successor is to be. If his health is equal to resist the climate, I should say Sir Jas. Graham was the most likely man. And, in the weak state of Govt. there are many reasons for considering such a selection not an impossible one.

I expect by the next mail to hear that H. M. has approved of my prayer to resign the Govt.

And now, my dear Currie, I have only to add that your readiness to do what is best for the public service, and for the honest fulfilment of the Treaty is most satisfactory to me. I am sure it will gratify the Home authorities, and if poor L. is unable to carry on his duties, I am confident that your administration of the Punjab will rebound more to your honour and reputation than any position within your reach for the next 5 years.

You will see by the Papers sent to Calcutta that I propose to send a 2nd European Inf. Regt. to the Anarkullee lines, and at the same time move up a E. Cavalry Regt. from Umballa into the vacant Infy. Bks. at Ferozpoor, with a E. Regt. of Inf. at Jullundur, with 3 E.I. Regts. in the Hills, and one at Umballa and eventually to place a 4th E. Inf. Regt. in the Hills in addition to 4 or 500 E. Artly. I do not wish to move some of the Artly. Estabts. from Dum Dum either to Meerut or Umballa, and I think I can demonstrate to the Home authorities that such arrangements will be as economical as they are humane and efficient. It is clearly established that deaths are nearly 3 in the plains to 1 in the Hills, and exclusive of the great expense of invaliding the sickly men, the measure is one of absolute duty, now that we have ascertained by experience the reality of the benefit.

The Goorusur affair looms awkwardly; I told Maddock

in one of my letters that from November 1845 till Decr. 1846, no papers relating to that affair had been sent up for information, although the burning of the villages had been reported in May 1846 by Capt. McPherson. I have taken no step officially out of consideration to Maddock and his independent powers as President in Cl. But it is impossible that the system adopted in April 1846 by Capt. McPherson of burning villages can be tolerated by the Ct. and the Bd. of Control. You have probably seen my opinion on that point given to Maddock three months ago.

I have been writing to Sir Chas. Napier at great length. Lady Napier has been dangerously ill and *he* is by no means well. Any sudden departure would be awkward. There is not a Bombay Offr. competent to take charge of the army in Scinde.

Col. Campbell 98th at Lahore is an admirable offr., the best offr. of H.M. in Bengal.

Lady Currie is remarkably well and the children more rosy and flourishing since the rains set in.

27. *From Lord Hardinge to Lieut.-Col. Henry Lawrence Resident, Lahore.*

Simla, July 15th, 1847.

Private

My dear Lawrence,

I received your letter of the 5th day after the mail left Simla on the 7th and as I had written to Currie on the 25th June after the receipt of your note to Elliot on the 22nd saying your health was worse than last year, and that the Doctors said you had been too long in India and requested your brother might in August come to Lahore to relieve you. I was obliged to wait for Currie's reply before I could answer your letter of the 5th.

I have received Currie's answer this morning and am now in a condition to let you know the exact state of the case, in reply to your letter of the 5th, in which you wish to know whether you can get leave to England for ten months without vacating your office.

The Furlough Regulations are delayed and it is not improbable may be referred to the Government of India, in

which case there will probably be delay of 4 or 5 months from this date before they are officially promulgated. But as you do not propose to leave India till March 1848, the official sanction will be given to the Regn. before the end of the year in all probability.

I shall however take this opportunity of apprizing you of what has passed between me and Currie, in case you should be compelled to leave India.

At the time of the Bhyrowal Treaty, I felt it to be my duty not to come to any decision as to the appointment of the Resident until the whole arrangement had been concluded.

I felt the importance of the services you had rendered from the death of Major Broadfoot, your energy and ability during the Cashmere Rebellion, the value of having the best officers in the service at Lahore and your just popularity with the Sikh Chiefs. There is but one draw-back and that was the apprehension I felt whether your health would stand the climate and the labour of administering the Lahore State.

On the other hand as regard our friend Currie, I had long known his eminent qualifications in the Political, the Judicial and the Revenue departments and that his health was good whilst yours unfortunately was impaired by the effects of climate.

I had to consider all these points and the embarrassment of your leaving Lahore in case your health should fail, the general impression being then, as it is now, that your health requires change for renovation.

In consulting with Currie upon the subject before he went to Lahore and on his return to Bhyrowal, he acted with the greatest disinterestedness. He would willingly have accepted the office but he laid great stress upon your Military qualifications, the favour of the Sikh Chiefs and the admirable manner in which you had conducted yourself; and, the result of my consultation was that I appointed you; he was not then a member of Council, although I was confident that that just reward of his service could no longer [be] withheld.

In writing to you I stated in one of my letters that if ill-health or any accidents deprived me of your services, I could not pay you higher compliment than by requesting Currie

to be your successor. He left my Head Quarters in perfect readiness to take your duty if you should not be able to perform it. I wrote to Sir John Hobhouse and Sir James Hogg to the same effect, namely that if I were deprived of you I should wish to appoint Sir Frederick Currie. Sir John has admitted that I could not make a better choice and the mode of effecting is under consideration.

By the mail of the 23rd, having received your note to Elliot the day before, I informed Sir John that the dilemma I anticipated had practically arrived and I gave him your own account of your health, requesting him to give me at the earliest period an explicit answer. I expect the answer the end of September.

On the 25th June, after the mail was despatched, I wrote to Currie stating what I had written to Sir J. Hobhouse and requesting to know if, as I apprehended you were compelled by illness to leave Lahore, he would still be willing to supply your place. This morning I have received his answer and as usual he states his readiness to do what is most conducive to the public interests.

If therefore you go home for a year in March and that the Home authorities consent to the deputation of a member of Council to Lahore and that Currie will also consent to carry on the Government at Lahore I shall be most happy to be able to make so advantageous an arrangement for the public service.

But, I must apprise you that since the 25th June, I have not written to Currie nor have I sent him any copy of your letter of July 5th, and therefore I cannot say how far he will be disposed to take the Government of Lahore for a limited period, nor can I say how far the Home authorities will be disposed to admit of such a temporary arrangement. These are points on which I can come to no determination and they must be deferred till I can hear from England.

With regard to your brother, my confidence in his power and ability to replace you has undergone no change. I have publicly and privately expressed my deep sense of his services whilst at Lahore last year, and whenever your health renders it adviseable that you should come up here in September, the *ad-interim* Government can be safely confided to his hands.

I have now given you the most explicit statement in my power of what has passed between Sir John Hobhouse, Currie and myself on this subject, and as there is ample time before you propose to go to England, to take this question very fully into consideration, I can do no more at the present moment than to assure you that the manner in which you carried on the Government since last January has justified my decision and confirmed my most sanguine expectations—an opinion shared by the Home Government whose commendations I have communicated to you and that it will give me, on public grounds and personal esteem, the greatest pleasure to be able to make arrangement which will meet your wishes.

28. *From Lt.-Col. Henry M. Lawrence to Lord Hardinge.*

Lahore, July 20, 1847.

My Lord,

I am much obliged for your Lordship's kind letter of the 15th instant. If the Home Government is satisfied with my work I cannot conceive a reason why they should object to my return to Lahore, nor do I think it likely that Currie would place any obstacle in my way. When there was a good deal for him to gain last Decr., he acted magnanimously by me. I therefore see no ground for distrusting him now that he could gain nothing but trouble. Next to my brother John there is no man to whom I would prefer making over my work than Currie. John will perhaps be less disappointed in the matter than I am for he very much prefers his present duties to those of Lahore, and so I believe would any right minded civilian. He came here on my account, and would do so again but he did not like the work nor do I think Currie will. A man must have been a good deal accustomed to desultory modes of procedure to take kindly to, or rather to put up with, the best native systems.

I have not been so well the last 3 or 4 days and the Doctor tells me he does not consider it safe for me to stay here during August. I have therefore written to my brother that I shall be glad to be able to get away as soon after the 1st August as possible; as it would probably do me no good to go to Simla until the middle of September and as I have much to say and to do with Maha Raja Golab Singh I will

venture the trip. Moving always does me good, and once in Cashmere, I shall have dry cool weather.

P. S.

The shawl weavers have turned out in a body and pitched a camp near the city of Cashmere and are crying for justice against their masters, not against Golab Sing — it is not unlikely that the Maha Raja may have instigated the men to shew the mischief of our interference.

An inroad is reported to have been made by the Yessen Raja on Gilgit. On many accounts I shall be glad to pay a flying visit to Cashmere. The Maha Raja tells me he has strictly prohibited *Suttee* and Infanticide, and that of all his subjects; the Brahmans and those of his own family are the only [exceptions]. He therefore wants some rules of guidance as to their punishment. I much fear a trap for certain of his kinsmen.

The Lahore Durbar has issued orders against *Suttee* and Infanticide and I hope that they will proclaim both acts to be punishable.

29. *From Lord Hardinge to Lt.-Col. Henry Lawrence,
Resident at Lahore.*

Simla, July 25th, 1847.

My dear Lawrence,

I have your letter of the 20th, and I am grieved to find you will be obliged to venture to reach Cashmere as early as you can. During the rains Simla would not answer. Wood has rather retrograded as the atmosphere is so damp. However, you must do whatever you are desired, and don't think of waiting for John Lawrence as every day is of importance, and above all don't make yourself uneasy about arrangements which are not expected for 8 months.

You must clearly understand that I wrote to the home authorities in the month of January, explaining my arrangements in filling up so difficult and important an appointment as that of Resident at Lahore.

[In the next two paragraphs he repeats something of what has been previously written in his letter of July 15, and then in the next three assures him of the appreciation of his services by the home authorities and quotes Sir John

Hobhouse regarding the proposed K.C.B. for him saying, "I shall not, however, you may depend upon it, lose sight of your Col. Lawrence."]

Your visit to Cashmere cannot fail to do good, however much I regret the cause.

I have received Queen's permission to resign my office in a letter most gratifying to me and I hope to embark the end of December or first week in January. Between this and then there will be time for making arrangements for our meeting. In the meantime, attend to your health which is public property.

The mail goes out on the 8th and I write to Sir John Hobhouse simply narrating what has passed between us.

Pray take care of your health.

30. *From Lord Hardinge.*

Simla, August 9th, 1847.

My dear Currie,

I received your letter 4 or 5 days ago and at that time as Lawrence was reported to start from Lahore I deferred writing to you till I should have seen him. This morning I have letter from him of the 4th merely saying he shall leave Lahore on the 16th for Simla via Umritsir and be here about the 1st Sept.

Nothing can be more judicious than your letter. I shall send extracts to Hobhouse by the next mail. I certainly concur and shall tell L. so when I see him. Two years will renovate his health, and as you observe, would enable you to devise and execute your plans for the administration of the Punjab of permanent benefit.

If the arrangement is to be made in my time, I shall give you control of both banks of the Sutlege, solely reporting to the G.G. in Cl. and I shall tell Hobhouse the Sumptuary Allowance ought to go with the Resident whoever he may be.

I have had a very satisfactory letter from him and you will infer what the private terms are from those in the Despatch from the Secret Comee.

He distinctly says that the new Govr. Genl, will not be selected till after the elections.

31. *From Lord Hardinge.*

Simla, August 19, 1847.

My dear Currie,

On the 14th as the mail was going out, I received a letter from Lawrence enclosing one from you proposing that he should remain in Europe for 2 years. He accepts the proposal. I sent copies of both these letters to Sir John Hobhouse as well as of the former letters with a strong recommendation that he should insist on the arrangement receiving the assent of the home authorities and showing that it would be a *saving*. I requested Hobhouse to address you *direct* at Calcutta as well as myself, as you would receive his answer, the middle of November, unless he had previously given me the necessary authority to dispose of the services of a member of Council.

If in any intervening letter before November, the authority is given, then I can write to you to come up to Lucknow or Cawnpoor. I shall assure Lawrence that in the event of the arrangement being assented to at home, he will in January 1850 be restored to his kingdom, and I have no doubt in an improved state.

Lawrence the other day very properly made a batch of Sikhs K.C.B., Tej Singh a Raja of Sialkot and 15 Sirdars.

The Ranee indignant that her enemies should be honoured, tutored the Boy that he should affront the chiefs in public Durbar when he had to dip his finger in the saffron paste and anoint their foreheads.

He resolutely played his part, tucked his little hands behind him, threw himself back in his chair, and one of the priests performed the ceremony. In the evening she would not allow the Prince to be dressed to see the display of fireworks.

In short she is breeding him up systematically to thwart the Government and hate the English connexion. I am in *confidential* correspondence with L. and I see no remedy but to remove her from Lahore. In a few days this will be settled. In the meantime we observe profound silence. Pray do the same.

Sooner or later it must have come to this. As he grows

older it is our duty as his guardians to remove him from her evil example, and the effect after the first surprize has blown over will strengthen the Govt. and make the Council take their line decidedly with us.

32. *From Lord Hardinge.*

Simla, August 23, 1847.

My dear Currie,

I have received your letter of the 13th. Lawrence seems to like the arrangement, and as I have urged Sir J. Hobhouse to carry it with the Court of Directors, we must patiently await the result.

Sir Herbert in a note to me thinks you should reside at Umballa and Simla, in charge of the N.W.P. and of the Punjab, Thomason taking your place at Calcutta, and in a note of the 12th he says as he goes away in March and Millet in August 1848, that my successor if deprived of you ought to have Thomason.

It is absolutely necessary the representative of the B. Govt. in charge of the Punjab should reside at Lahore. I hope Maddock confines his remarks to you and to me. I had not mentioned the subject to him. It is now pretty well known however and Hobhouse's decision will be received before other suggestions can reach London.

I received a letter from L. last night in reply to a memo. of mine, 16th August, authorizing the removal of the Ranee from Lahore which was accordingly agreed upon by the Durbar and H.H. was removed with her female attendants at 9 o'cl. at night of the 19th, the Prince having ridden to the Shalimar gardens at 6 o'cl., there to remain, which is occasionally the custom. She submitted pretty well. When it came to the point with the Durbar, they were averse to her being exiled out of the Punjab, and selected Sheikhpur about 30 miles from Lahore, where the mother of Kurruck Singh was confined. Lawrence would have preferred her deportation to the British Provinces, but our case for such a measure was slight and I think the Durbar has judged rightly.

The national scandal of parading the widow of Runjeet

S. and the mother of Duleep S. through our Provinces might have been viewed as a great affront. The case is now confined to separation. It may be more troublesome to keep our bird in its cage on the trans-Sutlege side than on this, but we avoid many difficulties by the milder course and the 2nd removal to a more distant residence can be adopted or not as necessity may dictate. I will cause the correspondence to be copied and sent to the President by tomorrow's *Dak*.

The labour on L. office is very great in consequence of his furnishing Thomason with copies of his diaries, reports, which I was not aware of until 2 months ago, or I should when L. went to Lahore have prohibited it. Mr. T. can give no orders and only sees one side of the question as of course he does not see my Despatches.

I justify the removal of the Ranee on Political and moral considerations, and am quite satisfied the course adopted is the proper one.

... ..

You never say what Maddock's opinions are on the Punjab — whether he condemns the first act and approves of the 2nd or what is the line he would have pursued. I find it stated pretty generally that Ld. E. would have annexed. You know how devoid of truth that report is. You will see by my letter to the Ct. of Directors on the reliefs for 1848, what a force we have on this frontier — double that which Ld. E. and Lord G. had prepared to meet a Sikh Invasion in 1844, after reducing 50,000 men.

Napier will certainly embark for Suez towards the end of September, much obliged to you for the G.O. relating to Sir C. Metcalf. The suggestion you offer is very prudent. It ought to come off my own hat.

Your dear little wife has given me a very beautiful and comfortable Dressing Gown of eastern materials.

33. *From Lord Hardinge.*

Simla, 17th Sep., 1847.

My dear Currie,

The mail came in the day before yesterday, confirming

Lord Dalhousie's appointment by a letter from him to me, in which he promises to be at Calcutta the end of Decr. Lady D. accompanies him. It is an excellent appointment and gives me unmixed satisfaction and I anticipate the same policy throughout the Indian Service. He was not in the Cabinet when I left England in 1844, and never having sat in the Commons he is personally very little known to me, but the public report is too universal in his favour not to be justified by real merit and I congratulate you as you will during the next 5 years have much intercourse with him.

The Govt. provide him with a steamer from Marseilles to Alexandria, and Clerk will take care to have a Bombay steamer at Suez by 1st Decr. to bring him to Calcutta, in which I shall return. For Maddock's sake I could have been glad to have taken my own time by leaving Calcutta, without waiting for my successor. However this is the arrangement made by the home authorities to which we must conform.

... ..

P. S.

Lawrence is quite determined to go home, and I hope to see him at Calcutta 25th Decr., taking him across Egypt with me.

... ..

34. *From Lord Hardinge.*

Simla, Sept. 24, 1847.

My dear Currie,

... ..

Sir Charles Napier embarks I believe tomorrow for Suez. He wishes to remain for 6 m. on the Indian Staff till he hears from the Duke of W. But all prospects of being C.C. of India is I should think at an end.

... ..

Lawrence is better. John L. is working admirably at Lahore in contenting the people.

... ..

35. *From Lord Hardinge.*

Muttiana Bungalow, Oct. 5th, 1847.

My dear Currie,

... ..

On the eve of my departure from India, however strong must be the interest to take in Punjab affairs, I ought not to have and really have not any selfish objects to gratify by urging you to adopt a course contrary to your wishes: and I can further say that such has been during the last 6 months the success of Lawrence's administration of the Punjab that the necessity of your replacing him is not so urgent as it was. I say this to relieve you from embarrassment, and because it is the fact.

If you decide to come up to Lahore, I have provided the best substitute for Lawrence.

... ..

After your long and distinguished service your personal wishes and professional interests ought not to be sacrificed, if since the offer was made you prefer the legitimate duties of member of Council. Under the circumstances I must leave the decision entirely in your own hands.

36. *Extract of a letter from Sir John Hobhouse to the Govr. Genl. dated Octr. 7 (1847).*

(In this Sir John Hobhouse explain the legal side of the arrangement proposed by Lord Hardinge in replacing Lt. Col. Henry Lawrence by Sir Frederick Currie as Resident at Lahore. "I do not see," says Sir John, "how in the face of this opinion of the judges" of the Supreme Court at Calcutta, dated 24th January 1840 regarding Mr. Robertson, "and this complete precedent," in the case of Mr. Robertson who had to vacate his seat in Council to go to Agra to undertake the Lieutenant Governorship of that place, "Sir Frederick Currie could go to Lahore as Resident without vacating his seat at Council." He concludes saying "I wish I could have given you a more satisfactory reply to this portion of your late letter, but I cannot.")

37. *From Lord Hardinge*

Simla, Oct. 22nd, 1847.

My dear Currie,

... ..

In a letter from the Chairman to me of the 5th Sep. he says "I was prepared to submit an arrangement to the Court for giving effect to your Lordship's suggestions for appointing Sir Frederick Currie to the administration of the Punjab, but we cannot make any move here until the retirement of Colonel L. is officially announced. The papers tell us that he is about to proceed to the Hills."

Lawrence will be at Calcutta about the 20th or 25th Dec. You will probably like to confer with him before you move up the country and you will also like to make the acquaintance of the new G.G. and give the old G.G. a parting shake of the hand.

If you do not accept, I shall appoint John L. to act for his brother and at any rate he will remain at Lahore until the whole arrangement be settled.

I wish to leave you unfettered in your option for the reasons already given.

I must have your answer to my note from Muttiana in 2 or 3 days.

I move on the 26th into the plains.

P.S. I send Lawrence a copy of this letter.

38. *From Lord Hardinge.*

Simla, 22nd Oct. 1847.

My dear Currie,

... ..

I have addressed the Prest. in Cl. officially as to the annexation of Sind. Your answer will be sent home and the explanation of the delay. I have no lawyer here. Clerk has every power he can want at present, and as to the Governor's going away, the section quoted by you settles that point. The Court also authorizes him to do so. I do not believe any formal notice is reqd. to render the transfer of authority to Bombay legal.

The steamer which took Napier to Suez will wait for Dalhousie, and I will return in her. I have told Tucker that

I very much wish in making the arrangement for your coming up to Lahore, that Maddock's term of service be extended. He would be of great assistance to Lord Dalhousie, and with Millet's solid good sense and right judgment, he would be well supported.

I hope I leave every [thing?] in a safe condition—but it is very provoking that I cannot for want of the Madras and Bombay Mily. Return draw up my memo. of the Peace Estabt. for the army of India.

... ..

39. *From Lord Hardinge*

Jhugadree 40 m. from Umballa,
30th Oct., 1847.

My dear Currie,

I received your letter of the 16th the day before I left Simla.

I am glad you have accepted the Lahore mission. ...

I shall now do every thing in my power to make such arrangements as will be satisfactory to you. I shall place the Jullundur and the Cis-Sutlege districts under your immediate superintendence, altho', as regards the former, I am aware after J. Lawrence's able management, his being placed under any other direct control than that of the Supreme Govt. will not be complimentary, less so in your case because he has a high personal respect for you. But with your tact, these matters of form ought not and will not create any uneasiness. As to instructions I will confer with you on reaching Calcutta.

With regard to your letters to Edwards, I have seen none. It is always better that I should not see private letters. But as doubts existed whether you would accept Lahore or not, I naturally asked on what authority the doubts rested, and I was told that letters of yours had been received, recapitulating your altered position when Maddock and Millet left India, and I was determined you should make no sacrifice on account of what has passed between you and me in February.

As regards the Policy under Lord Dalhousie, it may be doubtful whether your presence in Council or your direct control of affairs at Lahore may be most conducive to an honest and steady adherence to Lahore Treaties. If this were

the only point I should personally prefer your being at Lahore. But this is not my view of the ground on which the decision ought to rest. My view is that the best man, I can get, ought to occupy the most difficult post, and that is at Lahore. On this account I am rejoiced that you will be at Lahore during the next two years, and on this very account of my personal wishes, I was determined to do nothing which *could bias* your choice.

I saw Mr. Thompson at the C. C. dinner the evening before I left Simla and told him your mission to Lahore was no longer a secret.

I told Inglis he had better go to Lahore and assist Lawrence during your absence and I suppose he is on his way by this time.

Lawrence will be at Calcutta the 15th Decr. . . .

40. *From Lord Hardinge.*

Gt. Stanhope St. [London],
July 7, 1848.

My dear Currie,

.
I hope also to hear that the reports of extensive Sikh difficulties have been exaggerated. During the last three years their loyalty has been frequently and rudely tried, in the Cashmere expedition as well as in those to Bunnoo and also at Peshawar confirmatory to the hope that they might be trusted against the Mussulmans in the defence of the frontier. But I have not had the Diaries or the Reports before me and when I saw Hobhouse 2 nights ago at the Queen's Ball, he did not seem to consider the last intelligence from India as affording any fresh ground on which a decisive opinion could be formed of the state of the Punjab.

41. *From Lord Hardinge.*

15, Gt. Stanhope St. [London],
24th March, '49.

Private

My dear Currie,

I suppose this note will find you at Calcutta having cast off a load of odious intrigues and treasons when you left the walls of Lahore.

I can now more freely address you. As the G.G. agent there is great inconvenience in corresponding where open discussion would be breach of trust, and I have scarcely therefore written to Elliot, and not once to Benson.

The Jehlum operations have been scarcely handled by the Press. And I wish Lord G[ough] had come home in August when his period had expired. Nevertheless he will give Sher Singh a squeeze if it is possible that the 2 armies can remain in sight of each other from the 13th January till the 24th February, by which time the rear of the Moultan force will have closed up. It is difficult to conceive such inaction suiting two parties whose interests are to be calculated by contraries—and the enemy will probably make wide sweeps in our rear towards Ramnugger which must be met by troops from Jullundur and Lahore.

Golab S. will now come into play and I have no doubt has too much sense not to prefer us to the Affghans.

As to our right to dispose of the Country as policy may dictate, I have no scruple, after what has passed, on that head. It may be a question as to the extent to be annexed. In June last before Chuttur and Sher Singh's defections, I should have been averse to annexation, and even now should prefer a Hindoo Govt. acting as a buffer between us and the Khyber Pass. But the state of that question has varied and in proportion as the Sikhs have shown their restless turbulence and untameable propensity for war, so must the policy to be adopted be liable to modification. Here there are some who advocate splitting the country into 3 or 4 Native States (Sir G. Clerk, I hear), others for throwing down the forts and walls of the towns and retiring behind our frontier. But if the general mass of the people be (as I believe they are) favourable to us or hate us less than the Sikhs, we may then with advantage apply the maxim that the Punjab, if it cannot be Sikh, must be British.

This question must be settled shortly. All the members of the Govt., even *Palmerston*! admit the policy was right at the time, and the question for consideration is what ought to be the policy in the altered state of things arising out of Sikh treachery and love of war.

I grieve for the loss of poor Peel, he had a good heart—
G. 7

a thorough gentleman and a brave soldier!

He was much attached to you and Lady Currie.

42. *From Lord Hardinge*

Private

Gt. Stanhope St. [London],

May 5, 1850.

My dear Currie,

...

...

...

From what I hear from official men, I am led to suppose the G.G. and the C.C. do not quite agree in military matters. There is a report here that Napier has written a Report, the upshot of which is in the way of advice to the G.G. "Make yr. Govt. of India and of the Punjab more military on Lord E. system in Sinde, and in 2 yrs. I can hold the Punjab with 15,000 men and reduce eventually 50,000 Regs.—Continue to make your Govt. of the Punjab, as it is now civil, and I can't spare one man of the 50,000 now on that frontier—and the principal mode by which the gt. object is to be accomplished is to disband 100,000 Chuprasees and Burkundauzes which you civilians keep up for yr. protection and substitute 100,000 milry. Police in their place.

A Military rule is congenial to barbarians—a civil is hateful in the East, and that at gt. expense a civil govt. has been tried for 100 yrs. and has failed !!"

This I hear in vague rumours, but I wish the memo or memoir or whatever it is were before the experienced offrs. civil and mily. of the service, because it will in all probability be discussed in Comns. when the new charter is before the Legislature. The value of free discussion is the probable attainment of truth, but if the project is brought forward here before it has been well digested and discussed in India, it may not be so ably discussed as by those who are now in business and know this business.

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MARQUESS OF DALHOUSIE
Governor-General of India
(Jan. 1848, to Feb. 1856)

Born :
April 22, 1812

Died :
December 19, 1860

PART II

SECOND ANGLO-SIKH WAR

(iii) LETTERS OF LORD DALHOUSIE

43. *From Lord Dalhousie to Sir Frederick Currie*
Private

Govt. House, March 28, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Your public letter has announced your entry on your duties at Lahore and I shall hope soon to hear from you privately on the aspect of affairs there, when you have had time a little to look about you.

One of your diaries shows that you have received intimation of a gentleman having arrived here as representative of the Ranee. He was not more strongly recommended to my consideration by the fact that he requested our reply might be sent to him through an attorney's firm. You are in possession of our answer and no more need be said about it.

But I should like you to tell me whether there is any foundation for the allegations of unusual strictness of custody contained in her petition. Of course I do not for a moment imagine that she is treated with any undue severity, but I should like to know the real facts as to the amount of superintendence over her and interference with her which really exists. The avidity with which these matters are caught at by grievance-mongers now-a-days both in and out of Parlt. so constantly subject ministers to questions being addressed to them in the House, that it is very desirable to keep them accurately informed, that they may meet allegations with authorized statements of facts.

In Mr. Lawrence's last despatch he did not appear to me to hold out any very sanguine expectation, that, as Revenue matters stand at present, the object which everybody aims at and nobody hits—the "equalization of Income and Expenditure"—is likely to be attained in the case of the Punjab. . . .

General Ventura sometimes ago left Calcutta on his way to a property which he has in our districts under your authority. The retention of it by him has never been officially

sanctioned and the papers have been sent to you. If you can cause the Assist. residents near him to shew him any civility or offer him any facilities, I should be very glad.

He has lost every six pence he had in the world by Calcutta failures—poor man!—except this Jaghire.


44. *From J. H. Maxwell to Lord Dalhousie*

Spencer Hotel, Calcutta, 5th May, 1848.

My dear Sir,

As it would seem that there is some chance of a disturbance at Moultan, and the following information may be of use to the Government, I beg you will excuse the liberty I take in writing to you.

When the late Field Force under Sir C. Napier was concentrating and marching upon Bahawulpore, orders were given to the Engineer officers to get every information regarding Moultan, and plans and some useful matter was collected, and the detail of material and means to meet these



properly calculated. These were made out by Major Peat, C.B., of the Bombay Engineers, then Commanding Engineer to the force and whose death I see in yesterday's Gazette.

The papers however alluded to, and which at the present moment may be of some use to Government, must be amongst the effects of that officer at Kurrachee and procurable.

None of the Engineer Officers (amongst whom I was one) were allowed to take copies of these papers or I should probably have had them.

It is a mistake supposing Moultan a strong place. A native town surrounded by a badly flanked wall (not in good order) and an imperfect ditch is open to escalade and the Citadel, the only place of strength, must surrender or be reduced, the town once in our possession.

As far as attacking a place *on paper* goes, I think we made out it ought only at furthest to take 5 days.

I know a great deal of trouble was taken in collecting information and we have some Moulthanees with us, and it might be of use to Government if these papers were in the spot or sent up there, and I have therefore thought it as well to let you know of their existence.

45. *From Lord Dalhousie*

Barrackpore, May 15th, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

In reply to the letter in which you announce to me the attack made on Mr. Agnew and Lt. Anderson by the troops of Dewan Moolraj at Mooltan, I intimated my approval of what you had already done, and conveyed to you the expression of my entire confidence in your ability, firmness and energy to meet the danger that had arisen.

I abstained then, and have abstained since, from attempting to furnish you with specific instructions for your guidance in this emergency. Whether operations against Mooltan were or were not forthwith to be undertaken, was a question which, I knew well, must have been considered and decided long before we had even received here intelligence of the events, out of which the question arose. No instruction from the Government could by any possibility reach Lahore in time to aid you in coming to your decision. In these circumstances the orders we might send in ignorance of the course of events, and of your determination, might possibly tend rather to embarrass than to assist you. I therefore re-

solved to wait until we should learn from you the decision to which you came, in communication with the Commander-in-Chief, respecting the movements of British troops to Mooltan before I addressed you on the part of the Government.

Last night I received your despatch in which you intimate your acquiescence in the opinion expressed by His Excellency that the movement of our troops at this season of the year would be highly inexpedient, if not impracticable.

Knowing that you must be desirous to learn the views of the Government respecting these important proceedings, I will not incur the further delay which would arise from preferring an official letter to the members of Council for their sanction; and I lose no time in conveying to you in this form my entire concurrence in the decision to which you have come.

The movement you first proposed to make of a portion of the British force might have been expedient as a demonstration in aid and support of the Durbar troops, who were advanced for the purpose of repressing the insurrection at Mooltan. But when intelligence reached you that the Durbar troops who formed the escort of the officers had in a body joined the insurgents, and when you had good ground for believing that the whole Durbar army would, on arriving at Mooltan, have followed their example, you acted with prudence and discretion in pausing before you engaged, and in now finally determining not to engage, the British troops in such a district as Mooltan, and at such a season of the year, in operations on the extensive scale on which they must have been conducted.

If these deplorable events had occurred a few months or even a few weeks earlier in the year, I should have expected and required a very different course of action. The British force must in that case have been instantly moved, and the outrage committed, the treachery shewn on the part of the leaders and soldiery connected with the events at Mooltan, must have been followed by a retribution as prompt as it was severe.

But to have moved the army now, with knowledge you had of the strength of the fort of Mooltan, requiring a Siege train for its reduction—with a knowledge of the force

collecting there, of the probability which the admission of the Sirdars has since converted into certainty, that the army of the Maharaja was not faithful—at a season when the heat is intolerable, the rains in early prospect, and the rivers already beginning to swell towards the inundations which they spread over the country, this would have involved the certainty of a fearful loss of life among the troops, and in all probability would have resulted in a temporary failure of the enterprise in which we had engaged.

I am fully—painfully—alive to the effects which our remaining inactive, for several months, under such an insult and injury to the British power will have on the minds of the people of the country. I cannot but share in your apprehensions that the flame kindled at Mooltan may spread into conflagration throughout the Punjab. I neither question the existence of danger to British influence in the course we have adopted nor underrate its extent. But on the other hand I am convinced that the discontinuance which the season would have compelled and the apparent discomfiture implied in that discontinuance would have caused the rebellion to spread as rapidly and would have produced dangers quite as grave as those which our present policy would produce, while it would have left us in many respects worse prepared to meet them than we are now and shall be hereafter.

For these reasons I consider that the decision, to which you have come in concurrence with the Commander in Chief, was, in the choice of evils, a right decision and a wise one.

When the period shall have passed during which Military operations are impracticable, I shall consider it my duty to put forth, if necessary, the whole power that the Govt. of India can command for the purpose of inflicting signal and severe punishment on those guilty of this outrage and of exacting from the state of Lahore that national reparation which it is my firm determination to obtain for the national injury done to the Government of the Hon'ble Company.

This is not merely a question between the Govt. of India and the Dewan Moolraj of Mooltan. The servants of the Company have been murdered while employed in the interest of the State of Lahore by one of its chief servants; they have been treacherously betrayed to their death by the

desertion of the troops of Lahore. The Govt. of Lahore has failed and still fails and, I fear, will ever fail, to punish the murderers and repress the treason. We must do this for ourselves. In due time we will do so; but I will hold the state of Lahore answerable for such reparation for all this hereafter as the Govt. of the Hon'ble Company may think it fitting and right to demand.

In furtherance of this determination the Government will issue immediate directions for 'the commencement and vigorous prosecution of such preparations as may enable the army to take the field as soon as the season will permit. In the meantime our attention must be directed to the adoption of every precaution necessary for securing our present position and for providing against any danger which may arise within the Punjab.

From your letters of the 5th and 6th May, brought to me an hour ago by express, I am happy to see that you have already directed the reinforcement of the troops at Lahore. I earnestly beg to impress upon you the vast importance of providing amply against the possibility of attacks on the British force at a time when the season may make it very difficult to advance troops to your support. I have much satisfaction also in believing that you have resolved on placing a garrison of our own troops in Govindghur. If I am in error in understanding that such is the case, I would urge on your attention the expediency of availing yourself of the powers conferred upon us by the VIIIth article of the Treaty.

You will doubtless have taken such precautions as, without imposing any unnecessary restrictions upon His Highness, will effectually secure our possession of the person of the Maharaja, and preclude the possibility of any abstraction or secretion of his treasure, jewels and property. The moment is so favourable for the exercise of her powers of intrigue, and so well calculated to excite anew her ambitious hopes that I cannot doubt the Ranee is prepared for and already busy in mischief. Every fact which comes to me from the other side of the Sutlej, proves the hopelessness of relying on the fidelity of any portion of that people. Having regard to the influence which her presence as well as her abilities would have with the insurgent force, if she could escape and join

them, and not having any confidence in the trustworthiness of the Sikh custody in which she is placed, I request you to take steps for obtaining the consent of the Durbar to her immediate removal into the British territories for her temporary safe custody there. In the event of the Durbar showing any reluctance to do this, which in their present perilous position in relation to the British Government I can hardly conceive to be possible, you will take your own measures and remove her accordingly, without waiting for their consent. I do not wish entirely to fetter your discretion in this matter, but, I am so fully convinced of the probability of her escape and estimate so highly the mischief she could do that unless reasons very urgent indeed lead you to a different conclusion, I request your adoption of this measure.

In the constant change of circumstances which occur with you from day to day, I think it advisable to leave to your discretion the mode by which and the terms in which you will communicate with Moolraj and the Durbar, and will make known our intentions to them. You will, however, not fail to make it clear to them that the Government which you represent is neither indifferent nor inactive: that we are fully prepared for every event, that we deeply resent all that has occurred, that when the proper time shall come we will assuredly inflict punishment and exact a heavy reparation, and that the extent of that reparation will greatly depend on the manner in which the State of Lahore shall be found to have observed its engagements and fulfilled its obligations towards that Government which has hitherto shewn itself so full of moderation and friendship towards the Government of Lahore.

Your letters of the 5th and 6th instant and enclosures from Lieut. Edwardes have filled me with deep anxiety for the fate of that gallant officer and others employed on detached service like him. I fervently hope and pray that the measures you have taken may secure their safety.

Warning should also be conveyed, and probably has already been, to the officers and others travelling in Cashmere to retrace their steps, if they have not postponed their departure.

The intimation you give of the attempts made to temper with the fidelity of our army disquiets me. I pray you to be vigilant and not to allow it to be made light of. If you detect an offender and prove against him the offence of seducing troops from their allegiance you will deal promptly with him. We are in circumstances requiring stern and unhesitating execution of justice, and mercy to a proved traitor at such a moment as this would be weakness indeed. I say this merely to assure you that the measures which your own vigour will prompt you to adopt in such circumstances as the present will not fail to receive all due support from me.

I deeply deplore these events. I lament the loss of gallant and able men, and the renewal of prospects of war. But the course which it is the duty of the Government of India to follow is clear; and we shall walk in it firmly, vigorously and justly.

46. *From Lord Dalhousie*

Barrackpore, May 17th, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

My letter sent two days ago will I hope be satisfactory to you. You shall however have an official letter to the same effect. I preferred writing at once to you both because it saved time and because it was more likely to be satisfactory to all parties that I should express myself freely instead of confining myself to the dry paragraphs of a Govt. letter.

I am extremely sorry to hear that you are suffering especially in your eyes. If they are troublesome do not scruple to employ the hand of your Secretary to your dictation in writing to me.

You have done quite right to resolve on asking Mr. John Lawrence's co-operation if you are overwhelmed with work. I have no doubt he will give it readily.

Yesterday I sent a letter to the C. in C. enclosing a copy of mine to you. We shall proceed to make every preparation to act as early as possible. Whatever turns up, give no terms to Moolraj or the Officer Commdg. the escort. I can't quite make out what Sirdar Khan Sing's conduct *really* has been.

Lt. Maxwell has conveyed to me the enclosed informn. relative to a plan of the part of Mooltan made by Major Peat.

I have sent a copy of this letter of Lt. M. to C. in C. and I have sent to Bombay and to Kurrachee to have enquiries made about it. The plan is not in the office here. There is only a duplicate of that which you have at Lahore.

47. *From Lord Dalhousie*

Private

Government House, May 28th, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

We received yesterday your despatch of 18th May, enclosing copies of your demi-official letters from and to Lt. Edwardes on the present state of affairs in the Punjab.

Much that is contained in those letters is very satisfactory, but I regret to be obliged to add that I altogether dissent from the opinion you have expressed to Lt. Edwardes, that he has done quite right in the negotiations he has entered into with the Dewan Moolraj with a view to induce that rebel to surrender himself and to come in.

I object altogether to Lieutt. Edwardes having taken upon himself to enter into any such negotiation, absolutely and utterly without any authority from yourself or any other superior officer, still less from the Govt. and I object to the substance of the communication he has made. No officer in the very subordinate position in which Lt. Edwardes is placed has a right to enter on questions of such magnitude as this, committing his Government (who may be unwilling to do any thing which may appear to break the faith supposed to be pledged by its officers) and in all probability seriously embarrassing its future proceedings. Here has been a deed committed in Mooltan with which all India and all England will ring, the rebel Governor applauding and rewarding the deed, thereafter actively engaging in open and formidable revolt and the State of Lahore confessing itself incapable to give us justice on the murders, still less to put down the rebellion or afford reparation for the public injury. This is a grave question to be settled between the British Government and the State of Lahore and yet a subaltern officer, on the extreme confines of the Punjab, without reference even to his superior officer takes upon himself to undertake the

settlement of the matter, offers terms to the rebel Governor of Mooltan and gives guarantee to the head of the treason. The substance of the guarantee is nothing to the point. What I am now condemning is the impropriety of any officer in such a position venturing to take a step of such magnitude and presuming to negotiate in a state affair such as this without any semblance of authority from his superior officer or any previous reference to him.

I have a very high opinion of Mr. Edwardes' gallantry, energy and intelligence. I have much applauded his proceedings heretofore. But in this instance his zeal has outrun not only discretion, but propriety. I cannot permit that young officers, civil or military, should assume such powers to themselves that they should in point of fact assume the powers of Government, and I greatly regret that you have not taken this view or considered Mr. Edwardes to have exceeded the powers with which he was entrusted. I have thus stated my objection to an officer in such station entering into any such negotiation at all. I have further to object to the substance of the communication made. No terms in my opinion should have been made at all. I am quite aware that the terms given as such as under no circumstances would have been withheld, that the guarantee is only for that which, as a matter of course, the Dewan Moolraj would have received, namely justice and a fair trial. But with a rebel such as this—a criminal of so deep a dye, a traitor of such magnitude, *no* parley should have been held, no condition should have been listened to, no promises made, no matter how safe those promises were. Absolute, unconditional surrender is the only communication from the Dewan Moolraj to which we can give ear, or to which we should reply.

If Mr. Edwardes and the Dewan have gone on with their correspondence and the latter has come in on guarantee, I greatly fear that it will seriously complicate embarrassments already sufficiently numerous and perplexing. The guarantee is of fair trial. That he would have received at any rate. But he will not understand, the people will not understand it as we do, and I lament its having been given.

Rely upon it that you and I—you as officer on the spot, I as the responsible head of the Government—will have a

heavy cannonade of reproach directed against us for that we have not instantly launched the British power against this rebel and murderer in his hold. I have above expressed my concurrence in what you resolved and I repeat my assurance of it. But we must not look for general concurrence. When it shall appear that approaches have been subsequently made to this man, that he has been permitted to enter into correspondence with a view "to make terms" for himself, I greatly fear we shall have increased those reproaches and that we shall be considered to have lowered the British power into an attitude less commanding than that which the circumstances demanded, and which policy would suggest. I have only to hope that I may be wrong in my anticipations.

If, however, the Dewan Moolraj should still be in rebellion when this letter and the accompanying despatch reach you, I have to request that no terms whatever shall be made with this man. A great public offence has been committed. The British Government has no fear of the offender or of the united force of all who may abet him. But it will not enter into a contest with the seasons and the elements, and it therefore abstains from moving the army now. When the time comes, as you have been instructed to state, punishment will be inflicted and reparation exacted. In the meantime no anxiety should be shewn to settle matters by negotiation; and I repeat it again, nothing but unconditional submission and surrender should be listened to from the Dewan Moolraj.

In the event of any sudden conclusion of this insurrection being brought to pass, I request that you will not enter into any negotiation with the Durbar and decide on anything regarding the reparation to be made to the British Government, unless on points on which immediate action is required imperatively; but that you will reserve that question for the consideration and instructions of the Supreme Govt. and all proceedings necessarily requiring immediate action are confidently left to your discretion and vigour.

While I have been compelled to express my dissent from the view you have taken of Mr. Edwardes' proceeding, and while I have given you my whole mind, as on parting with you I said my private correspondence would always do, it gives me sincere pleasure to assure you in the strongest

terms of my approval and contentment with all the rest of your proceedings at Lahore.

My letter, which is already in your hands, will have satisfied you of my approval of those measures which you have taken in anticipation of my wishes. The official despatch, which, perhaps, has not reached you is in the same terms.

The promptitude and vigour you displayed in the seizure, conviction and execution of Khan Sing and the Moonshee are entitled to the highest praise, and I have no doubt will exercise most important influence on the course of public events in Lahore.

Nothing could have been better planned, more speedily, more secretly or better executed than the Removal of the Maharanee with the sanction of the Durbar. You have got rid of a very serious danger by that act; and have not only fulfilled but have anticipated the wishes of this Govt. I congratulate you on both events as calculated to raise your reputation as a public man.

The reinforcements moved into Lahore are very satisfactory and make matters quite safe, I think. The Commander-in-Chief is anxious to have a steamer at Ferozepore, and it would be well if you could communicate with the authorities of the Indus and get one up before the floods are heavy. I will send orders by Bombay, but this will be sufficient for the local authorities.

You shall be informed as soon as the Government has decided on the force to be employed in autumn. The C. in C. has recommended one on a very irresistible scale, which I hope may not be required.

The result of the investigation into the fidelity of the Sepoys seemed to me highly satisfactory. I was glad to see you had rewarded them publicly and orders have now gone from the Military department to promote them all a step.

As I have not received any private letter from you lately, I hear nothing of your health. But I hope it does not suffer from your great labour and from anxiety, and that your eyes are not plaguing you.

48. *From Lord Dalhousie*

Barrackpore, June 13th, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I had the pleasure of receiving your letter of 27th ult. in time to give through it the latest intelligence to the powers at home.

Your tidings upon the whole are better than one might have anticipated a month ago. But after all, my mind can arrive at no other conclusion, either from them or from the public letters which you transmit to us from your assistants, than this that the whole army of Lahore is in rebellion against us, if only they had the courage to declare it.

With reference to the present, everything has been done that was either necessary or desirable for our safety. The vigorous treatment of the conspiracy, the prompt transportation of the Maharanee, and the reinforcement of the troops at Lahore, were all excellent; and I have no doubt will be conclusive in their effect, so far as that part of the country is concerned.

The successes which you have reported of the corps under Lieutt. Edwardes are very satisfactory and will be very beneficial, if only he is content to act within his sphere and obey his orders. I entirely approve of the instructions you issued to him to remain on his own side of the Indus and to make sure of the tranquility of the troops, and of the revenue of that district. I hope he will not have disobeyed your orders after having asked for them and before having received them.

I am sorry that Govindghur was not occupied as the troops from Jullundur passed. It is doubtless right and judicious not to show any undue distrust. But the Treaty so clearly gave the right of occupying all forts, whenever we judged fit for the peace of the country, that neither the State nor the people would have had any right to infer from it any undue extent of distrust in our minds. As far as the Durbar is concerned, after having formally declared to you that their army was not to be depended upon, they could not under any circumstances pretend to the right of expressing either surprise or discontent at any such proceeding on our part.

I hope the confidence which is shewn by Mr. Herbert's proceeding to join his appointment at Peshawar may be justified by the event.

To move troops now to occupy Govindghur would be too great a parade of distrust; but if, hereafter, before these troubles are brought to a crisis, a favourable opportunity should present itself of dropping a regiment into it, I should be glad to see it done.

One never can sufficiently lament that this affair had not occurred two months earlier. As it is I have never hesitated for a moment in my conviction that the Commander-in-Chief and yourself were perfectly right in the conclusion to which you came. In all our despatches the Government has accepted fully the responsibility of the decision and has expressed its concurrence and approval.

A despatch has been sent to the C. in C. relative to the force to be assembled. I have found myself unable to recommend to the Govt. to consent to an increase of the army, either temporary or permanent. In like manner I have been unable to assent to the proposal of H.E. for assembling so large a force, both because it seemed to me larger than the occasion demanded, and because without an increase of the army it could only be obtained by withdrawing from the lower provinces a greater number of troops than I conceived myself warranted in sparing, unless under circumstances of grave emergency.

Having regard to the very large force at Lahore and in the Jullundur and which I do not contemplate diminishing, I considered an army of 20,000 men, with 30 Siege Guns, was the utmost that could be required by the worst state of things which it was even possible to anticipate in November next. With you I hope that a very much smaller force will suffice.

A column will be prepared for co-operation on the side of Scinde.

Instructions have been issued for entering on the necessary preparations, avoiding as much as possible all premature expense.

It is unprofitable to speculate on the probability of intermediate events. It is equally unprofitable to attempt determining beforehand what shall be the reparation we

shall exact, since much must depend on those intermediate events. It is, you may well believe, a subject of frequent and anxious reflection to me, and, in whatever point of view I regard it, I find the issues perplexing in the extreme.

No great nation can afford—least of all can the British in India afford—to let a great offence against its honour and interests pass without signal punishment and reparation which shall be memorable. Such an offence has been committed against us—therefore punishment we must have; reparation we must have; and reimbursement we must have, if we are compelled to right ourselves by the might of our arms.

If, as is not at all improbable and as you have more than once supposed, when our preparations are made in a great degree, the insurrectionary force melts away, having strangled Moolraj before they parted, even the punishment we demand on the actual offender will be lost. Reparation and reimbursement will under all circumstances be difficult of attainment.

Whatever may be the immediate result of this episode—if it be an episode and not the catastrophe—the events of it have put an end in my mind to all hope of seeing in the Punjab, either during our protectorate or after its termination, that which in common with my predecessor I should sincerely desire to see the formation of a *strong and friendly* state on our western frontier.

While I am not inclined, as some are, to attribute all that has occurred to secret intrigues on the part of the Durbar or its members, it would be well to keep a vigilant eye on their past and present proceedings with reference to future considerations.

Everything here and at home, financial and commercial, is in a deplorable state.

49. *From Lord Dalhousie*
Private

Barrackpore Park, June 27th, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I have to acknowledge your letter of the 6th instant, to which I should have replied sooner, but that I have been too unwell to admit of my doing more than carry on the indispensable despatch of business.

I have been heartily glad to perceive that nothing has come of Lt. Edwardes' communications with Moolraj through Mustapha Khan, and consequently that no harm has been done. I must, however, frankly say that my views respecting his proceeding are in no respect changed. I have no doubt that Lt. E. and yourself both regarded the answer given as one which virtually was a demand for unconditional surrender, and I distinctly stated in my former letter that Mr. E. promised nothing but what as a matter of course the British Govt. would have given without pledge offered by it or its officers.

My objection was two-fold.

1. That Mr. E. altogether exceeded his authority in negotiating at all. The exercise of such powers by detached officers is highly inconvenient to the Govt., highly objectionable, and is at this moment producing embarrassment and obstruction to the Policy of the Govt. in other quarters in India.

2. That any guarantee in this case was objectionable, tho' the matter guaranteed might in itself have been reasonable and right. The view taken of such a guarantee by ourselves and by the Diwan himself and his countrymen would have been widely different, and it appears to me certain that had it been acted upon, either justice would have been evaded or a reproach of breach of faith in the execution of justice would have been incurred.

To you on the spot the matter probably appeared less important, from the improbability of anything resulting from it, than it did us here. Nothing *has* resulted, and therefore nothing more need be said about it. Your instructions to Lt. Edwardes are very distinct and conclusive. His position is a very distinguished and enviable one for a soldier to fill, and I hope his discretion will keep pace with his gallantry and energy.

The intelligence which you send us is on the whole much more favourable than I had looked for. The reports of the officers in the various districts convey to my mind the impression that the universal army are traitors to a man to the British authority, but want the courage to avow it. The ignoble end to which you have driven the Bhae Maharaj will

be a fresh damper to Moolraj and all who openly are his partisans or secretly his well-wishers. I incline now to believe that our great embarrassment will be where to find a criminal to punish or how to discover a means of reparation for the affront the Lahore State or its army have put upon us.

If the Diwan's cause should melt into thin air, or if Lt. Edwardes and the Nawab of Bahawalpore should with their troops beat him or catch him, it will make the Government and all of us look rather small!

But whatever the issue of this immediate outbreak may be, it must, I fear, be regarded as going far to prove the impracticability of our being able to ensure the construction of a firm and self sustaining Govt. to rule the Punjab. The account you give of the materials out of which it is to be formed, as they have been exhibited by the test these events have applied to them, is very discouraging, and Mr. John Lawrence's estimate of the Chiefs and leaders is not a whit more favourable than yours. The debt due by the State of Lahore is very large, notwithstanding the windfall found in the Tosha Khana. There seems a very faint probability of the 22 lacs being annually made good. Are we to go on being generous and magnanimous, maintaining for other six years a Govt. which can neither punish its criminals, control its army, pay its annual contributions or discharge the principal of its debt? Especially are we to maintain it for six years at this sacrifice, when we can hardly doubt that at the end of those 6 years, the chiefs will be as impotent under a boy sovereign of 15 as they are now, the army as insubordinate, and consequently the frontiers of our territory as unsafe and the neighbourhood as turbulent as they were likely to be in Decr. 1846?

These are grave questions, perplexing to solve, and yet (putting Moolraj and war out of view) they will press for consideration and decision very speedily, after what has already occurred.

On the part of the British Govt. I will observe the Treaty to the letter as long as its provisions are acted up to by the other party to the Instrument. But to continue to act rigidly in observance of a treaty at great trouble, great cost and

much anxiety to ourselves when the other party to it are quite unwilling or quite unable to fulfil its main provisions, seems something more than can reasonably be expected.

How do these considerations present themselves to your mind?

I am happy to see that you speak well of the climate and that your health has improved. The last two hot months have taken too much out of me and I fret grievously when I find myself not quite up to my work.

Sir Herbert, I am sorry to say, is so unwell that he is obliged to go away for some time. He looks very ill.

It gave me the pleasure to put your brother into the Board. He will be of great use.

50. *From Lord Dalhousie*

Private

Barrackpore Park, July 13th, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letters of 22nd, 25th and 27th June. Each of them as they arrived found me confined to bed by illness, where I remained until the receipt of your letter to the C. in C. sent me to the Council Chamber. This will excuse my not having replied until now.

Although my own opinion on the subject of your reference to the C. in C. was very decided, I did not wish to issue instructions on a matter of so great importance without giving the council an opportunity of meeting to discuss the subject personally or by merely submitting to them a minute. The result of the discussion will be made known to you by a despatch sent by express immediately afterwards.

We were very clearly of opinion that Mr. Edwardes' proposal that you should send guns down to *his* force was preposterous and am glad that in your reply to him you had so regarded it. I will add that Lt. Edwardes' letter of June 21st, which reached me last night only, could furnish abundant evidence, if any had been wanting, of the impossibility of confiding British guns and British reputation with them to a force so constituted as he describes the army with him to be, and so little disposed to harmony of action and feeling.

We were further of opinion that the C. in C. was right in declining to trust the large force of guns proposed to a single brigade, and that his views were sound in laying down that no force should go unless it were of a description calculated to ensure success for itself, irrespective either of native allies or of native enemies. The despatch will have also informed you that we considered him right in objecting to send *any* force now to Mooltan and in recommending an adherence to the determination previously formed and declared.

If I could have discovered any change in circumstances which weighed with me in recommending to the Council to approve the original decision of the C. in C. and yourself of not moving a force until after the rains, I should not for a moment have hesitated to advise now a change of policy; altho' unquestionably such changes must always give an appearance of vacillation to the acts of Govt., which is an evil in itself. But I could discover no such change. Even so far as the supposed prevalence of inundations round Mooltan weighed in the consideration of the subject, we have no reason whatever, as yet, for assuming that the supposition of their prevalence has been an error. It is clear that you had received no such satisfactory information as to convince you that inundations did not prevail, for the last despatch we have of yours to Lieut. Edwardes directs him to enquire and report on that point.

Assuming, however, that no inundations do exist sufficient to render Siege operations impracticable, setting aside all questions of carriage, draught commissariat and stores, I could not consent to move a force upon Mooltan now, because the reasons which induced me to approve of withholding an army two months ago exist not only in equal but augmented force at the present time.

The chief reason, which weighed with me and with the members of Council in sanctioning delay until after the rains, was the advanced season of the year and the consequent dangers to the health and almost to the existence of an European force. The notorious fierceness of the heat in the district of Mooltan, the approach of the rainy season and exposure in the field at such a time, would, we believed,

produce that fearful loss of life among the troops to which the C. in C. adverted on 30th April, and on which he based his advice, as a military man, that we should not attempt to take the field then.

Everything that I have heard from every quarter, every opinion that I have received from officers, whose opinions were worth having, confirmed this view. And if I had required anything to remove a doubt or to resolve me in abiding by that decision, it would have been supplied by your letter of May 27th, by which I was much struck at the time. After saying that the more the dangers and difficulties of delay stared you in the face, the more you were satisfied that the delay could not have been avoided, you go on to express your conviction that if an European force had gone to Mooltan early in May, not one man in five could have returned to the provinces, and not one in ten could have ever done the state another day's service. All I hear confirms the accuracy of that conviction; but if that were so, if those were the consequences likely to ensue two months ago when the monsoon was only in prospect, how certainly would it be the result now that the monsoon is in its force.

I know of no calamity, political or otherwise, which could occur in the Punjab which could weigh in the balance with such a calamity as this, falling on our army. In that view I concurred in refusing a force in May. That view remaining unchanged, the reasons for it continuing in increased cogency, I could not consent to moving an army now.

I am well aware of the political importance of hinging this business to a conclusion. I am fully awake to the dangers of a continuance of a rebellion. But in the fullest contemplation of all those dangers, I approved of delay at the commencement, and I am not induced to give greater weight to them now, when every danger has been greatly diminished and by your own measures and by the success of Lt. Edwardes, we have every reason to believe that, in your own words, "the neck of the rebellion is broken."

I have considered it to be due to you that I should enter fully into the reasons which induced my colleagues and myself to concur with the C. in C. in his objections to the employment of the force which you desired to move upon

Mooltan. And, I am fully prepared to accept and to meet the responsibility of *any* thing that may occur in consequence of it.

If the vicinity of the troops under Lt. E. and his ally shall terrify the insurgents into submission and dispersion, I think you have well provided for the occupation of Mooltan. In that case it will be held by British troops for their Govt. until the adjustment of this question between the two States. If this should not happen, I do not think you can do better than direct Lt. E. to act upon your original plan, which has always appeared to me a most judicious one, namely to draw, as it were, a *vide* cordon round Mooltan, to occupy the Doabs, preserve quiet and collect revenues.

Lt. E., I perceive, has not forgotten that this was the plan: for in his letter of 21st he speaks of himself as an 'intruder' in that Doab. His desire to dash at Mooltan is, as you observe, very natural; but if Moolraj's nerves can stand the shock, the failure of it will not improve Lt. E.'s position or our's.

The dismal state of our finances and their prospects have induced me to delay my preparations involving *immediate* expense. It is happy I did so, for I think we may now fairly assume that one half of the force contemplated by the Govt. will now be sufficient. If some decisive intelligence does not arrive from Mooltan within a week, I cannot safely delay longer and the orders must issue. Whether a British army should ultimately be required or not for the reduction of Mooltan, it is a question demanding consideration whether the assemblage of a force will not be necessary still. The solution of this question must depend on the decision to which the Govt. may come relative to the policy to be observed by the British Govt. after the insurrection shall have ended whether of itself or by force of arms.

I have observed in the course of your letters a gradual change of your views regarding the Punjab, which you broadly state in your letter of 22nd June. You are now evidently of opinion that (as you say) the direct administration of affairs in the Raj must be assumed by us—that the entire Civil and Military administration must be changed. For my part I do not see how it is practicable for us to assume

more directly the administration of affairs than we do, except in one way—by subverting the State and declaring the Punjab to be a British province.

If we desired to have this territory, if it were either unquestionably advantageous for us to possess it, or if we wanted only an excuse for seizing upon it, I apprehend that the most rigid upholders of treaties could not deny that we shall have a perfect right to do so, if the British army shall be called up to take the field against Mooltan.

Ours is a treaty in which we enjoy by stipulation a right to friendship, a right to be obeyed in every department of the State and a right to certain regulated payments in return for protection and defence. In place of friendship we have our officers murdered by them when engaged on *their* business, murdered by their officers, which they could not have been unless they had been deserted by *their* troops. When in pursuance of the commonest right of nations, where there is no treaty at all, we demand delivery and punishment of the criminal, they declare themselves unable to compel their army to seize him. When, in exercise of our controlling right under the treaty, we order their troops to move to the attack, the Lahore Govt. tells us "if they do, every soldier will join the insurrection." The mother of the Sovereign is detected debauching the fidelity of the troops with us—we know positively that every man in their army is a traitor tho' he dares not do a treasonable act—some of them do commit the deed—all wait for a safe opportunity to do it. The insurrection shews itself in another part, and the leader of it is received with open arms, apparently by high and low, thro' the principal doab in the Punjab. Lastly the tribute is never paid. These facts prove that virtually and in truth the Treaty is broken into pieces, and that if our army is compelled to act, we shall have a *right* to do what we please with the Punjab.

But altho' in the event of our army taking the field we shall have undoubted right to do what we please with the State, the question still will remain, is it necessary to do so, is it practicable to do so?

When a member of the Imperial Govt., I approved of the

policy observed by my predecessor Lord Hardinge in abstaining from occupation of the Punjab. I thought and I think still that the firm establishment of a Hindoo Govt. between the British frontier on the Sutlej and the Khyber is the most advantageous circumstance that could be desired for British India. I am desirous of fully and fairly carrying Lord Hardinge's policy into effect, honestly and candidly if it *can* be done. But if the experiment which has endured for now two years has proved a failure, and if the experiment has been continued sufficiently long to enable us to draw a sound conclusion from it, and if in the judgement of those best qualified to judge, the experiment has proved that a strong Hindoo Government can *not* be formed in the Punjab, if the Chiefs and Sirdars are hopelessly and helplessly impotent, and thus material is wanting from which a Govt. may be constructed capable of sustaining itself, if the army, in spite of discipline, in spite of pension and pay, is thus traitorous to a man, if both soldiers and Sikhs of every degree thus catch at every opportunity of ejecting or destroying us, altho' we are protecting and aiding them, and if, as is the case, not one shilling of the Treaty-subsidy is paid, are we to overlook this gross national offence, are we to content ourselves with hanging Moolraj, taking reimbursement of our own expense and enough to reward and reimburse Bawul Khan, then forgive the rest and go on till the 5th September, 1854, sacrificing 22 lacs per annum, bearing all the labor, all the anxiety, and then retire with the certainty that we leave a state on our frontier whose Govt. is as incompetent, and whose army is as uncontrollable as were the army and Govt. which we found there in Feby. 1846? Are we to do this? or are we to say, we have tried you enough, we have borne with you enough, we have dry-nursed and bolstered you up enough; your army and people are and ever will be hostile to us—all our generosity is thrown away upon you, you injure us and either will not or can not give us redress, we will bear with you no longer, your power is at end and your country shall be ours!"

The answer to these questions will determine whether it is *necessary* to annex the Punjab, and whether an army should still assemble.

The second question is whether it is practicable for us

to do so. That we have it in our *power* to walk into the country, take it, occupy it and keep it when we please and as long as we please, in spite of Sikhs, Afghans and Hillmen, no one among us will for a moment doubt. But will not the force required to ensure its continued occupation and tranquillity be so great, will not the expenses of the administration of the province be so large, as to render its occupation a losing concern, and so make occupation virtually impracticable?

The leaning of your opinion on these points, both with respect to the expenses of occupation and to the resources of the state from which those expenses can be met, seem to be in favour of the practicability of occupation. I should be glad to be favoured with it fully.

The result, therefore, of my consideration of this portion of the subject is that if the British army should be required to take the field against the Dewan Moolraj, our right to do what we please with the Punjab will be beyond cavil or dispute, and we shall then have to decide whether consideration of our own safety and interests would require us to take it at once, and whether we can afford to do.

There still remains another issue of these events, and the one which at present seems the most probable.

Suppose that either from fear of Lt. Edwardes' army or from internal dissensions the fort of Mooltan should fall and the insurgent force should disperse, our policy would be greatly more doubtful and perplexing. The punishment of the criminal will be secured either way, not so the reparation we have declared our intention of exacting. At present the State of Lahore is a flagrant offender against the British Govt., a foul crime has been committed against us and the Durbar has declared they cannot give us justice on the criminal because its troops will not obey their orders. But if the Dewan's force shall now surrender or fly, they surrender to or fly before General Cortlandt's and Lt. Edwardes *commanding the troops of the Durbar*, in which case the Durbar *will* have obeyed our call and will have acted against the rebel to his end.

I am aware that in your letters you have regarded all that has been done by the force, I have named, as done by

you and not by the Durbar, most justly so far as the *reality* of the things is concerned. But the Durbar will contend that General Cortlandt's are their troops, the new Pathan levies are made in their name, enlisted under their colors and paid with their money. And if there was any ambiguity about it, Lt. Edwardes in his letter of 21st has effectually removed it, for he has there officially informed the Bahawulpore General that the two corps are fighting for the Maharaja, for the restoration of Maharaja's rights and that the guns captured from the rebels belong neither to him, nor to the British but to the Maharaja.

If then, Lt. E.'s troops, altho' in company with the troops of Bahawulpore, shall take Mooltan and Moolraj, in that case our demand for reparation will be open to arguments, and, as it seems to me, we shall have to confine ourselves to the request of payment of our little bill, on behalf of the Nawab and ourselves.

In the determination of the grave questions, propounded in this letter, a great deal will depend on the proofs which will be obtainable of the complicity of the army, the population and the leaders and to the production of which you seem to look with confidence.

Paras 7 to 18 of your despatch of June 17th are most important, if susceptible of clear proof.

Instructions will be sent to Major McGregor to seize the papers of the Maharanee and to have an inventory made of her property as soon as she arrives at Benares.

I have troubled you with a very long letter but it has become necessary in the prospect of an early termination of the insurrection, as anticipated in your despatch.

No one can be a better or more impartial judge of the question than yourself who have borne so great and distinguished a part in the affairs of the Punjab. Naturally, therefore, your opinion as to future policy is the first I ask.

With respect to writing to Lord Hardinge, I do not see that there can be any objection. I have not the slightest on my own part to your doing so. I have written to him fully myself. I do not see that Sir John H. can have anything to do with your writing to Ld. Hardinge, avoiding of course the mention of matters *secret*, of which as yet there are none.

My own position is more delicate in consequence of considerations of political party as between me and the present Govt. But I see no reason why you should not write if you wish it.

Touching my coming up the country, believe only what you hear from me. You may rely upon it that no body in the upper provinces would have earlier information than yourself.

My coming will depend entirely on the course of events, unless indeed my health should grow shaky, which it inclines, I fear, to be. They tell me it is seasoning. I hope so, but if so, it is an unpleasant process.

Sir Herbert has gone away very sick to Ceylon.

51. *From Lord Dalhousie*

Private

Govt. House, July 25th, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

There was not time to send you a private letter by the Express which carried the despatch of the Govt. in reply to yours of the 10th in which you intimate your resolution of sending a force down to Mooltan, and the orders you have issued.

It is disagreeable to me to express opinions different from those which have led you to adopt this resolution. In common honesty, however, I am bound to say that your despatch has not produced any change in the opinions I have more than once expressed.

Your despatch most conclusively shews that the political dangers which were involved in the quiescent of our army have sunk comparatively to zero; it does not convince me that the risks of climate do not stand as high now as you have hitherto believed and as the C. in C. still believes. If we are justified in moving troops now when the dangers of climate are as great as ever they have been represented to be, and the political danger much smaller, I do not know how I am to justify our not having moved when the political dangers were immeasurably greater.

In all that you say of Lt. Edwardes' gallantry, intelligence, zeal and self-devotion, I cordially concur. He shall be

highly applauded, and as far as the utmost limits of my powers as Govr. Genl. allow me to go, he shall be highly rewarded. But of the policy and state advantages of this advance upon Mooltan after his action of the 18th, so far as the British State is concerned, I entertain a different opinion.

However, having said this much, I have nothing more to do with the past. My object will be to afford every possible assistance to you in the measure you have now resolved upon. As the despatch has already announced to you, they must be carried into effect at all the hazards of climate or otherwise which have hitherto deterred us. The C. in C. was addressed by the same Express as yourself, and I am happy to learn by letters since received from him that His Exly. is making every exertion to equip the force and ensure its efficiency. Of its success, I entertain not one moment's doubt, and I heartily hope that it may not undergo the sufferings from climate which have been so continuously anticipated.

Where I am to find money to pay for this, God above only knows. The revenue is about £ 1,400,000 behind the expenditure. The loan produces *nothing*, nothing is advanced on bills here. Nothing can be raised on bills by the Court at home; and for the 2nd time since I assumed this Govt. 6 months ago, the Directors have sent for a remittance of half a million of money in bullion! These are grave considerations.

I shall await with much anxiety and interest the proofs in your report to which you have alluded. Of the facts mentioned as certain in para 4 of your despatch of July 10, you must be aware, especially after my letter of 13th instant, that important political results will hang on evidence of these and similar facts.

In my last letter I mentioned that I had delayed until the last moment, which would admit of their being made so as to bring the army into the field at the time named on orders for preparations for its equipment. The orders for those preparations were in draft when your despatch of the 10th instant arrived. As a matter of course the force having moved, no orders for a force against Mooltan in October are requisite.

I await now the course of events consequent on this

movement. On those events and on your report as to the facts connected with the State of Lahore requested in my late letters it will depend whether another army will assemble hereafter or not.

P. S.

I feel it to be almost superfluous to mention it, but as the papers shew the subject is in his mind, I may as well observe that, as at present advised, I cannot hold out hopes to Bhawul Khan of *territory* in the Punjab by way of recompense.

52. *From Sir Frederick Currie to Lord Dalhousie*
Confidential

Lahore, 26th July, 1848.

My dear Lord,

Your lordship's letter of the 13th reached me two days ago, and, as you will easily imagine, it has added considerably to my anxieties to find that your Lordship was so very decided in your determination not to sanction the movement of the troops at this season, just as I had got them fairly started, on my own responsibility, for Mooltan. If I had any doubt as to the paramount necessity of the measure on the grounds which were not in your Lordship's knowledge when I took upon myself to order the move, I should have been still more perplexed when I received the orders of Government, followed by your Lordship's confidential letter, but I am quite certain that had your Lordship been in my place, you would have acted as I have done. I am so sure that the course I have taken is under the circumstances the right one, the only one which could have been followed with safety, and I am so confident of success, that my only care is—and it is a heavy one—that I do not carry your Lordship's concurrence and approbation along with me.

Viewing the affairs of the Punjab from the distance at which your Lordship is placed from the theatre of events, and judging only from the imperfect details which my despatches bring before you, it is impossible for you to know the very uncertain state in which things have been for the last three months, and still are. The circumstances which arise almost daily and threaten a crisis and the unceasing watchfulness

and anxious management which have been necessary on my part to prevent a general revolt and insurrection.

The Mooltan rebellion, in itself, apart from the extensive schemes and combinations now connected with it, is quite unimportant; but in connection with these, its continuance or otherwise becomes a matter to the last degree momentous.

I do not yet know all that was intended, or the extent to which hopes are still entertained of success to the scheme for expelling us from this part of India. Every day brings new revelations, some of which seem to elucidate and some to mystify the whole affair.

It is quite certain that all last autumn and cold weather plans were forming, combinations were being made, and various interests were being enlisted with a view to a grand struggle for our expulsion from the Punjab and all the territories west of Delhi.

The scheme originated, as far as I can make out, with the Ranee, and was contemplated, and her endeavours for its accomplishment set to work, from the time of her being sent to Sheikhpoorah. The plan was communicated to the Sikh army and to all the Chiefs of the Punjab. The members of the Durbar, with, perhaps, one or two exceptions, were consulted and promised their co-operation—emissaries were sent to Cabool, Candahar, Cashmere and Jummoo and the Hill States—the Protected Chiefs on the other side of the Sutlej were consulted, as were the Chiefs of Rajpootana, and the Nawabs of *Jujjur* and *Rampoor*! It is positively asserted that effectual co-operation was promised by all that I have mentioned, with the exception of the Rajpootana States and Putteeala—the former of which sent no positive replies, and the latter a direct refusal. The great hopes of the conspirators lay in the promised aid from Cabool and Cashmere. Whether either Dost Mahommed or Maharajah Goolab Singh intended to keep their promises, I cannot tell, but there is no doubt that the former has collected a large army in the neighbourhood of Cabool ostensibly for operations to the N.W. which it is now said are impossible on account of the countries having been ravaged by locusts, so that supplies are not obtainable, while an advance has been made towards Julalabad on the plea of defensive precautions being necessary, on

account of Lt. Herberts having been sent to Peshawar, in company with Osman Khan, a British pensioner and a known enemy of the Dost!

Maharajah Goolab Sing has also strengthened all his positions, and added considerably to his army within the last 6 or 8 months; and it is beyond doubt that he was in secret communication with the Maharanee in December or January last.

The nature of Goolab Sing's communications I do not know—letters which have been intercepted at Peshawar from one of the Dost's sons shew that promises of aid were made by the writer *as soon as the Sikhs in Peshawur followed the example of Moolraj in Mooltan.*

These two Chiefs are too wary to commit themselves with the British Govt. while there is a fair prospect of our maintaining our position, but the facts I have stated are beyond doubt; and it is equally certain that the Sikh army and most of the Chiefs *believe* that both Dost Mahommed and Goolab Sing were entirely in their interest; the remuneration to the former is to be the restoration of Peshawur and his other former trans-Indus possessions.

As I have already reported to Govt., I do not think that any distinct plan of operation was determined beyond what I mentioned in my letter of the 10th instant; when the outbreak in Mooltan occurred, from that time it has been blended with the whole affair, and lately I have been assured that if Moolraj could hold out till November or December, the whole scheme, as at first planned by the Maharanee, would be executed and a grand struggle take place in which Sikhs, Hill Rajpoots and Mahommedans were all to join.

I put little faith in this, the combination could never be made; but the Sikh army believe in it, and hence, more than for any other reason, their sympathy with Moolraj; if Moolraj could at this time make any head, the army with Raja Sher Sing would join him, and the rest of the Sikh troops would to a man go off with their guns and all their *munitions of war to Mooltan.* Our ally Bhawul Khan with Lieutt. Edwardes' army would be beaten off and perhaps destroyed, and the British officers in the Frontier districts would be *sacrificed.*

This is what makes Moolraj and his rebellion so important. Reduce Mooltan, punish Moolraj and put down the rebellion, and the whole conspiracy will be at an end, without the prospect of its revival.

As the Durbar troops under Raja Sher Sing, etc., and Bhawul Khan's army with Lt. Edwardes' levies are now situated, and with the sympathy which Moolraj has (on account of his connection with the conspiracy) with all classes, I cannot prevent the rebellion from assuming the very formidable character I have described, except by putting it down at once. But I have, through the assistance of Lt. Edwardes, brought things to that pass that I *can* put down the rebellion by moving a British force, and such an one as is at disposal on Mooltan.

Moreover I can move the Force down without greater danger to the health of the Europeans than if they were in their cantonments, or at any rate very little greater, while the native portion of the force can march exactly as if they were in their own provinces, sending their tents ahead and marching only at night.

The season of the year is much less unfavourable than it was. There are no local rains in Mooltan; it is beyond the limits of the monsoon, but so far within its influence that the urgency of the heat is allayed and the air is softened by rains over the neighbouring countries and the inundations from the streams which flow through it. It is curious that the only two officers in this side of India who have resided in Mooltan and its vicinity—Major Mackeson and Captain Cunningham—both wrote in May last, recommending operations in July and August, rather than during prevalence of the hot winds of May and June.

Very comfortable choppered boots, in abundance, have been supplied for the European regiments, officers and men are delighted with the arrangements and no inconvenience from exposure or otherwise is anticipated, while accounts from the land columns are most satisfactory. All are in high spirits at the trip, the only dissatisfied parties being those who are left behind, while from the number of applications for permission to go with the force merely as amateurs (several of which have been granted by the General), one

should think that the expedition was looked upon as of pleasure, rather than to be accompanied by danger and distress.

I enclose for your Lordship's perusal the last report I have received from the Right Column; that of today from the Left merely said of the weather—"It has hardly shown itself once."

I hope from what I told you in this, your Lordship will think that I was justified in what I did. It seemed to me absolutely indispensable for the public interests that the move should be made; and it is a great gratification to me that I have been able to arrange the operation as to save the troops from any great degree of exposure and suffering.

I will give your Lordship my views upon the other points mentioned in your letter in a few days. The Durbar have been exerting themselves wonderfully to provide all that is necessary in the expedition and have succeeded beyond any hopes. I am curious to see what the effect of the actual move will have at Mooltan. It is probable that it may make Moolraj—as he has often declared he would—attack Edwardes, etc., with such troops as he can persuade to accompany him, and die on the field. This would be a sad disappointment to the advancing brigades; but I think it more likely that he will take to the Fort, with the few troops that may stand by him and abide the issue there. He will have but a small garrison—all, but the Sikh deserters and a few fanatics, will leave him when the Siege guns appear.

I am very sorry that your Lordship's health has suffered so much. I think, on all considerations, that your Lordship should come up to Simla for a year—there will be much to be done that will require your presence.

There has been very little rains in these Provinces hitherto, and if some does not come we shall [have] a famine.

53. *From Lord Dalhousie*
Private

Barrackpore Park, July 26th, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

After I had written to you yesterday, your private letter of the 15th and the despatches arrived.

I am very happy to see you were so far advanced as to expect to commence movements on the 16th. That which you tell me about the shafts for elephant draft is too bad—first because they ought under any circumstances to have been with the guns, and secondly because if they were not with them at first, there has been time enough to get them from Delhi since these troubles commenced. I mentioned to you we had postponed preparations till the latest *safe* moment. But one of the preparations which we did make was to send down orders immediately for the Engineers and Artillery Chiefs to proceed immediately to Ferozepore and get everything ready there. Col. Reilly answers that he is very ill and can't go. Where Major Abbot is I know not.

Now the troops are off, we will talk no more of the past, and only wish them good luck in the future.

I am myself inclined to believe that it will be necessary for me to come to the frontier for the squaring of accounts. I see no mid-course between punishing to some extent, and then forgetting and forgiving, or becoming *masters de jure* and *de facto*. Either alternative would be, in my opinion, an evil, but we have done only a choice of evils in every stage of this perplexing concern.

The Chairman writes to me that Sir Henry Lawrence proposes to return by the time you name. After adverting in a former despatch in no very gracious manner to your re-appointment as suggested in January, they now, in announcing Mr. Lewis' appointment as Provisional Councillor, intimate their intention of re-appointing you, and in terms which lead me to understand that they propose to give you precedence over him making your future term of 4 years' duration. This I suppose will open Council to you again when Sir Herbert retires in March 1849.

He looked very ill when he went away. I fear the spectacle of his coffee estates, from what I am told, will not exhilarate him much: but he proposes to be away 3 months and I think he will ride out the cold season here.

The season here has been a very severe one and has tried me sorely. I am better again.

I hope you have not spared Capt. Abbott's knuckles.

They required a rap extremely, and I am glad to see his later diaries less furious.

54. *From Lord Dalhousie*

Private

Govt. House, Augt. 4, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I had hoped that all further reference to the past policy respecting operations against Mooltan would have been unnecessary, since active movement had been commenced. The arrival, however, of your letter of 20th July has rendered it impossible for me not to advert to it.

You replied to the letter of 11th apparently as soon as you received it. I regret that the reply had not been for a little while deferred, for I am willing to believe that a more deliberate reference to the treatment you have received from this Government would have prevented your preferring complaints of want of confidence and want of support, which are altogether unjust towards the Govt. you serve.

I take leave to say that no officer ever received from his Govt., publicly and personally, a more frank, a more cordial or more prompt support than you have received from myself and the Council of India.

On the very first symptom of troubles my confidence in you was instantly declared and proved by the abstinence from the issue of any orders until you had intimated the policy you counselled. When intimated it was atonce approved. Not only was it approved, but in reporting it to the Secret Cee. we lifted from your shoulders the responsibility of that policy, whatever might be its consequences, and placed it on our own, by cordially concurring in its propriety.

We have approved all your active measures and applauded them. During the two months that have intervened, we have left you entirely without interference, tho' you had armies in the field. On every day of those months we have shewn our confidence by imposing on you no directions in respect of these measures.

When we gave our opinion on 10th July, the despatch shews you that we meant to relieve you, and did relieve you,

from responsibility. That letter did *not* limit your discretion any more than the letter in May did. Your own despatch of 20th shews that it did not impose any restrictions on your discretion as to the future, for you state that altho' you had ordered the movement of troops, whereas that letter approved of their standing fast, you felt that you were *not* acting in obedience to the orders of the Govt.

Lastly when we learned a few days after we had expressed that opinion that you had issued orders at variance with it, those orders were instantly confirmed and aided.

When, therefore, you refer to the position you left in Calcutta and to the expectations of confidence with which you assumed your present charge, I am free to confess that, if the facts I have recited are no sufficient proofs of confidence, I know not what you expect at the hands of Govt., unless it be not only that they shall leave you free to act on your opinion, as they *have* done, but that the Govt. must not entertain any opinion of its own, far less venture to express it.

Undoubtedly the Govt. has had an opinion as to the policy which it was right to pursue, and they have not been able to say that they have changed their opinion of that policy. They could not, in honesty, say so, when they have seen no facts before them to shew that the reasons which induced them to adopt that policy were erroneous or exaggerated.

Your despatches shew abundant grounds for moving British troops with reference to the political considerations, they shew that the rebellion has been effectually checked, that resistance will probably not be great, and that without movement the insurrection may again spread. They shew also—tho' not in my judgment conclusively—that the inundations will not render Siege operations impracticable.

But I say again, as I said before, that these statements do not touch the cardinal question on which our policy turned.

The consideration which mainly determined, and which itself could have been sufficient to determine, the Govt. to assent to European troops not being moved till October, was the imminent danger to the health and efficiency, if not the very existence of such a body of troops, if moved at this

season of the year and in that district. The experienced officers here (of whom these are not many), Sir John Littler to begin with, confirm that opinion, and your own words which I have already quoted, written on the face of all the political difficulties, haunt me whenever I think of the subject.

I have sought in vain thro' the despatches for facts to shew that these dangers are visionary and exaggerated. I cannot find them. I cannot even find a statement that the original representations made to Govt. were erroneous. Either those representations were correct or they were not. If they were correct and *justified* a refusal to move troops before October, it is impossible for the Govt. to express an opinion that they should move now. If they were not correct, then all we can do is to regret that movement should have been so long deferred and to be thankful that we have escaped the difficulties which not moving was thought likely to produce.

I heartily pray God that the results may shew that the dangers of climate *have* been exaggerated and the European troops may not suffer on this service so fearfully as was anticipated.

It is disagreeable to me to be obliged to revert to this subject, as I have been compelled to do. But despatches such as your's of 20th July cannot be passed by either in public documents or private letters. I am conscious of having acted honestly and cordially by you. The most unpalatable reproach which—in my judgment—can be addressed to a Chief is that of shirking responsibility by throwing it on others, and not backing his officers, and I do not care to conceal from you my feeling that it is impossible for any man to have *less* reason than you to address that reproach to me or to the gentlemen who sit with me in Council.

55. *From Lord Dalhousie*

Private

Govt. House, August 19th, 1848.

Dear Sir Frederick Currie.

I have to acknowledge your letters of 26th July and 3rd August. In the former of these you advert to the consideration which I stated to be the main foundation of our wish

not to move the troops until after the rains, and you state your opinion to be that they can perform the service of taking Mooltan "without greater danger to the health of the Europeans than if they were in their cantonments or at any rate very little greater."

I must beg you to remark that in treating of moving the force to Mooltan, you have never said one fiftieth part of what you say in these three lines. If you had done so, your proposal would have been presented to the Govt. in a very different point of view.

As it is, the opinion you now express is diametrically opposite to that which you expressed on the same subject before. Both are statements of opinion only. The service now in progress will prove which of the two is correct; and I do most fervently hope that the latter opinion may be borne out by the results. The last mail has brought us despatches from the Secret Cee., and letters from the Chairman and from the President of the Bd. of Control. All cordially approve of the resolution taken at the commencement, not to undertake operations at that season.

The despatch further leaves to the Govt. ample discretion as ordering our future relations with the Govt. of Lahore.

I am glad that you placed on official record your letter to me of July 26th. It has gone home by this mail. That despatch is most important and, if fully followed up, decides the question.

If you are able to lay before the Govt. satisfactory proof (I do not mean judicial proof, but proof morally convincing and sufficient) that there has been a conspiracy in existence "with a view to a grand struggle for our expulsion from the Punjab, that it was communicated to the Sikh army and to all the Chiefs of the Punjab; the members of the Durbar, with perhaps one or two exceptions were consulted and promised their co-operation," then we have but one course. But there must be evidence shewn in support of this most important charge. In making heretofore similar charges against the Chiefs and army, you have been understood to intimate that the means of proof are in your hands.

The time is now advancing. Not a day is to be lost if

measures of the magnitude which will become necessary are to be undertaken after the capture of Mooltan at the commencement of the cold weather. I must beg you, therefore, to transmit to this Govt., *as soon as is practicable for you to do so* after receiving this letter, a confidential report setting forth the facts or the documents on which you rely for proof of these vitally important denunciations. We cannot act on general impressions, on the supposed notoriety of such intrigues having been in progress. Prove the complicity of the Durbar, the chiefs, the officials and the army in those intrigues by reasonable evidence and I am prepared to act. I am well aware how much your time must be occupied. But no occupation connected with the Punjab can exceed in importance an early submission to the Govt. of these charges and their proofs, and I therefore beg to urge all expedition in the transmission of them.

When the troops have taken Mooltan, it will be just (if a political officer is left there or whether left at that spot or not) that Lt. Edwardes should be invested with the charge of the Province of Mooltan, where he has so highly distinguished himself, during our temporary occupation of it or until such time as its fate is finally decided, and in the first charge of it. The garrison you will leave will of course be made ample to take care of itself.

We have here for some days Bazaar reports of an action at Mooltan and disaster to our side. Hearing nothing from you and having heard many such reports before I see no reason to attach any credit to this one.

56. *From Lord Dalhousie*
Private

Govt. House, Augt. 22, 1848.

Dear Sir Frederick Currie,

I received last night your despatch of August 6th. The present does seem a strange moment for raising the question of the Maharaja's nuptials; but I presume the request covers some secret object.

I presume they will understand your answer to be, that they may please themselves, and that they cannot found on

that answer any assertion of a renewed guarantee of the Raj to the present holders.

Mr. Edwardes, I observe, notices the prevalence of a feeling that the British Govt. will hold the Punjab to have been forfeited and urges a declaration to the contrary in order to shew that the Govt. will keep good faith and adhere to the Treaty. The only inference to be drawn from this passage is that Mr. E. desires to express:

1. An opinion that however one party to a treaty disregard and violate its provisions, the other party must continue to observe it, or be guilty of a breach of faith; and

2. that if the Punjab is held forfeited, that then the British Govt. will not have kept good faith.

Mr. Edwardes possibly meant this as a private letter; he should have marked it accordingly. Should he have intended it to be an official, it would be a friendly act if you or some of his well-wishers would point out to him that for an assistant to the Resident to transmit to his Govt. a *volunteer* opinion that they would be guilty of breach of faith if they adopt a particular policy, which the Govt. of India, Her Majesty's ministers, and the Secret Cee. all contemplate as probable is hardly discreet, quite unbecoming and altogether unnecessary. I value and admire independence of opinion. This is something more. I don't intend to take any notice of this, and mention it privately to you, because I wish well to Mr. Edwardes. If you do not concur with me, no harm is done. Your description of Lt. Edwardes' character in a former letter seems very accurate.

The contents of the diaries from Dera Ghazee Khan, Bunnoo and Hazara are very important. It really looks as if Capt. Abbot were about to prove Cussandra after all. I cannot conceive the possibility of their attempting a march to Lahore, but you will doubtless be prepared.

I learn from his letter that the citadel of Lahore is garrisoned by Sikhs: for I had supposed that from our first occupation a British force had held it. I do not know the situation or how far it might be held against us or become either formidable or vexatious to us. But if it should be capable of being either formidable or vexatious, I have no doubt that on the remotest appearance of risk, you will act

on the clause of the Treaty of Bhyrowal and insist on our right to hold the citadel with our own troops, so as to provide against any danger to ourselves, and so as to ensure that which I pointed out as important in my first letter, viz., the safe custody of the Maharaja's person, jewels and property.

I observe you seem unwilling to believe the statements of the disaffection of the Chiefs. In your letter of 26th July I understood you to include them all, except two or three, in the imputation of complicity. These circumstances render me more than ever anxious to receive your full report which I took the liberty of urging you to forward some days ago.

I rejoice most heartily in the health of the troops, so far as we have heard on the march and hope for its continuance.

There are rumours here respecting Sir Herbert Maddock not having been heard of since the revolt in Kandy, which are anxious and which would be painful indeed if they were more than rumours. I heard from him at Colombo by last mail, just preparing to go to the hills, but he did not say where. Intelligence comes from Ceylon rarely and I shall be uneasy till we hear again.

57. *From Lord Dalhousie*

Private

Govt. House, Augt. 28, 1848.

Dear Sir Frederick Currie,

I have read your official letters to 16th instant and a private one of 13th, transmitting details relative to the outbreak in Huzara.

If this event shall prove to be the result exclusively of Captn. Abbott's manifestation of distrust, it will be unfortunate in as much as it will place the British in a false position. Deriving my information solely from your despatches and the diaries, my mind has not received the impression that it is to be attributed altogether to Capt. A. and my belief is that the Huzara force was in nearly every respect as bad as the Futteh Pultan.

Major Lawrence's opinion as to the Sirdar is decided and I am at a loss to reconcile your evident inclination to believe him innocent of conspiracy, with the very distinct allegations made in your letter of 26th July and 31st inst.

relative to all the Sirdars, with one or two exceptions. Further intelligence will probably explain it.

I am extremely glad that Mr. Cocks remains at Lahore. The Secret Cee. in their despatch lately received animadverts with severity on the detachment of officers without sufficient protection. Their animadversions are not altogether fair, but shew the opinion of the powers that be. I think it right to make you aware of this, in order that European officers may not be detached without a secure force with them. I wish to God we had at Lahore the officers who *are* detached, for in that case I should be comparatively indifferent as to what might happen.

The C. in C. has written to me regarding moving support up towards the frontier. This I have of course authorized him to do as quietly as may be.

The accounts of the progress and state of the Mooltan force are very satisfactory indeed. I look for further intelligence from Lahore.

Sir Herbert has been heard of safe at Kandy.

58. *From Sir Frederick Currie to Lord Dalhousie*
Private

Lahore, August 30th, 1848.

My dear Lord,

I received yesterday afternoon your Lordship's letter of the 19th instant.

In the first page in the sentence between inverted commas, as an extract from my letter of the 26th ultimo, your Lordship has not quoted my words quite correctly. I wrote I could "move the force down (to Mooltan) without greater danger, &c. &c." I did not say or mean to say that they could "*perform the service* of taking Mooltan without greater danger, &c., &c.," for I know that in the operations they may be called on to perform there may [be] exposure and fatigue, be the season of the year what it may, to which the troops would not be subject in their cantonments. I do not expect that there will be, on the present occasion, very great, and it is surprizing what a preservative against sickness and disease excitement is under such circumstances. That I was right

in my opinion of being able, with the arrangements I was enabled to make and with reference to the season and climate of the place, to bring the force before Mooltan in good health and without more casualties than they would have been liable to in cantonments, the statements I have sent to your Lordship from time to time and the letters from the army which I enclose (they are the last I have received), will prove to your Lordship. I am thankful to be able to send your Lordship these accounts and I am sure they will be gratifying to you.

Your Lordship says that this opinion is diametrically opposite to that which I expressed on the same subject before. I must, in justice to myself, be permitted to refute this charge. The opinion alluded to by your Lordship as formerly expressed by me had reference to the sufferings which the European would undergo, *marching in the hot winds* in the months of *May and June*, through a country *occupied by the enemy*. My present opinion had reference to the *conveyance of the Europeans in boats*, properly thatched and fitted in the months of *July and August* after the rains had set in and the hot winds over. The difference of the season, with reference to the climate of Mooltan, was much, but not nearly so much as the difference in the mode of conveyance. It is the marching in the hot weather which kills the European soldiers, and in the dry season, and before the enemy country was occupied by friendly troops, the conveyance by boats was impossible; in proof of this assertion I need only refer your Lordship to the enclosures of this letter and my former statements. H.M. 10th, proceeding by the Ravee and landed within 5 short marches of their standing camp, lost 2 men between Lahore and Mooltan. The 32nd were, by my arrangements, also to have been landed 5 short marches from Mooltan. In order to shorten the whole distance, the General, after leaving this, altered the plan, and shortening the river portion added to the land-part of their trip; instead of 5 *short* marches, the 32nd made eight *long* ones—the consequence was they lost 18 men and arrived with 103 in Hospital. The sick soon recovered on reaching the standing camp, and all are now doing well. There is not an officer sick in the whole force, though their late inactivity has been trying to them.

Your Lordship also says that in treating of the moving of the force, I never said one fiftieth part of what was expressed.

[The remaining portion of the letter is not available in the collection.]

59. *From Lord Dalhousie*

Private

Govt. House, Sept. 4, 1848.

Dear Sir Frederick,

I have to acknowledge your letter of 17th August, written in reply to my letter of the 4th. I am very happy to know that you are satisfied the Govt. and myself have sincerely sought to stand honestly by you, and we will now let "by-gones be by-gones."

The intelligence from the columns of the security and healthiness of their march is most highly gratifying to me and to every body else.

Your letters of the 19th and 22nd have also reached me and continue to give the same satisfactory news.

If Dr. Cole's report of the climate of Mooltan turn out to be essentially correct, it is strange to think that all travellers should have received and recorded so different an impression, and that there should have been so universal an idea of the intensity and insalubrity of the climate as I have every where found, and as prevailed in the minds of all the local authorities when the question of moving on Mooltan first arose.

With respect to Huzara I shall not say much unless we have fuller and closer accounts. I confess that connecting these late events with your statements recorded on 31st July, I have a full conviction of Chuttar Singh's treason. I cannot believe that the movement of Capt Abbott *first* raised a hostile feeling into his mind, and I cannot anticipate the possibility of his being able to clear himself from the suspicious conduct you admit him to have pursued for the last two months.

As for the "treaty looking Gueer", there is no occasion to go further than the fact that a British army is at this moment bombarding Mooltan in pursuit of justice which the *Lahore Chiefs* either could not or would not render to the

British Govt. for the murder of its servants. That fact is conclusive. The treaty, my dear Sir, is in fragments, a *casus belli* has arisen, if ever one arose between two nations before, and the only question for decision with us is whether we can avoid proceeding to the extremity of war and conquest or whether we can or ought from considerations of general policy to stop short of the point. I have already written on that part of the subject.

The little affair with General Whish's piquets went off nicely.

But surely if Raja Sher Sing's men had any desire even to make a parade of fidelity they (to say nothing for Mr. Edwardes' army of 20,000 men) might have done something to prevent a weak column of 1,500 getting back to the fort, when they had ventured 11 miles from it to attack us.

My own expectation is that Moolraj will shew severe play yet and I shall look anxiously for this week's intelligence.

I think I mentioned to you that Sir Herbert Maddock had been heard of in safety at Kandy.

60. *From Lord Dalhousie*
Private

Govt. House, Sept. 16th, 1848.

Dear Sir Frederick,

The state of affairs in the Punjab continues to be such as to do away with the hope I entertained that possibly I might have been enabled to remain at the Presidency for another year. The Council has concurred in the opinion I have formed that it is my duty to place myself somewhere near to the scene of negotiations or of the war, as the case may be.

I lose no time therefore in giving you the earliest intelligence of my determination. I have directed the camp to be formed with all speed at Umballa in the first instance, and, as soon as the rains are over, I shall come towards the frontier as rapidly as my strength will allow.

I received yesterday your despatch relative to the affairs in Huzara, and as you were in expectation of a conflict I am anxious for the next intelligence.

Who struck the first blow of the two does not yet appear.

That Sirdar Chuttur Sing *deserved* to be smitten I can see no room to doubt.

This mail from England brings no news of consequence to us in India. They were waiting for the intelligence from us.

61. *From Lord Dalhousie*

Private

Govt. House, Sept. 16th, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I have the pleasure of acknowledging your letters of August 30th and Sept. 2nd, 5th and 6th, and am much obliged by the full and frequent reports you have given me.

Were it not for the officers detached towards the frontier we might with justice and advantage leave the Sikh Sirdars and people to twist the hemp with which they seem determined they shall be hanged. Your last letter gives so good an account of Lt. Nicholson's position at Attock, and his preparations on the river, that taking them in connexion with the encouraging report of Major Lawrence's last diary, I would fain hope the officers are secured against any risk.

I can of course form no opinion as to whether Raja Deena Nath will bring in Chuttur Sing or not. The Durbar seems so positive that one must suppose there is a chance. But if they should do so, I doubt its having any composing effects on the troops he will leave behind him, and I feel very sure that whether he comes in or not it will not alter my opinion as to the outbreak and as to the only effectual security against its periodical recurrence.

The guilt of Runjore Singh which you report, and the irresistible case which I have just received built up by Capt. Abbott against S. Jhunda Sing, are all strong corroborative proofs of the existence of the general conspiracy you spoke of.

The Maharaja Gholab Sing is deep in this, tho' he will carefully stop short of committing himself, I have no doubt. I have as little doubt that there was no more real mutiny in the Regt. that came into the plains, than there is in the Queen's 10th and that the movement was altogether a feeler.

I am sorry to find that the strong statement you made of a general conspiracy does not rest on tangible proofs. I shall

be very glad, however, to receive the report of the reasons which satisfied you of its existence early in the day.

Mr. Edwardes mentioned some papers of importance found in the stable of a man whom he transported to Lahore. Did nothing come of them?

Our allied force of British, Pathans, Sikhs and Daood-potras appears to me to have occupied a very odd position for 10 days at Mooltan. And when the prize agents come to account for what will be due to the Army, I hope they will per contra account also for the camels, elephants, &c., which have, according to report, been carried off from our 30,000 men by the followers of Moolraj's 7000. It seems to me very like acting over again on a large scale the single combat of "Catching of Tartar."

However the arrival of the guns announced in your letter of the 6th will, I hope, soon settle the affair. I shall be delighted if it is done soon. I shall not be disappointed if it takes some little time.

The Secret Cee. in their despatch just received desire me to regard the property which may be found in the fort as applicable to paying the expenses of the force sent to reduce the place, and direct me to apply *the surplus* towards paying a portion of the Lahore debt!!

The financial calculations of the Cee. are, I fear, vide of the truth. But the repayment of these expenses we cannot do without: so once again I beg you to ensure the safe custody of the Maharaja and all his treasure and property.

Orders were issued to the C. in C. to draw quietly up to the frontier a considerable force in support. On receipt of your late despatch, he has been requested to assemble at Ferozepore the same force formerly approved of, 20,000 men, inclusive of those at Mooltan. If events shall satisfy the Govt. that strongest measures and a larger force are necessary directions will at once be given.

The Court and the Govt. are very well pleased with the transportation of the Ranee and the other events of that time.

Lord Hardinge will not, I conceive, find anything to do in the command and he has consented to take in the south of Ireland. There will be murder but no rebellion, I think.

62. *From Lord Dalhousie**Private*

Govt. House, Sept. 19, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letters of 6th inst. and 9th inst. with enclosures which I return.

I am sorry, but I am not at all surprised, to learn that the artillery men have made up their minds to approach Mooltan steadily. It seemed to me impossible that every body else, who had seen the place before and described it, should have been so mistaken as to its strength as to have represented it to be formidable if it was in reality contemptible, as newspapers and other higher authorities have attempted to make it out lately.

European life, valuable everywhere, is beyond price in the Indian army and I am quite content that they should take the safest as well as the surest mode of approach.

The fall of the place may be of importance with reference to the movements of the insurgents in the north west; but one must needs suppose that they had resolved on their part, with the full knowledge that whether a few days or a few weeks sooner or later, Multan must fall.

It is true that from all I have seen and from all I can learn, you cannot judge of the motives or conduct of a Sikh by any rules of common sense or ordinary reason. In that view they *may* have supposed that Mooltan could stand, and may be upset by its fall, but I can hardly anticipate it.

As I observed before, the Durbar seem so sure of Raja Deena Nath bringing in Chuttur Sing that one must suppose there is a chance of it. Whether he does or does not, he has gone too far and done too much to admit of his surrender himself now having any effect on the future policy of the British Govt. If we wanted to make an excuse, we might perhaps avail ourselves of such an act on his part. I am not much disposed, however, to take advantage of an excuse; so strong is the conviction in my mind, gradually grown to its present strength, that no settlement of our relations with the Punjab can possibly be satisfactory or final, excepting one, after what has come to pass.

Your letter by express has reached me. Previously orders had been issued for the assembly at Ferozepore of the same army which was sanctioned in June, amounting to 20,000 men, inclusive of what was at Mooltan, with all speed.

The object of your present letter is to suggest that the point of assembly should be Lahore instead of Ferozepore. As your letter is addressed to the C. in C. and as he will doubtless communicate with the Govt. upon it immediately, I cannot issue any order on what is so exclusively a Military question until I have His Excellency's opinion before me. I do not confess to be more than half a soldier, but I should imagine the C. in C. would prefer to have the point of assembly in our own territory with full command of supply and communications.

I cannot imagine it possible that Chuttur Sing should be such a fool as to march on Lahore. If he is such a fool, I should wish nothing better that he should fulfil his intentions.

63. *From Sir Frederick Currie to Lord Dalhousie*

Private

Lahore, October 3rd, 1848.

My dear Lord,

I have not written to your Lordship for some days. I have had nothing very particular to report, and every moment of time is more than occupied with business of all kinds. I only write these few lines today lest your Lordship should be disappointed at not hearing.

Chuttur Sing was still at Hazara, when I had heard from the Camp. Capt. Abbott's present statements regarding this rebellion are not reconcilable with his reports of its extensive and comprehensive character. Captain A. and Lieutt. Nicholson begin now, for the first time, to doubt C.S. having the aid of Maharaja Goolab Sing! He is said to be, like the rest of the world, hard up for hands.

At Mooltan our troops are in excellent health and good spirits, anxiously hoping to get Moolraj and Sher Singh to move out into the open plain. A letter received this day from Dr. Macbeth, the Senior Surgeon of the 19th has the following passage: —

"I visited Lieutt. Edwardes' camp yesterday, and it

may interest you to know that his hand is quite well; Lieutt. Lake recovering rapidly; Lieutt. Pollock, Lieutt. Lumsden and Lieutt. Taylor are perfectly well and in excellent spirits. We have been exceedingly quiet in camp for two days past. The Europeans are wonderfully healthy, and throughout there has certainly been less sickness amongst the X, both officers and soldiers, than we usually have during the hot months in cantonments."

This is some consolation in the midst of our disappointments. The Rebel camp is described as in a state of utmost distraction and distrust. There is no doubt that when Sher Sing made up his mind to be a traitor, he wished and meant to join his father at Hazara, and this [is] what he will still do, if he caught an opportunity. Moolraj does not expect him, and will not trust him. He will not pay Shere Sing's troops who are leaving by hundreds and going to their homes. Moolraj insisted on Shere Sing's attacking the English as a proof that he is not still in their interest, and this he is afraid to do.

I send for your Lordship's perusal and amusement Lieutt. Edwardes' letter of today; his notion that he is protecting the British force is very characteristic. I find the Bunnoo Regts. he alludes to are in great difficulty. Futteh Khan Towanah has succeeded in raising the Bunnoochees by thousands to his aid. Their hatred of the Sikhs is most deadly. Futteh Khan was himself, when I last heard, in the inner fort, but at Bunnoo, with heavy guns, ammunition and provisions, but short of water, the Seikh troops had the outer work with field guns, but neither provisions nor ammunition—they had expended both. The Bunnoochees were outside, having surrounded the fort completely. If the Bunnoo force is destroyed by Futteh Khan, the Peshawur Regts. may keep quiet. All was quiet at Peshawur on the 28th and Major Lawrence full of hope. Mrs. Lawrence is on her way in with the children.

64. *From Lord Dalhousie*

Private

Govt. House, Oct. 8, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

The arrangements which have been rendered necessary

by the intelligence conveyed in your despatch of the 17th ult. and confirmed in that of the 18th together with the mass of public business heaped upon me in the prospect of my departure, have rendered it impracticable for me to address you privately in reply to your letters from 17th to 26th for all of which I am greatly obliged to you.

The public despatch sent by the Express immediately after we received your letter of the 18th will have informed you of the orders the Govt. have issued, and will have very clearly indicated to you the policy the Govt. mean to pursue.

Without dwelling at present on the future policy, our present business is to consider and to provide for the operations which must precede it.

The rebellion of Raja Sher Sing followed by his army, the rebellion of S. Chuttur Sing with the Durbar army under his command, the state of the troops and of the Sikh population everywhere, have brought matters to that crisis I have for months been looking for, and we are now not on the eve of but in the midst of war with the Sikh nation and the kingdom of the Punjab.

The result of this mad movement to the people and dynasty of the Sikhs can be no longer matter of discussion or of doubt.

To the last I have sought honestly to give effect to a policy which I approved. I have sought to avoid war or conquest. I now seek no longer to pursue a policy which I am satisfied can never be successful, and I have resolved to prosecute with vigour a war, which on the part of the Govt. of India I had hoped to have avoided. The Sikhs have forced me, for this Govt., again to draw the sword, and I beg you to interpret my words in their clearest and most emphatic meaning when I say that being compelled to it I *have* drawn the sword, and have thrown away the scabbard, both in relation to the war immediately before us, and to the stern policy which that war must precede and establish.

Moderation and magnanimity were good, and I applauded them, but moderation again attempted, when such a return has been made to it, would be imbecility; and such magnanimity again displayed would be in the eyes of all India, not

magnanimity or a consciousness of power, but cowardice and a sense of weakness.

The occurrence, at the moment at which the adoption of such a resolution as that which I have described had become necessary, of such a scene as the retreat of the British army from before Mooltan is mortifying and exasperating in the highest degree. Like yourself I am unable to comprehend, and unwilling even to believe it. I withhold my public declaration of opinion until the Major General had had an opportunity of offering the explanation the C. in C. has demanded. I know not what can be said in explanation or in extenuation of the *conduct* of this siege from the time Major General commenced. But in the meantime I am disappointed and disgusted.

The C. in C. has submitted two alternative plans for operations in the Punjab. I have told the H.E. that I recognize no alternative plan. I have told him that as long as there is a shot in the Indian arsenals and a finger to pull a trigger, I will never desist from the siege of Mooltan until the fort is captured and the army as an army utterly destroyed.

The Sikh army and the whole Sikh population will, as a matter of course after the retirement from Mooltan, rise against us so far as their means will admit. Their army must be destroyed as an army, and their people deprived for ever of all the means of making war.

To this end the Govt. of India has ordered their army to be again augmented. I am sending more troops from Bengal to be replaced by Regts. of Madras, and everything has been done which is in our power. In three days I leave Calcutta for the frontier and shall come as rapidly as I may. Every one of us must exert himself to the utmost, for this business, as it is to be done, must be done promptly, fully and finally.

The first object being to put down all hostile opposition, and this operation requiring time for its execution, no public declaration of policy is at present requisite. Before the time shall arrive at which it must be made, I shall, if I live, be upon the frontier.

The remarks I have made and the instructions the Govt. have issued will give you the cue as to the resolution it has formed. Nothing should be said as to our ultimate policy at

present, but your assistants may with advantage be cautioned not to make more frequent mention of the future Govt. of the Maharaja than need be.

I have received today your letter mentioning Mr. Edwards' promise to retain the services of the General Cortlandt's troops and your mention of the promise you made to the Peshawur force. It is to be borne in mind that our army is to be augmented by 17,000 men and that I have written for 3 more British regiments. These cannot be reduced now. They are ordered. It is necessary to be chary of promises to very large numbers, else we shall find ourselves early in difficulties, and with by far too many troops, whom I can never henceforth regard as trustworthy, however plausible their apparent fidelity.

It was with great satisfaction I learnt you had put the 53rd Regt. into the citadel, and with still greater satisfaction that you had got Govindghur. The expedition was excellently conducted and executed and does the greatest credit to all concerned.

We are at a loss here to know what Deena Nath has done, and what you have done with Runjore Singh, as you have not lately mentioned either.

Maharaja Goolab Singh is without doubt as deep in this as anybody else. How far he has committed himself remains yet to be seen. If he has done, he shall smart for it.

I can't think Chuttur Singh will come to Lahore or go to Mooltan either.

I will let you know my stages on the road, as soon as I can.

65. *From Sir Frederick Currie to Lord Dalhousie*
Private

Lahore, Oct., 12, 1848.

My dear Lord,

I am somewhat disturbed at not receiving any letters from your Lordship in reply to those I have written since the defection of Raja Shere Sing, and the suspension, by General Wish, of operations before Mooltan.

I doubt not that your Lordship was fully employed with some correspondence for the steamers and the preparations

for leaving Calcutta, and I trust this is the cause of my not hearing.

I have today received the letter of Government of 3rd instant, No. 376, the last para of which has a good deal puzzled me as to the line which your Lordship wish me to take at the present time.

The letter says: —

“The Governor General in Council considers the state of Lahore to be, to all intents and purposes, directly at war with the British Government.”

Now if that be the case, I, with my assistants, am in an anomalous position, as superintending and aiding the administration of the Lahore State; and if I were to withdraw from the Government, and to declare the Treaty violated and all amicable relations between the two states at end, we should have the whole country up at once as one man to destroy us if possible. There is no doubt that all, with a very few exceptions, are, at this time, chiefs, army and people inimical, aye hostile, to us in their hearts, and desire to get rid of us; but there is a portion who, doubting the success of the present movement, and conscious of the inability of the parties concerned or any of the parties to combine conflicting interests, or to form a Government if they could get rid of us, continue neutral and to a certain extent loyal, that they may preserve their Jagheers and property and may escape the ruin which the failure of the present movement must, they know, bring on those concerned in it.

I only know two parties who are, as I firmly believe, heartily with us from goodwill towards us. These are Raja Tej Sing and Misr Mella Ram and his sons. Fakeer Noorooddeen and his family are with us from the hatred of strife and contention and the love of peace and security; they have moreover no fellowship with the Seikhs. Raja Deena Nath is, I think, with us from fear of the other factions who are most violent against him, and, as he has lately discovered beyond doubt, thirsting for his blood—and from sagacity. The remainder are our apparent friends (and they are still many), and are so merely while we remain strong, and from motives of direct self-interest that they may save their property. The Sirdars, who refused to go over to Moolraj or who having

been forced over deserted the cause, did so, not for love for us or for the present administration but from hatred to Shere Singh and doubt of his success.

Still the division amongst our adversaries, let it arise from what cause it may, is strength to us, and we are not as yet in a position to relinquish which it gives us.

I should mention, however, that tho' there is scarcely any one who cares about little Dhuleep Singh, in the family of Runjeet Singh, yet as he has been recognized as the nominal and *de jure* sovereign by them and this Government is still carried on in his name, they continue a passing allegiance to him, having no one to whom to transfer such allegiance if they rebel against him.

This is the present state of things, and thus they should, I think, remain until the Government is prepared to declare that the conduct of the Lahore State has dissolved all existing engagements by the violation of the Treaty on which they were based, and that the course for the future administration of the Punjab which the Government has determined to pursue. This declaration should not be made till the Commander-in-Chief is in a commanding attitude, at Lahore, and the sooner the H. E. is here, with, at any rate, a portion of his army, the more easily will all the future operations of the Punjab be conducted. I think that the declaration to be made by the Government should be to the purport above expressed, very briefly recapitulating the nature of our position here, and the circumstances by which the treaty of amity and friendship, on which our relations with the State of Lahore are based, has been violated, setting forth that the British Government will now occupy the Punjab Province, with its own troops, and district officers, making such arrangements for the future administration of the country, as may seem to it fit and proper, that all consideration will be paid to the interests of Maharaja Dhuleep Singh, who, from his tender years cannot be held personally responsible for the misconduct of the Lahore State, and that the just rights and property of those who have been in no way concerned in the hostile proceedings, and who do good and faithful service at this juncture, will be respected.

I think that in the first instance nothing more explicit

of the Government intentions need be proclaimed, and that this proclamation should not be made till we are in circumstances to follow it up. In the meantime I have done and will do nothing to pledge the Government to any line of policy, or in any way to embarrass any proceedings which it may be eventually determined to adopt. I think we may quietly annex the Punjab districts to the British Provinces, making a suitable provision for the state and comfort of Maharaja Dhuleep Singh, who may continue to occupy the Palace in the Fort of Lahore, the Fort being in our possession, in the manner decided in the papers lately sent to your Lordship.

We are still safe and tolerably quiet at Lahore, but the insurrection is spreading all around us and the whole country is, as I said above, hostile to us. On this side of the Jhelum there is in many places the semblance of subordination, but in many there is open rebellion. Very little revenue will be collected. The Treasury is empty, and how the Government establishments are to be paid for the next month, I know not.

The communication by post with Peshawur, Attok and Hazara, is completely closed. I have no intelligence of a later date than the 3rd. I have not heard any rumour of things being worse there. I have not heard of Sirdar Chuttur Singh for 8 days. He was still near Husun Abdal evidently waiting for the Peshawur troops.

For the state of affairs in Peshawur, I am in the greatest anxiety. The success of the revolt in Bunnoo would, I fear, be a signal for the revolt of the troops in Peshawur. Attok *may* hold out. Chuttur Singh would not delay before it, if the Peshawur Sikhs joined him.

The Bunnoo troops, when I last heard from that place, were selling their grain and extra property preparatory to a march and their direction was said to be either to join Chuttur Singh at Hussan Abdal via Kala Bagh or to join his son Outar Singh who is said to have moved towards Pind Dadan Khan. It seems certain that they will *not* go to Mooltan. They will be a great addition to Sirdar Chuttur Singh, as there are 4 regiments of Infantry, with 1 of Cavalry and 10 guns.

The Seikhs from the Manjha have left going to Mooltan.

The tide has set to the northwards, and the struggle, such as it may be, is to be in the neighbourhood of the capital.

It has been evident from the first that Raja Shere Singh could not remain at Mooltan. Raja Shere Singh and Moolraj cannot agree, and the former finds his position anything but pleasant. More than a third of those who went over with him have left Mooltan, some to get up rebellion on their own account in their Jageers, some on pretence of loyalty and repentance and some to look after their families. I have very little doubt that Shere Singh is at this moment out of Mooltan on his way to join his father in Hazara. He gives out that he is coming here by the direct route to make a diversion in favour of his father, but he knows better. At any rate he is about to leave Mooltan, it seems certain. Moolraj tells him if he won't fight, has no use to him and he won't feed his followers. If Shere Singh goes, a great many of Moolraj's people will desert, and General Whish will, I think, now remain unmolested until reinforced.

The Bunno have made a successful revolt. I am sorry to say, and when I last heard they had sold off their grain and extra property and were about to march, as they say, and I dare say truly, via Kala Bagh to join Chuttur Singh. They were pressing bullocks for the draught of the 4 heavy guns they have got, the Durbar bullocks having been carried off or sent to Edwardes.

This will be an important reinforcement to Chuttur Singh, and when they join, whether he gets the Peshawur troops or not, he will march in this direction.

The whole country is up between the Attok and Jhelum, and our communication by dak with Peshawur, is, I am sorry to say, closed.

My latest news is up to the 1st, but Nicholson who is to be in on the 15th, has to the 3rd all quiet. I am afraid that the success of the Bunnoo Troops will have a bad effect there, and I am most apprehensive about our officers and poor Mrs. Lawrence. Mrs. L. was as far as Chuckwal on her way here under an overpowering escort, when the rascally Zumeendars of Chuckwal frightened her to the state of the road to Pind Dadan Khan and she returned to

Peshawur. I have no news of Abbott in Hazara later than the 1st but he is I doubt not quite safe.

Maharaja Goolab Singh *seems* to have repudiated the Chuttur Singh insurrection, if he had anything to do with it, he expresses himself most anxious to do service and show his friendship to the British Government. The insurgents certainly distrust him now. He sends me Chuttur Singh's correspondence in original and has seized some of the rebels and sent them into me. He will only be faithful while we are strong.

I don't know with certainty the present strength of Chuttur Singh's levies. He will have, when Bunnoo troops join him (who will certainly do so rather than go to Mooltan), 10 battalions of Infantry averaging about 500 each, and about 30 guns and 1100 regular cavalry. The officers of his battalions have, most of them, left him.

He will probably fight one fight, but with the exception of that there will be no opposition shewn to the army. There will be a good deal to do, I dare say, by detachments in reducing individual insurgents in their strongholds before order is restored.

P.S.

Several minor Sirdars have joined Chuttur Singh lately with their followers, expecting to be led towards the capital, and the Durbar officials in the districts, and the people, are in favour of the rebel cause, some passively, but most of them actively. The larger Sirdars are equally disaffected, but they are mostly looking on, biding their time.

66. *From Sir Frederick Currie to Lord Gough (?)*

Confidential

Lahore, Oct. 13th, 1848.

My dear Lord,

I have not heard from your Lordship for a long time.

The tenor of a letter from the Govt. of India, dated 3rd instant, received yesterday, makes it more than ever desirable that we should be in as commanding a position as we can at Lahore at the earliest possible date. The 5th para of the Govt. letter is as follows:—

"I am directed to intimate to you that the Governor-General in Council considers the State of Lahore to be, to all intents and purposes, directly at war with the British Government and he expects that those concerned in these proceedings, will be treated accordingly by yourself and your assistants."

Now we are not in a position for me to make known to the State of Lahore the opinion of the British Government. As at present, I and my assistants and the British garrison, are here for the purpose of aiding by superintendence, advice and protection, the maintenance of the Lahore State and its administration. We cannot continue to protect and maintain a state which we declare to be at war with us; and we are not in that commanding or strong position here which would enable us to take the steps, such a declaration would render necessary. I have been explaining this in a private letter to the Governor-General.

The insurrectionary movement is drawing closer round us, and individual rebels are getting together collections of armed men for mischief, within 30 or 40 miles of us, and there is a very strong desire to get up a disturbance, and, if possible, to attack the cantonment and Residency before the British troops arrive. The first approach of the first portion of the British army will drive these rascals to distance or make them disperse.

Your Lordship's plan of putting Cureton's division or a portion of it on this side the river at Kusoor will have an excellent effect and will be felt up to Peshawur.

It is quite astonishing the awe in which the people of the Punjab stand of Regular Troops, and more than all of British troops. I will mention a recent instance.

A petty Sirdar set himself in his fortified house at Goojranwala, about 36 miles from Lahore in the direction of Wuzeerabad and commenced raising armed followers and sending forth inflammatory notices. I requested Brigadier Campbell to knock him over as an example. Just at this time an officer of Chuttur Singh's with 1000 men (as reported, which may mean 300) crossed the Jhelum and took possession, with the connivance of the Kardar, of the fortified Sarai of Aurangabad. Brigadier Campbell moved 2 guns,

500 Infantry and 100 Cavalry to the *Ghat* across the Ravee, when I heard that my Goojranwala friend had fled, and Cocks went on with Skinner's Horse and a sapper Sergeant with some gun powder, and blew the fortified house up. When Chuttur Singh's party heard that British troops were at the Ravee, they precipitately evacuated Aurangabad and got away across the Jhelum again as far as possible.

The rascals who have been meditating the interception of our communication with Ferozepore with 250 horse and 1 gun sent up from Mooltan, will vanish when Cureton shows his face this side the Sutlej. The tide has ceased to flow towards Mooltan.

Moolraj feels that no numbers he can accumulate of disciplined levies will enable him to attack the General in the plain, and a certain number is all he can employ for the defence of the city and fort, and he is discouraging the influx of more, whom he has not the means of paying.

[The above letter, apparently addressed to Lord Gough, ends here abruptly, as the next continuing sheet is not traceable in the collection.]

67. *From Lord Dalhousie*

Private

On board Soonamookhee,
N. of Coolna, Oct. 16, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

In consequence of the sudden closing of the river, the steamers were late in returning. I left Calcutta, however, on the morning of the 10th and have been moving through the Soonderbuns, where boisterous weather has delayed me considerably.

In consequence of my absence I have no letter from you later than Sept. 26th, nor any despatches for a week. It is uncertain where I may find them, so I write a few words to you to be put into the first post office.

A Delhi Gazette contains a statement which, if true, is calculated to disturb me. It mentions that certain troops, re-deserting from Shere Singh to Lt. Edwardes, have been entertained by him and been promised employment. Now I mentioned lately to you that a very large increase, both of

European and native troops, has been sanctioned in our army. The increase thus made will supply the additional force stated by the C. in C. to be sufficient for the permanent occupation of the Punjab. Some further troops will probably be necessary in addition, but these must not be prospectively entertained to anything beyond an inconsiderable amount. The Mahomedan troops who have been perfectly true under General Cortlandt's command, I do not object to, the same troops at Peshawur who have adhered to Major Lawrence, I consent to. But I beg it may be distinctly understood, that I will not confirm promises of entertainment made on any large scale, or to troops not undeniably faithful or to *Sikh* troops at all. Events have proved that *nothing* can secure the fidelity, or neutrality even, of a Sikh, to us. Events have proved also that Sikhs can deceive with an appearance of fidelity those who are most with them and best know them. Witness Lt. Edwardes and Shere Sing. Accordingly I never will trust again a Sikh and least of all a Sikh soldier. I hope and believe the report to which I have alluded is incorrect, but I lose no time in making the observations which it has suggested.

I await with much impatience some illucidation of the movements, still to me inexplicable, at Mooltan.

It is most probable that you have already done what I am about to propose. If not the condition of the officers at Peshawur and Attok renders it desirable that they with every precaution should be attempted to secure their safety.

I would beg you to convey an intimation to Sirdar Chuttur Sing and cause his son for his own sake to do it also, that if any injury should be inflicted by him or his followers on the British officers in his neighbourhood, the lives of himself and of his son Gholab Sing, now in our power, and of everybody belonging to him, shall answer for the lives of those men. You will give him to understand that the day for gentle measures and for any other than the utmost vengeance will in such a case have passed away.

68. *From Lord Dalhousie*

Private

Myussoorrie, Oct. 16th, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I received your letter of the 9th which is quite clear and satisfactory as to the levies.

I think you had very much better remain at Lahore. You are there not only a representative of the B. Govt., but a sort of impersonation of it; and anomalous as your position necessarily is at present, I think you should by all means continue there, rather than go on with C. in C. I think you are very right in avoiding all state ceremonies, and all that is now going on is a sufficient explanation of their absence without entitling anybody to draw a political inference from it.

You must not think of making way for Lawrence before the time originally proposed. It would be misinterpreted by those who are desirous of misrepresenting you, and though, I dare say, you do not care for their misrepresentations, still there is no occasion to put a weapon in their hands. I have written to Sir Henry Lawrence begging him to join my camp, which he can hardly do before the new year. There will be still time for you and me to meet and confer fully before your return to the Council.

I saw the Regt. of Loodiana yesterday evening at Cawnpore. The officers of the Regt. and the Brigr. all report most favourably of the conduct of the men and it is certainly to their credit that altho' they had their leave of absence into the Sikh districts as usual during this summer, not a man failed to return and 3 or 4 were a day after their time. But I heartily agree with you that for the present at all events we have quite enough of them.

Your letter has touched on many other interesting and important points which are too large for a letter and which my time now will not admit of my entering upon. You shall hear from me as I get along, but, although the travelling is not so rapid as I expected, I still hope to be at Umballa on 23rd or 24th.

69. *From Lord Dalhousie*

Private

Comercollee, Oct. 18, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I have just now received your letter of Oct. 3rd.

The intelligence it conveys of the rising of the Durbar troops in Bunnoo cannot surprize me, and I fervently hope that the old Khan and his Bunnoochees together may dispose of them.

Lt. Edwardes, I observe, says it will be awkward if these troops with their guns join the force at Mooltan. This is a strange "if" to be used by a man who has done such things as Lt. Edwardes. I should have thought his 20,000 troops with the 7000 British troops he is "protecting," would have been considered sufficient to render a reference to such an "if" superfluous, and would have been held to make the event to which he adverts an impossibility. Truly events test men and their mettle! I have never seen and do not recollect to have ever read of more remarkable instances of the truth of this observation than Lt. Edwardes and Capt. Abbott.

I do most truly from the bottom of my heart rejoice to hear Mrs. Lawrence is on her way to Lahore, and Lt. Taylor to our camp. I venture now to be sanguine we may escape more murders.

I have already said to you that as our resolve is now taken, no compromises should now take place and as little reference to the future condition of the state of Lahore to be made as possible, until the Govt. of India shall declare publicly its intentions. I have no wish to pick up a quarrel with M. Gholab Sing, if he seems innocent; whatever may be thought of his wishes, I will not harm him. But if his Regts. have joined Chuttur Sing and I am not thoroughly satisfied with him, he must have some better excuse than absence in Cashmere or mutiny in his troops, to save him.

As far Deena Nath and the rest of them, I trust none and believe none, but I will judge each according to his acts.

Sir Henry Lawrence is expected at Bombay this month. I have written to him to say that I do not think it expedient he should serve in subordinate political employ, and I have

asked his plans. Of course he knows he cannot return to his former post until the stipulated time.

Sir Herbert is again Depy. Govr. He looks much better but he says he is not well. Millet goes, alas! in December.

70. *From Lord Dalhousie*

Private

Bhaugulpore, Oct. 25, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I have received your letter of 6th instant, but so defaced by wet as to be hardly legible. I only hope the wet which defaced it was rain near the Sutlej.

If such an event as scarcity would occur in the Punjab, there will be a serious aggravation of our difficulties and a vexatious impediment to our operations.

Major Mackeson's recommendation does not appear to me one that ought as yet to be assented for many reasons. Rain may come, and under all circumstances it is better not to proclaim this intention of remitting revenue. It can always be remitted if necessary when the time for collecting it comes. To proclaim it would open wide the doors to every abuse.

The news from Bunnoo are distressing, but not surprising. I take for granted that even general Whish will not allow 2500 men with their guns to cross two rivers and join Moolraj without destroying them. The worst effect of it, I should fear, may shew itself in Peshawur.

I do not trust Maharaja Gholab Sing or believe one word he says. Nevertheless I quite agree with you that, as far as the information before me goes, he is not committed, nor apparently implicated in what has happened. His sending the money to Capt. Abbott and his offer to co-operate are in his favour. We shall be better able to judge, however, of his sincerity, as Capt. Abbott says, when the money is delivered and when his co-operation is actively given, and not merely offered.

I am writing with much impatience and anxiety for the transmission by the C. in C. of General Whish's explanations on points on which H.E. demanded them. I remain altogether

dissatisfied with the proceedings at Mooltan and cannot believe them to be justifiable.

Lt. Edwardes, I am happy to say, has been recommended by the C. in C. in England for a local majority. He well deserves it all for his conduct as a soldier.

I observe in your diaries that letters have been written to Shumshere Sing and many others praising them for their loyalty and promising *rewards*. If this means encouragement and compliment and perhaps exemption from utter and absolute confiscation, such as the Attareewalas must undergo, good and well. But if these men are to build on these letters claims to Jaghires and personal aggrandisements, I must say to you frankly that I will not fulfil their expectations. I do not believe in the loyalty of one of them. I do not think that if they *are* true, they have any title to reward for what is after all a mere abstinence from gross and perfidious outrage on the power whom these very persons invited to be their protectors, and finally matters have come to that pass that I do not think it necessary or expedient to court or coax their adherence, or shew any concern about it.

It is very satisfactory to know that by the precautions you have taken with Brigadier Campbell, the Dussera has passed off so peaceably. I have always understood it to be a fruitful hatching time of mischief, and it is well when the 'ides of March' are past.

According to our plan we shall succeed in forming camp at Umballa by 10th December. If tidings which meet me on the road seem to require it, I will hurry on myself faster.

71. *From Lord Dalhousie*

Private

On Ganges nr. Buxar, Nov. 3rd, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Our movements have been so thrown out by bad weather and bad steamers since we left Calcutta, that your intelligence does not perhaps reach us regularly. I have, however, your letters of 12th ulto. and I have received your despatches of 19th, 20th, 23rd and 24th Oct. A public letter will be despatched from Ghazeepore in reply to them.

Even at this diminished distance events are fluctuating from day to day, and even the scene of operations liable to be changed. The wisest thing, as it appears to me, that I can do is to describe clearly the object I wish to have accomplished, and to fetter those on the spot as little as possible with detailed instructions on specific points.

I am sorry you should have felt any perplexity in consequence of the passage in the letter No. 376 to which you advert. It was not meant to convey, and I am glad you have not understood it to convey, any instructions to you to adopt any different course of action from that which you have hitherto pursued, but only to intimate to you our view of the real state of affairs between the two states, and our belief that, as you say, "all, with a very few exceptions, are at this time, chiefs, army and people, inimical, aye hostile, to us, in their hearts, and desire to get rid of us."

You have taken a perfectly correct view of the line of policy to be observed at present, and have rightly concluded that the intentions of the Government, whatever they may be, should not be declared until the preparations of the C. in C. are completed. Before that event is accomplished, I shall myself be at hand and enabled to communicate on all points rapidly with you. Meantime the course of the Govt and yours is clear.

When our officers were murdered and the Dewan Moolraj broke into open rebellion, the state of Lahore, having confessed its inability to inflict punishment and to afford reparation, were informed that those who had injured the British Government would in due time be punished by it, and that reparation would be demanded at the hands of the state.

The great body of the Sikh army and Sikh people having since that time risen in arms for the avowed purpose, as declared in their proclamation, of expelling and destroying the British, the British army must be employed in meeting, defeating, disarming and crushing all forces found in arms for the object, and all who are known to be aiding and abetting in the same.

The subsequent destiny of the Sikh dynasty and Sikh nation will be pronounced upon when the objects, above mentioned, are accomplished.

In the meantime it will be sufficient for you in your communication with the Durbar, should any explanation be solicited as to the intentions of the British Govt., to refer them to the declaration which was made to them by the Govt. of India in May last that those who committed the unparalleled outrage against it would be conspicuously punished and that all who have since joined in the evil designs which were then declared will be made in the like manner to feel the weight of our power. With respect to the future you should state that the British Govt. had at the same time declared its intention, when these objects were fulfilled, of demanding reparations at the hands of the State of Lahore, and that, when that time arrived, you would doubtless be instructed as to the wishes of the Govt. whom you represent. In the interval the position of yourself and your assistants must necessarily remain anomalous, as indeed it has long been. I have full confidence that, as you say, you will not in any way hamper us.

The last letters I have received lead me to hope that the C. in C. will have hurried on to Ferozepore, and that some movement will have been made to catch them in detail and deal with them before they can unite in any great force.

I don't at all understand Mr. Nicholson's movement. Letters appear to be missing which may perhaps explain it.

I wrote to Mr. Edwardes announcing his intended promotion. I am very glad they gave it as he richly deserved it and well *won* it up to 1st July. But they are crowing at home about him and the whole affair too loud and too soon.

His subsequent proceedings (between you and me) have disappointed me and I can not but regret such policy as sending a fictitious letter addressed to Sher Sing and intended to fall in the hands of Moolraj. It may perhaps have had an effect. I would far rather forego the advantage gained than obtain it by such means. All stratagems, I know, are fair in war. That however is hardly stratagem of war, and altogether it doesn't suit me and I don't like it.

The representations I receive render me very doubtful whether under any circumstances I ought to advance my large camp beyond Umballa. I shall be guided entirely by events, and, in the meantime, I have authorized the C. in C.

if he is hard up for carriage to take, as soon as he can get it, the whole of the carriage cattle prepared for my camp. This is of more importance than my advance. If, however, it should be desirable that I should be near, I will come on without equipage alone and by dak.

I am losing no time now that I can help and shall push on by horse *dak* with Elliot from Allahabad.

72. *From Sir Frederick Curries to Lord Dalhousie*

Lahore, Novr. 5, 1848.

My dear Lord,

I have not written to your Lordship for some days privately. I have been very anxious about Peshawur and Attok. Ugly rumours have been prevalent in the Bazaar for some days and I have been without authentic intelligence. My latest accounts were to the 19th from Peshawur. I am very sorry to say that last night authentic intelligence of the revolt of the Peshawur force was received and of their fraternization with the rebels.

It seemed that with ditch inconsistency the Peshawur troops resisted for three months nearly Chuttur Sing's endeavours to seduce them from their allegiance. At last they gave him a distinct refusal to join him till he had possessed himself of the capital or at least the fort of Attok. In despair Chuttur Sing turned his face to the south and made two marches to Hussan Abdal to join the other insurgent forces in the neighbourhood of Gojrat or Wuzeerabad. When Chuttur Sing retired, his party in Peshawur seems to have prevailed and to have gained over the whole force. I enclose the copy of a private letter from Lt. Herbert written at Attok on the 25th and despatched the 26th, which gives as much of the details of the revolt as I have received. It is said that Major Lawrence and Lt. Bowie made their escape to Kohat on the night of the 24th ultimo.

Mrs. Lawrence was at Kohat where she has remained since her unfortunate return from Chuckwal, in the house of Barukzie Milac Sooltan Mohumed Khan.

I have little doubt that the persons of these parties will be safe with the Barukzie Sirdar, but I do not expect that he will allow them to leave Kohat.

I have scarcely a doubt from what I hear that this Milac and his brother Peer Muhd. Khan are among the chief instigators of the insurrection and that the Mahomaten portion of the force were induced to join the Sikhs through their machinations. They will of course have taken possession of Peshawur on the Sikhs leaving it. In fact the Peshawur Province was offered to the Barukzies by Chuttur Sing as the price of their assistance as I have reported.

Although the fraternization of the Sikh troops in Peshawur and everywhere was to be expected, still I was not without hope that as they had remained aloof so long their union might be averted.

This adds infinitely to our difficulties. The six regiments of Regular Infantry, 2 of Regular Cavalry and 30 field guns, all drilled by our officers! which they will bring to the rebel standard, are the least important part of the matter, perhaps. The embroiling us with the Affghans and the necessity of reconquering the Province of Peshawur with its nine forts—if we consider it necessary to possess it—will be most serious matters, and it was in the hope—not I confess a very strong one—that the more early advance of the British army might save this province, that made me so importunate with the C. in C. to make that advance as soon as he possibly could, with effect and without risk.

We may yet be taken unprepared. The brigade which is in advance with Genl. Cureton is very weak in Infantry—and the Sikhs are most rapid in their movements. The Sikhs under Sirdar Chuttur Sing, with the Peshawur force, the Bunoo troops under Ram Singh, Raja Shere Sing's army with the detachments under Sirdar Oatar Singh, Lal Singh Moraria, Sooruth Singh Majethia, Jowahir Singh and others might concentrate within 8 days from this on the Chenab, with 18 regiments of Regular Infantry, many thousand Cavalry and 70 guns with from 10 to 15,000 newly raised levies; and the C. in C. is by no means prepared to oppose such a force.

To add to this I must say that the country is against us to a man and supplies and carriage are withheld; on the slightest reverse every man's hand would be against us; at Lahore the feeling is as strong against us as anywhere else.

I hope the C. in C. will move up at once to Lahore, and I

much wish that your Lordship was nearer to us that I might know your mind upon many matters.

This is just the state of things which I was assured in June and July last would take place by the beginning of November, if the fall of Mooltan did not in the meantime re-establish our position and check the purposed insurrection, and yet the present insurrection *appears* to have arisen out of circumstances not then anticipated.

I write in the greatest hurry and under the pressure of the most anxious business, and in the midst of interruptions. I have written already today to the C. in C. by Express. I have much more to write to him by the regular dak.

My usual letter went yesterday by Express to Bombay. I did not know of the Peshawur defection till after it was despatched. It therefore has not been reported to England.

73. *From Sir Frederick Currie to Lord Gough*

[The first portion of the following letter bearing the date and place, the name of or reference to the addressee, and the opening matter are not available in the collection of letters. From the internal evidence, however, we can safely say that it was addressed by *Sir Frederick Currie to Lord Gough.*]

....

....

....

can delay no longer the measures which are necessary for maintaining our present position and preventing the insurgents from hemming us in, crippling our supplies and intercepting our communications. For this we must have a demonstration on this side of the Sutledge and at Lahore, or we shall be bearded at the capital in a very short time. A mere demonstration is all that is required to effect this, and that made now will keep us comparative masters of the country, nearly if not quite up to the Jhelum, for the next six weeks, if necessary. There will be risings of individual Sirdars in parts at a distance from our troops, but if there are troops, there will be no general insurrection. The influence of the neighbourhood of regular troops in the Punjab must be seen to be appreciated.

The regular army of the rebels will not, I fear, under any circumstances, cross the Jhelum or Chenab. They will not meet us again in the open plain, if they can help it. They

will get together all the troops they can to make their stand in the country between Rotas and Pind Dadan Khan, a great deal of which is very difficult, and favourable for irregular and indisciplined numbers. On this side the Jhelum the country is open, free from all obstacles and such as it would delight your heart to meet the Sikh army, in any numbers, in.

The object of the rebels is to remain in force on the other side the Jhelum, and to raise the population in the intervening Doabs; and this, the presence of British troops on the Sutledge and on the Ravee can alone prevent.

Wheeler's operations in the neighbourhood of the Beas will have admirable effect on the country from Ferozepore to Deenanugger and Noorpore. When it was ascertained in Mooltan that we had got Govindgurh, it was determined to send up some reinforcements to hold Runger Nugger to raise the country in its neighbourhood, and towards Bhyrowal, in order to cut off the communications with Jullundur. It was necessary therefore at the same time to punish the rebel, Urjan Singh, by confiscating his property and destroying his castle, and to anticipate the intention of the rascals by demolishing their stronghold.

Murara must be destroyed also as an example, and because the treachery of the proprietor is most atrocious, and the position advantageous one in reference to the Hill Frontier. Your Lordship will have heard of Wheeler's success at Runger Nugger. The rebels will not allow him to play the same game at Murara, I am afraid, but will run before he reaches them, but he will find the spoils of Buddowal in the Fort.

Major Mackeson, in his letter, contemplates what cannot be—opposition to Cureton on the right bank of the Sutledge.

The Sikh population without arms and discipline are no more formidable than any other population. There is nothing excepting the regular army in the Punjab that would stand before a single regiment and a couple of guns. The hostile population is dangerous in many ways and embarrassing, but it can never be formidable to even a small body of British troops. Cureton's presence on the right bank of the river, and, perhaps, the wing of a regiment in Kusoor, where Captain Tytler now is, will be of the greatest benefit possible. I

have constructed a bridge over the Ravee. It will be ready in a couple of days, and if we could then have a Brigade or even a regiment and a Battery on the Ravee across the river, we could continue to draw our supplies from that Doab.

Nicholson is in Ram Nugger with about 400 Irregulars. I don't like to leave him there, but he is so sensible of the importance of his position at present that I cannot easily get him in. I am strengthening him with trustworthy Mahomedans, but I shall not let him remain if Oatar Singh sends any troops to the Chenab.

P.S.

Just as I had written the last page, I received by Express the enclosure from Lord Dalhousie. It is "confidential" but I do not hesitate to send it for your Lordship's perusal. You see the expressions are altogether general. I shall be glad to consult in all things with your Lordship in carrying into effect the views of Government, and I therefore rejoice that you will soon be nearer. Kindly return me his Lordship's letter.

I wish you could see Tremenhere's proposed modification of the present plan for holding Lahore—that is, that you could see the locality yourself. I think your Lordship would see its superiority over the present management, independently of giving me 3 regiments and a half for Field Service.

74. *From Lord Dalhousie*

Private

Allahabad, Nov. 14th, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I received your letter of 5th on my arrival here and would have answered it two days ago, but that my first entrance under canvas have given me so violent a cold as to unfit me for anything. Today I am sufficiently better to admit of my attempting to go on and, if not stopped short, I expect to be at Umballa by 23rd or 24th instant.

If the movement of the C. in C. shall not have rendered it impracticable I shall run on Dak to meet him at Ferozepore. I wish very much that I could have the same opportunity of conferring with you. But it would not be expedient

at present either that I should come on to or that you should quit it, and our meeting must be deferred.

The intelligence of the whole troops at Peshawur did not—could not—surprize me, but it is a grave addition to the difficulties of our operations. However, matters had reached that point that if only the personal safety of our officers can be ensured, my chief anxiety will be removed.

I am glad to learn that the C. in C. has found himself in a condition to move a portion of the force which has been collected, and that he is himself at hand. For sometime to come the progress of events must be in his hands by means of the troops.

I have no anxiety whatever as to the result of these events, but the movement in the Peshawur province will cut out heavy work for us there. The very best we can hope is that they may quit that province and joining Chuttur Sing may come down into the plains to meet us there.

No doubt these repeated defections will be attributed, by those inclined to blame, to delay in putting down insurrection in its commencement at Mooltan. It would be valuable to all of us to have the means of proving, as you reported and have since repeated, that an outbreak was contemplated before. But after your reply to my enquiry as to the evidence of such a scheme some months ago, I presume I must conclude that it is a matter which is notorious, but not capable of distinct and formal proof.

I received last night by Express a letter from General Whish narrating his affair on 7th. His account is confused and incomplete, and I can make no more out than that it was a very small affair which he appears to consider a great battle. However a success of any kind is a satisfactory novelty in that quarter at present. It is less a novelty, though still remarkable, that one of Cortlandt's 3 regiments had gone over to Moolraj the night before the action. I am not sorry for it now.

I have received the newspapers of 25th Sept. and 5th October and some letters of the latter date, but no despatches of either mail.

Sir James Lushington has said to me that his attention has been turned to the question of your return to Council on

the occurrence of another vacancy and your precedence there. He gives no opinion however.

Millet retires positively on 1st December which they are aware of, and as I wrote sometime ago begging them to send their orders on all points, we shall have them before your return shall have become necessary on Sir Herberts' retirement at the expiry of his renewed period, and I hope they may be satisfactory.

Their last despatch had a far less cordial tone than its predecessors, and looked very like blowing hot and cold as to public measures.

I am anxious to learn from you the result of our negotiations for a loan from the border chiefs. This is a matter of great moment, and I beg you to let me know the result as soon as you possibly can.

75. *From Lord Dalhousie*

Private

Umballa, Tuesday Morning, Nov. 28, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I have received your several letters, and last night that of 25th. I feel so strongly the necessity of controlling the impetuosity which, I learn from other quarters as well as from yourself, is likely to work us mischief, that I send by Express a letter to the C. in C. which I request you to forward by a safe messenger as quickly as possible. It is sent under flying seal that you may be acquainted with its contents.

I contemplate sending some one expressly to the C. in C. on my part to keep him in mind of all I have in view.

I have attended to your most just request, as to Lahore, as you will see.

I am in hopes the C. in C. is preparing and will effect an attack on Shere Sing with reasonable precautions this time.

Lt. Nicholson's affair is very bad. I will attend to your intercession as much as possible, but, after all that has passed before, it is a flagrant official impertinence on his part and he must be made to feel *some smart*.

I have no time for more, but will write again directly.

P.S.

As soon as my camp comes up, I propose to move on to Ferozepore.

76. *From Lord Dalhousie**Private*

Umballa, Nov. 29, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I arrived here on the evening of the 25th and have to acknowledge the receipt at uncertain dates of your letters of 19th, 21st, 22nd, 24th and 25th, many of which preceded earlier dates in consequence of my movements. I reply now to those portions of them to which I did not advert yesterday.

In your letter of 19th you intimate that you had sent forth a proclamation to the people of the Punjab. The terms of that proclamation as stated in your letter is not only unobjectionable but most proper. Some days before I received a public letter in which you suggested a proclamation and its contents. To this I shall reply as soon as I have the means of doing so officially. I am adverse to proclamations of this character when they can be avoided. They are an Indian invention and modern invention even here, and (as I know from the memory of past documents of that nature) they are more given to produce embarrassment than advantage. I see no necessity for a political proclamation at present, and as I am now within a few hours of you comparatively, I beg you to do me the favour of issuing no more without previous reference to me. I beg also to have a copy of the document mentioned in your letter of the 19th.

You certainly have blown Lt. Nicholson sky-high. His proceedings were very unjustifiable in every point of view, but you will see from my reply to your official report that at your request I have been contented with your censure, and in consideration of his past conduct have agreed to say no more about it.

Sooltan Mahomed Khan's conduct in giving up our officers to Chuttur Singh is inexplicable to me, for I do not perceive how he reconciles it with the advancement of his own interests, which I look upon as the only motive one ought to think of in considering these people's conduct. I fervently hope their personal safety is not doubtful. Whatever you do, I pray you to make sure of the persons of those Chiefs you have. It will be well to hold them in terrorism, and if any of those in arms injure the British Officers, I will not take upon me to say that I shall not grow blood-thirsty.

My opinion of the operations at Mooltan remains unchanged, and even the Commander-in-Chief's remonstrance would not have deterred me from suspending General Whish, if I had had any other officer undoubtedly competent to the command. I have him not. Wherefor I cannot remove this man when I cannot replace him by a better, in opposition to the opinion of the C. in C. given on military grounds.

I am looking anxiously for intelligence from the Chenab. The C. in C. proceedings betoken, I hope and trust, that he is going to work with caution than heretofore, and that he will make sure of his blow this time.

My camp has not yet come up. In a few days I hope to move on. Yesterday intelligence came of a disturbance on a small scale at Nurpore above Roopur. A movement may possibly have been made on it from the Jullundur side. But to take every precaution, and in case they are otherwise occupied there, I have desired that a wing of the battalion at Subathoo and above it should be sent down towards Roopur, and the Nalagurh man, who is vouched for here as perfectly staunch, has been called upon to produce his contingent.

We have no very accurate particulars. I should be very glad if the first time one of your assistants has time, he would look to the list of names affixed to the Treaties of Lahore and Byrowal and to the names of those present on December 26, 1846 (Parlt. Paper page 52) and mark those who are faithful, and those who have been or are in arms, specifying where each is, I require it for public documents

77. *From Lord Dalhousie*

Private

Umballa, Dec. 1st, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

The Commander-in-Chief expresses to me a very strong desire for the services of Major Mackeson, C. B., with his army to aid in obtaining information and supplies. I am resolved that nothing shall be left undone by me which can tend to ensure success of H. E.'s operations, and that every possible request shall be granted which he makes with a view to ensure success. Major Mackeson accordingly will leave this place today in order to join H. E.'s camp.

I accede to his Excy.'s request all the more readily that I was desirous of having some officer near his person who was fully in possession of my views and future intentions, and who might exercise on my part some influence over His Excy.'s proceedings. I propose to entrust this task also to Major Mackesen in addition to the functions which the C. in C. wishes him to discharge.

It is impossible that Major M. should occupy the position the C. in C. desires under the orders of Mr. Cocks and Lt. Nicholson, and I am very unwilling to displace them at all, while I am equally determined that the C. in C. should have what he wants. I propose, therefore, to name Major Mackeson "Agent to the G. G. with the C. in C." In that capacity he will be under my orders and those of His Excy.

In respect of the duties which the C. in C. desires to employ him upon respecting to supplies and information, I beg you to be so good as to arm him with whatever powers may be necessary for him within the Punjab, placing your assistants in co-operation with him, or in subordination to him, if the latter course should be necessary. I cannot doubt that this will not be very palatable to Mr. Cocks and Mr. Nicholson. I would beg you to be so good as to let them know that the arrangement is not made from any dissatisfaction with them but because the C. in C. has asked for the services of this officer and because I wish that H. E. request should be complied with. I have no doubt that Mr. Cocks and Mr. N. will have the good sense to see the necessity of falling readily and cordially into the arrangements which I find it expedient to make for the public service. In respect to these officers' political duties under you, Major Mackeson will have nothing whatever to do with them.

General Whish's correspondence is of a piece with his other proceedings. I shall send you tomorrow an expression of my opinion publicly.

The letter of Raja Shere Sing and his colleagues is such as their worst enemies would have written for them. Surely the Dewan Hakim Rae must be in your pay?

Last night brought me also a letter written by Dhuleep Sing to General Ventura—ambiguous in its terms, but perfectly intelligible in its intent and purport.

78. *From Lord Dalhousie**Private*

Umballa, Decr. 2nd, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Mr. Elliot has communicated to me your letter which he received yesterday. The stand which Mr. Herbert is making in Attok is most honourable to him whatever may be the issue, and I can hardly venture to hope it can ultimately be a successful one.

I wish that my intelligence from camp confirmed the observation you make that supplies are pouring in upon them. My information derived from various sources tells a different tale. I hope your version may prove the correct one.

I have read your enclosures with much interest and some with other feelings. For when Mr. Cocks talks of "both Nicholson and himself have explained!! (to the C. in C.) the importance of thwarting the enemy in detail," I cannot help at exploding at such a piece of political, coxcombical impertinence, and I cannot help saying that if I were, the C. in C. and Assistants to the Resident presumed to talk to me on any such subject, I should be very much inclined to send them to the Quarter Guard.

I am prepared to find occasion for coming down upon General Auchmuty with much severity. In the meantime I have sent peremptory orders to hurry on every available man. General Whish is all you call him, but I think there is reason to believe General Auchmuty as bad, and if possible worse.

79. *From Lord Dalhousie**Private*

Camp Umballa, Dec. 5th, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I received last night your letter of 2nd and am looking every minute with great anxiety for news from the front. I have many letters from the army. All regard the C. in C. plan as good one, if no unforeseen obstacles arise. One blunder spoiling the first day's designs has already been reported to me. I hope the next day will be more fruitful of results. The Quarter Master General's department seems to

be open to the criticism it met with before, and to be either sadly inefficient or sadly unlucky.

We receive no very accurate information here of the state of Jullundur. On hearing what had happened, I ordered down a wing of the Nusseeree battalion which has now been asked for. But they are very short of officers. The death of the Raja too rather complicates matters, but with Mr. Lawrence's movements on the other side, and these movements on this side I do not see much danger of its spreading.

It is impossible to account for the folly of these petty chiefs in thus rising to their own ruin, and equally impossible to account for the folly or to conceive the villainy of Sooltan Mahomed Khan in giving up the victims of his hospitality (—so one must call them —) to their worst enemy. I hope to have one day a close reckoning with him on that score.

I sent off some days ago a thunderbolt at General Auchmuty. If the correspondence shall confirm the impression I have already received of his conduct, I will have a severe settling with him too.

As you say, there seems something mephitic in the atmosphere of these provinces at present as it affects Major General.

I have to thank you for your enquiries as to its effects in its natural capacity on me. My health has improved wonderfully since I left Calcutta, and I hope, please God, to be set up for the rest of my time in India before I go again to Bengal.

My camp arrived on Saturday. Yesterday morning I came into it, and as soon as I get the English mail despatched tomorrow, I shall move on to Loodiana, whither after that I cannot quite say.

80. *From Lord Dalhousie*

Private

Camp Umballa, Dec. 6th, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I received last night the list enclosed in your letter of 3rd. It is substantially, if not exactly, the same as that printed in the Parliamentary Papers and answers my purpose completely.

My intelligence from Ram Nugger of evening of 3rd is satisfactory so far as it goes and I wait anxiously for particulars of the final result which must surely reach us tonight or tomorrow morning in time to catch the express for England tomorrow.

The end of the Juswan Raja's business, which Elliot has reported to me, is very satisfactory. Pray let Mr. Lawrence understand that there must be no forgiveness to any of these gentlemen. Liberality and kindness *now* would be quite misplaced, however right they were in the first instance. He may hang the decision up now, if it should be convenient to do so, but ultimately they shall all be confiscated.

81. *From Lord Dalhousie*

Private

Camp Umballa, Dec. 6th, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

The Commander-in-Chief's despatch reached me last night. He makes the best of the affair, of course. It is not to be considered a victory consequently. I have declined to fire a salute as he suggested. You were very right, in my opinion, to fire a salute at Lahore, because it is unusual among the people so to glorify similar occasions, and it is as well perhaps to claim a great prosperity by 21 guns in the ears of the Seikhs. But within our own territories I conceive — as I have informed the C. in C. — that such rejoicing should be rarely indulged in, and should be reserved for overwhelming victories gained by us. I don't wish my praise to become worthless by making it cheap and invariable.

However, although it is not a victory, it is a success, and the effects cannot fail to be materially advantageous to us.

I have reiterated to the C. in C. my injunctions not to advance *permanently* beyond his present position. If he can shew good cause for doing so, he shall go; but he must shew cause. In the meantime it is very desirable that this period of halt should not be a season for inactivity.

Major Mackeson will have communicated my intentions to you for the future. They have been deliberately formed and are fixed as "Ailsa rock." I have been unwilling to put them on paper, and gladly availed myself of his passage to

make them known to you fully and unreservedly, as I begged him to do.

I do not think it necessary to be very particular in accounting to the Durbar for what we chose to do, when the whole country is in a state of war and rebellion, and *they* shew themselves perfectly powerless to help us. I apprehend, however, that through the whole Rechnah Doab there are numbers of forts belonging to the disaffected and suspected parties. These must be rendered quite incapable of defence, for I am resolved that not a defensible place shall be left, excepting those immediately intended to be occupied by British troops, or calculated to be useful as depositories for civil treasuries, police posts, thanahs, etc.

Accordingly I have mentioned today to the C. in C. that I should address you on the subject of these forts. I shall be obliged to you if you will communicate with him regarding them, and if I am right in my impression that there are many such fortified places in the Doab, I would beg you to point them out to him, specifying those which it would be desirable to destroy. His troops cannot be better employed than in getting rid of these pestilent nests of mischief, the destruction of which will render his advance more secure when he resumes it, and will save us time, trouble and expenses hereafter.

Your proclamation of the 18th is very safe, and I don't think there is anything they can lay hold of. Under the circumstances you describe, some thing was quite requisite.

My time compells me to postpone reply to yours regarding Major Mackeson's appointment of December 5 until tomorrow.

82. *From Lord Dalhousie*

Private

Camp Umballa, Dec. 9th, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I received yours of 5th as to Major Mackeson's appointment. I am obliged by the readiness with which you have entered into my views—a readiness which I have had much pleasure in observing on all occasions displayed by you since we have been in communication on the affairs of the Punjab.

I quite concur with you in thinking that Major Mackeson should act as much as he can through your assistants Mr. Cocks and Mr. Nicholson. He should also communicate confidentially with you on all that is going on, in order to prevent any clash of authority. But for that very reason I have thought it is desirable he should be considered as *under the orders of myself alone*. He must derive authority from you over the native official persons, and for that purpose a general letter or roobocarry, or whatever it is termed, should be addressed by [you] to him or to the Kardars through him, desiring all Kardars and parties whom you have named to obey his directions and answer his requisitions in the same manner as they would your own.

This will be all that is necessary. To put him actually *under your orders* would tend to produce that very clashing of instructions which might possibly arise, and which I desire to avoid.

I have already placed Mr. Erskine in the charge of this province and have directed him to exert vigilance. Every thing appears quiet at present, and the speedy termination of all attempts at outbreak hitherto in the Jullundur will lead to compose them more.

I shall write to Major Mackeson on this subject today and communicate to him what I have now said to you.

The whole establishment has now come up and on Monday morning I move onwards.

83. *From Lord Dalhousie*
Private

Camp Rajpoora, Decr. 12th, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I restore you the letters you enclose, several of which are very interesting. Whether the Commander-in-Chief "expressed his satisfaction in the most hearty manner" to Mr. Cocks, or whether he did not, His Excy. expressed in the strongest manner to *me* his opinion of the value Major Mackesan's services would be of to him, upon which I appointed him to go to the C.-in-C., availing myself of the opportunity to give him other functions also. If Mr. Cocks is not aware of this, you are very welcome to tell him so, and to add what I already

have stated that I entertain no dissatisfaction with Mr. Cock's performance of his duties. But I repeat that I will leave nothing undone, I will withhold no officer, whose services (as those of Major Mackeson's were) are stated by the C.-in-C. as likely to increase the probabilities of full success.

If Dost Mahomed Khan, who is now appearing on the scene, should do fully, I beg that you will not initiate any communication with him, and if he should address any to you I beg that you will transmit it with all speed to me; simply informing him that it has been so transmitted, and that a reply will immediately be sent.

If the Dost comes in to stir the storm, the steering will become ticklish; and it would neither be fair to other people, nor consonant with my views, that when I am so near at hand, the helm should be guided by any other than myself.

Whatever may be the ultimate disposal of Peshawur, the conduct of Chuttur Sing and Sultan Mahomed Khan must compell me to overrun and to punish in the first instance.

Dost Mahomed Khan has no business at Peshawur at all at this moment, and if it be ascertained correctly that he is there, it may be necessary for the British Govt. to enquire of him what he means by it. But let us have more certain knowledge first of the Dost's presence.

As regards Maharaja Gholab Sing's force, I am extremely adverse to employing it, and in the face of the melancholy experience we have had. I should be very doubtful of feeling myself able to justify the employment of another officer there. The best thing the C.-in-C. can do is to ensure that it keeps its distance from him and prevents any Sikh forces getting into the country in his rear. When the C.-in-C. moves on, it will be necessary for him to insist on Gholab Sing's force making some movement which shall prevent their getting into his rear themselves. I do not think it possible that after he has read what I have written to him, Sir H. Lawrence could dream of receiving Moolraj. However to avoid all risks, I shall this day address a letter to him which I beg you to send to Mooltan so as to ensure his getting possession of it at once—and a duplicate, which I beg you to send to a safe hand at Bhawulpore.

The Bombay Govt. has most stupidly sent all my letters and despatches *round by Calcutta*. It is too bad. I have nothing by the mail which arrived on the 29th November.

The prisoners are my only real anxiety. I would give Chuttur Sing, his son and adherents, their filthy lives on delivery of the prisoners. An amnesty and indemnity, which should show them as traitors defying the British Govt. for months and waving on it, get in the end unharmed and unpunished, I dare not grant. As a servant of the Sovereign and an officer of the Company, I dare not so sacrifice, or so risk, the public interests and the tranquility of India and the stability of our power there.

84. *From Lord Dalhousie*

Private

Camp Rajpoora, Decr. 12th, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Since I wrote to you this morning, Elliot has shown to me, as you desired, your letter enclosing others from the C.-in-C., Mr. Cocks and Capt. Abbott.

His Excy. has doubtless found reasons in the interval of time; else he would experience some difficulty in reconciling his letter to me of Nov. 24th, respecting Mr. Cocks and Mr. Nicholson, and Major Mackeson, with that he has now addressed to you. If you will refer to his letter of 24th to you, of which he sent me a copy, in his letter to me of 24th, you will be able to estimate the essence of what he said to me. After having the C.-in-C.'s letter and Mr. Cock's I adhere to the opinion, I stated this morning, that no practical use shall be made of Gholab Sing's troops. I do not and never shall trust him. Your policy in relation to that force, I conceive, should be to use it so as to commit Gholab Sing to an open support of and co-operation with the British Army, but at the same time so as to preclude the possibility of their having an opportunity of working us harm, if they should be so inclined.

The C.-in-C. says that the force can do him neither good nor harm. I entirely believe the former statement; and I beg that you and he will issue such orders as shall effectually make sure the correctness of the latter assertion.

85. *From Lord Dalhousie*

Private

Camp Sirhind, Decr. 14, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I received yesterday evening yours of 10th.

I am in perplexity as to the C.-in-C.'s intentions. My information from other quarters tells me that he is *preparing* to attack. Mackeson only says H. E. wishes to do so; his letter to you is in that direction also. But to me he conveys the impression that he means to stand fast, and on the 10th a letter received from him this morning tells me he is going to the front to see how affairs stand. I greatly fear there is either great inconsistency or some duplicity in all this, as I suspect there has been in the affair of your assistants and Mackeson. It is between ourselves.

Now that his supplies are apparently abundant, one reason for prohibiting his advance is removed, and undoubtedly if one could feel only a decent degree of security that operations would be conducted with ordinary discretion and judgment, an attack is the thing to be done. I await some certain intelligence of his intentions; for I feel that I may do harm if I write prematurely.

I have no despatches yet by the mail which reached Bombay on 29th Nov. They have most vexatiously sent them to Calcutta.

I will most certainly let you know the moment I hear anything of your seat in Council. I have heard nothing since they told me that they had found legal difficulties and had a case prepared.

General Whish's letter is one of General Whish's letters. What can I say more?

I am very sorry for poor young Herbert's prospects. He has behaved admirably and I hope to prove to him I have thought so. You have never told me how Lt. Nicholson comes to be safe at Ramnugger, when he was ordered to take charge of Attok.

I have received your despatch enclosing depositions of the person who was with poor Agnew. Have you the man who deposed to Moolraj having given money to the soldiers who brought him the head and others who gave evidence at the time?

I observe that in this paper you again refer to the intrigues and combinations which had been previously carried on, with a view to a rising, and which you have said undoubtedly existed. You have never given any reply to the Govt. letter which asked for the evidence, whatever it is on which you founded those statements. They are strongly adverted to in the letters of the Secret Cee., and they are of importance.

As for the Govt. of India is concerned, it matters little whether there were intrigues or not. Subsequent events have made their policy very clear. But as a matter of argument, it would be of advantage to the Govt. of India to be able to establish the fact of an insurrection having been in the course of preparation, and it will be of essential moment to the reputation of your own administration.

Those who are inclined to criticize (and they are many) will say loudly as they have already said: "It is all very well to speak of a general insurrection of the Sikhs, but if Mooltan had been attacked at once, or, if when attacked, it had been attacked in proper force, nothing would ever have been heard of a general insurrection. Such is *not my* opinion, but will be said. If it could be shewn that insurrection had been previously on foot to a large extent, and that Mooltan and Moolraj were merely the opportunity for the outbreak, and not the causes of insurrection entering into their Khalsas' hairs, the answer to all objections will be complete.

As it stands at present, when I write my despatch to the Court announcing future policy being declared in the Punjab and tracing the causes of it, I can take no notice of what at present has no greater solidity than other rumours.

Be assured this is of importance, and moreover unless you supply it to me very shortly, it will be of no value, for to be of value it must stand in the front of our narrative.

86. *From Lord Dalhousie*
Private

Camp Saneewal, Dec. 18th, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

On receiving intelligence of the resolution which the C.-in-C. ultimately formed not to attack the enemy in his position at present, and after considering the letters of the C.-in-C.

and Major Mackeson from the spot, I yesterday addressed His Excellency.

Referring to his observation that I had tied up his hands "almost to defensive operations, I reminded H. E. of the considerations which induced me to prohibit his advance to the Jhelum, *without further communication with me*. I reminded him that the conditions of his supplies, his supports and his communications had then placed him, according to his own statement, "in a most critical position"; and that my duty required me to act accordingly.

I observed that his letter represented that a change was taking place in the circumstances above mentioned. His supplies were described as much more abundant; troops were approaching nearer; Wheeler had fallen back to the Beas; and we might hope that the full success of Mr. John Lawrence's measures would tend to avert all fresh inclinations to rise in Jullundar.

If the state of supplies, supports and communications were materially improved, if he could satisfy his own judgement deliberately exercised regarding them; if he obtained full and accurate knowledge, of which he seems to be entirely devoid at present, of the enemy's position, force and circumstances, and if he is convinced that he can attack him successfully without disastrous [results]; I have informed H. E. that I would in that case be glad to see a decisive blow struck, being as fully impressed as any man could be of the advantage of early success, especially in Indian warfare.

At the same time I again impressed upon H. E. the necessity, in coming to his conclusions, of bearing in mind how inferior our strength was now to what it had been in the last war, and the great hazard which would be involved in any appearance of a reverse.

The instructions will give him the right of attacking if he pleases, while at the same time, if these cautions do not induce prudence in his acts, I know nothing which would suffice to do so.

My reply regarding an officer to be attached to Gholab Sing's force has already reached you. I am quite fixed on that point. I don't wish to appreciate the propriety of Gholab Sing's proceedings hitherto. No great merit is to be attribu-

ted to his sending small sums of money to Abbott, in as much as he owes us a very large one himself, and let him be plausible as he may, I never will trust him, nor venture on any movement in which the possibility of a sudden act of hostility on his part is not fully provided against.

Col. Cheape thinks Mooltan very strong, and quite capable, if well defended, of costing us time and life still.

Major Mackeson appears to me to be acting with tact and judgment and I have no doubt that with the cordial desire to promote the public service which I with pleasure acknowledge in your assistants, all will go on smoothly.

87. *From Lord Dalhousie*

Camp Saneewal, Dec. 18th, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I have received your letter of 14th, enclosing letters from Major Lawrence to Mr. Cocks, shewing that some of the British prisoners are with Shere Sing's army on the left bank of the Jhelum, and indicating a desire on the part of the Raja and the Sirdars to treat either with respect to the release of the prisoners or with respect to making terms generally.

With regard to the latter proposal, I have but one answer to give to all applications from the Sikh army for the opening of negotiations regarding terms. I will listen to no proposal but that of absolute, unconditional surrender. If the surrender shall be immediate and complete, I will not forfeit the lives of any by reason of their rebellion. If the surrender shall not be immediate and complete, the Sirdars and their troops must endure the consequences, and their blood will be on their own heads. The Dewan Moolraj and his followers must be understood to be excluded from the statements I have now made.

With regard to the release of British subjects, who are prisoners in the hands of the rebels, I entertain the deepest solicitude for their recovery. But in resorting to every expedient, in putting forth every exertion for that purpose, I cannot in my anxiety for their safety forget the duty which I owe to the State. I should not be justified before those I serve, or in the eyes of the country, if I were to consent to the sacrifice of great public objects, in order to accomplish

the freedom of the prisoners; or if I should do any act which should encourage our enemies in India to believe that the possession of the persons of one or more British subjects would at any time paralyse the energies of the Government, and ensure to those who hold such prisoners, immunity from all punishment, however heinous their conduct may have been.

I have already caused intimations to be made to Sirdar Chuttur Sing calculated, as I hope, to ensure their personal safety. As the rebels have now brought the prisoners to the neighbourhood of our army and have manifested an inclination to treat for terms, it would be desirable to repeat the attempt to obtain their restoration.

I have already said that no negotiation can be allowed for general terms to the Sirdars and rebel army, but I am ready to assent to an exchange of prisoners, respectively held by us and by them. I would accordingly inform the Raja Shere Sing that on the safe return of the British prisoners and their delivery to H.E. the C.-in-C., I will deliver up Raja's brother Sirdar Gholab Sing, and any others who may be in our hands, belonging to that family, with such other Sirdars as are in our possession. Raja Shere Sing should be further informed that if the British prisoners are kept in captivity, and especially if any injury whatever is done to them, the British Govt. will exact a terrible retribution for the sufferings of its subjects.

The Maharanee Jhinda Kour and Raja Lall Sing, whose names have been adverted to, must of course be excluded from any arrangement of this nature.

I would beg to have your opinion as to whether any advantage would arise from taking measures to make it known that the Govt. would highly reward any one who should bring the prisoners safe into camp.

I think it right to communicate to yourself as Resident in the first instance my views of the course which should be pursued, in consequence of these apparent overtures from the Sirdars.

I shall today address Major Mackeson enclosing to him a copy of this letter and instructing as agent to the Govr.

General with the C.-in-C. to act upon it. A copy will also be sent to H.E. for his information.

I write now demi-officially to save time. A public letter to the same effect will be addressed to you.

88. *From Lord Dalhousie*

Private

Camp Loodianah, Dec. 19th, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I promised to let you know as soon as I heard anything about your seat in Council. Last night the despatch reached me, appointing you provisional member of Council on Mr. Louis' taking his seat. It gives me pain to add that while they give you precedence over Louis, they place you after Sir John Littler. I will send you a copy of the despatch. It is dry, hard and ungracious, gives no reason, no explanation, does not even advert to the recommendation of the Supreme Govt., not a word on the subject is said in any of my letters from the President or the Chairman. In short it is as gruffly done as it could be done: and I am sincerely sorry for it in every way.

I did not choose to say anything in my demi-official letter of yesterday's date relative to the remark you make that these Sikhs expect much from Sir H. Lawrence's return, and from his brother being in their hands. But you must have seen enough of me by this time to know very well that Sir H. L.'s presence or absence will make no sort of difference in what I shall do or shall refuse to do. My resolution has been formed after long, anxious and conscientious consideration; and neither Sir H. L. or anybody else can shake it.

Regarding the prisoners, if one of them were my own brother, I should pursue the same course as I have now taken. I shall certainly not depart from it because he is Sir Henry Lawrence's brother.

I see they have been allowing large detachments under Narrain Sing to leave Mooltan and return to it just as they pleased! I cannot understand this for the life of me.

Sir Herbert Maddock writes to me that he is "credibly (!) informed" the Sikhs have [been] treating for assistance with the French at Chandernagore!! There is an item for your Ukbar.

P.S.

Can you find me the names of any other Sirdars now in rebellion, or who have been so, during the summer—besides those in the Parliamentary Papers? I know 3; Sirdar Goolab Sing, Sirdar Ram Sing, Sirdar Heera Sing. Are there any more? I ask because all at home refuse to believe there has been any wide disaffection among the Sirdars against us.

89. *From Lord Dalhousie*

Private

Camp Loodianah, Dec. 20th, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I received last night yours of the 15th. I have always heard that the Brigadier you have got was as great an ass as the Colonel immediately preceding him. However I observed the C.-in-C. desires him to consult with you about the defences of the Citadel and city. If the Brigadier is obtuse, so bump-tious, refer to me.

I have been obliged to give the Brigdr. Wheeler another Exp. He is an excellent officer and I appreciate his value. But every Brigadier hereabouts seems to me to be a G.G., and if he will dribble his fist in my face, the knuckles of said fist must smart for it.

The letter you sent me is not a favourable specimen. I return it with thanks. Your observations on it are quite just, but I have already learnt in my comparatively short indentures to statesmanship that a public servant must make his mind, if he be high up, to bear the burdens of many. The writer is either very forgetful or very disingenuous.

I have been looking today at the signatures to Shere Sing's "25 points" with reference to the request I made to you for the names of rebel Sirdars. I can't quite make out which are Sirdars and which not. Would you make somebody look them out and mark them; and if any of them are identical with those in the former lists you sent me, mark them.

I had a letter today from Sir H. Lawrence. He is coming up to my camp immediately. I shall remain here till after Xmas, enquiring in the meantime where I can fix myself so

as to obtain easily forage for the multitudinous beasts of this large camp.

90. *From Lord Dalhousie*

Private

Camp Loodianah, Dec. 21st, 1848.

I have received your letter of 19th and your official papers respecting the evidence of projected insurrection in the Punjab, previous to events at Mooltan.

From the terms in which you spoke of the evidence in your possession, I was prepared to expect much a weaker case than that which you have submitted. It appears to me to be very strong, especially in the evidence of Lal Sing. The letters also leave on my mind no doubt of the treachery of Khan Sing Man.

I assure you, I think, you have greatly fortified your own position and that of the Govt. by these papers, and I have been glad to see them.

I quite see from his letters that H. E. is very wroth with me. I am sorry for it; but he has no right whatever to be angry, and I must do my duty. Furthermore I will do it, however disagreeable it may be to myself or others.

Mr. Hodson's affair seems to be a most gallant one—very modestly told. Pray make an official report of it that he may get the *Ku80a* which is due to him. His name has been often before me, and always honorably.

If the troops at Mooltan are afterwards to move up the River Jhelum, it is probable from what is reported to me of the state of the navigation that the Indus steamers would be available. In that case they should be warned, and preparations should be made for the arrangements necessary for the advance of the troops.

Major Mackeson wrote to me on the subject of the answer to Sher Sing's "25 points" and informed me he was going to write to you. I answered his letter yesterday and told him that the message was intended as a reply to their list of grievances and not as a reply to a proposal to treat. I added that I had already acquainted you some days ago that I required unconditional surrender and would accept it. Accordingly if he had modified the answer to the 25 points

so as to shew that I would accept surrender, I told him I would approve.

I dare say your plan of separating the two, and founding the information that surrender would be accepted on your proclamation, and sending a copy of it simultaneously with the answer to the points, is better, and I have no doubt that Mackeson will have acted upon your suggestion.

It seems very doubtful whether Dost has yet left Jellalabad. I should not be sorry if he made overtures of friendly co-operation. It would save us a deal of trouble, but it would hardly do for us to make overtures to him.

91. *From Lord Dalhousie*

Private

Camp Loodianah, Christmas day (Decr. 25), 1848.
My dear Sir Frederick,

I have received your two letters of 22nd instant which arrived last evening.

According to precedents I fancy I have no option, but must offer to Sir John Littler the Presidency and Deputy Governorship as a matter of course, and however ready I might be to show that the Govt. of India were no parties to your return to Council in any other than your former place, I should not feel myself justified in putting an undeserved slight on Sir John Littler who is declared senior member of Council, because the Court has put a most undeserved slight upon you. Not upon you only. It is a slight on the Govt. of India and on myself, for, although it was proposed by Lord Hardinge, your appointment (and the recommendations annexed to it) was the first act of my administration.

Thanks for the list you promise of Sirdars in rebellion. I should be glad to know the names of those who are not. It is not as a matter of curiosity that I ask, but because at home they profess themselves unable to believe that more than a very few Sirdars can possibly be involved.

I quite agree with you about Gholab Sing and Mr. Nicholson's scheme for rescuing the prisoners. I remain quite of the opinion that no use should be made of Gholab Sing's troops for any purpose on which anything depends. If the

attempt should fail, or even if it should succeed, unless we could release the *whole of the prisoners at once*, the effect would be to increase the rigor with which the rest would be imprisoned.

I hear to my surprise from Mooltan, and from Col. Cheape too, that they are again going to attack the suburb side! They were to attack this morning.

Has the C.-in-C. written to you at all about the move of the force afterwards and the use which may be made of the Indus flotilla?

92. *From Lord Dalhousie*

Private

Camp Loodianah, Dec. 25th, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Since I wrote to you this morning, I have received yours of 23rd enclosing Mr. Nicholson's letter of 22nd.

I do not quite know what he means by 2 or 3000 lightly equipped troops—whether he means troops of ours or of Gholab Sing.

I object to the employment of G. Singh's troops unless very good cause be shewn to me and I object to the enterprise altogether unless nearly all the prisoners are together for the reasons I have before stated. You have therefore acted very prudently in preventing any foray by Capt. Nicholson without direct authority. His proposal of plans are vague and hazy as they well could be.

The private notes are received by me quite as you understand, and I make my comments on them to you with the same unreserve with which they are sent, not intending that any remarks I may make should go to them *from me*, altho' you can make such use of them as you think expedient.

With that preface I remark a moment on what he says about getting on with Major Makeson. I have no doubt they all will. I have no reason to suppose they do not. But in plain English they *must*. I have placed my confidence in Major M. with the C-in-C. and hitherto he has fully justified my confidence. I will not for a moment stand any obstruction to him on the part of these young officers, nor any independent dealing on their part with H. E. on *political matters* in which

Major M. represents my views there. Major M. on the other hand will in no way interfere with the communication of your political assistants with yourself. And I will say to you frankly that on the first appearance of it, I would order the whole of them away from the army and back to Lahore by return of post.

I do not see the use of that Mr. Robinson there, as at present advised.

Further you have more enlightened me as to how Capt. Nicholson who was ordered to a post of danger at Attok, leaving Lieut. Herbert there, is now in a post of safety with the army. It may be alright, but no letter, public or private, has explained it, and it concerns him that it should be explained.

The C.-in-C. has not written a word to me since the 17th instant.

Many thanks for the list of Sirdars who signed the "25 points."

I grieve to hear the report of Attok having fallen. However, stand or fall, Mr. Herbert will find his reputation well cared for, so far as I can do it.

93. *From Lord Dalhousie*

Private

Camp Humber, Decr. 28th 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I have just now received your letter of 26th.

I wish to take no lives, to shed no blood on the scaffold, nor do I wish to impoverish small people. The unconditional submission, therefore, of rebels in arms to the British Power (I would say nothing about allegiance) will secure the lives of all, and the little property of little people. But as for the Sirdars, *I will confiscate the lands of every man of them who is actually in rebellion against us.*

Hodson's account of the friendly hints of the Jummoo people is very amusing, but "that Cock won't fight" any longer.

I am much vexed by what reaches me from Mooltan. Ten days ago, M. General Whish and Brigdr. Cheape had agreed to attack the fort on the north. Four days ago both wrote that they were to attack the suburbs as before on the south, but without giving any reason either for the quarter of attack or

for this change of opinion. Two days ago they report that the Bombay people differ with them: and Heaven only knows now *where* they will attack, for they do not know themselves! Upon my word, it is too bad.

John Lawrence spent some days with me at Loodianah. He reports everything quiet and safe in Jullundur. He has returned.

In about a week I shall expect Sir Henry.

On Tuesday or Wednesday I expect to be at Mukho where I propose to fix my camp for the present. If there is no great difficulty or insecurity I should be glad if you would be so good as to establish a dak direct thither from Lahore. If you start your letters in the evening I should receive them early next morning, and if necessary, an answer could be sent the same day, if it were of consequence.

There seems reason to fear that Dost Mahomed has committed himself and is probably at Peshawur.

94. *From Lord Dalhousie*

Private

Camp Dhurmnote, Dec. 30th, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

You have probably observed Mr. Newmarch's proceedings respecting the Maharanee in Calcutta. He will give us, I dare say, a great deal of trouble.

Could you send me a translation of the decree or act or whatever it was by which her removal from the Punjab by consent of the Durbar took place in May last?

They may as well be warned at home for any sudden attack which may be made upon them.

Sattara is pretty well run out now: and the Maharanee is a perfect fox worth starting.

95. *From Lord Dalhousie*

Confidential

Camp Dhurmnote, Dec. 31, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I have received yours of 29th and I am obliged to you for communicating to me unreservedly your wishes as to Council.

Some days ago I wrote to Sir John Littler simply asking

him what his views were. From other quarters I gather he will be ready to serve, but I thought it due to him to enquire his wishes before proposing anything. I will let you know what his reply is before I act upon it.

The Union Bank Act will probably be out of your way, and passed before Maddock retires. I agree with you in thinking that he has no intention of going before the end of his time.

Sir H. Lawrence was only to be at Sukkur on the 27th according to General Whish. In that case he can hardly be here so soon as the 6th. He has been requested to come on here at once, as soon as I have fully talked over things with him, he shall go on to Lahore. It would be very advantageous if you were able to join us in camp, but I do not think you ought to quit Lahore even for a day at present.

Besides communicating to Sir H. Lawrence confidentially all he ought to know regarding recent events, and the conduct of persons who have been dragged in them, I hope you will put me confidentially in possession of the same facts also. It will be very desirable that I should have all possible aids in forming a judgment on persons there, in order that we may as far as possible, avoid the risk of giving people ground for believing that services they have rendered are neglected, because the Resident who was cognizant of them has gone, or that misconduct of which they have been guilty will be unnoticed, because a Resident who formerly thought well of them has returned.

If there should remain time for it, I shall be very happy indeed to see you in Camp. We shall be at Mukho on the day after tomorrow and there I propose to settle.

96. *From Lord Dalhousie*

Private

Camp Mukho, Tuesday night, January 2, 1849.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I have received your letter of 27th and 28th.

If my mind were fully satisfied that Dost Mahomed is really at Peshawur and had acted as is alleged, I would send you by this post the terms of a short message demanding to know his intentions. But Mackeson does not seem satisfied

on the point yet and your opinion that Jubbar Khan's letter is a forgery, seems to me to strengthen that doubt. The truth must surely be authentically declared before long.

You mention being in consultation with Mackeson as to what communication should be made to Maharaja Gholab Sing in the alarm which he feels regarding the loss of Cashmere and other portions of his territory. I have no doubt Gholab Sing's alarm is real. I think it would be well to take advantage of the moment to speak explicitly to him. I would intimate to him that the British Govt. will not permit Dost Mahomed Khan to take possession of territory belonging to Gholab Sing provided Gholab Sing gives decisive proofs that he may be depended upon as a friend to the British Govt. and a peaceful neighbour. The British Govt. sets no value on half and half friends. The Maharaja has hitherto given no real proof of his trustworthiness and amity—for I cannot regard as such a proof, his sending a few thousand rupees to Capt. Abbott when his H. still owes several lacs to the British Govt. If the Maharaja shall really do effective service against the Sikh army now in arms against the British Govt., or against Dost Mahomed in the event of that person attempting to aid the Sikh army, he may rest assured that Dost Mahomed will not be permitted to injure him. If on the other hand, the Maharaja does not render such service, it is impossible that the British Govt., can place any reliance on his friendship, and they will proceed to take such measures against the Sikh power, against Dost Mahomed and the Maharaja himself as their own interests and security may seem to require. The British Government sincerely desires to see the Ma. Gholab Sing retained in possession of his territories, and in friendship with it, and it counsels him now to take a just view of his own true interest and to act in accordance with that view.

Pray do not introduce the name of Maharaja Dhuleep Sing at all.

If nothing has occurred in the interval which renders it inexpedient to act on these instructions, you can do so at once and a public letter of the above tenor will be sent to you.

Early in December I wrote to the C.-in-C. relative to the making of preparations and issuing instructions for the advance of the force from Mooltan after that place should

have fallen. I presumed, of course, that they were issued. Your anticipations, however, expressed in your letter of 28th are correct, for yesterday came a letter from the Adjutant General, stating the case and soliciting instructions! I have sent a reply, a copy will go today to General Whish and you shall have also one.

I have just heard from Mooltan of 29th. Breaching batteries to open next morning positively. Sir Henry Lawrence is there and I expect him here directly. I wish he may not get himself knocked on the head by staying there.

97. *From Lord Dalhousie*

Private

Camp Mukho, January 6th, 1849.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I have to acknowledge your letters of 3rd and 4th.

Sir H. Lawrence has not yet joined me. I suppose, naturally enough, he cannot tear himself away from the charms of the bombardment at Mooltan.

The explosion of the magazine cannot fail to expedite matters, altho' it has not been conclusive. It is a great pity that Moolraj was not "hoist with his own petard," both because it probably would have broken up his following and because I don't want to leave the hanging of him. It appears by a letter of General Whish that they were to assault the city on the 2nd.

Pray continue to inform me of anything you think important and do not pass it by on the supposition that Mackeson has reported it. Between the two stools one often falls to the ground.

I have not sent you any draft of a letter to Dost Mahomed because of the discrepancies in the various statements sent to me. I am not satisfied that he is at Pehawur. However it seems so probable now, that I have written a minute and the letter will go directly to you. I don't at all mean that Major Mackeson should supersede you in these general questions, so the communication should be made by you.

The news from Attok are good as far as they go and I heartily hope young Herbert may be able to hold out. He has covered himself with honour.

The mail came in yesterday. Court a little fidgetty, but behaving well. They absolve you, justly, from all blame for the failure at Mooltan.

The 3 regts. for which I asked are to come directly.

There will be so very large a sum of treasure at Ferozepore soon, that I am not quite easy at the thought of only 2 N.I. regts. being there to protect it. Accordingly I am thinking of moving to within 8 or 9 miles of the place, so as to make the troops with me available in case of alarm, as I do not wish to weaken the reserve at Jugraon more. Of course, I shall not go ostensibly for this purpose: and I will give you timely notice.

Have you heard anything of Capt. Showers' 800 Rajpoot horse? From all I can make out the horse seem to be a patriotic phantasm of his own brain.

Poor Old Sutherland seems to have bitten all his assistants with the Rajpoot mania.

98. *From Lord Dalhousie*
Private

Camp Mukho, January 8, 1849.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Yesterday evening I received a letter from Mackeson enclosing Capt. Abbott's Diary, in which he coolly announces his having *a month ago* addressed a letter to Dost Mahomed, inviting him to assist the British Govt. and the answer which he has received to it.

If Capt. A. has really addressed Dost Mahomed to the effect I have quoted, I do not know what can save him. At present it is needless to discuss his part of the future. Mackeson seems to doubt the authenticity of the reply and entertains the belief that it has been the handywork of the Barukzaies. I hope so. In the meantime it does not appear to me, as at present advised, that we should accept this letter as genuine, and I see no reason for withholding the communication which I requested to be addressd to the Dost. Pray make your translation adhere to a literal rendering of it, for I have carefully weighed the phrases, and mischief might follow from any enlargement or paraphrase of them. The intelligence from Mooltan is most satisfactory. It was brought to me by Sir H.

Lawrence on Saturday night. By the account he gives of the condition of the citadel from our fire and from the explosion, I had hoped to hear its fall by this time. On the 3rd they were still shelling and breaching. Moolraj is a fine fellow, as a soldier at any rate.

In Mackeson's letter he urges that an advance and attack by the C.-in-C. should be sanctioned. I am quite at a loss to understand this, for I have laid no restrictions on the C.-in-C. for the last 3 weeks. On the contrary on the 17th ultimo I wrote to him, setting him free to attack whenever he pleased or could satisfy his own judgment that he could do so. This letter was made official on 20th and a copy I believe sent to you. I wrote to Mackeson last night to tell him this and I wrote also to the C.-in-C. expressing my desire to hear of a successful attack on Shere Singh.

The Court's despatch to me depreciates all proclamations of our intentions until the war is concluded. So it is fortunate that I have issued none. Some may be necessary for purposes short of declaration of intentions and these I will send as they may be required.

John Lawrence has probably informed you that Ram Sing is again on foot near Puthankote. Wheeler is after him and Lawrence is gone also. They seem to regard the fact of Ram Sing being in Gholab Sing's territories as an obstacle to their attacking him. This is quite an unnecessary delicacy, not at all required by the Treaty. They should attack anywhere anyhow all persons committing hostile aggressions against the British Government.

Sir Henry Lawrence arrived on Saturday night and it, therefore, becomes necessary to settle something regarding the time at which he should assume charge of the Residency and your return to Council.

Sometime ago, if I recollect right you expressed a desire to get rid of your anxieties as soon as might be, on which I recommended you not to quit your post till after the year during which Sir H. L. had leave to be absent had expired. The year will very shortly expire. As at the end of the year Sir H. L. was entitled to return and as your appointment was during his absence, Sir H. L. period of re-instatement is close at hand. He declines to express any desire as to the date at

which he should resume charge. But I do not consider it fair to him that he should not be re-instated at an early period after his return: and as you certainly ought to be in Calcutta to take your seat in Council when Sir H. Maddock sails, which, I understand, he means to do in the first week of March, and as you express a desire to spend a time in my camp before you go, I think 1st February would be a fair and fitting date for him to resume his charge.

Your own allowances are secured to you until your return to Council, and his allowances for that month I must issue to him extra. I shall perform that part of the agreement which depends on the Govt. of India; and I have to repeat that the Court has not thought fit to fulfil that part of it which depended upon itself.

Sir H. Lawrence proposes and has asked my consent to his going to Head Quarters, with a view which he will mention to you himself and which I do not wish to commit to paper, and on which you wrote on 22nd ultimo. He leaves this tonight and will be at Lahore tomorrow morning.

I have no news from other quarters.

99. *From Lord Dalhousie*

Private

Camp Mukho, January 10, 1849.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Your letter of the 8th reached me yesterday.

Capt. Abbott is really too bad. To send rebukes and disgrace to a man, placed as he is at present, is an odious task; but his fault is excessive and *ought* to be un-pardonable.

I am very glad to hear the Maharaja's people are behaving so well. I have no wish to quarrel with him.

I hope your anticipations that the C.-in-C. would attack Shere Sing today may prove true. I have nothing from that camp giving a hint of it. On the contrary Mackeson, in the most unaccountable manner, keeps writing in advocacy of sanction being given to an advance in order to attack Shere Sing. I don't know how I can sanction it more fully than I have done, unless I go over and give the word of command myself.

General Whish writes from Mooltan on 3rd and tells me *nothing*. What they are doing or preparing to do against the citadel I don't know.

Sir John Littler has replied to my letter. He says he has no wish to shrink from the task of Prest. in C. and Depy. Govr. This being so, the proposal will be submitted to the Council in the usual manner, and you will not have duties which you have said that under the circumstances you would rather avoid.

Sir Herbert is uneasy about the Nepalese, I hope, needlessly. Th Raja has gone on what he calls a hunting party with 5 or 6000 men and many guns. The Rest says it is all right, but it is well to be on our guard.

100. *From Lord Dalhousie*

Private

Camp Mukho, January 10th, 4½ P.M.

My dear Sir Frederick,

By all means let the letter go at once, and go as quick as it can.

Dost Mahomed does not appear to have crossed the Indus.

I will not recognize Capt. Abbott's impertinence or believe that Dost Mahomed has equalled it. So let the letter go: it may do good and can't do harm.

I don't know when your dak leaves, but it never comes in till 3½ P.M.

Our dak is just going and will reach you, I suppose, by morning. It leaves this by 5 O.C.

101. *From Lord Dalhousie*

Private

Camp Mukho, January 11, 1849.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I received the dak earlier today, about noon, and in it your letter of 10th.

I fear Attok must be down. If C.-in-C. will do something it will not much signify always provided I get young Herbert safe. I value him.

Mackeson tells me C.-in-C. will attack, as today. C.-in-C. has not written a word on the subject of an attack for long.

They seem to be going much more slowly on at Mooltan than circumstances would warrant, according to the account the General gives of the state of the place.

I am sorry to see you are not sanguine as to Lawrence's scheme. He does not seem to be so himself, from a note which I received from him today.

I hope matters go pleasantly between you. Of course he thinks everything wrong since December 1847. That must be allowed for.

102. *From Lord Dalhousie*

Private

Camp Mukho, January 12, 1849, 1 P.M.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I have just received your letter of 11th. I fear there can be no doubt of Attok having fallen. As I said yesterday, if young Herbert gets away, I don't so much care. Mackeson's letter yesterday was founded on intelligence which seemed to bear that he had dropped down the river with the Nizam-u-Doulah, but Nicholson's letter today rather damps that hope. It is difficult to conceive how Sikhs and Afghans can act together when such proceedings on the part of the latter are reported.

General Whish writes on evening of 8th that Moolraj had just sent him a reply to his letter of 6th in which Moolraj was told he must unconditionally surrender, and that Moolraj now proposed to send a man immediately. General W. supposes this is for the purpose of giving in.

I would rather have the citadel by assault, but really under such an officer, I shall be thankful to get it by surrender, or in any other honest way. His own letters shew him to be a perfect fool.

The C.-in-C. writes to me under date 9th, as if he were contemplating an attack. But it is very hazy and I can make little out of it.

They have made a baddish business of it with Ram Sing and I cannot say I think Mr. Melvill's letter makes so success-

ful a defence as Ram Sing did. However I hope it will be soon put to rights.

Report is very rife in these quarters that the Raja of Ladwa has crossed the Sutledge and is going off towards the north of the Baree Doab.

Moolraj, if he surrenders, has proved himself too good a fighting cock to be hanged. I wish he would blow himself up. I swore at first that if he had 50 necks, I would hang him by every one of them. But he has borne himself like a man and I should not like such a job now.

103. *From Lord Dalhousie*
Private

Camp Mukho, January 13, 1849.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Mackeson's vision of Attok agrees with the other but too well. There can no longer, I fear, be any doubt of the fort having fallen, and but little of Herbert also being a prisoner.

I sincerely hope the C.-in-C. will have attacked, and attacked successfully, before Chuttur Sing can join his son with the strong reinforcement he has with him.

Capt. Showers' scheme is all moonshine. I have refused him the guns, he has had the absurdity to ask for.

No letter from General Whish; but from Brigadier Cheape's of 9th it would appear that Moolraj will not surrender, and that the citadel has renewed its fire. There is a heavy fire apparently upon it from our side, but I cannot learn how they propose to make their way in or when?

There is nothing from the Jullundur today.

104. *From Lord Dalhousie*
Private

Camp Mukho, January 16th, 1849.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I have just now received your letter of 14th delayed by the heavy storm of wind and rain which has been going on since Sunday morning.

We are here in the middle of Lagunes, rising like Venice out of waters, but vastly more damp, cold and uncomfortable.

My letters from camp, received with yours', announce the

intention of attacking on 13th. During the afternoon of that day, very heavy firing was heard in this camp—apparently in the direction of the Jhelum, and heard by all alike, none knowing an attack was intended. I therefore conclude an action must have been fought and I wait for tidings with much anxiety, as I do not know what other firing we could hear.

Nothing as usual from Mooltan.

My letters from home bring me no intelligence of interest.

105. *From Lord Dalhousie*

Private

Camp Mukho, January 17th, 1849. 3 p.m.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I received this forenoon your letter of 16th, 10½ a.m.

I think you appear to have accurately summed up the operations of the 13th when you say that altho' the closing in of darkness made the victory less decisive than it might have been, still it is a victory. It is a victory and I heartily thank God for it.

I have directed a short notification of the event to be issued for publication and have ordered a salute to be fired everywhere as soon as possible. We stand in need of some announcement of that sort.

I fear from the C.-in-C. letter and from Mackeson's that our loss has been heavy. Neither of them mention any names except Brigr. Pennicuick.

I look for details most anxiously and beg you to favor me with anything you think fit not relying on other people giving it. Especially I am anxious to know the state of Shere Sing's army after this defeat. The storm ought to be as much against them as against our people.

You did not enclose Cock's letter as you mention. At least it did not arrive.

106. *From Lord Dalhousie*

Camp Mukho, January 20th, 1849.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I received your express this morning.

The C.-in-C. makes the officers look better on paper than I thought could be done, and he is right to do so, as far as

truth will allow him. But this does not change the features of the case.

I am making arrangements of giving him some support, which is not easy nor practicable without risk. I will write more fully on this point tomorrow.

It is sad to observe from all concurrent accounts what might have been done on the 13th and how much might have been spared. But these *private* accounts afford me no means of remedying the public evil. There is a very heavy responsibility on those who went out of their way to create the evil.

Lord Gifford and H. Lawrence have not yet arrived (3 p.m.). I shall hear the state of the army from them.

Elliot has just sent me a note from John Lawrence of 6th, stating they had attacked Ram Sing and driven him away. No particulars.

107. *From Lord Dalhousie*

Private

Camp Mukho, January 21, 1849.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Lord Gifford and Sir H. Lawrence arrived yesterday evening and the C.-in-C. despatch early in the morning.

I am endeavouring to make, if possible, some arrangements for affording the C.-in-C. some small present assistance. It can't be done without running some small present risk also, but risk must be run.

Orders go to Mooltan to expedite the movement of their force as much as possible.

I know of nothing to prevent Sir H. Lawrence moving to Lahore very soon if he wishes it.

I hope they will be able to take care of themselves at Chillianwalla. I don't hope for more than this.

The mail goes tomorrow and this makes today busy.

P.S.

I have not heard a word of General Wheeler's proceedings except that John Lawrence says they were "bolting".

108. *From Lord Dalhousie**Private*

Camp Mukho, January 22nd, 1849. 4 p.m.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I have considered well the question of reinforcements to C.-in-C. I do not consider he *ought* to require any; but at the same time I feel that under the circumstances it is expedient to send such reinforcements as may tend to add confidence to the troops. I have accordingly sent orders today for the 98th to come to Ferozepore and will send them on. I know there is some risk in this, but some risk must be run.

For the same reason I consider it expedient that a N.I. regt. should go from Lahore to Ramnuggur, there to receive the C.-in-C. orders. I am aware that you will consider this risk also, but for the same reason it must be run.

I move to Ferozepore in two days and as my escort will then be available for the protection of that place, I will send over a regt. from Ferozepore if there should appear any necessity for it with you.

The news from all quarters today is better than usual.

109. *From Lord Dalhousie*

Camp Mukho, January 24, 1849.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I have received yours of 23rd. The enclosures from Mooltan were welcome as I have nothing later than 18th from thence.

"Tomorrow and tomorrow and tomorrow" should be the motto of General Whish's new coat of arms.

I do not quite like this talk of a Candaharee invasion. It would not signify at an ordinary time. At present it would tease us. Nor do I quite understand what Edwardes says as to the Dost's sons being in Bunno. Are any of them there and with any force?

They seem to be in better feathers in camp, but this eternal delay at Mooltan is most vexing. As soon as the weather will let me, I shall go to Ferozepore.

I have not one word as to the operations against Ram

Sing from General Wheeler or anybody else. A note from John Lawrence intimates the fact of an attack, and no more.

110. *From Lord Dalhousie*

Private

Camp Mukho, January 26th, 1849.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I received yesterday evening your letter announcing the surrender of Mooltan. I had received an express during the middle of the day from Mooltan intimating the event, and I despatched the intelligence down the country, by Express also.

It is the end, I hope, of the first act; and if the scene had only dropped on 22nd Sept., 1848, instead of 22nd January, 1849, it would have been fully satisfactory. As it is, it is a great point gained and no doubt will have its full effect. The surrender saved many lives which must have been lost in an assault.

The tone and spirit of the other camp appears to be much improved. Mackeson writes cheerfully enough and even if nothing is effected before the reinforcements reach him, the C.-in-C. will rapidly dispose of the Sikh army when they arrive.

The recent proceedings of the Dost, and especially the descent on Bunnoo, and above all, if there be any truth in a Candaharee invasion, render it hardly possible that we can make any use of the Afghans, and must compel us to the necessity of turning them out neck and crop. The only difficulty—real difficulty—in this operation will be *time*.

Sir Henry Lawrence has left me today, as you wished, and proceeds to Lahore.

The country is now sufficiently dry to admit of my moving towards Ferozepore and I march tomorrow morning. There will, therefore, be no need of the Mukho Dak any longer.

I beg you urgently before you leave the Residency to send me two sets of papers—one regarding Lt. Nicholson, the other regarding the removal of the Ranee. The latter I wish much to send home by next mail.

111. *From Lord Dalhousie**Private*

Camp Mukho, January 26th, 1849.

I forgot to advert to Brigr. Eckford's and Col. Goodwyn's proposals as to building up gates and destroying bridges. I think them preposterous and mischievous, calculated to create alarm in our own people and encourage turbulence rather than provide against it, and I beg you to consent to nothing of the sort without instructions from me.

I wish to heaven that Col. Goodwyn was in the Soonderbunds and Brigadier Eckford with me.

112. *From Lord Dalhousie**Private*

Camp Something-Walla, January 27th, 1849.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I received your letter of 25th last night and restore the enclosures.

From all I have heard from Brigr. Cheape and others, I think we have great reason to be thankful that we got possession of such a place and such a garrison without bloodshed of an assault.

On the day I heard of it I sent down orders direct to Mooltan, desiring that Moolraj should be sent up with the troops when measures would be taken for bringing him to Lahore, there to be imprisoned until the pleasure of the Govt. should be made known. He deserves death fully, if we choose to inflict it.

I have heard not one word of or from General Wheeler! I learnt the events of the 10th from a Mofussilite which Col. Benson lent me.

It is possible General Wheeler has not received orders which I sent last month to report to me direct. If he *has* . .

I am heartily sorry for poor young Peel, especially after having lately scolded him.

Two regts. of Infy., entire regt. of Cavalry and artillery are to garrison Mooltan.

I will write again tomorrow.

113. *From Lord Dalhousie**Private*

Camp Ferozepore, January 28th, 1849.

My dear Sir Frederick,

There can be no doubt that the proper course for the advance of the army from Mooltan would be the right bank of the Jhelum. It is the proper movement, but in order to be safe in making it, you must have a commander who can be trusted. I am not fortunate enough to possess him; and I am on the whole, therefore, glad that the C.-in-C. has ordered the force to move by the left bank of the Chenab.

The C.-in-C. has asked me to send him Quin's Horse from Lahore, replacing them by Capt. Showers' Rajpoot Horse. This officer's force is humbug, and he has only 55 horses and I have ordered them forthwith to Lahore.

I have ordered today Liftrott's Horse from Loodianah to Lahore. They are strong, and they, with Rajpoots, will leave you nearly as strong as at present when Quin's Horse goes. Orders will be sent to the Brigadier tomorrow, and he can send either a wing or the whole corps at once, if there is no objection.

114. *From Lord Dalhousie**Private*

Camp Ferozepore, January 29, 1849.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I have received yours of 27th. Sir H. Lawrence tells me he is sick. Could he not be advised to go away?

Major Thonsly was lax in not reporting what the Raja of Nepaul proposed. I have never entertained any apprehension: at the same time when the Raja comes down with 13 regts. of Infantry and 41 pieces of Artillery on our frontiers and calls it a hunting party, it was right to guard against it being in fact something less innocent. The fears they appear to have entertained below were quite out of reason, if one may judge by private accounts.

General Whish, I hope, will now get on as fast as he can; he has been urged to do so in every possible way and he promises fairly.

115. *From Lord Dalhousie*

Private

Camp Ferozepore, January 31, 1849.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I moved on to this cantonment yesterday, and now encamped beyond the Parade Ground. I shall probably make this my Head Quarters until something conclusive shall have been done.

The Queen's 25th—500 of them—have arrived at Calcutta and will remain there till the arrival of the 96th in course of relief, when they will return to their own presidency.

A fresh regiment will reach Calcutta from England in March or April and two at Bombay.

All is quite down below. I have had no official tidings from Scinde of a Kandaharee invasion, and we shall yet deal decisively with the Singhs and Dooranies.

Whatever compromise I might have accepted from Dost Mahomed when I directed a letter to him he has been too aggressive and too mischievous to admit of anything of the sort being thought of now.

This is the last which I shall have to address to you as Resident at Lahore. Some days ago I placed upon official record my thanks to you for your services there and my sense of the difficulty and anxiety of the task you have had to perform, and I have publicly recorded my regret that on your return to Council it will not be in the position the Govt. had suggested.

I beg now to add my own thanks personally for the willing co-operation which I received from you and for the frankness and courtesy with which your communications have been carried on. We have differed but rarely, and have concurred on most of the leading measures which you have directed.

If it please God to give us a successful issue to the war in which we are engaged, I trust you will be long enough in India to see the Punjab peaceful, prosperous and *paying*.

(iv) *LETTERS OF LORD DALHOUSIE
TO BRIGADIER MOUNTAIN*116. *From Lord Dalhousie to Brigadier Mountain**Private*

Allahabad, Nov. 12, 1848.

My dear Mountain,

I have received yesterday and today your letters of 6th and 7th, both of which are very interesting to me.

I sent to the Rest. and to the C.-in-C. instructions as soon as they could be despatched, after we received intelligence of Shere Sing's move towards the North.

To sketch a plan of campaign is not my province, still less could I attempt to do so, where the forces opposed to us and the scene of action are changing from day to day. I hope you will think me right, therefore, in not attempting to instruct in detail, but in directing that operations against Mooltan should be pursued with the utmost vigour at the earliest possible moment, and that as the Sikh army had taken arms avowdly for our destruction, the British army should be employed to defeat and to crush them wherever the C.-in-C. can meet them. If I do not err the C.-in-C. will prefer this to any more minute directions.

I know very well that if the army had been augmented in April and supplies ordered for an army of 28,000 men in May, the C.-in-C. would have had 10,000 men more in the field now fully equipped and supplied. But supposing the events which were anticipated by *everybody* in July (his Excy. included) had come to pass and there had now been no enemy in the field, how should I have answered to the Court for adding 18,000 men to their army and some hundreds of thousands of pounds to their debt to meet an enemy which did not exist and extinguish a rebellion which had gone out of itself.

The C.-in-C. has got in his hands the old argument of "I told you so" and he is well inclined to use it even publicly and on record. It is a fine thing to advise without responsibility.

James Ramsay is in great embarrassment at the movements of the troops, but the advance of them to some extent at all events appeared to me to be very necessary.

The (Hon'ble) Sir F. Currie has not been able, I am sorry to say, to get up the river, and Mrs. Mountain and others must come in palanquins. . . .

I hope to be at Umballa on the 23rd and will run on if I can effect a meeting.

117. *From Lord Dalhousie to Brigadier Mountain*

Private

Umballa, Nov. 28th, 1848.

My dear Mountain,

I received last night your letter of 21st and 22nd. I would that its close had been so satisfactory as its commencement.

The affair on the 22nd is a sad one in every way in loss of valuable life, absence of all advantage and still more in the evidence it affords of the unsubdued (I don't call it gallantry, but stupid and wasteful) impetuosity of the C.-in-C.'s character as a commander. He was on the spot ridiculously exposing his own life where there was no need and ought to have prohibited such a reckless, bootless, attack instead of encouraging it.

This incident has done more to shake my reliance on his conduct of this campaign and to raise anxiety in my mind than 50,000 adverse opinions could have done.

I hope this failure will be compensated, this error redeemed, and I look with anxiety for the next few days' intelligence.

I arrived here late on 25th. As soon as the camp comes up, I shall move on towards Ferozepore, halting there or somewhere else on the river as may seem best.

One word before I close writing in haste. If the C.-in-C. (as I conceive he will, ought and must do) should offer to you the succession to the Adjutant General's commission, do not let any consideration of me lead you to decline what would be so much for your interest. Recollect you have your own age and your belongings to provide for. I need not assure you of my confidence and attachment, and of my pleasure there-

fore in your continued service with me personally; but I hope I need as little assure you of my greater pleasure in seeing your interests substantially promoted in official, tho' less close, connexion with yourself.

I am disturbed in spirit in this loss of life and display of indiscretion.

118. *From Lord Dalhousie to Brigadier Mountain*

Private

Camp Umballa, Dec. 9, 1848.

My dear Mountain,

I have been too hard driven with English mail and official correspondence to be able to write to you, and I now reply to yours of 4th and 5th.

There was no victory on the Chenab, but nevertheless there was much gained both in a military and political point of view. I doubt, the most was not made of the opportunity by the officer commanding the other side of the water and it leaves everything in the way of fighting yet to be done. But it gives us two Doabs and their resources which have been obtained at small expenditure of life—a very important consideration to us at present. The C.-in-C. has proposed to me to fire a salute. I decline. Twenty one guns must be only for a *pucka* victory.

General Gilbert's information to you was correct. When the C.-in-C. resolved to advance without full comt., without support, without reserve, and leaving our own provinces in a highly disturbed state and denuded of troops, it was time for me to interfere.

I have desired him, on 27th Novr., not to advance beyond Chenab without reference to me and leave obtained. If he can shew cause and that he can safely do it, he shall go and welcome. If he can't do so, then he must wait till his column from Mooltan is available. The wretched bungling there has spoilt everything. I have got an account to settle with Major General Auchmuty, which, if it proves to be as I think, will be a serious one for him.

I wrote to the Duke by last mail about you. I still expect to hear from you or Ld. G. (which there was not time to do

before the Express went) that there has been no double recommendation. But to avoid all risk I wrote.

I had a sprained heel, otherwise I am very well and able to ride a little, for the first time for nearly two years.

119. *From Lord Dalhousie to Brig. Mountain*

Private

Camp Dhurmote, Decr. 30, 1848.

My dear Mountain,

... ..

Yes I do agree with you in all essential respects in the views you express regarding the causes of the state of our own country and its cure. I believe all aristocracies to be necessary to the solidity and permanency of kingdoms. I believe too they have been the cause of the downfall of many. I think our own has and one great evil, but you must include in these sentences of condemnation others than the aristocracy of birth. I believe the aristocracy of Trade and Press had done more to injure the country than that of blood, while they have been the loudest in their denunciation of their superiors and professed Patron of those they have oppressed.

However there is no need to settle the exact measure of the faults of either. Both have been to blame, both may mend their ways, and if they do, I believe that by GOD's blessing, tho' all the battlements in Europe may rock, our own bit of bulwark will never tremble.

120. *From Lord Dalhousie to Brig. Mountain*

My dear Mountain,

I am looking to hear of the fall of citadel every hour.

If Sir H. Lawrence's account of it is correct, they must be fumblers if they are long about it now.

121. *From Lord Dalhousie to Brig. Mountain*

Camp Mukho, January 13, 1849.

My dear Mountain,

I have received yours of the 9th. I am glad to hear of an advance of any kind, and with such a force as is now with you and with Mooltan undoubtedly near its fall and probably down, I cannot perceive why an attack is not made.

Respecting the health of the troops my conclusion, after seeing many of the stations and hearing many opinions, is that the hot toddy has more to do with the destruction of European life than hot winds: and that if this curse of the Anglo-saxon could be removed beyond his reach or from his inclinations, the percentage of death would be very different and the natural influence of hill climates on a western constitution would shew itself more clearly. The experiment, even as it stands, has been too limited and too often interrupted to admit of our considering any conclusions trustworthy which have been founded on it alone.

122. *From Lord Dalhousie to Brig. Mountain*

Private

Camp Mukho, January 26, '49.

My dear Mountain,

I was rejoiced yesterday by the tidings of the surrender of Mooltan, as the troops were about to storm.

A capture by storm would doubtless have been a more impressive ending; but Moolraj had still more than 3,000 men, who in that case would have been desperate and we should have lost many valuable lives. I am thankful that these are saved.

The troops, I hope, are on their way to you before now, and when they come or even before, I cannot doubt that an overwhelming blow will be speedily struck.

I move to the neighbourhood of Ferozepore tomorrow.

123. *From Lord Dalhousie to Brig. Mountain*

Private

Camp Ferozepore, January 28th, '49.

My dear Mountain,

I received yesterday yours of 24th and was glad to see you write so cheerily.

The account you gave of the behaviour of men appears to me to be very satisfactory on the whole. Indeed I have been quite satisfied with all I have heard and consider that the troops behaved as well as could possibly be expected, always excepting those double d—d dragoons whom I propose to dis-

Facsimile of Lord Dalhousie's letter of January 31, 1849,
to Brigadier Mountain
(See No. 124, p. 167.)

Private Camp & Huzepoor
Jan. 31 1849

My dear Mountain
I have recd.

of letter of 28th

Which I have recd all the
letters you mention. But the
dates of arrival from Camp
are very irregular.

I am much
obliged of the promise for
Lagers

larger plan.

It must have been
hard on Mr Bowie to come
& go from you again.

The pretences of the
Ld^{rs} of their anxiety to get
back the Rance; when they
were perpetually seeking to
destroy when she was there
are preposterous. And the
more sincere they are, the
stronger are the grounds
for

for not according to them -
She has the only nearly
understanding in the Punjab.
And her veneration will furnish
the only thing w^h is wanting
to under the present movement
truly formidable, namely
an object and a head

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must we then is no
time for going back or
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Emp. mostinens

Dalhousie

Brig. Mountain
C.B.



22

and Dallmann
at the by 31.
and July 3.

grace by every means in my power unless they retrieve their character.

It appears to me hardly possible that the two armies, within 3 miles of each other, can keep their hands off one another for a month which must elapse before General W. can join you.

I only hope—and I have said so to him—that the C. in C. will find full and fitting use for his heavy guns and mortars next time.

The 98th are on the march; so are the 53rd N.I. from Lahore, and I will send Cavalry if I possibly can. Artillery he cannot want.

124. *From Lord Dalhousie to Brig. Mountain*

Private

Camp Ferozepore, Jany. 31, 1849.

My dear Mountain,

I have received your letter of 28th.

I believe I have received all the letters you mentioned, but the dates of arrival from Camp are very irregular.

I am much obliged by the promise of a larger plan.

It must have been hard on Lt. Bowie to come and go from you again.

The pretences of the Sikhs of their anxiety to get back the Ranee, whom they were perpetually seeking to destroy when she was there, are preposterous. And the more sincere they are, the stronger are the grounds for not acceding to them. She has the only manly understanding in the Punjab: and her restoration would furnish the only thing which is wanting to render the present movement truly formidable, namely, *an object and a head*.

Trust me this is no time for going back or giving back or winking an eyelid. *

* This letter has been received from a different source. It is included here to fit in the chain of correspondence.

125. *From Lord Dalhousie to Brigadier Mountain*

Camp Ferozepore, February 4, 1849.

My dear Mountain,

We heard heavy firing in your direction yesterday morning from 5 till 9½ and am anxiously expecting to hear the cause of it.

Sir F. Currie arrived here yesterday evening on his way down. He looks fat and well.

126. *From Lord Dalhousie to Brig. Mountain*

Camp Ferozepore, February 8th, 1849.

My dear Mountain,

... ..

The C. in C. is right to avoid an action till Wish comes up, if he can, and I hope he may have been able to do so.

He will be at Ramnuggur, I think, on the 13th.

The 98th will be here on 12th; 3 cos. go on to Lahore.

127. *From Lord Dalhousie to Brigadier Mountain*

Camp Ferozepore, February 13, 1849.

My dear Mountain,

I received this morning yours of 9th with sketch enclosed. My thanks for it.

I have been made more anxious today than I have yet been by receiving a letter from the C. in C. in which he appears to me to shew that he has lost all feeling of confidence in himself.

I trust to the army, to you and such as you, to make an effective job of your next action.

No British army in India ever fought a *Great* battle with less odds or with greater appliances and means of victory. Heaven send you all success and safety.

128. *From Lord Dalhousie to Brig. Mountain*

Camp Ferozepore, February 19th, 1849.

My dear Mountain,

I have received this morning yours of 17th.

The toils are surely closing round Shere Sing now; and I shall forgive his getting into the plain if he is caught there and finally disposed of as in such case he ought to be.

I should have thought they would put 53rd in your Brigade. However, of whatsoever it may consist, I am very certain, it will gallantly do its duty and well, if you lead it.

The croaking everywhere truly is disgusting. The *stuff* is in us; and as Sheridan said of himself, "it will come out."

All good luck be with you, my dear Mountain, and if anything happens, and you have the means, pray, when you write, let me know all is right with my boy Frank Fane.

129. *From Lord Dalhousie to Brig. Mountain*

Camp Ferozepore, February 23, 1849.

Bravo! my dear Mountain. I like that little grumble about *the Infantry having so little to do*; and the big guns threshing the Sikhs to their own tooth.

I condole with you, my dear fellow, on not having lost a leg or an arm or anything to gratify your taste for fire eating.

I sent your letter on to your wife by the Express.

I thanked God for what he has brought to pass, and for keeping all of you in whom I am interested under the shadow of His shield.

I am a happier man—I won't say a merrier, that's not the right word—this night than I have been this many a day, and I hope I recognize whence it comes and acknowledge it accordingly.

I trust we may feel in sight now of the sources of this stream of blood we have been tracing, and that we may shortly be able to dry them up.

130. *From Lord Dalhousie to Brig. Mountain*

Camp Ferozepore, March 2, 1849.

My dear Mountain,

I have received today your letters of 26th with the sketch, for all of which I am much obliged to you. All your letters have reached me.

The 21st was very good in its results, tho' I dare say we might have slaughtered more. However 53 guns out of 59 is a very fair chalk and I have no doubt Sir Walter and you will account for the other six.

As you go on, pray keep your eyes open as to cover for troops and give me your opinion.

The safety of this empire requires that War *must* not cease till the Sikhs and Afghans *within* the Punjab shall be subjected.

At this season there are many obstacles I know well, but they must be met, and I am certain the army will justify my confidence that it will meet them and bear them whatever they are.

Temporarily at all events military possession of the country must be held; and consequently the troops must partially at least be stationed for the summer in the districts they have won.

Reasonable cover will of course be found at Peshawar and I heartily wish I knew of your being there. Let me know what you think of this as you are now a Division General, you need not be diffident of giving an opinion.

I have hitherto no assistance from Head Quarters, altho' my views and intentions were stated long ago.

131. *From Lord Dalhousie to Brigadier Mountain*
Private

Camp Ferozepore, March 30th, 1849.

My dear Mountain,

Thanks for your congratulations on the accomplishment of the policy on which I had determined.

I have never wavered or doubted for a moment since we parted. I have had no instructions whatever. I waited for the proper time to act; and when that time came in the occupation of the remotest verge of the Kingdom by British troops, I did act.

On the night of the 26th, I received General Gilbert's despatch from Peshawur. On the 27th, I sent Elliot to Lahore—on the 28th he arrived and on the 29th he crowned the work for me. I am truly grateful for his aid and applaud highly his skill.

Last night after I had learnt that by my orders the Maharajah had been desposed, and the Punjab had been declared a British Province, I prayed God, with a *clear conscience* to prosper the work: and I laid my head on my pillow without being troubled by even the vision of a doubt as to the justice or necessity of the deed I had done.

My judgment may have erred. Time alone can show. But this I know—my motives are untainted and my conscience is at Ease. I *believe* the policy will be successful: I know that it is honest.

With this conviction I rest content till the decision of the Govt. shall come.

I have assumed a tremendous responsibility: but I neither quail under it nor repent it.

I thank GOD, that, whatever may be the issue, I shall have the tranquil mind.

In all probability I shall be gone before you reach this place. I hope to meet you at Simla much improved.

132. *From Lord Dalhousie to Col. Mountain*

Private

Camp Gooroo Ke Kote February 3, '51.

My dear Mountain,

... ..

However I hope good may come out of it.

We have marched from Jhelum past Rawalpindee since I last wrote—an awful country as you know. Lucky for us that Singh-jee did not stand, or he would have puzzled us for another season! I like the R. Pindee station—the 53rd wonderfully healthy and hardly any mortality for a year.

At present I am on my way to Kalabagh, but I shall hardly reach Dera Ismael Khan. The rain lost me two whole weeks.

We are all well here. My lady rode a fifteen mile march before 9 O.C. on halting, which tells well.

133. *From Lord Dalhousie to Col. Mountain*

Private

Govt. House [Calcutta], March 11, 1852.

My dear Mountain,

Gholab's original territories always came to the plains, so that we could not have avoided the circumstances of neighbourhood altogether. But we went out of our way to make them worse. When in 1847 Gholab complained that Huzara was very bothersome to him, the Resident at Lahore actually induced the Durbar to take this bothersome bargain off his

hands and to give him for it the rich strip of plain along the foot of the hills on which you have remarked! To this bad bargain we have succeeded and we must now make the best of it.

134. *From Lord Dalhousie to Col. Mountain*

Recd. about June 30, 1853.

Answered July 12.

I should have been sure that you felt for me, my dear Mountain, even tho' you had not kindly and promptly written to say so.

God, and those on whom He places it, alone can tell how heavy it is and how hard to bear this burden. And every circumstance both to me and to her poor children that could sharpen the anguish of such a lash has been added. I try to submit, and I hope I may.

God's ways are not as our ways. It is no right of ours to enquire his reasons. If we had such right, I should be quick to admit that he had abundant cause, if it seemed to him good, to inflict this punishment and chastisement upon *me*.

But its object could not be to wean me from the cares of Empire and their engrossing urgency. He who knows my heart knows too that these have long had no charms for me; that if I have devoted myself to them it was from pure duty, and that the toil, which I have pledged my word to complete, will now be repulsive to disgust, since I have no worldly future now to look forward to as my reward and for my repose.

(v) *LETTERS OF LORD GOUGH*

135. *From Lord Gough*

Simla, May 19th, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I cannot allow my official letters to your address to leave Simla without warmly congratulating you upon the energetic and wise measures you wisely have adopted on the most stirring events, much better calculated to maintain peace in the Punjab, and to put down disaffection both in the Khalsa Army and upon the frontier than if I were to march 10,000 men

against Moolraj, doubtful, whether I should do other than shut him up in his fort—the whole country, with their heads up, like a host of blood suckers anxiously awaiting results and inwardly rejoicing at the wasting ranks of the Feringees.

The enclosed copy of a letter from the Deputy Commissary General will prove to you the total impracticability of moving even a limited Siege Train without previous arrangements, even though all the energy of our late esteemed Govr. General had been thrown into the scale.

136. *From W. J. Thompson, Deputy Commy. General, Meerut, to Lt.-Col. F. Grant, Adjutant General of the Army Head Quarters*

No. 1129, dated 15th May, 1848.

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 1 of date the 9th instant, and for clearness sake, reply thereto marginally.

In what number of days you could	50 Guns 24 Prs. Iron require	
have collected at Ferozepore, Trans-		$50 \times 26 = 1300$
port Train bullocks equal to the	1 in 6 spare, say	220
Transport on a distant service, of a		
Siege Train of 50 pieces of heavy	Bullocks	1520
ordnance?		

and Elephants 100

T. T. Bullocks may be had from Agra 250

Cawnpore 650

Hissar 650

1550

By the above arrangement the Transport Train Bullock Establishments at Jullunder, Lahore, Umballa, Lodianah, Phillour and Ferozepore will be left untouched as reserves for any duties that may be required of them, either in the respective magazines or for pushing on anything to the Army. If the Right Hon'ble the Commander-in-Chief approve of the foregoing and will be pleased to authorize my ordering them up from their stations, it will be done forthwith and the time of their reaching on the distance they will have to travel. It

is, allow me respectfully to observe, highly desirable that the cattle should arrive at their destination sometime before their services may be actually required, in order that they may be refreshed by rest after their march and well up to their work at starting on service.

I propose not moving the T.T. bullocks at Delhi as they may probably be required for pushing on ordnance stores from the magazine at that place to Ferozepore.

100 Elephants to assist the Guns I must apply to the Joint Deputy Commissary General for, as soon as authorized.

In what space of time carriage could be provided for the conveyance of 1000 rounds of ammunition per gun for the same train and for the other stores of Artillery and Engineer Park of corresponding magnitude.

A reply will be given as soon as the quantity and description of carriage may be ascertained in reply to reference to Ordnance Department.

Specify the time within which carriage, Dooly Bearers and all the other prescribed and necessary means of transport could be in readiness for the march to the Frontier and into the Punjab of H.M.'s 29th Foot and 2nd European Regiments from Subathoo.

A reply will be transmitted in a few days.

It will take no little time to gather the number of Dooly Bearers which have to be collected and sent all the way from Cawnpore, Futtygurh, Agra, Bareilly, &c., and unless the Government will authorize the entertainment, at and above Meerut, of the Field Service complement, sometime before they may be wanted—I strongly recommend such being sanctioned early—disappointment and inefficiency must inevitably be the result.

As there will no doubt be a heavy call for Transport Train Bullocks (beyond what I above estimated for Guns) from Ferozepore magazine for store and platform carts, waggon, &c., I shall be obliged by your informing me if the 600 T.T. Bullocks (or any part of them) at Loodianah and 800 at Phillour may be considered available to be sent to Ferozepore.

Many thousands of Rewari camels will be required for conveying baggage of Europeans (as authorized in G.O.), victualling hospital, magazine and park stores, godowns of supplies for natives and gram for public cattle, which will, in collecting, take about 3 months, and I beg to urge the necessity of authority for their entertainment being given in good time, or all will go wrong. I am now collecting information from each Divisional Force as to the number it will require and when received shall be communicated to you.

Godown supplies such as Atta, Dall, etc., etc., there is none in stores—it is unusual to keep any in time of peace—and to secure sufficient for one month's consumption for each force as now stationed, will require at least two months from the time each officer may receive orders to purchase; the necessity for early authority is therefore evident.

I will shortly do myself the honour to address you on further points.

137. *From Lord Gough to Lord Dalhousie*

Head Quarters, June 9th, 1848.

My dear Lord,

I beg to acknowledge the receipt (yesterday) of your Lordship's letter of the 30th ultimo.

When I addressed you on the 12th May, it must be borne in mind that I did so under the impression, founded upon all Sir F. Currie's previous letters that we should only have to invest and to hold Moultan, *irrespective* of any support from Seik army but that the *whole Seik army* were disloyal and not to be trusted and would probably be arrayed against us in the field, a climax which may still happen, notwithstanding the present hell and for which I do think it imperative upon us to be prepared. With these strong statements before me, I did feel it my duty as Commander in Chief, (when called upon by the Chief Commissioner in his letter of the 4th May, copy of which I enclosed for your Lordship on the 12th to make arrangements for "the movement of a large British force" upon Moultan at the earliest moment) to submit my views upon the subject and to state that it would be desirable in order to guard against the "intrigues" and possibly "the

open defection of our at present doubtful allies" that that force should consist of 24000 of all arms.

I never contemplated that the whole of this army was necessary for the reduction of Moultan or should move on it, but I did, and do think, that a strong force should in the first instance assemble at Ferozepore ready to move into the Punjab and that a detached movement may very probably be not only very desirable but absolutely necessary.

The little progress Moolraj has made, the known disaffection amongst his troops and the probable effects arising from the prompt and judicious measures taken by Sir Frederick Currie have very much changed the posture of affairs and may make less powerful measures ample, but this is all conjectural—circumstance, on the other hand, may arise and may throw us back upon a line of operation, to be prepared for which is in my mind the most prudent, and if not acted upon by crossing the Sutlej by the whole force, will not be very expensive. The carriage of the greater part of the Europeans is now sanctioned by the Government, and out of thirteen Regiments of the Line proposed to compose the force, exclusive of the two Gorkha corps, nine will be required for the annual relief of the native corps now at Lahore, for I would strongly recommend that that arm should be relieved, not that I doubt the loyalty of these corps, feeling persuaded, that though it is on record that 20 to 22 sepoys did attend the meeting of the conspirators, yet their only object in doing so was to obtain money, and altho' this should be met by the most surville punishment which the law admits as an example to others, still it does not in the least shake my confidence in the native army.

With regard to the Siege Train I proposed, I regret to find that your Lordship and the Council consider it more than can be required. I was, as I announced to you, much guided by a *practical* Engineer Officer, Brevet Major Napier.

The accuracy and judgment of the calculation may be tested by a reference to experience. The analogy is perhaps strongest with Bhurtpore. That city had no more than an exposed mud parapet and a dry ditch yet, when taken in 1826, it sustained an attack of nearly a month by an army of nearly 25,000 men, aided by Siege Train of one hundred and twelve

pieces of Artillery of the largest calibre and fifty Field Guns. It was unsupported by an army or ally in the Field: had been severely shelled and was laid open by five breaches with the counterscrap blown in, yet it was necessary to storm it, though every operation of the Siege had been successful, it cost one thousand men, six hundred of whom fell in the assault.

This same place, when attacked by Lord Lake with an *insufficient Siege Train*, repulsed *four assaults*, lost the army four thousand men chiefly Europeans, and finally held out to the great detriment of our interest and military reputation.

A repulse at or a delay in taking Moultan would have a much worse effect from the *known disaffection* of the Seik army and the Seik population.

At Bhurtpore mining operations on the most extensive scale were carried on. In opening the works at Multan this operation would be difficult, if not impracticable, from the proximity of the water to the surface and where there is a wet ditch. Added to this Bhurtpore was within a few miles of our principal magazine, while Moultan is 220 miles, with a river intervening, from our most advanced magazine, if Ferozepore merits that denomination.

At first I proposed forty Guns, but from the strong doubts of our power to mine, Major Napier recommended and I concurred in naming fifty from the necessity of a weight of vertical fire in aid of that for breaching, and with every respect for and deference to the judgment of my brother members of the Council, I feel compelled to adhere to my former opinion; but whatever may be the decisions, whether adverse to or agreeing with me, I shall not, I trust, be found wanting in carrying out the views of Government, as may rest with me, in my capacity as Commander in Chief, whilst I remain in that position.

With regard to the increase to the native army, I certainly suggested the consideration of the subject as a permanent measure, which my knowledge of the weight of duty imposed upon the native army, since the reduction of the Police Battalions, would make very desirable.

A reference to my letter of the 13th July 1847, a copy of which I beg to enclose, will show that altho' I felt compelled by the showy statement laid before me as to our finan-

cial difficulties to acquiesce on the mode of reduction with some modifications (those regarding the increase to the three Regiments of Dragoons and the two European Regiments I should be very glad to see carried out at some future period), still I did so with much regret.

Extraordinary as it may appear, I rejoice at the decision your Lordship has arrived at; indeed so strongly did the objection press upon me from the warm approval manifested by all classes of the policy of the late Govr. General that I had almost made up my mind to address your Lordship withdrawing my proposal, not that I am less anxious to see the measure carried out, which I feel must eventually be the case, because I am quite sure it would be the reverse of palatable just now to the home authorities. But affairs have taken a very unexpected turn and I am well convinced that Lord Hardinge never would have made the reduction, could he have anticipated that the army of the Power we engaged to uphold were ready to a man to turn against the present Government.

With regard to the move of the European Regiment at Agra, I never heard that it was deemed necessary in times of emergency to keep one both there and at Cawnpore. This, however, can be done.

Judging from the Reports of the General officers, the two Seik Corps under my orders appear to be going on well, but at the regular period of relief I should consider it expedient to recommend their being removed to stations where an European Corps is quartered; this can give no appearance of distrust.

138. *From Lord Gough, C.-in-C., to Lord Dalhousie*

Head Quarters, Simla, 15th August, 1848.

My dear Lord,

Sir Frederick Currie concurring with me in opinion that it was very desirable that Lahore should be strengthened after the move of the right column on Moultan, I have taken upon myself to order the wing of the 14th Light Dragoons with the Head Quarters from Ferozepore to proceed and join the other wing stationed at Lahore, and I requested Major General Sir Walter Gilbert in consultation with the Superintending Surgeon of the Sirhind division to select between the 29th Foot

at Kussowly and the 98th at Umballa, the crops least likely to suffer at this season of the year to move to Ferozepore, and in my mind they have most judiciously selected the former regiment, more particularly as it is the corps I proposed for the relief of the 10th at Lahore, which will have had its full tour of duty of two years next cold season.

I feel persuaded your Lordship will approve of this move and of my having placed our Frontier station in such a position as will ensure immunity from any sudden outbreak.

The columns are favourably progressing towards Moul-tan, the 32nd embarked and sailed from Ferozepore on the 10th, and we may calculate its reaching the *Ghat* opposite Bhawalpore by the 18th, the same time the Sappers took going down the river. The land columns are expected to reach Hurree Singh's Well by the same date. They are moving down in rather a disjointed manner but I conclude it could not be avoided.

Bearing in mind your Lordship's observations with regard to the financial difficulties of the country, I hardly feel justified in proposing any measure likely to occasion expense, but I cannot avoid feeling that should any unforeseen delay occur in the fall of Moul-tan, and I am not quite as sanguine as to the time it will take in its reduction as my friends at Lahore, I feel we are not prepared to support the troops in the Punjab as effectually as military precaution would make it advisable.

If Sir Fred. Currie's views with regard to the general defection of Seik troops and population are well founded, there can be little doubt that any delay in reducing the rebellious Diwan would most probably occasion a very general manifestation amongst the disaffected Seik army. I have for sometime wished to address your Lordship upon this very important subject.

I beg to call your attention to a plan which, whilst it will bring together a respectable and efficient force at Ferozepore, can be effected with inconsiderable expense.

I have before stated my opinion that the native troops longest at Lahore ought to be relieved this cold season, the 10th Foot, the Horse and Foot artillery have been there their full period of two years, the relief for those will comprise the

greater portion of the troops I propose should be assembled. The additional troops with the exception of the Light Field battery from Delhi have their carriage already prepared, namely the 3rd Light Dragoons and the 98 from Umballa, and 2nd Europeans for Soobathoo, consequently their removing to Ferozepore and returning to their stations will be but little additional expense, whilst that of the relief itself must of necessity be incurred.

Thus you can assemble a force at Ferozepore ready to be formed into an army for support or to carry out the views of the Government consisting of ten thousand well organized men at very trifling outlay.

It must be borne in mind that about the 20th of October, the feast of Dusserah takes place, which is the great period of excitement; to be prepared for such excitement under present circumstances is in my opinion prudent and may be found imperatively necessary, should Sir Fredk. Currie's sentiments with regard to Seik disaffection prove correct.

I shall not enter more into the detail until I hear in reply from your Lordship further than to enclose the proposed arrangement with regard to the movement of corps, should my views coincide with those of your Lordship.

Lieut.-Col. Gordon's Jemadar Hurkarn has just returned from Moultan. I enclose his statement and sketch, rather a curious document; it does not throw much light on the subject but mainly agrees with our best information.

Simla, 10th August, '48.

Memorandum

To form a Reserve Force at Ferozepore the following corps may be assembled there, most of them destined to move in the course of the proposed relief of the Lahore garrison.

3 Troops, Horse Artillery

1st Troop 2nd Brigade Horse Arty. from Meerut to be ultimately stationed at Umballa.

The 1st Troop 3rd Brigade from Umballa ultimately to go on to Lahore, and the 2nd Troop 3rd Brigade now at Ferozepore.

2 Light Fd. Battery

No. 17 manned by Europeans from Umballa by the relief to go on to Lahore, and

No. 5 manned by natives from Delhi to return to that station.

4 Coys. of Artillery

Three Companies Europeans from Subathoo, two of which are by the relief put down to go to Lahore, one to remain at Ferozepore.

A native Co. from Cawnpore destined for Lahore.

Cavalry Brigade

3rd Light Dragoons from Umballa to return.

8th Lt. Cavy. now at Ferozepore.

13th Irregular from Mukho by the relief to go to Lahore, Mukho being occupied by a wing of the 12th from Loodianah.

3 Europeans, Infantry

H.M. 29th Foot now under orders from Kussowlee to Ferozepore.

The 98th from Umballa to return by the relief to Dugshai, and

The 2nd Europeans from Subathoo to return there.

6 Native Corps, Infy.

The 13th from Cawnpore, the 22nd from Futtyghur, the 69th from Meerut and the 56th from Loodianah all by the Relief to go on to Lahore.

The 7th from Loodianah on being relieved by the 4th from Delhi also destined for Lahore.

One Regt. from Umballa to return.

139. From Lord Gough

Simla, August 28, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I have just received yours of the 24th instant. I regret to find the Hazara business is not yet settled. It is however very satisfactory to find that the Seik soldiery at Peshawar and Bunnoo are quiet. Only let me get well into cold weather and the Government to sanction precautionary measures, and everything will go on well.

You will no doubt have heard from the Govr. General, the Secret Committee, the Board of Control and the Duke of Wellington all highly approve of the determination at first come to.

I have had very kind letters from home conveying the wish of the home Government that I should remain in this Command for the present. This mark of approval and confidence at such a time is very gratifying, however much I might wish on Lady Gough's account to return to England.

140. *From Lord Gough*

Simla, Sept. 12, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I waited in the hope of having a reply to a letter of mine to the Govr. General before I answered your private letter of the 3rd Sept. Your Official letter of the 8th enters so fully upon the painful subject of that letter in answer to which I wrote at some length yesterday, that I really have very little now to say. I shall therefore merely quote two passages from His Lordship's letter.

"To attempt to send from a distance of many hundred miles any more than the most general instructions respecting the proper measures to be adopted in circumstances which are shifting from day to day, apparently from hour to hour, is likely to do more harm than good. I rely therefore entirely on your Lordship to do what you judge right in those measures which belong to you as Commander-in-Chief, &c."

"I am certain your Lordship's mind will be as strongly suppressed as my own with the *absolute* necessity of running no risks whatever at Lahore than we must (to) make ourselves keep ourselves secure."

With these strong expressions from the head of the Government, you will not be surprised at the conclusions I have come to.

With regard to the demonstration on the part of the Julundur force, I wish to be understood that I merely recommend it *in case of any rising* in the Manjha country on the advance of Chuttur Singh towards Lahore. From all I hear,

the Jullundur force may have to watch the South west portion of that Doab.

141. *From Lord Gough*

Head Quarters, Simla, Sept. 15th, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I received this morning your confidential letter of the 12th by express.

You will perceive that I am no bad prophet as to what you are now informed as likely to take place—have long predicted it; and to guard against it all my proposals have been directed; but as the information you now give me is but surmise and report, and as I am unacquainted with the views of the Government, should there be a general rising in the Punjab, I am placed in rather an anomalous position.

I may call spirits from vasty deep, but will they respond to my call. I may say that an army should be immediately collected but where are they to come from. That which I have proposed and which has been sanctioned is infinitely too small, should we be "on the eve of another general Punjab War," and even that which I have since suggested will be too limited if we have to suppress internal risings within our own territories.

I have long felt a conviction that the army should be augmented and that our European force is by no means as strong as it ought to be.

I think Golab Sing will not at present take an open part, if a Regt. of his has gone over to Chuttur Singh, he will, I doubt not, be able to prove that it was without his orders. However we must be guarded equally against his secret and his open support of the rebels.

I have great confidence in the firmness of Major Lawrence. Much will depend upon the conduct of the Peshawar force. If the Mussalmans remain true we may be assured that no aid will be given by the Barukzye Sirdars.

I cannot concur with you that the delay in the Siege of Moultan is a misfortune. On the contrary I own it is my opinion that the undertaking of it before we were not prepared to put down at once with a strong hand any outbreak in the Punjab, is that which is to be deplored. Had the army I pro-

posed been formed I should now, or shortly after this, have had a force from 12 to 15,000 men ready to move upon Woozeerabad or to its neighbourhood (the point I always considered advisable), which would have kept all, Golab Sing, the Hazara and Peshawar in check, and effectually have protected Lahore, and suppressed insurrections in the Manjha Doab. By this observation I do not at all wish to reflect upon the movement under General Whish, on the contrary I feel it was forced upon you to prevent a greater evil, that of the dispersion or probable defeat of a force, which in my mind never have advanced upon Moultan, for which I admire the gallantry that prompted it. I cannot but regret the event.

Troops are now on their march to Ferozepore which I cannot but repeat I consider the proper base of operations, imperatively called for to check open revolt at this side the Sutlej. I shall take good care that Lahore shall not be threatened without giving it effectual support. But for a General Punjab War, I am not prepared. Such preparations must rest with the Government which is in simple truth *the immediate augmentation of the army*.

I shall move some corps by Loodianah so as to support Wheeler.

I do not know upon what data Major Napier formed his first opinion. From what all the plans I have seen, Moultan is not stronger than I calculated on, and it now has the advantage of the country not being inundated which it was reported to have always been at this season of the year.

The Moulтанees have as yet had all the firing to themselves. Wait until they feel the effect of a concentrated British force, when the rascals who have deserted will wish themselves back again.

This is a fearful season for troops to come up from Sind. Sept. and October are the most unhealthy months in the year on the Indus. The 78th were nearly annihilated going down this river, what would be the effect on Europeans coming up? A sickly force is worse than none.

I have directed that the Brigadier commanding at Ferozepore may be written to this day respecting forage for a larger Cavalry force in that neighbourhood. Possibly this arm must be formed at or near Mukho, to be prepared either to cross

and support Lahore or the Jullundur. If Golab is in earnest we shall have to look sharp everywhere.

Boats should be prepared to cross a large force at Ferozepore, even the wing of the 14th had great delay and difficulty in crossing.

Your communication will enable the Government to decide on Commissariat, ordnance and medical arrangements, without which no army can take the field with effect. Over these I have no control.

P.S.

I enclose a copy of my letter of the 9th June to Lord Dalhousie it relates so perfectly to the present position of affairs.

142. *From Lord Gough*

Simla, Sept. 16th, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I have this instant received your letter of the 14th for which I thank you. It is very important indeed that I should know the movements of Sher Sing.

I have ordered an express off to stop the 29th. As the case now stands General Whish will have ample European force, whilst the northern army, with probably more to do, will be very deficient in Europeans.

I shall when I get to Kalka, where my staff have all proceeded, give orders for the movement upon Kussoor I before mentioned.

I shall hope to hear from you upon any change taking place.

143. *From Lord Gough to Lord Dalhousie*

Head Quarters, Simla, Sept. 17th, 1848.

My dear Sir,

You will receive officially by this day's date M. General Whish's report of a check experienced by the working parties under Lt.-Col. Pattonn reinforced by a wing of the 10th Foot and 72nd N.I. on the night of the 9th. I regret much the circumstances from the confidence it will give the enemy, altho' it is that which must be calculated upon when we are working in an unknown country. I have no doubt but that the

enemy will have been driven from the house at the well post where we experienced this check, on the succeeding night, when our 4 Prs. were to open upon it. Our loss, your Lordship will perceive, has been very severe, 102 officers and men, but it will have the good effect of preventing our knocking our heads against the wall for the future, when a delay of a few hours by the means of our guns would have done the work more effectually. It will also prevent our undertaking such a rash act as that strongly pressed upon the Major General of attacking the town at once by assault before the defences were destroyed by our fire—which he most judiciously rejected. I am not disposed to blame any one for what has occurred. It is easy to say what would have been more advisable after seeing the ill effects of that which has been done, but I shall take care to point out the inexpediency of the officers rashly persevering in an attack when they find the object unattainable. Had Col. Pattonn, when he drove the enemy into a house to which there was only one door, placed his men under the cover of the surrounding wall untill he sent for heavy guns, much loss of life would have been spared us, and the enemy would have suffered much more severely. But as I before said it is easy to rectify an evil when we see it to be such.

The conduct of the troops appears to have been highly praiseworthy; the European officers speak with pride of the high spirit of the Sepoys, but, my Lord, we must keep it up and we must support the gallant fellows.

Were I sure that forage was favourable I would at once take upon myself to push a Division of Cavalry under Col. Cureton to their aid. I select him because I consider him one of the best (if not the best) cavalry officers in our service. This I have caused to be communicated to Major General Whish this day and I shall have this force prepared if I find forage favourable so as to be ready to start on receiving his reply.

At present Moolraj can get all the reinforcements willing to join him, and I never should forgive myself were I to leave one man there exposed to any risk. Therefore it is I wish to send this Cavalry Division, he being peculiarly weak in this arm.

I will not revert to what my views have hitherto been, the object now is to rectify what is amiss.

144. *From Lord Gough*
Confidential

Head Quarters Simla, Sept. 18th, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Enclosed I send for your information the copy of a letter I addressed yesterday to the Governor General. Major General Whish was written to at the same time by the Adjutant General of the army. The contents of this letter will at least give confidence to our gallant fellows before Moultan and will prove that we are mindful of them.

I shall as soon as I possibly can assemble another Cavalry Column at or near Mukoo, whilst the Infantry are moving on Ferozepore.

I have directed that Brigadier Wheeler should be written to this day upon the subject of what force would in his opinion be collected from that stationed at Jullundur, on the Beas, without injudiciously weakening his posts, in order to threaten the northern portion of the Manjha country, at the same time drawing nearer to the disturbed portion of Jullundur. Ultimately this force would be better prepared to co-operate with any that it might be found necessary to push across the Sutlej, joined by such corps as could be spared from Lahore, in the event of the Advance of Chutter Sing upon Lahore, or of any general rising in the Manjha, as it would be most injudicious to allow our prospective views to be known. I need hardly solicit you not to communicate these I have now conveyed, for your private information, and upon which I beg your opinion.

145. *From Lord Gough*

Hd. Qrs. Simla, 19th Sep., '48.

My dear Sir,

All my doubts are now verified that the force at Moultan, if not well supported by our allies there, was insufficient.

An express received this instant from Major General Whish of the 14th instant render the doubt a certainty. So strongly was I of opinion that he required support that I yes-

terday made arrangements for a Cavalry force to push across the Sutlej and move down to Mooltan, and this morning I advised the 29th to proceed by water accompanied by the 31st and 56 N.I. by road to move upon Bhawulpore, the 2nd Europeans replacing the regt. at Ferozepore and I reported to the Government that I had done so.

But the total defection of Sher Sing makes more and instant support necessary. I shall therefore move 3rd Lt. Dragoons and 98th first on Ferozepore. But I must earnestly impress upon you that we are by no means in a desirable position.

I have no control whatever over the Bombay troops. I would strongly advise you, therefore, to press upon Commissioner in Sind at once to send up the 60th Rifles and such other troops as he can afford by stream, if it can be done without rendering the Corps ineffective from the insalubrity of the Indus at this season. Men coming up by stream might obviate this as they would reach some ford below Bhawalpur before the fall of the river.

I send you a copy of a letter I despatched this morning, before I got this express, to the Governor General. We must now all do our best to meet this emergency.

Can you answer for the Durbar being prepared to provide supplies for a strong Brigade of Troops moving through the Punjab to Mooltan?

146. *From Lord Gough to Lord Dalhousie*
(Copy)

Simla, Sept. 19, 1848.

My dear Lord,

You will no doubt have heard officially from General Whish of his gallant and successful attack on the morning of the 12th which has brought him within 7 or 800 paces of the city.

The disposition of the troops appears to have been as judicious as the execution of the operation was successful. Every praise is amply due to all, and I am sure as it merits so will it meet the warm public approval of your Lordship in Council, and that the principal actors in this brilliant affair as reported by the gallant Commander of the force will have

the gratification of seeing that their conduct is fully estimated.

We must regret the loss of so many gallant officers and soldiers, but we must feel the cheering conviction that they fell nobly performing their duty; both Pattonn (who fell covered with sabre cuts at the head of his noble comrades) and Montary Ambert have left wives in this country.

A few such victories and our force would be crippled. I have this day ordered off H.M. 29th, the 31st and 56th Native Infantry with all the recovered men of the 32nd from Ferozepore. Capt. Brown, Political Agent at Ferozepore who is here sick, assures me there are sufficient covered boats at that station to take down the 29th who, I am happy to say, are peculiarly healthy, also the recovered men of the 32nd. I feel there is an absolute necessity for this measure so as to ensure success. The Cavalry Column are equally indispensable, if I can get forage, but it would be madness to send them with a chance of their becoming ineffective.

The Hazarrah affair is a matter of moonshine compared to Moulton on which all the eyes in the Punjab are fixed.

I have ordered the 2nd Europeans to move immediately on Ferozepore to replace the 29th Foot.

I hope your Lordship will entirely approve of all these moves.

147. *From Lord Gough to Lord Dalhousie*

Head Quarters Simla, Sept. 20th, 1848.

My dear Lord,

When I addressed your Lordship yesterday I little thought I should so soon have to write in such a different strain.

Your Lordship will be informed by the official letter this day addressed to the Secy. to the Government, Military Department, of the steps I have been compelled to take by the unfortunate turn of affairs at Mooltan which has of course been fully detailed by General Whish and Sir F. Currie. I am placed in a most painful position. None sees more clearly than I do the necessity for prompt and energetic measures, nor would be more anxious to put them into execution, but for my utter inability from want of troops.

I shall push forward the Infantry Brigade I detailed in my letter of yesterday with the utmost despatch on Bhawalpore. I shall push forward all the troops set forth in the Return I sent your Lordship on the 6th with awaiting the orders of Government. I shall form early in October a Cavalry Division to cross the Sutlej, taking up a position at Kussoor in order to support Lahore and with a show of readiness to march upon Mooltan. But the time is past when Cavalry would be useful there nor could they be so until we are in such strength as to invest that place again or attack any force that may be collected before it. Shut up as, I take it, General Whish now is, in the position originally occupied by Lieut. Edwardes at Sooraj Khoond, it appears to me that Cavalry would be rather a clog than an aid, whilst they may enable us to advance when we can collect a force from this side of the Sutlej. In the meantime I trust General Whish with the faithful portion of his allies, if any can merit this denomination, will be perfectly safe, having the powerful artillery he has, and supported, as he will be, by my Brigade and I hope by one, if not more, European Corps by steamers from Kurrachee with the Chenab open to him to ensure the receipt of supplies.

The public letter from the Adjutant General will point out in detail the movement and shew how inadequate the force is to carry out any extended military operations, the length of time also that must elapse before an efficient force can be collected.

I therefore beg to impress upon your Lordship the indispensable necessity of increasing the army without the delay of a day.

I have no hesitation in giving it as my decided opinion that this measure should be instantly had recourse to and am ready to take upon myself all the odium of having pressed it upon the Govt.

I have felt compelled contrary to the views of the Government to order the immediate advance of the 24th Foot from Agra, to be replaced for the present by a wing of the 1st Europeans. I beg strongly to recommend that the 18th be sent up forthwith by steamers to Allahabad to replace the 1st Europeans at Cawnpore and Agra so as to render the

latter corps available in the Upper Provinces where we should have at least one European Regiment when we cross the Sutlej.

Artillery from Dum Dum has before and can again occupy Fort William until a wing of the 25th from Madras can relieve them. If they could spare the wing intended to reinforce that at Ceylon and whose services apparently will not be necessary there, that Presidency could assuredly spare it to Calcutta. Do not, my Lord, think me an alarmist. I am a precautionist if you please, and if all is done that can be done I have no doubts whatever that however the horizon may lower now all will end in a brilliant sunshine.

P.S.

The Government have objected, in my first proposal, to my moving to the Frontier, to relieve other corps for service,

A Lt. cavalry Regt. and Troops of H.A. from Muttra,

A native Infantry Regiment from Lucknow, Dinapore and Barrackpore.

I pray your Lordship to look at the list of Corps ordered to assemble, and how lamentably few they are to form an effective army, particularly when it is considered that a great proportion of those corps are from the Upper Provinces which to leave denuded would be most imprudent.

148. *From Lord Gough*

Private & Confidential

Simla, 21st Septr., 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I have only just time, in order to save this day's *dak*, to enclose the copy of a letter I yesterday addressed to the Earl of Dalhousie. It will but show you what I have done.

I am now writing to his Lordship offering two propositions.

1st. To abandon for the present the Siege of Moultan, where we went only to support a Seik force with its allies to carry out the views of the Durbar, but when they turned against us we felt no longer called on to persevere.

2nd. To prosecute the Siege with vigour and the reinforcement I propose to carry out that measure which will

preclude us from undertaking any other operations in the Punjab until it shall be effected.

P.S.

Should the first proposition be decided, we shall then be able effectually to carry out the views of the Government with regard to the Punjab.

If the second probably we cannot this year.

149. *From Lord Gough*

Simla, Septr. 25th, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Many thanks for your private letter of the 21st which I received last night, communicating the satisfactory intelligence of the occupation of Govind Garh by our troops. The measure was well planned and executed and I have no doubt but that it will have a good effect. I have directed thirty men of the company of Reserve artillery from Loodianah (the nearest I have) with an officer to proceed forthwith and join Brigadier Wheeler, who is directed to make arrangements, when he can with safety, to forward them to Govindghur. I take it thirty men could not under present circumstances be sent with safety through the Punjab. These men will be replaced by a native company the moment we can get one. I am obliged to bring them from Cawnpore. It would be well for an artillery officer from Lahore to be stationed at Govindghur to act with the men drilled to the Gun exercise of the native Regt. now at that Fort until he can be replaced by the before named detachment.

The troops I have ordered on my own responsibility are all on the move to the frontier.

As General Whish is in his new position, I do not conceive that any fears need be entertained on his account. I am anxious to hear of the departure of the Brigade and Lt.-Col Eckford from Ferozepore. I hope the troops from Sinde will reach the scene of action nearly as soon as they do.

I have written this day directing that a Camel Dak should be laid to Bhawalpore as the post through the Punjab will, I have no doubt, be intercepted.

150. *From Lord Gough**Private*

Simla, 11th Oct., 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick

I have waited now three days but in vain for an answer to my letter of the 2nd Sep. to the Govr. General. I really am much puzzled as, I take it, neither you nor I possess authority to act so as to plunge us in a Punjab War without the sanction of the Government of India. All my arrangements so completely depend on His Lordship's answer to this letter that I am perfectly at a stand-still.

You will perceive I delayed the march of Eckford's Brigade until after the effects of the Dusserah were known. As to Whish, if he is not able to take care of himself with the force he has, aided by such a powerful artillery, we had better cut our sticks and leave India at once. Neither your force nor his shall want aid, should aid be required, I mean aid to ensure perfect success, but not for extended operations, which cannot be afforded until all is prepared to strike an effectant blow. I am a great enemy to little wars. We cannot afford the slightest check; a reverse, even upon a small scale, might set in a blaze. I only await the G. G.'s answer to start.

151. *From Lord Gough*

Simla, Oct. 16th, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I have just received your confidential letter of the 13th by express.

My official letter, I think (as all my baggage and papers have gone on to Kalka), of the 14th, conveys my views upon the present state of the Punjab.

I last night received letters up to the 8th from the Governor General. His Lordship throws the responsibility to the movements upon me, both as to the operations against Mooltan and to such other operations as may hereafter be found expedient, making them, if practicable, simultaneous, and I have no doubt of being able to carry out to a successful result all the wishes of the Government.

I wish, sincerely wish, that Chutter Sing may move on Lahore, but he will not dare such an undertaking, unless for

greater combinations than I am aware of, or think at all likely, exist. I have no doubt whatever that the whole Seik population are indisposed towards us, but I have great doubts of their being prepared to join Chutter Sing, unless some unhappy contra-temps occur, which would, let it be even so trifling, set the whole Punjab in a blaze. These isolated acts of his affection lead to nothing and will only end in the signal discomfiture of the perpetrators.

If Chutter Sing even crosses the Jhelum, his game will be up, except that he throws himself into some strong walled town, I believe there are no fortresses of any strength.

All my fears are for our officers on the frontier; if I were assured of their safety I should be perfectly at ease.

All my things are off. I start tomorrow. When once at Ferozepore and within a night's dak of you, I shall be better able to act, and when I do it, shall be in such force as to make opposition useless.

I wished to go to Moultan and proposed it. The Governor General thinks I can be of more use nearer home (Lahore) but leaves the decision to me. There is full time to decide, as I find the Bombay troops will not be at Moultan until about the 26th Novr., long ere which things will have developed themselves so as to enable me to act. In the meantime I have no fear whatever for General Whish.

152. *From Lord Gough*

Kussowlee, 19th Oct. '48.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I received yesterday evening on the march here your letter of the 16th with an enclosure from Major Mackeson. Just as I was leaving Simla your two letters of the 15th reached me. I had already by express countermanded the movements of the 29th Foot, which corps I regret to say has one third of its men in hospital; but as I understand Genl. Whish has counter-ordered the Siege Train from Suckur. I directed that the two native Regts. with the three companys of Artillery should proceed. However having during the day received a letter from Sir Willoughby Cotton sending me officially a return of the force coming up of 8,200 men of all arms, including a Siege Train with one Troops Horse Artillery, two

Light Field Batteries and two Reserve companies of artillery, I sent off an express at once to stop all movements both as to men and material from Ferozepore, acquainting General Whish at the same time that I had done so. We shall want all we can muster for other operations, the point to which a very few days will indicate. I shall, by the time I reach Ferozepore, have a sufficient force to move even to the Jhelum as far as I can see at present, but without a Reserve, this would not be prudent, as we should have to halt them, which would have a bad effect, for a defensive force, and therefore it is I am making every exertion to be prepared to *attack* any force that may threaten Lahore. I entertain however none of the apprehensions expressed by Major Mackeson. Nothing can collect at this side Lahore that I could not walk over. My present plan is to push a Brigade of Infantry and a Division of Cavalry across the Sutlej. Mackeson is wrong; I shall have a support for them ready to move across within a short period.

I propose moving two, if not three, Regts. to join Wheeler, ready to co-operate when I make a forward movement beyond Lahore, and in the meantime to keep the Hill portion of the Jullundur in good order, strengthening both Kangra and Noorpore.

I have had the kindest letters from the G.G. leaving it optional with me, to go against Mooltan or to remain for other and more important operations. Recent events make it more than probable that I shall adopt the latter, although I could have wished much to thrash Moolraj, possibly transferring the compliment to Chutter Sing and his son will be more efficacious. My letters from His Lordship in most parts are merely transcripts of the one you kindly sent, and which I now beg to return with thanks. His Lordship has fallen rather into an error in saying I sent him two alternatives. I did send him two plans of operation—one was to postpone operations against Mooltan, and put forth all our energies at once to subjugate the whole of the rest of the Punjab, and then smash Moolraj with this addenda.

"This most decidedly would be the more likely plan to command success, but it may be said whilst it will assuredly give confidence to the Seiks generally, it may also create feel-

ings at our side the water adverse to our supremacy, and this is a subject of such vital importance to the stability of our rule in India, that I cannot feel justified in recommending it."

My second plan was to make the Mooltan force so effective as to insure a speedy termination to that operation,—in the meantime to collect a sufficient force, effectually to support Lahore and protect our own frontier.

His Lordship it appears wishes to do both, and from the force the Government has placed, or rather is about to place, at my disposal, I have no doubt of being able to carry out His Lordship's wishes—His Lordship's blood appears to be up, mine flowed as rapidly some fifty years back, but the leaving effect of that number of winters, a great portion of which has now passed in wars and tumults, have taught me to look before I leap. But as I before said the Government have now come much liberally and nobly forward and with the blessing of God, their wishes shall be carried out "promptly, fully and finally."

153. *From Sir Frederick Currie to Lord Gough*
Private

Lahore, Oct. 16, 1848.

My dear Lord,

I have this morning your Lordship's private note of the 11th. I have the same complaint to make of the Government and Lord Dalhousie as your Lordship.

I have no letter either public or private, in reply to my despatches or private letters, written since the middle of the last month, with the exception of one of which I sent your Lordship an extract in my letter of the 13th instant. The understanding with me, when I came away, was that as long as I heard nothing to the contrary, I was to consider that Lord Dalhousie approved of what I was doing. They may say, perhaps, that my powers are plenary and that they have nothing particular to give me advice about. But, at the present moment it is most important that I should know the mind and intentions of the Government of India in reference to the late occurrences. I have endeavoured, since your Lordship told me the nature of communication you had made to the Governor General, to do nothing in respect of troops or otherwise to

interfere with your Lordship's measures for carrying out whatever might be determined on. I sent to Lord Dalhousie a copy of my reply to your Lordship. But the fact is that circumstances change so constantly and so rapidly that as long as the Govr. General is at Calcutta, or at a distance from the frontier, we on the spot must do without awaiting for instructions, and even, perhaps, in opposition to instructions.

I am very glad if your Lordship is coming to the neighbourhood. Simla is too far off for your Lordship to be able to control the operations, which must to a certain extent be undertaken forthwith.

I send for your Lordship's perusal the copy of a letter I have just received from Major Mackeson, urging me to do that with regard to Coll. Eckford's Brigade which, as I told your Lordship in my second note of yesterday, I have begged Brigadier Campbell to do. The turn which affairs have taken at Mooltan, and the transfer of the scene of all operations (except the mere siege of the fortress) to the neighbourhood, which will apparently be their result, will doubtless cause your Lordship to make a corresponding change in any arrangements which might have been in your contemplation. General Whish can now certainly hold his own with the utmost ease, till the Scinde arrangements enable him to resume the Siege, if Moolraj does not in the meantime get quite disheartened and evacuate his fort. And I have no hesitation in pronouncing that it is now impossible for operations in these quarters to be postponed till after Mooltan is captured.

It may be sometime before we are strong enough to move forward but we can. . . . I have mentioned this in several of my letters. He started on the morning of the 9th with all that remained of the troops he had taken over with him. He marched towards Sirdarpore. It is believed that he will go via Rewaj to join either Chutter Singh or Autar Singh. Moolraj would never persuade Sher Singh to attack the British force, of which he stands in very proper dread, and there was little but of mutual recrimination at most of their late interviews. Still the actual departure of the Raja with his force is said to have disheartened Moolraj and his remaining troops considerably. There is no longer any probability of any Sirdar joining him or any of the regular army; and his troops

are mere indisciplined levies, strong behind walls and entrenchments, but nothing in the open plain before a disciplined force.

I have of course kept the Commander-in-Chief informed of these facts. It is of the greatest importance that British troops should move up to Lahore quickly.

I hope to hear from your Lordship in a day or two at latest in reply to my letters of the latter end of last month.

154. *From Lord Gough*

Head Qrs. Camp, Oct. 21st, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I have only now received your official as well as your private letters of the 17th. Yours of the 18th I have received yesterday by express, and hope the answer will be satisfactory, therefore it is necessary for me to recapitulate what I therein expressed.

I must say that a mere movement of a Brigade, of two or three miles, cannot of a possibility effect that which you contemplate altho' it crosses a river—whilst it may draw attention to the point where the Brigade may be located, and their numbers, too few for any extended operation and too large for a move covering boats to protect the Brigade across the Bias, would greatly tend such consummation, whilst the Seiks may well believe you have not troops at Lahore to aid in any attack at a distance from the capital.

The strengthening of Wheeler's force so as to make any flank movements and the pushing across the Sutlej the Infantry and Cavalry I have mentioned will be felt as attack on Mooltan, whilst the insulated movements or a weak demonstration will not only not be felt but may appear to demonstrate our inability to do more. These are my deliberate opinions. But you say if I do not give you a Brigade to cross the river (but not to make a forward movement), you contemplate that the resources of the country between that river and Chenab will be cut off. I am prepared to give you that Brigade upon your own responsibility—altho' in opposition to my own views. But if I do I cannot support Wheeler, in my mind infinitely a more important movement in every sense of the word. But I ask you, if the rebel force attempt to take up a

position between the two rivers, will you be prepared from Lahore not only to support but to aid in overcoming such rebel force, leaving Lahore unsupported. I say unsupported as I cannot be a party to a little war. Make your own choice but let it be such as not to force even a piquet to fall back, which must not be. We have quite enough of movements without effect already.

Were I to give orders this moment for Cureton to move either on Pindee Bhuttian, Ramnugger or Wuzerabad, Sheir Sing from Jaryo would be several marches ahead. Cureton could not cross the Chenab and we should be laughed at on coming to a halt at this side with jaded men and worn out horses, if the laugh were not turned into a cry—under kind of flights of pony way do well for the Delhie, but would not go down with the Duke.

What was Edwardes about with his Cavalry? Indeed I never could find what his force was composed of, to let Sheir Sing walk off so leisurely.

155. *From Lord Gough*

Hd. Qrs. Camp Kalka, 22nd Oct. '48.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I have just received your letter of the 19th giving cover to the translation of Sheir Sing's letter to the Bunnoo troops.

Most sincerely I wish that both he and his father with all their troops may march on Lahore; this would save us an infinity of trouble.

I beg to return the several enclosures, as you may require them. I move on Loodiana, on which place I have this day ordered the march of the Sirmour Battn. I am very anxious to strengthen the hill posts in the Jullundur. I do not know what to think of our Jummoo friend. From all the private information I have, it is at least doubtful.

I am anxious to hear further of Wheeler's movements. I own I took with some nervousness to these detached movements without possibility of support, always to be avoided if practicable.

156. *From John Nicholson to Sir Frederick Currie*

My dear Sir,

Ramnugger, 21st Oct., 1848.

Shere Sing's advanced guard was at Pindee Bhuttian yesterday within chupooing distance.

The Durbar people have evidently misinformed you of the state of affairs in the Chaj Doab. The forts are all "yagi," and the people up. I have had flat *jawabs* from the garrisons of both of Koulonwala and Phaleea. Urjun Sing is at Goojrat with a daily increasing force. Aotar Sing is crossing from Jalalpore. The non-advance of our troops has disheartened all our well-wishers (and they were few enough) and inspired our many secret enemies.

Though Shere Sing is not very near me, yet the route by which he is advancing is favourable to any attempt he might make to intercept the retreat, he knows I must make. Taking all this into consideration, as also the very doubtful disposition of my Sikh allies, I think I am justified in falling back on Goojranwala, which I propose doing tonight.

I should also mention that the non-arrival of any reinforcements has increased the despondency which has for sometime prevailed in my levies, and I have no longer the little confidence I formerly had in them. I do not expect to be able to remain long at Goojranwala unless supported. To tell you the truth, I am not myself what I was a couple of months ago. "Hope deferred has not been entirely without its effect on me."

It strikes me that the C.-in-C. has now the option of advancing troops, or seeing the whole country up to the Ravee in insurrection. Had a brigade or two been started ten days or a week ago, we might by this time had established a depot for supplies here.

There are two fords between this and Wuzeerabad.

157. *From Lord Gough*

Hd. Qrs. Camp Khurr, 24th Oct. '48.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Do not think me too testy in replying to Lt. Nicholson's strictures, but it is too much for human patience when the mad folly of one of these Clives or Alexanders or Wellingtons or any other resurrections they may put on, has already without our being prepared, drawn almost all our readily available means to the southward, another more hot headed still urges the advance of a brigade unsupported to the north,

indifferent about denuding the frontier or leaving Lahore itself unsupported.

Read Col. Young's reply to your requisition and you will perceive the impossibility of acting otherwise than according to the course this Lieutenant presumes to censure.

Had I anticipated Sheir Sing's movement on the left bank of the river, which, I own, I still doubt, I would readily have pushed on Cureton. Now it is too late.

158. *From Lord Gough*

My dear Sir Frederick,

Two days back I wrote to Cureton when I heard of Sheir Sing's movement up the left bank of the Chinab, to move forward with the Cavy. if he thought there was any chance of his intercepting him. I own to you I do not think there will be the least, but I am glad to find by the letters recd. this day that the Brigadier Genl. has actually moved in anticipation of my approval. This is as it should be. I know he will risk nothing while I equally know that he will leave nothing undone. He has my fullest confidence and as a Cavalry officer he has not his equal.

I have this day by express ordered Eckford with the 31st, 56, and No. 17 Lt. Fd. By. and a corps of native artillery. I would strongly advise that heavy guns be placed so as to command the river.

I have proposed by express to G.G. that if Sheir Sing or any other Sing takes up a position at this side of the Chinab, that I might at once disperse and punish him.

I hope to be at Ferozepore by dak on Tuesday or Wednesday.

159. *From Lord Gough*

Head Qrs. Camp Sidham, 31st Oct. '48.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I yesterday received your letter of the 27th. Mine of the 23rd will, I think, have convinced you that you did not place the proper construction on the passage you have quoted from my letter of the 20th.

The Governor General has stated to me that he holds me responsible as Commander in Chief for all the Military ar-

rangements, and that the idea of absolving myself from that responsibility never for a moment entered my mind. I simply meant you to understand that, situated as I *then was*, I could not reinforce both Lahore and Wheeler, and that if I met your wishes, which I was anxious to do, I must abandon what I conceived was a more important object. But the opportune arrival of Sir Willoughby Cotton's letter announcing the march of the Bombay Column has enabled me to accomplish both purposes.

It is my intention to entrust Brigadier General Cureton, until a senior officer joins, with the command of the whole of the troops, of every arm, of the army of the Punjab that have moved across the Sutlej.

The garrison of Lahore has not yet been incorporated with this army, but I should be glad to know from you what portion of the garrison you think could be spared without risk to join in a forward movement.

I would, I own, be glad to take on Brigadier Campbell. He has had very trying work in his present position, and it would be only fair to afford him an opportunity of sharing in the expected service. If you can spare him and a portion of the garrison to me (on which I calculate from your letters approving of the proposed arrangements for the occupation of the place), I will take care to leave you a tried experienced officer.

You cannot be more anxious to move forward than I am, but, I own, I have great hopes that Sheir Sing, in order to give an imposing effect, may remain on this side the Jhellum, and perhaps be joined by his father. They may for a time devastate that Doab, but anything is preferable to their turning their whole attention to Peshawar. If we can save Lawrence and his force, the subjugation of the rest of the Seiks will be easily effected.

Wheeler, having accomplished his object, will, I conclude, take up a position on the Beas and I shall reinforce him. But will John Lawrence be pleased with the Jullunder being left with so small a force and without any support in his rear? The troops coming up from lower stations cannot reach the frontier until late in Decr.

At this moment I have but one Regt. Native Infy. and the sickly Regt. part at Ferozepore. My presence there is therefore of little moment, and as I have all my overland letters to write and to despatch today and tomorrow, I have relinquished my intention of proceeding by dak, except something unforeseen occurs, and I shall continue my progress but without a halt.

I am anxiously expecting letters from the Governor General. Up to this time he has never distinctly stated to me that we are at war with the Punjab.

160. *From Lord Gough*

Hd. Qrs. Ferozepore, Nov. 6th, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Last night I received your letter of the 5th by express. I have previous to its receipt sent orders to Bdr. Campbell to move forward in support with a strong Brigade of Infantry from Lahore (in communication with you leaving Bdr. Eckford in command at Lahore) and Bdr. Wheeler to push across the River to Emenabad, communicating with Brigadier Genl. Campbell, who would thereby be placed in command of a division.

The day after tomorrow, 8th Nov., the Cavy. Brigade and three Troops H.A. will move in 3 marches upon Lahore and immediately pass the Ravee, I hope on the 11th, at furthest the 12th. The same day, 8th, Sir Jos. Thackwell will move forward upon Lahore with the 24th Foot and 25th N.I. and a Lt. Fd. Batty.

On the 9th, Hd. Qrs. 29th Foot, the 13th, 30th and 45th N.I. will follow, and on the 15th, a Brigade of Infy. and 7th(?) Cavalry with 10 heavy guns together with the Pontoon Train and Field Horse will move. Let Sheir Sing then cross the Chinab if he dare.

I own I was in hope to have drawn him away from Peshawar, but every thing is for the best.

161. *From Lord Gough*

Hd. Qrs. Camp Kussoor, 10th Nov., 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Here we are progressing slowly but surely. My tail is

fearfully long including the advanced By. of Heavy Guns and the pontoon train.

The Cavy. and Horse Arty., I hope, will have reached Lahore this day and that they will cross the Ravee tomorrow so as effectually to support the advance.

I shall make no halt until I see you. I have strongly recommended Capt. Bythe to increase his force here to 200 men and I shall leave him a Rasallah of Ferozepore Cavalry having two more at the Brigade when Penny moves forward on the 15th.

My news from Mooltan is not very satisfactory. However, I hope by tomorrow I shall have something worthy of relating.

The G. G. and myself are at issue about the supercession of Whish. I have strongly opposed it. For altho' I do not entirely approve of all that has been done, I do not still feel that I should be justified in dishonouring a decidedly brave officer. I enclose a letter for Cureton which I pray you to send off express.

P.S. 2 O'clock.

1. Hurrah! Whish has been most completely successful, and with a most trifling loss taken all the Guns opposed to him but one.

Edwardes was hard pressed but beat back the enemy—one of the remaining Seik Regts. deserted to Moolraj. So we have given him fresh fuel, but which we shall soon exhaust.

2. Lt. Nicholson, I take it, keeps you informed of what is going on in the front. I am surprized I have heard nothing of Wheeler.

162. *From Lord Gough*

Confidential

Hd. Qrs. Camp Lullianee, 11th Nov., 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I this morning received your two letters of the 9th and 10th, those taken by Mr. Cocks.

I quite join you that under present circumstances we must keep ourselves as far as possible from the members of the Durbar, otherwise we may compromise the Government. I am very glad therefore you put a stop to . . . of ceremony.

When I return after punishing the rebels to their own sovereign and the opposers of the British arms, it will be time enough to think of ceremony.

I am very awkwardly placed. I have pushed on thus far and shall not stop whilst there is a rebel at this side the Chenab upon my own responsibility without having an idea of the policy proposed by the Government.

I feel it for the public good and my shoulders are tolerably broad, even should not my movements meet the approbation of the Government of India.

I am glad to find you are disposed to give a salute, having done so before I consider it most advisable.

With me it is a different thing. I steal through the country with as little noise as possible.

Lt.-Col. White cannot remain in command. I should wish and always proposed Eckford in whom I have the greatest confidence, but I would not for worlds hurt the old soldier's feelings. If that should be the case, we must send a wing of the 50th with Hd. Qrs. (to) take charge of Kussoor and the Bridge.

Orders have been sent to the Cavy. and Horse Arty. to move forward via Bamniwala and Corie to join the advance.

P.S.

What is the road via Pinde Dass ke Kote, Bara Mulheean, Noushera and Thahal.

163. *From Lord Gough*

Head Qrs., Camp Khana Kutcha, 12th Nov., 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I have just received yours of this morning. Please God I shall be at Lahore by 7 o'clock tomorrow.

I have directed the Hd. Qrs. camp to be pitched upon the parade grounds at Anarkullee so as to be near you for the *very short* time I shall remain.

I should not wish to be near the Citadel which I shall only visit privately in coloured clothes unattended to see the present defences.

I have directed Lt.-Col. White only to have two Flank Compys. to receive me. I should wish to steal in and steal out if I could.

Much will depend upon what I hear tomorrow as to my future plans.

I enclose you a letter unsealed (a duplicate original) for Campbell, which, when you have read, pray send on *except* that you have an acknowledgement to the original sent through you yesterday. It is of great consequence he should be in possession of my views.

I know no regulation for not giving a salute on a Sunday. I believe it is usual for the park and Guns to join at once when a victory is announced.

The two brigades with the guns, commissariat, etc., will be, I take it, at Mian Meer, but as near the cantonment as can be effected with regard to the ample supply of water.

164. *From Lord Gough*

Hd. Qrs. Camp Burra Mulheean, 18th Nov., 1848.

My dear Currie,

By an express received during the night from Campbell, it would appear that Sheir Sing has actually passed the river with his guns and that the Bunnoo troops also to follow this day. I can hardly believe such a piece of good luck. But Nicholson's spies declare it is a fact. So much so that Campbell has ordered Wheeler to join him forthwith with his Infy. and Arty. and he has pushed on to Sacharian.

We are progressing very comfortably, but should this news be true, but I fear it is too good to have that character, I shall push on myself to the front.

P.S. 3 o'clock

Alas, Alas.

Instead of Sheir Sing being on this side, the moment he heard of Campbell's advance, he withdrew all.

165. *From Lord Gough*

Thahal, 20th Nov., 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I last night received your letter. Are you aware why Campbell did not attack the force at this side the day I ordered him to do? The Camp was struck and our troops pressed to march when Nicholson got information that Sheir Sing and his guns were actually across and that Bunnoo troops were to

follow that day. Do you think, under these circumstances, when support was within a few marches of him, he would have been justified in attacking? If he had, every military man would cry out *shame* and say you have sacrificed your country's good with an expectation to gain personal credit.

Had Campbell known facts, he would have attacked and it would have been most desirable.

I expect him in every minute. I have not gone on to meet him as I have arrangements to make about putting down Uttur Sing. To do it would be very desirable that the two Corps of Infy., the 3rd and 9th, should move forward with Brigadier Penny with the least of men and stores with him. Quin, by letters received this day, will be at Ferozepore on the 24th and he shall be advised immediately to move in 3 or 4 marches to reinforce you, by sending the two Regts. of In. One shall march off from Burra Mulheean to attack Jubbor, the rebels' present fort with 4 heavy guns and four companys of Infy., the Cavalry surrounding the place until the guns come up to blow it to pins. I understand it is a pukka built house and possibly nine pounders would not have much effect upon it. Had I known he was there when I passed by, I should have saved Penny the trouble. Pray give Penny the enclosed plan which shows the nature and position. The rascal was within a very short distance of my camp last night.

166. *From Lord Gough*

Ramnugger, 26th Novr.

My dear Currie,

I received your official letter last night enclosing one from John Lawrence. It has turned out as I expected. Whenever you remove troops, the disaffected will show themselves, but I am preparing a rod which with God's blessing will act as a great sedative.

I expect Sir Dudley St. Leger Hill will have reached one of the frontier stations, either Umballa, Loodianah or Ferozepore. He is entrusted with the command of all the troops in the rear. Should any serious outbreak take place in the Julundur, Wheeler should return to it and Sir D. S. Hill applied to.

The 34 N.I. will be at Loodianah by the 14th or 15th Decr.,

which he can also, if he thinks it necessary, send into the Julundur, if he can spare them from the protected States.

P.S. I hope Ramsay and Cocks are getting on better. I desired Nicholson to send you the son of Sultan Mahomed who in my mind came here to play the same game his father did at Peshawar.

I send you a copy of my answer to Sheir Sing yesterday.

167. *From Lord Gough*

Camp Ramnugger, 27th Nov., '48.

My dear Currie,

I have just received your letter. Your wishes shall be attended to. A Commissary of Ordnance I appointed yesterday (Captain Delemain). He is, I join with you, very requisite.

I do feel that Lt.-Col. Byrne would make a trustworthy commandant of the Citadel. Col. White coming in the Cantonment, and at the gates for the present. I would not send back at such a critical moment poor Eckford who I propose to be the Commandant. You must feel I have a great object in view and am only awaiting the fulfilment of my combinations. Nothing must [be] hurried or risked. The fate of India in a moment would be jeopardized were we to make a false step, which nothing shall force me to do. It is all very well talking about walking over your foe. But we must first get at him and I have an infamous river in my front.

With regard to your Engineer, Tremenhere told me the youngman there was perfectly in possession of his plans with all the alternations I pointed out and that he was energetic which he appeared to me. But I shall have Major Goodwyne written to to superintend the works, but bear in mind too many cooks may spoil the broth. I entirely approved of what Major Goodwyne may take a different view and another reference may be found necessary to me. But with the guidance and protection of the Wise Disposed of all I shall in a few days be free to go to meet the Governor General. When I finish my work I shall get in one day to Lahore and the following to Ferozepore. I know you will readily aid me in good horses whom I promise not to injure. I inspirited the troops this morning.

P.S. I have just had a long and satisfactory communication with your friend Misr Sahib Dayal. You must send him for me something very handsome for a magnificent horse and five Gold mohars; the trappings of the horse are very valuable. Of course I have sent all to Cocks.

168. *From Lord Gough*

Ramnugger, 1st December, 1848.

My dear Currie,

You are aware I even regretted Wheeler's crossing the Ravee except even to destroy the rebel fort and return. We must not let the Jullundur get into open revolt, the moral effect of which would be very injurious. He must keep on or upon the left bank of the Beas. The Sirmour Battn. are only at Loodianah; they cannot be moved. The Nusseeree are at Juttog; the G.G. disapproved of their leaving that sanatorium. A portion might I think move across the Sutlej into the mountain tract beyond it to support the hill men.

My combinations are progressing beautifully. I can but within half an hour disperse or at least force back the force just in my front when they appear almost all collected, but no clearing as at the first day. My batteries are all armed and only do not join because I am awaiting the movements of the flank columns from which I expect any moment to hear. All my fears are that they will retreat during the night as Thackwell by some of the Regt. not finding their way to the front of the rendezvous during the night, did not get off until 5, when they are ordered to march at 2, but up to this hour, I hear no firing up the river so I hope the passage was effected without opposition.

I shall keep this open until the last moment.

P.S. I did not have much time in making the movement as Penny only joined me at noon yesterday and his guns did not reach camp until afternoon.

169. *From Lord Gough to Lord Dalhousie, with copy to Sir Frederick Currie*

Ramnugger, 3rd December, 1848, 11 A.M.

My dear Lord,

Everything I could have wished has come to pass. The enemy are fixed and prepared to give battle. I have just rein-

forced Thackwell by the 9th Lcr. and 14th Lt. Dragoons with Godby's brigade of Infantry, 2nd Europeans, 69th and 48th (45th?) Foot. Not a man on this side and advanced Batteries upon the Ford which I shall force if I can silence the Guns that protect it. With God's blessing Shere Sing's force will bewhelmed this day. I write this fearful I may be too much engaged throughout the remainder of the day.

170. *From Lord Gough*

Ramnugger, 5th Dec., '48.

I am about to push with a flying camp to the advance at Hillah about 10 miles on the other side of the Chenab and 12 from this.

The enemy have fled in three trapes on Jellum, Jellalpoor and Pind Dadan Khan. It would be difficult to catch them. Cocks will communicate the proceedings of an interview I had this morning with Tej Sing's nephew and a Sirdar that came over to me some days back who are going into Lahore *as true servants to the Durbar*.

171. *From Lord Gough*

Flying Camp Hillah, 6th Dec., 1848.

My dear Currie,

Every thing getting on beautifully here. The 14th pushed on yesterday fifteen miles on the Jellum road, but the rebels had the legs and arms far in advance in a disorderly retreat towards the river. The 9th Lancers pushed fifteen miles in advance upon the Julalpoor road and came within sight of apparently their rear guard consisting of from 1000 to 1500 Infy. and Cavy. in a dense jungle where the Cavy. or Arty. could [not] act effectually. Major Genl. very judiciously would not attack them so situated, without support and remained until after dark, when no doubt the enemy continued their retreat* and he quietly returned. I give out I only wait for my spare ammunition and tents which are actually coming up, as this force has been without them since the passage of the river. I shall then make a flank and not a retrograde movement.

*Nicholson tells me this is actually the case.

P.S.

Our actual loss

20 killed of all ranks.

50 wounded -do- -do-

Officers seven as I mentioned, with the exception of a Subadar which has lost an arm. But some of these are slight, so much so that in inspecting the Cy. this evening one of my wounded officers was on parade.

172. *From Lord Gough*

Ramnugger, 14th Decr., '48.

My dear Currie,

I feel you need be under no apprehension whatever.

I have sent off Br. Eckford, a most excellent officer, one of my most active ones after Campbell, to take the Command at Lahore. It was forced upon him, but his feeling for the good of the service superseded his military rage for favour. I would bring you to confide in him. I will own I think the time has or will shortly arrive for withdrawing the Guns and guards from the gates and having a strong cantonment, with a sufficient force in the Citadel. Believe me the bundle of sticks represented by the — I now forget the name—is a good exemplification of military strength. I own I always thought the detached way in which the troops are placed at Lahore—a very false and a very dangerous position for them—well justifying the Seiks in being able to annihilate you in detail. Another chief with 1000 men has positively offered to come in, or to betray their army by giving me an opportunity of surprising them. The latter would be rather a hazardous manoeuvre which I certainly shall not undertake. You are aware the G.G. but restricted me to the arc of the Chinab; he has now approved of my proposed position at Wuzeerabad with an advance at Ramnugger. I shall go a sure bit in front of it, and if the Seik army came into the plain, I must forget my orders and trust to my country leaving me harmless for exceeding them. I cannot have my honour nor that of the army famished by letting another opportunity pass of annihilating them. I do not blame what has been left undone, prudence dictated it but prudence was a jade which should have been pushed out of the Council Chamber. We have numbers of

their wounded. Every village in front brings forth some. They suffered fearfully and fled most dastardly. The native as well as European Infy. were mad to be at them. The Cavy. and Arty. horses were certainly much jaded, but they all had a kick and a gallop for the avenue.

The two guns in the river, when it decreases, I may yet find. Six are somewhere but where is not known. However they have had 45 which they are ready to run from, I have little doubt; but movement is the time to be at them, half my force would in that case overthrow them; in their cursed holes they are very formidable.

Poor Cureton's, Havelock's fall altho' lamentable has had a most beneficial effect. The Goorcherras will never again show their faces to our Cavalry. The charge in which these two gallant men fell would astound even a French army. It is now for our Cavalry to advance and theirs fly. The Arty. also admit they cannot stand ours in the field. But they so confoundedly bring themselves that with 20 guns of the heaviest I could not silence 6 of theirs which covered the ford and which, if they had not withdrawn, I should have had many broken heads in forcing it on the morning of the 4th.

173. *From Lord Gough*

Hd. Qrs. Camp, 25th Decr., 1848.

My dear Currie,

I begged of Grant to give out an order so as to meet your wishes with regard to our pay-master and to officially report that he had done so.

Enemy quiet and no movements on either side. I am watching my friends very narrowly. This day the bolt re-opens at Mooltan. It appears Short coincides with Napier as to the expediency of attacking the city first. Those on the spot must be the best judges.

174. *From Lord Gough*

Camp Right bank Chenab,
28th December, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

This evening received your letter of the 18th. Mr. Vulman is a known bad character and it was very wrong to have

left him in charge at Lahore. I have ordered an officer forthwith to replace him. A C.-in-C. cannot see to all these minor details except the subject [which] is brought to his notice. I am making a move to keep the minds of my friends in front unsettled. If my information is right, even the partial one the river permitted me to make has induced them to send a great part of their heavy baggage to the other side of the Jelum. I am persuaded I have only to make a forward movement in person to oblige them to fall back across that river. In this there would be no object. They are now upon the alert. If they had a river between me and them, they might hatch schemes.

They fired a salute of 80 or 60 guns of sorts last night. Attock may have fallen, or Moolraj's brother may have joined them or they may find such a demonstration of smoke necessary to keep their spirits; the more noise they make the more frightened they are.

We are all in the mud and cannot move without exposing the Europeans to sleep on wet ground. *Boora* we cannot get so as to sleep upon a dry substance.

(vi) *LETTERS OF HERBERT EDWARDES*

175. *From Lieutt. P. A. Vans Agnew [copy]*

Mooltan, 19th April, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

You will be sorry to hear that as Anderson and I were coming out of the Fort Gate after having received charge of the Fort from Dewan Moolraj, we were attacked by a couple of soldiers, who taking us unawares succeeded in wounding us both pretty sharply. Anderson is worst off, poor fellow, he has a severe wound in the thigh, another on the shoulder, one on the back of the neck, and one in the face. I think it most necessary that a doctor should be sent down tho' I hope not to need him myself. I have a smart gash in the left shoulder and another the same arm. The whole troops have mutinied, but we hope to get them round. They have turned our two companies out of the Fort.

I am having my wound dressed, so can not write myself this moment to beg of you to ask Cocks to let my friends know that I am in no danger and also Anderson's thro' Coll. Outram.

176. *From Lieutt. Herbert Edwardes to Sir Frederick Currie*
Camp Ghat of Dera Futteh Khan, 15th May, 1848.
My dear Sir Frederick,

The more I think of it the more advisable seems to me the encampment of Bhawul Khan's army at Shoojabad 20 Koss S. of Mooltan.

It will recall all these wandering expeditions of Moolraj's, confine the rebels to their own fort, prevent recruits from joining them, keep them in constant alarm, and make the Trans-Indus and Sindh Sagar dependencies secure. It will also prevent Moolraj from getting hold of the revenue. They say he is hard up for money. That his 2 crores are all out at interest with Shroffs, and that the *Rubbee* revenue is absolutely necessary to enable him to keep boiling the big cauldron he has set on the fire. He has now 4000 men and 10 guns collecting revenue in the south of the Sindh Sagar Doab so close as 25 Koss from Leiah; and I expect they will soon advance higher.

The effect produced by this public impunity is very injurious to the reputation of our Government and makes even the well disposed doubtful as to our power to punish Moolraj. There would be no harm in our waiting 3 or even 6 months if we could pen Moolraj up in the Fort of Mooltan, and exhibit him in a condemned cell instead of on a throne, and there is no other way of doing this except by encamping the Daood-putras at Shoojabad. For a few thousand rupees they could put up chopper huts and be as comfortable as anywhere else; and all the small detachments, such as Sher Sing's, Cortlandt's, and mine, could then close in within a few koss and secure all the country behind us. I would myself advance under those circumstances to the Chenab. Dispatch however is the point, for the *Rubbee* all depends on the next 20 days. Kowrah Khan Khosah, the great Toomundar of Dera Ghazee Khan, has this morning sent his son to me, and is advancing with 500 sowars to help General Cortlandt. This is equivalent to the keys of Dera Ghazee Khan. Longa Mull, the rebel

Hákim of Ghazee Khan, fled on hearing of the fall of Mungrotah. So on *this* side we are getting on better; but it must never be forgotten that we exist on the sufferance of Moolraj, who if he is left alone (i.e., if Bhawul Khan's army does not cross) would be a fool not to pitch all his strength into either Cortlandt or me, and you know what our power is to resist him, what are the dangers of allowing his troops and ours to come within corresponding distance.

Yesterday I heard from good authority that the terms offered by Moolraj to the Futteh Pultan were 12,000 Rs. to go over, and 12,000 more to bring my head along with them.

It was on the certainty of this arrangement, the rebels advanced to Leiah! I am still sanguine of the defection of the Puthans from Moolraj and await the answer of Moostupha Khan with anxiety. Already reports of quarrels amongst themselves, and pistol shots in Durbar, are rife, and I hope herald the truth.

Moolraj is making great efforts to lay stores into the fort. He was ill provided when the affair broke out having sold off the greater part of Sawun Mull's zukheera, but he has now got together enough for a long siege.

I am glad to hear from Lumsden that you are thinking of removing Tezbel from the Punjab. Fortunate would it have been, had she been removed long ago, and to "the remotest isles."

177. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Dera Ghazee Khan, 1st June, 1848, Night.
My Dear Sir Frederick,

Your No. 216 and private note of 25th May both reached me this day. Most provokingly a dauk was robbed two days ago; and I seem to have lost some communications from you. But after all it is merely the general scope of your instructions that I either want or can attend to, so long as you have confidence in me, when left without any! I am glad you are pleased with the behaviour of my Puthans at Leiah. It was indeed a gallant little affair, and inflicted the first blow that Moolraj has got in this wanton war. Concerning Bhawul Khan, if you told his Vakeel on 13th May, and wrote yourself on 20th to tell Bhawul Khan to cross, it is very odd that he

has not done so some days ago; but report speaks now confidently of his having encamped a large army (from 15,000 to 18,000 men) on 3 ferries of the Sutlej.

I shall have a reply—*moraslah* from him the day after to-morrow, which will put an end to all doubt as to his plans.

The enemy is in a most awkward fix opposite to me. He cannot move up, or down, or back, without allowing me to cross and advance to the Chenab.

You are, I see, quite adverse to my crossing the Indus; but your object after all is to get Moolraj's whole force into the fort for the summer; and I don't think this can be effected by Bhawul Khan *alone*, unless it is true that he has 15,000 men with him.

You will, I know, leave me to my own discretion and I promise not to abuse it. I have this whole affair very much at heart, and shall never be able to rest until the campaign for the summer is closed by the gate of Mooltan being slammed in my face.

I am sorry to see that Bhaee Maharaj [Sing] is still at large, and has crossed between the Ravee and Chenab. If he makes his way to Mooltan he will be mischievous.

Peer Ibrahim Khan is a good man, and will be useful across the Sutlej; but still it would be good also to get up little Becher, should any entrenching be required. Science is a great aid to pluck. Who knows but like Ghuznee Thompson he might find an opportunity of giving the Dewan a blowing up.

All is going on well here. Cortlandt is carrying on his administrative arrangements as if he had been Názim of Ghazee Khan for 20 years. He is a good public servant, and I shall ask you to make his pay up to the same as the other Názims (Goolab Sing Pohoovindeah, Chuttur Sing and Kanh Sing Man), viz. 18,000. He had 12,000 as Nazim of Ishmail Khan, and this is a tremendous addition of work and responsibility to him. He should also, I have often thought when reading the Sirkaree Purwannahs to him, have a more respectable titles than merely "Tuhuvour Punnah Shoojaut Dastgah", which has followed him through all the grades of the service for 18 years. Titles have been given freely to every man who could claim a chair in the Durbar. Here is

one of whose good services and indefatigable zeal for the public good I have been a personal witness for 18 months and yet no one says a word for him.

P. S. Morning of 2nd June.

A note from Geo. Lawrence just received. Forwards me the *original* of your letter to me of 10th May, which Inglis, it appears, sent by mistake to him. Still other dispatches are missing.

I hear this morning that Bhawul Khan's force has crossed in 4 places, and among others in the Sind Sagar Doab. If so, we are nearly approaching another act of the drama. This is refreshing.

Lumsden tells me Mr. Quin is coming to me, but on consideration I think a *Baboo* would be much better; because I am leading a terrible knock about life, and am only kept from fever by good tents, etc., etc., and an abstentious habit. Quin could not command these advantages and would be getting sick, and be more trouble than help to me. Therefore, if he has started I would rather you would *recall him from wherever he is*, and give me a thick skulled native who shaves his head in defiance of coupe de soleil. This reminds me of the Durbar's politeness. The Eckhbars are full of "Kus-Kus tatties and tents" sent to Jhunda Sing, Jowahir Mull Dutt and other delicate Kheyr Khwahs; but it has not occurred to them that probably I felt it rather "close" on the banks of the Indus in May! Not that I want their tents; but these things are all indications, I think, of the spirit which pervades the Durbar.

178. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Ferry of Dera Ghazee Khan, 10th June, 1848.
My dear Sir Fredk.,

This will be brought you by Dewan Hookm Chund, Lahore Dufturee, who has now knocked about these districts with me for two years, and done more hard work than falls to the rosy lot of Dufturees in general.

The little man has the misfortune to be implacably hated by Dewan Dena Nath, who has kept him out of Jageers and titles, when those good things were going at Lahore.

Could you make him a "Gold-pen of the State" or "Ink-stand of the Punjab"? I would add to the little man's stature those inches which nature has denied.

His son Busumbur Doss also got somehow squeezed out of Duftur, which is a family misfortune of 4 Rs. a day.

For the sake of the service the little man has been to me. May I ask you to reinstate his son, if possible?

Please also compliment the little Dewan on being son of "that celebrated man Dewan Bhowanee Doss, one of the first Dufturees of Runjeet Sing"; but as a friend I advise you not to allow him to begin any stories about his respected progenitor.

P.S. I have given him the best Khillut I could muster; but hope the Durbar will give him another.

179. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Noorae, 19th June, 1848.

My dear Sir *Frederick*,

I have little to add to the glorious news of yesterday's victory. The enemy are said to have halted a little while at Shoojabad, and then pursued their flight to Mooltan. Eesree Sing's guns have been recognised in our camp; and a captured Goorkha of Gooldeep Sing's Regt. says two companies of those traitors were in the fight. (The other 6 companies are dispersed as follows:—2 at Leiah, 2 at Maharajgurh, and 2 at Shoojabad).

The loss of the enemy seems to have been considerable, and the majority of the dead are Sikhs. One (said to be the comandant of Moolraj's Ghorchurrahs) is one of the finest specimens of a man I ever saw. Deedar Sing, who commanded one of Moolraj's Regiments is also said to be killed. He was a notorious moofsid. The only person of note killed on our side was poor Shahniwaz Khan, son of the Esaukheyl-wallah, whose family I restored to their home and rights last year. He was killed charging a gun in the bravest manner; and I regret him much.

Foujdar Khan, my "Adjutant General", must needs charge with six sowars into a body of three hundred, got a sharp sword cut over the shoulder for his pains, and was only brought off alive by a generous sally of other Puthans to his assistance. Kaloo Khan of Kolachee a second time proved his

fidelity and received a disabling wound in the same arm that suffered so in the fight with Shahzad Khan last March.

I narrowly escaped; a grape shot making four holes in my sleeve, without touching my arm. (I had on a loose blouse.) It is difficult in an irregular force to find out the number of killed and wounded; but the list is being made out. At present all I can say is that the native doctor has full occupation; and that there is hardly a Braduree which is not engaged today in burying its dead. Still I expect we have lost few men in comparison with the length of time we were under fire, having been sheltered to a great extent by the jungle. The Daoodpotras say they have lost about 100.

We have only got six of the rebel guns; but the report is rife that they only carried off *one* out of the 10 they brought into action; so there are probably three lying about. Our men are in search of them.

This reminds me of the Nawab's C.-in-Chief, Futteh Muhommed Khan Ghoree. He is the veriest old dunderhead I ever met with; pretends to be deaf, and hears like a hare; and mumbles his words as if they were pawn. You must know that (to the best of my belief) the Daoodpotras did not take a gun. Their own guns were silent, and they were not engaged even in the final struggle on the left, except a few Puthan officers who out of sheer love of fighting left their own lines and came over to ours. After we had taken all the guns and pushed on after the enemy, the Daoodpatras inclined to our rear and followed in our track picking up the four first guns that had been captured. My men reported this very indignantly at night; but I thought it mattered little who said they took them. This morning Futteh Muhommed called on me, and I desired him to make over all the captured guns to Genl. Cortlandt that they might be repaired, horsed, manned, and carried along with us to Mooltan. He said, "very good", but never sent them. At noon I sent my Moonshee to remind him, when he said, "it was the first time he ever heard of it, and that there was no necessity for our troubling ourselves about the guns, as he would repair them himself; we might repair those we had taken if we pleased." I thought this might be an exaggeration of the Moonshee, and sent for Peer Ibrahim Khan and Futteh Muhommed Khan Ghoree to

my tent. He then somewhat modified the speech; but evidently had no mind to give up the guns, though he said he would do so if I *ordered* him. Under the circumstances I declined taking them for fear of a collision, and said I should refer the matter to you and the Nawab. A sensible man would have at once taken the hint, but he said, "I was master," and made no offer of sending over the guns, though Peer Ibrahim explained to him that they were neither the property of the British nor of the Nawab, but of Maharajah Duleep Sing. After he had taken his leave, Peer Ibrahim told me that he is a complete fool in the hands of a Moonshee named Fyzoollah, and that he contradicts himself, denies his words, and changes his mind a dozen times a day; that he listens to little or no advice, and makes the most absurd arrangements in the world.

Here is a nice fellow to have at the head of an army. It is wonderful how the Nawab ever sent him; and I think the sooner he is changed, the better. This is the man who was Meer Roostum's chief adviser in Sindh, and the author they say of the attack on Outram.

I trust you will not overlook his opposition to my wishes upon this occasion; and it would be a good opportunity to get rid of him. Poor Peer Ibrahim says, "My soul has been in my nose every day on the march on account of him. He is an Ihmuk!"

Please send a cart-load of Khilluts round by Bhawulpore to me, for my officers. Tomorrow morning, I have told the Nawab's troops to advance 3 Koss. Our men will be all over the Chenab tomorrow, and we will join the Nawab's people next day.

P.S. Herewith I send a letter No. 33. I wrote the evening before the battle, but had not time to send. The battle dispatch should have been 34.

180. *From Herbert Edwardes*

My dear Sir Frederick,

Enclosed I send my defence to the last accusation which I should have ever expected to have been brought against me. I feel it to be a cruel misconception; but it is impossible to repel "the proud man's contumely."

There is something exquisitely unjust in accusing *me* of insensibility to the murder of Agnew and Anderson, and the insult offered to Government, when to this hour I am the only soul who has struck a blow in revenge of either! May the Govr. General in the course of his Indian administration find bushels of officers more alive to the honor of their country, and the ammaculate fame of the Anglo-Indian Governt than

Yours much disgusted

Herbert Edwardes.

P.S. Pray accept my warm thanks for your kind and able defence of my motives, public and private.

P.S. 2nd. Lord Dalhousie's standard of patriotism must be lofty, when after two months of most fatiguing opposition single-handed to the Mooltan rebellion, under canvass in May and June, he measures me out 3 lines of satisfaction and two pages of displeasure. At this inverse ratio it would have been better for me never to have done anything.

181. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Shoojabad, 24th June, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

There is a report today that Bhaee Maharaj Sing was *not* drowned, but escaped and reached Mooltan two days before the battle of Kineyree, and that a salute was fired in his honor. I do not believe a word of it and conceive it is "a weak invention of the enemy."

We have been delayed here to throw bridges across the many canals which fertilize this remarkable country. (The district of Shooajabad is 5 Koss long and 2 wide, and *produces* 4 lakhs of Rs.!) Tomorrow we proceed, leaving our wounded here in the fort.

Lake has not yet joined us. Mr. Quin arrived 2 days after the battle, all safe.

The Nawab's C.-in-C. has not only appropriated all the Maharajah's guns as I before related, *but refused the artillerymen which I appointed to work them*; and I understand he gives out that all the country and revenue, and guns, which they take, belong to the Nawab and not to Dulleep Sing!

This is a state of things very nearly as bad as Moolraj's rebellion; and I must say our allies are the queerest on record. I wish you would set the question of the guns decisively some way or other as it is not pleasant to be made a fool of. Futteh Muhommed's *Moonshee* is the author of all this: the old man having no opinions of his own, nor being able to remember other people's for half an hour together.

It is necessary also (do you not think?) to begin turning over in your mind how you intend ultimately to settle the Mooltan country. As far as I can see the country is in a very flourishing state; the high state of cultivation to which Sawun Mull brought it, having been only slightly deteriorated by the short and more grasping administration of his son. To continue the prosperity of the country it is only necessary to take Sawun Mull's aieen as a basis, and make a money settlement for a term of years, which would amount to a reduction of about 10 percent on the present status. Such a concession would make a most favourable impression on all the people, and secure the country from a relapse. But there is no man in all the Khalsa Court that I am aware of to whom this delicate task can safely be entrusted. They are all corrupt: looking to their own purpose, not the public service, and disinclined to apply to business. The Mişr Sahib Dayal has more than can he well do already in the customs, and his father is equally well occupied with the salt; both departments which require honesty and ability.

I do not know whether you are well acquainted with Kanh Sing; but taking his doubtful conduct into consideration, I presume you would not continue him as Nazim. Shumsher Sing would have been a better man because of a better disposition, and more honest character; but neither of them are in the *Kárdár* and *ábádee* line; and it would be a pity to trust so important a revenue to either. Sheikh Emamooddeen seems to me to have a hankering after the post, but it would be the joke of India, if we were to *translate* him from *Cachmere* to *Mooltan*. Neither has he any longer the application to business which in his father's days he was forced to display. He is more emphatically an "árám tulub" and his abilities appear only in witty conversation. He is moreover as corrupt as a Union Bank Director; and having paid his way

like a prince, conceives public property is only made for sale. Cross the Chenab and take a peep at Jowahir Mull Dutt, an emperor in his cups, a bad kárdár when sober. I trust your snub will do him good; but I have already confined his authority to the extensive districts dependent on Munkhera. He fancied he was lord of all between Jheylum, Chenab, and Attok; but Munkhera which is about 4 lakhs is quite as much as he should be allowed to spoil. (*Spolia opima!*)

The same objections apply to every other member of the executive with whom I am acquainted; and my chief object in writing now is to recommend General Cortlandt to the post. He has got a very good one already; you have now made up his pay to that of all Nazims; and he has nothing to gain by a removal. But the Sirkar has much to gain by making use of him on this occasion. I have seen a good deal of him during the last two years, and I believe him to be an honest man both from principle and inclination. He knew nothing previously of Government and Kárdárship, till he got the Dera Nizamut, yet he has shown a very unusual degree of executive ability; and by indefatigable application to his *Adawlut* has won the good opinion of all classes under his authority. No kárdár can deceive him, for he inspects all accounts himself and spares no one. These you will allow are high qualities, such as, thank God, are common enough among our own civil service, but not to be had at any price in the Punjab.

It seems to me, therefore, that in this time of trouble and confusion you would do well to put other men into the Dera-jat, and trust the gathering up of the Mooltan districts and revenues to Cortlandt. Sheikh Emamooddeen was in former times at Dera Ishmail Khan, and might go there again, Futteh Khan Towannah relieving him of the only troublesome districts of Murwut, Bunnoo and Esaukheyl as also Kuchee and Koshab.

Dera Ghazee Khan is not yet ready to make over to any one; and judgment is required in selecting a man for its Government. For the present Cortlandt can carry that on also, as it in fact did belong to Mooltan, and its separation or not is a mere matter of opinion.

If you agree in this view of the matter I will make Cortlandt take up all the districts into which the Nawab's people do not enter and thus turn the next two months' interval to good account, and administer justice to the people in spite of Moolraj's disturbances. Otherwise, we shall be in a regular scramble of authorities, and not know who is master and who is man.

Let me have an answer please on this head soon, as I am much bothered to know how to keep the accounts of the ilakahs daily "annexed."

182. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Sooraj Koond, 4 Koss from Mooltan,
29th June, 1848.

My dear Sir Fredk.,

My brain is so full of plans and plots, and manœuvres, that I have been quite unable to write to you for the last two days, nor should I write now, but that I feel it would be gross ingratitude in me to delay any longer thanking you for the undeservedly flattering terms in which your private and public letters to myself and Government of India speak of my recent services.

I have felt keenly the most unkind and unjust reproach of Lord Dalhousie, and public duty alone made me endure it. Your kindness, and more than justice, stands out in smoothing contrast; and you may rely on my complete devotion to the cause in which I am engaged, so long as my own health, and your confidence, hold out.

To work day and night in defiance of climate, bear up against political troubles, over-powering numbers and treachery, raise an army on my own responsibility, and expose life and health freely from the purest motives of duty to Govt., and friendship to the dead (in Mooltan) and living (on the N.W. Frontier) has been to me a task of real happiness unalloyed and undamped by danger, and discomfort. I asked and expected nothing for it, but the approval of my own conscience and the confidence of my superiors. But I certainly did not expect to be insulted, and the cold heartless sneer penned by his Lordship under a Punkah in his palace 1000 Koss from the dangers, through which I am struggling,

has made a deep and lasting impression upon my mind. He may command my services to their last fraction, but to his censure or his praise I feel indifferent for the future.

As for the victory of 18th June, he will doubtless discover that I am a hero. It is the way with Governors. But I should have been better pleased had he *beforehand* allowed me to be a gentleman possessed of common humanity and as much patriotism as ordinarily falls to the lot of Englishmen.

We marched here yesterday from Adee Wallah Bagh, and found the bridge over the great Nullah between us and Mooltan destroyed, and a rebel picket entrenched on the other side with guns.

Moolraj has moved out into Camp himself, but not come down to seek a fight, knowing that we should thrash him. I am deeply engaged in settling in my own mind a plan of operations, for I feel how much is depending on my present right decision. Let this apologise for my apparent silence.

At present I will merely tell you that Sher Sing's army is discovered rotten, that I have halted them wherever they are, that we must not be surprised at any time to hear of their fraternization, and that my intention is now to take up such a position as will enable me to defy all comers and still blockade Mooltan. We are doomed it seems to struggle on these difficulties to the last; but by God's help our firmness and resources will be equal to the occasion. Things are in odd position certainly. If Dewan Moolraj was brought handcuffed in by his own soldiers tomorrow, I should not be surprised. And if I was to hear of his being joined by 2/3rds of the Chechawutnee force, I should say merely, "then that is settled." The resurrections of the Bhaie has totally altered the aspect of affairs as regards *the Sikhs*; but the Dewan and his defeated army, like "burnt children" dread our "fire".

Sheikh Emamooden is within 4 Koss of us and 5 of the enemy; but is on the wrong side of the Nullah and I am under some anxiety about him; but am making *superhuman* efforts to construct a bridge for him and get him into camp to-night. My present (and almost in my mind *matured*) design is to make a dash up to the *western* side of Mooltan and encamp for good and all within 2 Koss of its gates, thus securing Raj Ghat,

the door of the North West, and all the Sindh Sagar Doab, the trans-Indus territories, and our own supplies from both. I only wait for Emamooddeen as if I advanced he would be destroyed. He tells me he has sent 500 of his Sikhs into distant districts. I hear they took French leave. It is a matter of indifference.

Lake joined us yesterday evening all right and jolly. Don't be depressed at this aspect of affairs. We shall bring you through it, rely on it.

P.S. What say you to acting on your own views of things and taking the field at once with the British troops? There can be no doubt now, whatever, there may have been at the beginning that *a very little more demonstration* would turn the balance. Mooltan is now you may say invested; but I am afraid *we* are not strong enough to do more. The greatest depression is in the hearts of the Moolraj garrison and the very sound of British cannon would melt away bars and bolts.

It is my opinion that you are certainly running a great and unnecessary risk in waiting for the cold weather, and giving the Sikh army the temptation to rise, when by a mere march the rebellion would now be settled. Rains you know there are none in Mooltan. Six showers a year are reckoned a fine season. If you are ready to come now, Come, say I.

P.S. 2nd. Express no displeasure in the Durbar about the Chechawutnee force. They *may* forbear; and I am afraid considerable mischief has been done by *an idea of annexation getting abroad*. Verb: sap.

183. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Tibbee, 2 Koss from Mooltan,

7 P.M., 1st July, 1848.

My dear Sir Fredk.,

I did not expect we should have to fight 2 general actions in the space of a fortnight; but I am delighted to announce to you a *second victory!!*

I am too tired and exhausted to enter into details; and the *coming storm* has alone prevented me from writing to you publicly, the last 2 or 3 days. It is hard both to think, and report our thoughts, in this weather.

I will write you fully tomorrow. At present suffice it that large desertions of Sikhs from the two "allies", Sheikh Emamooddeen and Sher Sing, raised the confidence of Moolraj to such a pitch that he determined to fight once more in the plain before submitting to be shut up in his fort.

Bhaie Maharaj Sing with great ceremony and incantations fixed the Mohoorut when the Kuthree would be invincible, Saturday, the 1st July. We marched this morning from Sooraj Koond to Tibbee, about 3 Koss; and Lake and I were out with the Rear-guard till 11 a.m. expecting an attack in the rear.

Moolraj however chose a bolder part—countermarched and crossing the Nullah, which separates us from Mooltan, close to the city, with all his available men and guns, came down upon us in front! We had encamped, and were going to breakfast when the tidings of his advance came *at noon* (just like Moodkee). Not to be behind hand in courtesy, we moved out to the village of Suddoosam to give him the *Istikh-bal*, for he came in person, on his elephant of state, like a real rebel.

Our line was formed thus. The Daoodpotras under Lake on the right, with 10 guns, Cortlandt in the centre with 10 guns, my Puthan levies in the left centre, and Sheikh Emamooddeen well on the left that I might observe him.

The rebels took up their positions most skilfully in some very difficult ground, cut up by Nullahs, and posted themselves for greater strength in villages surrounded by date and palm groves, which completely screened all but the smoke of their guns. A very severe and oftentimes doubtful action was the result; and though our numbers were numerically very superior to the enemy (18,000 at least, to between 8 and 9000), such was the fanaticism and desperation of the Dewan's religious warriors (mostly old Sikh regulars) that I honestly confess we had as much as we could do to give them a licking. From village to village however and grove to grove, we slowly, slowly, slowly, drove them as it were inch by inch, and after an engagement of six hours routed them under the walls of Mooltan, so close that they got away all their guns but two, which were carried in the most noble style by Cortlandt's Sooraj Mookhee Regt. Most of the enemy's killed, I perceived,

were Sikhs. We have lost some Puthans of note; and Capt. McPherson of the Nuwab's service has fallen. As yet we have no account of the enemy's loss but it must have been severe.

The rebel army retreated right into the city; and lost in dust and growing twilight, and afraid of pitching under the fire of the fort, we returned to our morning's camp.

The obstinacy with which the Sikhs served their guns would have been admirable indeed in a better cause. The Daoodpotras did well, and I need not say Lake was of the utmost service at their head. Cortlandt handled his troops like a soldier; and Mr. Quin, my clerk, put himself at the head of the Sooraj Mookhee, and fought like a lion. Sheikh Ema-moodeen's force did nothing; for which I am grateful. (Don't take any notice of it—but pass it all over under the cloke of general congratulation.)

It has indeed been a hard fought field, and I shall be glad to get to bed, where I intend to dream of Moolraj, and the intense chagrin, disgust, fear, and self-reproach, which like so many devils must be preying on him at this moment. He had quite made up his mind to win; and the Sikhs had all (it is said) painted themselves out with Mhendee for the triumph promised by the Gooroo [Bhai Maharaj Singh] to their creed. Let me congratulate you on this second blow to the Mooltan rebellion.

P.S. Please send us an Assistt. Surgeon and establishment without delay, via Bhawulpore, as it is cruel to see the unassisted wounded.

Moolraj was knocked out of his Houdah by a cannon ball, striking the guddee, but I am afraid he is born to be hung and has received nothing but an opodeldoc bruise.

184. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Tibbee, 2 Koss from Mooltan, 10th July, 1848.
My dear Sir Frederick,

Though the wound in my hand makes me very sick and unfit for business, yet a private letter from Major Napier dated 6th July has so alarmed me that I cannot but make an effort to avert the consequences of what seems to us all here a most fatal error. Napier tells me the departure of the Siege train and British troops to Mooltan has been *again* suspended,

pending a reference to the Governor General, at the request of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. If you are certain the result of this application will be the sanction of the Governor General to an immediate move, the twenty days that will be swallowed up in the reference, will not be of any serious moment, provided that you do not suspend your operations in the meanwhile, for from Napier's account, fully that time will be required to get the train under weigh. But if there is any chance of the Governor-General agreeing with the Commander-in-Chief, and dis-agreeing with you, that is, if you have not expressed the most decided opinions upon the point to His Lordship, then it is right that I should without reserve express my sincere belief, that the next two months are more full of danger to us all, than the two which have so fortunately passed away; and I think it is a pity that at heart so brave and patriotic a nobleman as our old chief, should have it put in his power to involve your administration in difficulties, which his slight knowledge of the Punjab prevents him from understanding, and from which, perhaps, all his army will be required to extricate us. Henry Lawrence, I will remember, was armed with powers inferior only to those of the Governor General himself with a view to the arising of such an occasion as the present, and though of course he would have done all in his power to carry the Commander-in-Chief's concurrence along with him, he was not obliged to give up his own conviction of what was necessary, should it happen to be opposed to that of His Excellency. I do not know exactly how you are situated with reference to this matter, but apriori I should fancy, that your powers are wider, rather than smaller than Lawrence's. Your letters since the battle of Kineyree have assured me so decidedly of your own opinion being in favour of an immediate move, and putting an end to the rebellion at once, that I naturally attribute the relapse to inactivity, to your having reluctantly sacrificed your own views, out of respect to "the highest military authority." His Excellency cannot know as you and I do full well, that the whole Seikh army from Lahore to Peshawur, and from Bunnoo to Huzara, have only been kept from going over to Moolraj by the Dewan himself being put on the defensive. Sirdar Shumshere Sing candidly enough told me this morning, that had the force

under Raja Sher Sing been ordered to advance against Moolraj before the battle of Kineyree, it would have either run away, or else have gone bodily over to the enemy, so decidedly did the soldiers sympathise with the rebellion. If this is the case (as there is no reason whatever to doubt) how alarming becomes the position of this same force when it is proposed to expose them for two months to the golden promises and more substantial bribes of Dewan Moolraj. A short walk separates the besiegers and the besieged; and in spite of all the Sirdars can do to prevent it, the Dewan's Seik emissaries are night and day in the Raja's camp, and the day before yesterday a messenger was seized by the Raja's people, and letters from Dewan Moolraj to Sirdar Shumshere Sing and Kehur Sing Sindhanwalla were found upon his person. Sirdar Shumshere Sing has sent the letters to you, so that you will be able to judge their insidious and dangerous tendency. Of course the Raja himself, Utter Sing Kalleawalla, and all the other Sirdars have received similar letters, but prudently say nothing about it. On the fidelity of the Sirdars I think we could rely, even were they to sit here six months idle instead of two, but not so with their infantry and Sowars; and should it unhappily be ultimately decided upon by the Governor General to adhere to the old plan of not taking the field till October, (which in the end will be November), I shall expect nothing less than that about a fortnight hence (when this reprieve shall become known), Dewan Moolraj with his army will some fine day move down again upon my front, and in the middle of action, I shall be agreeably surprised by the whistling of Sher Sing's artillery in my rear. Against such treachery what precautions can I take, and in so singular a predicament what hope is there that I, and Lake, and Lumsden could hold together our irregular and incongruous army? There is much to raise a smile in the idea, but I assure you, I broach it with the most serious sadness, and would have it so contemplated by others in whose hands, and not in mine, I now feel that the safety of my own army and the peace of the Punjab rests for the future. Napier does not state Lord Gough's reasons for still deferring operations, nor can I conceive any, for I hold his Lordship to be superior to the selfish wish which the regular army may be supposed to entertain

for an easy campaign in comfortable weather, against a place sufficiently weak to give them little trouble, and sufficiently distinguished to entitle them to C.B. ships, mural medals, and six months' batta. Having none of these temptations before my own eyes, I look with a cooler judgment on the matter, (even with the thermometer at 90°) and I think it will be most culpable supineness if we allow a rebellion which may now be settled by a brigade or two, to rise again into a meet foe for the British army. The Europeans can glide down the Ravee and Chenab comfortably in boats to the Ghats which I command within 5 miles of Mooltan; and the native Regiments are I presume as well able to march from the ferry opposite Bhawulpore to Mooltan as the Seikh troops and Puthan levies along with me have been to march from Dera Futteh Khan to Dera Ghazee Khan, and from that place to Mooltan. Doubtless shares of ice are very pleasant things, and the hottest bungalow in Anarkullee may be cooler than the coolest tent in Mooltan; but to the party who argues politics in this way, I would reply by enlarging upon the incomparable flavour of Mooltan mangoes, "*Sub tegmine mangi*," what discontented ensign, or apoplectic Major could find it in his heart to blame you for moving him from Lahore? Greediness alone struggling with gratitude could prevent them from sending you a banghy full of luscious "*Shah pus-sunds*" per diem.

Dewan Moolraj is just doing what we could wish him, devoting his whole energies to the fortification of the city, (not the fort) round whose wide girth he is planting many of his guns, apparently ignorant that (without ditch or rampart) his rotten city-wall would be untenable against our heavy guns for an hour; he however seems to be a keen judge of human nature for whom you first talked of sending up the siege train and I eagerly gave out that it was coming, the Dewan treated the rumour with contempt, revived the spirits of his soldiers with jests upon the delicate Sahib log who could not fight in the hot weather!!!! Bhaie Maharaj Sing is popularly said here to have gone to heaven, but less figurative minds shrewdly suspect that he is off on a mission to Bunnoo, Peshawur and Huzara. Napier tells me that though three months have elapsed since the rebellion broke out, the

heavy train bullocks are still no further than Cawnpore; at this rate they may be expected to reach the frontier sometime in 1849, and I beg you will tell Napier not to lean on such a broken reed as the Commissariat, but to rely on himself, and, as for carriage for the train, the whole carriage of this army is at his disposal, besides what I can get out of the districts. I think I never told you that Hur Das Sing (the Komedan of Moolraj's Dograhs) has agreed to sell me the six gates of the city on terms of recovering a resumed jageer in the Jullundur, of 4,000 Rs. per annum, and he and 120 of his particular friends be taken into service. There seems to have been a general expectation that I should take the city of Mooltan. Perhaps I could do so, even without the treachery before alluded to, but I am much too prudent to entangle my irregular troops in the city until the siege train is at hand to engage the fort. It would be a scene of plunder, licence, and disorder, and I should lose all command over my army, whom I have work enough to manage in the open field.

No news yet of Doctor Cole, but there is no fear of him, as I have three different parties coasting up the river to escort him in safety; he has been a long time coming, and night after night as I toss upon my bed in search of a painless position for my hand, I wonder what adverse breeze or foolish alarm has detained him on his road.

Once more let me earnestly beg you to rely upon the opinions of those who are here upon the spot, and not delay marching the British troops. If it is indeed impossible for this rebellion to be finished and forgotten before the end of September, we had better go all lengths of comfort and defer its suppression till November, as it is notorious that the only unhealthy month at Mooltan is October.†

† Some passages in this letter have been crossed, perhaps, by some later custodian of the collection just as, in some cases, they have been scissored; and certain sheets have, perhaps, been removed or destroyed.

185. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Tibbee, 13th July, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Your note of the 9th July reached me last evening and I was much perplexed at first to account for the first seven paragraphs of No. 42 not having reached you with the rest of the letter; but on searching my papers, it appeared that the rough copy of the last part of the letter only had been sent to you by mistake, instead of the fair copy of the whole. I wonder this did not strike you on looking at the manuscript, in which, though written from dictation, there surely must have been many corrections and second thoughts. I now send you the fair copy of the whole. Kindly return me the rough draft. I much regret the mistake, and the gap it has made in your information, but I must crave your indulgence for this and many other failings of which my unhappy accident has entailed. I am quite dependent on those about me, even to be propt up and let down in my bed.

You are quite right, I think, to act upon your own opinion in sending the force, even though the Commander-in-Chief is averse to it. You are responsible for the peace of the country, Not Lord Gough.

Between your efforts and ours, carriage in plenty will be collected. I think the Comdr. in-Chief is right in wishing to send two Brigades instead of one. An immense army is no longer necessary; but whatever British force takes the field should, I think, be compact and complete in itself in all arms, in all branches so as to be sufficient in itself and independent of the conduct of allies. The difficulties in the way of the move I cannot understand; it is now nearly three months since Government determined to move an army of 50,000 men in October, yet a couple of Brigades have not as yet been provided for. You seem to think one European Regiment would be enough; perhaps it might, but the circumference of Mooltan is extensive; and whether operations have to be directed against the city or the fort, two European Regiments would find full employment. It will not do for us to fail, and once having resolved to undertake the move, I would, were I you, try to make it as strong as I could with reference to the carriage available, not as weak as is consis-

tent with safety. Despatch however is the great thing. Let Moolraj and his men know as soon as possible that you are in the field.

All however may be decided before the British force can move, if what I have heard today is true, that to an application from the citizens for permission to evacuate Mooltan and escape the horrors of war, Moolraj replied by telling them to wait a day or two longer, when one way or the other the matter would be settled, either by his own destruction or by our falling back. This seems to intimate an intention on his part to try his fortune in one last desperate effort in the field; a step to which he probably has been driven by the refusal of the majority of his soldiers to be shut up in the fort. Certain it is that he has for the last two days discontinued his fortification of the city and talks of cutting the Nullah immediately; though of what use the latter will be, I don't know. Saturday, the day after tomorrow, is even named as fixed for the event. Rumours are also afloat of night attacks, so that you see that the air is charged with electricity. Out of 11 or 12000 men that Moolraj mustered before the battle of Kineyree, he may still have between 5 and 6,000; but I do not think that he will venture upon another pitched battle without bringing his heavy guns out of the fort to counterbalance the disparity of his numbers, and this he will only do if he sincerely means the desperation which he tells, and is indeed resolved to "set all upon a cast, and stand the hazard of the dye."

With respect to the Khans of Tank, I am glad that you have told them to come on to me. Raja Sher Sing is the responsible person for the Sirdarpore country, and though he thought proper to leave it unprotected, I have made him send back 300 horsemen from Sooraj-koond for the protection of the road. As for the river communication, there is no fear whatever; but should circumstances seem to require it, I will not fail to order the Khans to cross over to Sirdarpore from Rungpore whenever they reach that point; at present I know not where they are.

There were a lot of boats lying at Sirdarpore empty. These have all been sent up to you to Lahore to assist in bringing down the Europeans, or the stores that follow them.

I cannot tell you how grateful I am at the arrival of the Doctor two days ago. He has put my hand out of the horrible pain I was suffering, and he says, though a bad wound, it is doing remarkably well. It will be a long long time however before I can do anything with my hand, and perhaps two of the fingers may never be of much use to me. This is a pleasing memento of the Mooltan campaign.

A thousand thanks to you for the Soda water, Stelton cheese and other unheard of luxuries you so kindly sent me by the Doctor.

186. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Tibbee, 2 Koss from Mooltan,

13th July, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Raja Sher Sing so incessantly bullies me to report the presence and good conduct of himself, the Sirdars, and the force along with him, in order that Sirdar Golab Sing may wave it before your eyes, that I have at least hit upon the expedient of writing to you in English, and sending it through the Sirdar. With respect to the Sirdars, I believe them to be heart and soul on our side, which is the side of Jageers, titles, employments and whole throats. But their force, with equal confidence I report to be against us to a man. What is strange, the Poorbea Regiment (Colonel Ajodea Pershad's) is the most disaffected of the whole; and a few days ago, before there was any certain tidings of the approach of an English force, they had got so bold in their talk that I have no doubt they would have gone over, had any delay on our part occurred. In Shumshere Sing's graphic language, the news of a British force being positively about to take the field came upon Sher Sing's camp "like water upon fire." The expression is so good, that as you read, you will, I am sure, fancy that you hear mutiny hissing at being extinguished, and dying away into smoke with sputtering curses at the ever victorious Feringhee. Thus you see, that to the last moment of the rebellion, I and my force are doomed to walk hand in hand with treachery; but all their conspiracies are only dangerous when we desert ourselves.

Had you hesitated to take the field now, I candidly own, that I think my position would have been converted in a month to one of the greatest peril; the advantages I have gained would have slipped through my fingers one by one, and about a fortnight or three weeks hence, I should be constrained in self-defence to keep our prestige by taking the city. A general action would ensure; we should be victorious; Moolraj would be driven into the fort; and the city of Mooltan would be disgracefully sacked; perhaps burnt by the wild mass of ruffians, I have under my command, and I should have the satisfaction of being abused from Lahore to London, without having advanced a step towards ending the campaign—all this amid treachery, defections of Regiments, squadrons, and artillery, and probably the rising of all the troops in the north west.

The very decided nature of your present proceedings in Lahore, have, in my opinion, prevented Moolraj from rising superior to his difficulties, and I trust you will not relax until the British force and train are on their way to Mooltan.

Moolraj himself, as well as his troops, is at his wit's end, sometimes he talks of a night attack, and sits up all night in a Hindoo temple near the bridge, cased in chain armour from head to foot like Don Quixotte watching for his knighthood in the Cathedral aisle. But nothing comes of it. Another time he talks of cutting the canal, but is restrained from doing so by fear of destroying the fort ditch. One day he fortifies the city, another day he fortifies the fort. To-day he tells all his soldiers to leave him because he has got no money to pay them, and to-morrow keeps up their spirits by assuring them that when iron shot fail, he will fire silver on the besiegers. His army, I think, rather increases than decreases; many have been deserting, but new recruits from the Manjha are once more beginning to come in by tens and twelves. I estimate his number at 6,500, he may possibly have 7,000.

Moolraj had 12,000 men before Kineyree; that battle and Suddoosam reduced his army to one half. What I mean to say is that it is now again rather looking up.

All the Mooltanee Affghans but two have deserted him.

The following are the names of those who have come over to me:—

Gholam Moostupha Khan, Sudhozye.

Abdool Sumund Khan, Badozye.

Gholam Hyder Khan, Babur.

Khalik Dad Khan, Babur.

Sirbullund Khan, Bamezye.

Sirbullund Khan, Badozye.

Sadik Muhomed Khan, his son.

Muhomed Ussud Khan, Nootkane.

Gholam Moostupha Khan, Khazwane.

Mussoo Khan, Nootkane.

Payindah Khan, Khazwane.

Gamund Khan, Tataree.

Muhomed Khan, Babur.

Sukundur Khan, Babur, and his brother.

Moosee Khan, Turreen.

Maroof Khan, Turreen.

Saleh Muhomed Khan, Khazwane.

Abdool Raheem Khan, Jemadar of foot.

I have treated them all kindly; admire their race (as natives go); and shall be glad when these troubles subside to see them entertained in a body as a Musulman check upon Sikh disaffection.

As you seem to wish the Khans of Tank to be sent to Sirdarpore, I have ordered them there; they are at this moment near Maharajghur, and will cross over from Rungpore to Sirdarpore as soon as they can get boats.

I quite agree with you in thinking this move a good one, now that we have troops coming down the Ravee. You seem to be under the impression that Maharajghur, Ihmedpore, and Rungpore are in a state of rebellion, whereas their chief Zameendars throughout these troubles have been fighting like Britons on our side, and only a few days ago took their leave from my camp, where they had come to receive my thanks. Under these circumstances there is no occasion whatever to make those districts over to Misr Sahib Dyal. I have appointed my own kardars, and sent my own Tannahs. So please tell the Misr not to trouble himself with the district in question, but keep to his own side of the Chenab like a good man.

Let me know when the troops actually start from Ferozepore, that I may send off all the carriage I can muster to the Ghat opposite Bhawulpore. We shall be able to render very active assistance in this way. What a shameful fact is that you mention with reference to the shafts of the heavy guns. The extraordinary thing in our service is that there never seems to be any one responsible person on whom the Commander-in-Chief can lay his finger and bring him to a court martial.

I would at all events send the elephants that belong to the guns to Mooltan, they will be useful in a thousand ways, in bringing brushwood for fascines and gabions, carrying supplies, &c.

The Nawab of Bhawulpore has at last recalled his incapable ass of a General, but he leaves his office vacant as though all the rest of his officers were greater asses still. With a delicate compliment he has begged Lake to supply Futteh Muhomed's place; to this I demur, as Futteh Muhomed was invariably in the rear, except at the safe end of the action, when the old gentleman used to be carried violently to the front, and wiping his forehead declare with great self-complacency that it had been a glorious fight.

After all I had not the heart to take away the whole 10 guns from the Bhawulpore troops, and left them 5, which to this day they have not repaired so as to be efficient. Cortlandt has made a very efficient troop of our five.

You say "you see I am not of the reconnoitering parties." I shall deem myself lucky if I join any reconnoitering party at the end of three weeks, or a month. At present, I am in my bed, and likely to stop there, my hand propt up upon pillows, and kept in the same position for 12 hours at a time; in fact I am quite disabled.

The arrival of the doctor was most timely both for me and all the wounded of our camp. Doctor Cole seems a very energetic and scientific young fellow, and great credit is, I think, due to him for volunteering on this hard duty.

Lake and Lumsden are indefatigable in visiting the piquets, &c., &c.; neither are they poor hands at the mangoes (a vicious remark, which you must attribute to my not being allowed to eat any). By the bye, I hope there is no truth in

the report that you are going to send McNair as political with the British Brigade. I don't know him personally and perhaps may do him wrong, but everybody says he is a horrid slow coach, and this is neither the place nor the weather for slow coaches. Pray send my old school fellow Arthur Cocks. I hope also still more fervently that we are not to lose the services of Brigadier Cambell, he is a real soldier, such as we should all feel confidence in, and a real gentleman that we all should be glad to serve under.

187. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Tibbee, 2 Koss from Mooltan, 20th July, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I was delighted to receive your note of July the 16th, and to learn from the General's enclosed, that both columns were to march on the 20th, and so strong as you detail. But what a pity you could not manage the Brigadeing so as to give us Brigadier Campbell instead of Brigadier Harvey. I do not know what is the use of sending good soldiers like Campbell to the Frontier, if it is not that they may be employed, when war arises. Lord Hardinge picked out Brigadier Campbell from the whole of the Queen's troops in India, and sent him to Lahore, in order that if a row took place, the troops might not be handled by an imbecile, who might claim a Brigade in virtue of seniority; yet, on the very first occasion, when troops turn out of Lahore, this picked man is kept in hand for some grander occasion, which I hope never may arise, and three Regiments are allowed to fall into the hands of an old fool who cannot manage one. I am sorry to be uncharitable, but really it would almost seem as if the Military authorities took pains to castrate our expedition.

With respects to the Political Officers accompanying the force, I feel sensibly your kindness in wishing to vest all the authority in my hands; but I assure you, I feel no jealousy of Cocks whatever. He is an old friend and a school fellow of mine; my senior in years and position; and if there is any more honor to be plucked out of this Mooltan rebellion, I declare, that I would rather help old Cocks to it, than appropriate it myself; and as you say he is desirous of coming, I hope you will send him. We shall all here be glad of his

company. Whatever embarrassment there might be in addressing your instructions to Cocks, and thus, apparently, setting me aside, would be easily got over by putting him and me in a commission, of which he shall be the senior member, and directing your letters to both of us collectively. I urge this point rather pressingly, because I should reproach myself very much if I were to stand in Cock's way, for whom I have a regard quite superior to professional jealousies.

The Lahore division, in my opinion, should halt at Sirdarpore, until the Ferozepore division arrives at an equal distance from Mooltan on the south, when both columns should converge to one point on the eastern side of Mooltan, where their work will be. It would be waste [of] labour, now I come to think of it, to bring the Ferozepore column all the way round the Chenab to Rajghat to disembark, as they would only have to march again from the Ghat, along the whole line of our rear, to get again to the south east of Mooltan, where the operations of the British force will be. You had better therefore define Sirdarpore as the point where the Lahore Column will halt, until it can communicate with the Ferozepore column and myself.

The steamer has not yet arrived, and I am thinking, when it does come, of sending it with a large party of workmen to stop up the three heads of the Mooltan canals on the Chenab. Armed as the steamer is with Sepoys and guns, it will be better able to effect this duty than any party which I could send by land.

Yesterday our piquets and grass-cutters got engaged with Moolraj's, and did their best to bring on a general action; indeed our whole line turned out, and advanced out on the plain to offer battle, remaining in that attitude several hours; but though Moolraj did his best, he was unable to bring his men up to the scratch. Indeed I do not well see how he could, for while we offered him battle on the west of Mooltan, I directed Raja Sher Sing and the Sirdars with him to move their force across the Nullah at Sooraj Koond, and advance upon Mooltan on the eastward as soon as ever they should hear our artillery engaged. The Raja and his army executed this manoeuvre in such a style as even to elicit the admiration of the Puthans I sent to guide them. They took up with alacrity

a very advanced position on the Mooltan Road, and there awaited my orders; and as soon as Lake and Lumsden brought back our army into camp, I then recalled the Raja's army back across the Nullah.

You might with advantage write and compliment the Sirdars and their men on the favourable report I have made of their behaviour on this occasion.

I am afraid that a good many of Sirdar Jhunda Sing's men have deserted to Moolraj from the apprehension that they were about to be discharged at Lahore. Hyattoollah Khan, and his party, have, I hear today, caught 15 Sikhs, and several Golandazes of Jhunda Sing's on their way to Mooltan. It would be well if you were to write and assure Jhunda Sing's Regiment that you have recalled them to Lahore only to guard the Maharajah.

Last night Moolraj fired a salute and gave out that his cavalry had plundered Raja Sher Sing's treasure party between Sirdarpore and Mooltan, but I do not credit it, as two days ago it was agreed between me and the Raja that the treasure should not come beyond Sirdarpore, but cross over the Chenab and come down in boats, and this morning I have just heard that a treasure boat has arrived at the ghat, which, I am in hopes, is the Raja's, but shall know more about it in a few hours.

If the Officer in charge of the treasure has indeed advanced beyond Sirdarpore by land, it would look very much as if he had done so in collusion with the enemy, but I hope better things. The Dewan propagates some new lie every day to keep up the spirits of his men, and as I know he was so badly in want of money a few days ago as to be obliged to melt down all his silver vessels into cash, it is not improbable that this report about seizing the Rajas' treasure has also been coined to meet the emergency of the moment.

The day before yesterday he congratulated his Officers on my having been shot through the chest, and got rid of me at last, paying me the posthumous compliment of calling me a "Sukht jewan!"

188. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Tibbee, 2 Koss from Mooltan, 24th July, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I have received this morning your note of the 20th July, enclosing a note from General Whish of the same date. The route by which the General proposes that the right and left column should converge and meet is *impracticable* for such large bodies of men at almost *any* season of the year; and just now when grass and water are both dried up, the march could *not* be made! It is a pity you did not consult us here about the point of junction; but it is by no means too late. I have been busy all to-day cross-questioning the best informed parties concerning the roads for the two columns; and I will send you the result in a public letter to-morrow; meanwhile I write to ask you to let the General know what I have communicated above, and to tell him that in laying down a new route for the two columns from Toolumba and Kurrumpore, I will study to interfere as little as possible with the General's previously proposed routes; but he would, I am sure, be very displeased with me if I knowingly allowed his army to die of thirst in the jungle. He must make up his mind for the right column to come on from Toolumba to Sirdarpore, as from that place alone is there a practicable route for any army to converge upon another army approaching Mooltan from the south. Please send me a detailed list of the stages which the General intended the two columns to make throughout; and tell the General that I will take care to send two invaluable Puthan Khans to lead his two columns from Sirdarpore and Kurrumpore to such point of junction south east of Mooltan as may be practicable at this season of the year. If the General is in line of Raja Sher Sing's and my dak, it would be a great thing if he would let his aide-de-camp give me a line *every* day to state the General's *movements, intentions, and wishes*, in order that I may not be in the dark about them. Perhaps the Political Officer is the proper person to do this, but if both write it will be better. I cannot understand the object of leaving the siege train and Her Majesty's 32nd Regiment so much in the rear; by the programme you have sent me, it is not contemplated that the left wing of the Queen's 32nd will reach the Ghat opposite Bhawulpore, be-

fore the 15th of August, *ten days after the siege train*, which they will have to accompany several marches in the rear of native portion of the left column. Ask the General whether instead of splitting up his left column into these details, he would not prefer the native portion of the left column being joined by the 32nd and siege train at a point on the Mooltan road equi-distant from Kurrumpore and Bindree Ghat so that the whole of the left column with the heavy guns in one compact body might advance together towards the point of junction with the column from Sirdarpore? Please also inform the General that I have ordered Baba Malee Sing and the Tank Khans to Sirdarpore, and that when the British right column reaches Sirdarpore, the Baba's force will be at the General's disposal, either to remain behind with the depot at Sirdarpore or to accompany his right column on its march to meet the left. The latter I would recommend; but the general is "malik". The more freely the General communicates with me, the better. Pray send a commissariat Officer here at once. Don't let him shirk behind with the columns, for when he comes here, he will be the first man to say "Confound those Politicals, they never have anything. If the Commissariat had only been here, &c., &c.!"

I am delighted to hear your report of the excellent spirit which animates both officers and men coming to Mooltan. It does them credit, and is the best guarantee of success.

All here are well. A tremendous fall of rain to-day. I dare say we shall have no more all the season. I will write more fully tomorrow.

189. *From Lt. H. B. Edwardes, Official No. 45.*

Camp Tibbee, 2 Koss from Mooltan, 26th July, 1848.

Honorable Sir,

In reply to your letter No. 348, forwarding the routes of the Mooltan field force, I have the honour to send through you, and request that after perusal you will be good enough to seal and forward the enclosed letter to the address of Major-General Whish, containing all the information called for by that officer in his letter No. 504, to your address.

2. It is only necessary to add, that if the right column comes on to Surdarpoor as I have suggested (and I see no

other alternative), it will be necessary for Baba Malee Sing to send any detachment to Tolumba, as of course the depot will in that case be at Surdarpoor, a much more convenient distance from Mooltan.

190. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Tibbee, 2 Koss from Mooltan, 27th July, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I received your note of the 24th this morning. I never heard of the extensive desertions from Sher Sing's camp reported to you by the Bhawulpoor Moonshee. If the said Moonshee is Sher Alli, the correctness of his sources of information may be estimated from a letter of his Mooltan news—written yesterday intercepted by Lake—wherein Moolraj's force was stated to be 15,000 men! I shall be happy to eat without sauce every man he has got above 6,000. At the same time there can be no doubt that Raja Sher Sing's camp is in a very ticklish and unsafe condition. This however is no news, I have reported it to you long ago, and doubtless it was one of the arguments which weighed in your mind, when you so judiciously resolved on delaying no longer to send off the British troops to Mooltan and put an end to the rebellion. Neither the Commander-in-Chief nor the Governor General can, I think, be aware of the anxieties and difficulties of my position here, blockading a declared enemy and keeping watch upon most suspicious friends. Perhaps, indeed, I have not sufficiently dwelt upon these matters in my public letters, thinking it no use *talking* about dangers, from which my superiors seemed determined I should not escape in a hurry, *exempli gratia*; last night a large portion of Dewan Moolraj's army advanced from the city to within a Koss of Raja Sher Sing's camp; it is believed on a private understanding with a body called the Charyaree Sowars, that the latter should desert the Raja at the enemy's approach; but the Raja either having information of the treachery, or if there was no treachery, having information of the *bona fide* attack, had all his troops under arms, and thus defeated whatever object was in view. The army retired without effecting anything. One account does say that a hundred sowars went over, but I do not believe it. The Raja comes to me this evening about some

private business of his own (—I rather think concerning the celebration of the Maharajah's marriage with his sister—) and I shall then have an opportunity of asking him plainly all about it.

There is no doubt that all the Sikhs in his camp go and come to Mooltan pretty much as they like; some to buy atta and other requisites in the city (taking advantage of a foolish boast of Moolraj's, that his house and Sher Sing's camp was *one*, and that any Sikh was at liberty to come and buy atta in the city), others to see how Moolraj is going on, with that passion for intrigue peculiar to Sikh soldiers, and not few perhaps to squeeze bribes out of Moolraj in this extremity, under pretence of buying over Sher Sing's army. I even believe that some few desertions from Raja's camp have taken place; but from first to last I should say that a hundred men had not gone over. This is all very bad to be sure, but I say again that it is no news; nothing but what any man of common sense, *who has mixed with Sikh soldiers* would have foreseen from the very first to be inevitable; and that no other remedy could be applied to the evil but that which you *have applied*. I hope and believe that the British troops will be quite in time to *confirm the loyalty* of the Raja's force; at the same time that I feel and see that that loyalty is entirely dependent on the coming or not coming expedition or delay of the British army. Still were the worst to come to the worst, I am quite prepared to engage both Moolraj and all Sher Sing's force united. The battle would be desperate, but, please God, we should win it.

Moolraj two days ago tried to move us from this position by cutting off the small water cuts which supplied our camp, and whose sources unfortunately are in his hands; but we immediately met the move by opening other cuts from another canal in our rear so that we scarcely suffered a few hours inconvenience.

There was no truth in the report that Moolraj had got hold of Sher Sing's 29,000 rupees; the rupees came all safe to hand. With such lies the Dewan keeps up the spirits of his army.

Hyatoolah Khan and his party have crossed to Sirdarpore and I hope will soon be joined by Baba Malee Sing with the guns.

The Raja has come, and I can write no more.

191. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Tibbee, 2 Koss from Mooltan,

6 P.M., 30th July, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Yesterday some Zemindars of a village about 3 koss from the Camp petitioned us to send some camels under an escort to bring away their grain as Dewan Moolraj has been plundering the adjacent country all round the city, and the Zemindars were afraid that he would come to them next.

Accordingly a hundred camels under guard of 300 sowars and some footmen were sent this morning to the village to bring away the grain; but moving of late, and being still further delayed by water on the road, it seems that Dewan Moolraj got tidings of the move in time to send 2000 horses and Zumboorahs by a short cut (I don't think so many but they say 2,000) and surprised our party so completely that all the camels were cut off, and 4 Surwans and 3 soldiers killed. The cavalry seeing themselves outnumbered absconded, in which they were quite right, but, I think, had they behaved well they might have brought the camels away with them. When I heard of this, magnified a 1000 times of course by report, I sent almost all our cavalry to support the party in advance, and thinking that perhaps Moolraj might follow up his first success, we all agreed that the best plan was to be prepared for him; so Lake Lumsden and Cortlandt took the whole force down and made a sweep in front of the bridge by the Bohur Gate of the city, at the same time repeating the manoeuvre of moving Sher Sing's force across the Sooraj Koond Nullah. All ended in smoke, the Dewan's troops having no stomach for another general action. It is provoking however to have lost so many camels. I write this in haste lest the post should take you false reports of the affair.

192. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Tibbee, 2 Koss from Mooltan,
31st July, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I have received the proclamations for the inhabitants of Mooltan and have taken measures for their publication. I have also had one pasted on the door of a Musjid, and one on a Shivallah in the city. The Hindoos of Mooltan are thorough Moofsids and deserve all they get, but it is right to give them warning. Enclosed I send you a note which came from Abbott mis-directed to me. I can only conclude it was intended for you or Inglis. I am glad to get it out of my camp for fear it should set fire to the Magazine. You will laugh when I tell you that I received it on the "dies asignata." Were my nerves weak, such letter would either make me run away as the Mofussilite says, with a "rah-dekhlana walla or guide", or drive me mad at any post. It is a pity to say so brave and chivalrous a man as Abbott turning Quixotte with a fevered imagination, and seeing giants in every wind-mill. I have this day sent off 402 fine camels for the siege train. Sadik Mohammed Khan went off yesterday in the *Conqueror* steamer to Sirdarpore, whence he will proceed by land to meet the General at Tolumba and guide the right column from that place via Sirdarpore to Mooltan. The steamer will also go on to Tolumba to make herself generally useful. Three days ago I also sent off Moostuffa Khan Khazwanee to guide Brigadier Salter's column from Loodun. I fancy the Moon-gul Sing whose 4000 sowars you heard had deserted to the enemy, means Sirdar Soorjun Sing Mokul, whose sawars are indeed much discontented with him on account of his not paying them up. Eleven of them have been reported to me as having gone over to the enemy, and to give the rest no excuse for following their example, I have today advanced Soorjun Sing, 2,000 Rupees. As a jageerdar the Sirdar has no excuse, but I am anxious to get over the next fortnight with as little open treachery as possible. Unlike Abbott, I believe the Sirdars to be generally well content with the part assigned them under our administration, namely "consumere fruge." The lesson which I believe the rebellion reads us is to pursue steadily Henry Lawrence's wise policy with respect

to the upper classes; but unsparingly and firmly to remodel to our own purposes the Sikh army. It will be a task of considerable difficulty, but it is one with which you must grapple as soon as the Mooltan rebellion is put down. If you agree with me in this *now*, while we are looking the corruption of the Sikh army in the face, you should write it up on the wall in capital letters as a thing **TO BE DONE** to prevent the errors of easy oblivion and contempt of experience, which when the crisis is past so commonly creeps over our Government, as if at one blow we had fought all posterity, and the enemies we had slain had left wisdom in entail to all their sons.

Kindly interest yourself in securing to Shumshere Sing the house in Umritsur given by Runjeet Sing to his family some 40 years ago. If the house[s] confiscated by Runjeet Sing and bestowed upon his Sirdars are to be now recoverable by the heirs of the original owners, every man at court will be turned out of doors.

193. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Tibbee, 2 Koss from Mooltan,
3rd August, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I have little doubt that the Kurrumpoor canal is perfectly navigable for any boats on the Sutlej, but I am almost afraid that the train will have past the mouth of the canal before the General's orders for coming by Kurrumpoor can reach Major Garbett. You say you are "amused at my notion of Moolraj moving out to attack the right column," and that you and the Brigadier made merry over my timidity. I never had any notion of the sort; but from what I heard of the General, I expected *he* would have; and it appears I judged my man very correctly, as will appear in the following quotations from the General's public letter, No. 524, in answer to mine. "I shall be obliged by your letting me know how matters are ten days hence, and *whether there will be any risk in my proceeding independently to Hurree Sing's well.*"

The steamer is today at Tolumba, two marches from the left column. The proclamations have been thoroughly pub-

lished in Mooltan, and much enraged Moolraj. Eighteen soldiers came away the next day, and I gave them a rahdaree to their own country. Moolraj has taken it into his head that we have sent bravos to assassinate him. I have had many offers to execute much detestable service, but need not say declined them. I am going to hang Loonga Mull to-morrow (the rebel kardar of Dera Ghazee Khan). I have not previously had time to look over his case, but it became necessary to do so, as he commenced intriguing again, though in irons; the example will be timely just now. No more news of the Futteh Pultan. I hear daily now from the General's camp. Price does not seem to be much in the General's secrets. Beecher is all questions; but I have stopped all their mouths by sending them Sadik Mahommed, who will answer anything for 50 miles round Mooltan. Baba Malee Sing has at last arrived at Sirdarpore. He strikes me as being very ill inclined. He has given me a plain answer that I can have no supplies from his country. I have told him, that if he does not bring 20,000 maunds of grain to the godown at Sirdarpore, I will get him turned out of his office. Please tell Misr Sahib Dyal to brush him up, as he cannot humbug me to believe that there is no grain in Jhung. Lake is unwell, something like cholic, but the Doctor says nothing serious. The two wounds in my hand will, I hope, be healed up to-morrow or next day, when I shall get my arm in a sling. The troops all healthy. I do not think I ever mentioned to you that we have in camp a young volunteer named James, brother of Captain James, Deputy Collector Sukkur; he is expecting a cadetship, and like young Norral, having "heard of battles," he "longed to follow to the field," &c., &c.

P.S. Do not forget to send me an answer about the marriage of the Maharajah.

194. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Tibbee, 2 Koss from Mooltan,

5th August, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I have this morning received your note of the 2nd. I am glad you consent to the Maharajah's marriage being cele-

brated, though you do not agree with me as to its having a tendency to settle the minds of the Sikhs at this crisis. Of course I shall do nothing to compromise the Government to any line of policy.

Enclosed I send you a proclamation which Dewan Moolraj sent to Raja Sher Sing's camp as a foil to yours, also a letter from the Dewan to the Raja; both of them are evidently genuine, and require no comment; they speak for themselves. Lake will have told you all about them in his note of this morning; I merely send them for yours' and the Raja's satisfaction; they are indeed curious, both of them, and the most unmistakable documents I have yet seen during the rebellion. How Abbot would stare, were such a document to fall into his hands, is indeed sufficient to fire asbestos. Soojan Singh, who is the ring-leader in the disaffection of the Raja's camp, has been seized by the Raja and confined. The Raja and the other two Sirdars called upon me last night in great perturbation about these said papers and the poisoning affair, which latter is rather suspicious, but not substantiated. I told the Raja that the best thing was to get over the next week as quietly as possible. He replied triumphantly, "That is just what I told the Sirdars, and we have agreed to spin out this conspiracy of Soojan Sing by examining one witness a day." There is no doubt that the whole of that camp in native phrase have had their mouths very wide open for the last week, but since Soojan Sing's capture all has settled down marvellously into perfect quiet. In the same way the hanging of Loonga Mull has had a wonderful effect in Mooltan; all the Dewan's privy councillors have been consulting among themselves how they shall escape a similar fate, but I hope they will not succeed. The astrologers have persuaded Dewan Moolraj that he is unlucky in command of the army, and accordingly he has made over the command to his brother Sham Sing; but I think it will require a Napoleon to get them out of their difficulties. I am not obliged to Napier for his remarks about our piquets. If he will only play his guns as well as my piquets do their duty, we shall be able soon to congratulate each other on the end of the rebellion.

195. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp, 7th August, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I received yours of the 4th this morning. The Bindree Ghat route seems determined upon for the siege train; I should not wonder if Napier himself be at the Ghat to-morrow.

Enclosed I send you another proclamation more truculent than insidious and looking as if it had been written by a butcher with a blunt skewer. The best of it is it professes to come from Maharajah Duleep Sing! It was found suspended on a tree in the Rajah's camp. Desertion goes on merrily in that force; but appearances are still kept up by the great body of the camp which is all I care about. Last night a division of Moolraj's moved out along the Mooltan side of the Nullah towards Sooraj Koond and drawing two guns on to the top of the high bank of the Nullah made a clumsy attempt to enfilade the Rajah's camp but they only killed a Jackass after all. As for the intention of playing false, which you say well informed people at Lahore report Shere Sing's force to entertain, I cannot understand why they should wait for the siege and not avail themselves of the present opportunity of striking a blow with effect. Depend upon it no Seikh will be ambitious of going over when the Fort is beseiged. I send you the last *ackbar* from Mooltan to which I have only to add that Sham Sing, Moolraj's brother, got a severe fall from his horse yesterday which not only shook his bones but his belief in astrology. All our party are complaining today of seedines and try to make out that Moolraj poisoned the pudding on the "Salmon" yesterday at dinner. Myself I attribute it to the beer.

P.S. Please stir up the Darbar to send the *horses* and *harness* required by Cortlandt for the conquered guns. They are much wanted. Two maunds of a sort of steel called Ispat are badly wanted for the workshop and cannot be got here.

196. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Mooltan, 13th August, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I regret much to hear of the disturbances in Huzarah;

but how instructive is its occurrence at this moment in spite of its being publicly known that a British army is in the field. What would have been the state of the country had you left me unsupported here and taken no notice of the rebellion till the cold weather? Sirdar Chuttur Sing seems to me to have behaved weakly but naturally in trying to conceal from your knowledge to the last moment the disaffection of the Khalsa troops under his command. I do not like Abbott to attribute this to treachery; adhering to my old argument of the interests of his family. His son the Rajah behaved in exactly the same manner to me on his first arrival, stoutly denying the desertions from his camp until they became too public for concealment; since which time the Rajah has made no bones of assuring me in confidence that he and Shumshere Sing are quite prepared to pitch into all the *cash-paid* Sowars of Uttar Sings.

I should think the measure Abbott has resorted to of raising the Mussulman population will prove sufficient, *if not too much!* What a strange spectacle is this! After striving for nearly three years to maintain a Hindoo state between us and the great Mahomedan world, we are reduced to call upon the Mahomedans themselves to assist us. My absence from the Residency has left me quite in the dark as to the intentions of Government and Lord Dalhousie's view of recent events, but I should think another demonstration of British power in the shape of a visit from the Governor General with an army of escort in the next cold weather would be most politic; and if any such intention exist it will soon be time enough to commence the assemblage of the troops on the frontier; preparations which at this moment would not be without a salutary effect on the people of the Punjab. I have heard no more of the Futteh Puttan.

The siege train is much behind hand; and what is worse Col. Drummond wants the right and left column to halt where they are until the big guns can come up; just as if the guns were to protect the army instead of the army to cover the guns! Some day this man will be a Major General; think of *that*? General Whish (if I may judge from his correspondence) is by no means the old woman he has been accounted.

With reference to Tej Sing's recommendations to scatter the Charyareh Sowars, tell him the trick is too stale.

The moment Jowahir Mull detached the Churunjeets, they saw they were suspected and went over to Moolraj.

When Mooltan is invested we can dispense with a good many useless hangers-on. I send you a copy of my public letter to the General about stopping up the canals and if the General agrees to my plan, Napier's heart's wish will be obtained in a day or two.

I am somewhat alarmed about the supplies for the British forces who are already crying out. As yet no news whatever of that inefficient department, the Commissariat, who should have sent some part of their establishment on here a fortnight ago. I thought you had taken measures for a boundless supply of grain from the valley of the Sutledge and trust you did not overlook what I said so long ago, viz., that the resources of this country are fully called upon by the large armies already in and around Mooltan.

We contemplate changing places with Shere Sing's force in a day or two so as to be able to co-operate with the General on his approach.

Lake has so fully described this move to you that I need say no more about it. The time is getting now very exciting and I am happy to say that as I have got my hand into a sling I shall be able to get on horseback and take part in whatever is going on.

197. *From (Dr.) John Jones Cole to Sir Frederick Currie*
Camp Mooltan, August 15th, 1848.

Hon'ble Sir,

I am sure you will be much pleased to hear, and consequently it gives me additional pleasure to say that Lieut. Edwardes' hand is completely healed. There will be more or less stiffness of the fingers for some time, and difficulty in using the hand, but he will be able to write *with it* in the course of a week. The wounded in the late battles are doing as well as I could wish; many have been discharged cured. All the wounded in the last skirmish are out of danger, and progressing famously, and I am still able to say have lost only one patient.

The officers here have had slight colds, the effect, I think, of the great change in the weather. For the last fortnight the heat has been many degrees less than when I arrived. At noon in the sun, the thermometer stands at 143° . In my hill-tent, without tatties, it ranges from 98 to 104. With tatties in a large tent 88 and 90. At midnight it usually stands at 84, sinking towards morning as low as 72 and 74 degrees. I think it is by no means unhealthy, in the neighbourhood of Mooltan at this season of the year, neither have I reason to think it so at any other except when much rain falls (which occasionally happens); then, I am informed, the natives suffer much from ague, and this I can well believe, as great numbers apply with enlarged spleen. The natives are generally a well grown, athletic people, but I fear much addicted to intemperance.

198. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Sooraj-kond, 17th August, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

This is one of my first efforts with my right hand, of which however I never hope to recover the perfect use.

We have all been half poisoned, whether accidentally or by Moolraj is doubtful; but I rather suspect the latter, as the Dewan is known to have lately seriously meditated our assassination.

You will be glad that we have effected our move towards the British troops. It was "a delicate combination," but I thought every dawd from Huzara would make it more so; I am glad it is over.

The enclosed copy of my letter to the General will tell you what I think of the Attareewallah Share in these disturbances; but the fact is not to be denied that the conduct of Sikh soldiers is quite independent of the opinions and wishes of their Sirdars; so that whether Shere Sing is concerned or not, his force is equally to be mistrusted if the Sikh regiments in Huzara (joined by those from Hussun Ubdal) obtaining any advantage over Abbott's insurgents or break out of Huzara. While I am writing a soldier-spy of Cortlandt reports that the arrival of two sowars with letters from Huzara has thrown the Raja's camp into a ferment, as Chuttur Sing is said to

have written to his son that he (C. S.) is so involved in the mess that nothing can save their family but the success of Moolraj, to promote which the Raja is exhorted to go over at once, with all his own force, and as much of mine as he can seduce.

This is what I dreaded. I had written a friendly letter of good advice to Chuttur Sing in the morning, and one to the Raja assuring him he should have an honorable post in the approaching operations.

I have now sent for the Raja's motbir and shall tell him plainly what I have heard, and my advice that if his father is mad or rebellious, that is no reason why he should be so too.

Enclosed is an *Ukhbar* which will give you the particulars of Moolraj's unsuccessful attack last night on the General's camp.

199. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Sooruj-kond, 18th August, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I write a few lines to tell you that I had a long and most satisfactory visit from the Raja this morning, in which I trust I fully set his mind at rest, as he did mine, by his straightforward explanations, and sensible remarks about his father's position. I will write you a detailed public letter about it tomorrow, having been prevented to-day by the hurry and bustle consequent on the arrival of the right column. I was prevented by the Raja's visit from waiting on the General, this morning, but Lake went to see him, and narrowly escaped being shot by the advance guard as a Moolrajan. The backwardness of the siege train is very much to be regretted, not only for the bad moral effect but because the Dewan has thus time to strengthen his outworks. I do not think Moolraj will now venture upon an engagement in the open plain, but he will scatter entrenchments and batteries all across our road, out of which of course the big guns will very soon drive him. I do not know what the General's views may be, but I shall give my voice for not attacking until the heavy guns came up, and make success not only sure but instantaneous and overwhelming. After waiting six weeks for the heavy guns, it

would, I think, be absurd to commence hostilities a day or two before their arrival.

Brigadier Salter might join the General tomorrow if he liked, but I expect he will not come till the day after.

Glover, who is engaged in damming up the head of the canal, has failed as yet, and it remains to be seen whether he will succeed at all. At any rate my predictions are justified that it would not prove such an easy matter as Napier supposed.

200. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Seetul Ke Maree, 24th August, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I have been spending the day with the General and talking over our prospects; and as I have not had time to write to you for some days, I steal half an hour to do so now, though I have little to tell.

Napier has not yet arrived, but the General has written to him to-day to beg that he will leave his subordinates to bring on the train and come on ahead himself to reconnoitre and arrange a plan of attack.

The heavy guns will start from Bindree Ghat tomorrow, and will therefore be here on the last day of the month, when *adieu to the Buniyeah*.

I must tell you a good joke of the Moolraj family. Throughout the rebellion Moolla's mother has been in the habit of *sacrificing* at the shrine of Bhawul Huk in the fort and praying "That her son might not only conquer the English but afterwards the *Sikhs*, and become *King of the Punjab*." Moolraj also put up similar prayers. Since the British troops have arrived, the aspiration has been moderated into "O Lord, put mercy into the hearts of the *Feringees*."

Moolraj seems to have given up all idea of fighting outside and is strengthening the city and Fort. I am buying one or two gates to diminish, if possible, the loss of life in taking possession of the city. Squabbles take place every day between the camp followers and the enemy's piquets, and the General lost an elephant the other day. But we shall find him again soon no doubt! The companies of H. M. 32nd march in to-morrow. The two hot days cut them up very much; but the cool wind returned again; and on the whole I

fancy there is not so much sickness in the force as you have in Lahore.

Soojan Sing was made over to Raja Sher Sing the day before yesterday to be hanged to-day; but to-day being the Iykadshee (on which a hanged criminal goes to heaven, and the judge to the Devil), the execution has been deferred till to-morrow. Sher Sing wished violently to get off hanging him in this camp, but I thought it indispensable not only to mark the Raja's participation in the judgment but to make him declare himself on our side in this political crisis by an act as marked as that committed by his father in opposition to Abbott in Huzara. The execution will no doubt be very impopular with "the punt"; indeed Sher Sing sent his Motbir to tell me that I must not desert him afterwards. The Sikh party ought not in my opinion to be yielded to at this moment in so plain a case.

Pollock, having no duties in the General's camp, has joined me.

Kunyah Lal, Hookm Chund, and Rattan Chund Doogul have all got their rookhsut, and fly the sound of cannon balls.

The canal mouths cannot be stopped, yet though an Engineer has been at work on them nine days. So much for Napier's easy job.

I have been unwell the last ten days—my wound and confinement to bed having pulled me down much, but the siege will put me all up again.

Give my love to the Brigadier and tell him never to believe that I have been thrashed by Moolraj even if the prettiest woman in Lahore tell him so in a whisper.

Have you any news from Lawrence in England. People here say he is coming out in the cold weather.

201. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Sooruj-koond, 25th August, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I am afraid I have been very irregular in my writing of late, but I have been anything but well, and since the General's arrival, I had so many demands on my time, in the shape of notes, that I have been glad to get Lake or Lumsden to write you the little news we had. I will tell all the young

fellows to write more regularly, and when affairs become more interesting (that is when Military operations actually commence) you may rely on hearing from me every day. On return from the General's camp late last evening, I found Raja Sher Sing waiting for me here, and had a long and satisfactory interview with him. He and I get on very well together, and I am doing all I can to inspire him with confidence. Like every native, he can scarcely get over the idea that he must be responsible for the misdeeds of his relations. My task of late has been to assure him that if his father were to charge Abbott sword in hand, he, Sher Sing, would not be taken up even on suspicion. Last night he brought me a letter from his father, full of a sulky kind of loyalty, almost as dangerous as rebellion, complaining bitterly of Abbott, whose suspicions and treachery (Munsoobuh) had driven him to adopt military measures to guard his life and honor. Lastly, Sher Sing would not be contented without my promising him a letter, assuring him, that he would not be called upon to answer for his father's misconduct. On the whole, he left me under the impression that he almost despaired of an amicable settlement in Huzara, and, like the unjust Steward, is making up his book with the English, "that they may receive him into their houses." This is all as we could wish, and I have endeavoured to set his conduct as much as possible in contrast to his father's. I hope he executed Soojan Sing this morning; it was settled last night that Soojan Sing was to be blown away from a gun, instead of hanged; and I heard a gun in Sher Sing's camp this morning, though, as yet, I have had no report of the execution.

Two of Moolraj's emissaries have been caught tempering with the Sepoys in Major Finnis' regiment. The General wrote to ask my opinion what to do;* I said, assemble a Drum-head Court Martial made up of native non-commissioned officers, and having proved the offence hang both of the culprits before all the force and the Mooltan fort, in sight of both

* That of a General commanding an Army, writing to ask a young Lieutenant what he should do with emissaries from the Enemy detected in tempering with his soldiers!! (F.C.?).

friend and foe. One of them is discharged trooper of the 11th Light Cavalry.

Our dak goes now along with the General's, so that you ought to get letters at the same date from both camps.

Moolraj's garrison shall be formally summoned to surrender as you desire.

Jowahir Mull Dutt and Shaikh Emamooddeen are both along with me and consider that they are doing enormous service—a very harmless delusion.

I shall of course attend to your wishes in consulting Napier on his arrival as to your views of Mooltan affairs generally; though, I think, those affairs are now pretty well removed into the hands, or rather mouths of the Siege guns, those best of all political agents. The dam at the head of the canal burst again yesterday; and all that has resulted from trying to stop it up, has been to make it larger. Eight companies of the 32nd Regiment joined the General this morning, and the heavy guns start to-day from the Ghat, so that our shooting season will commence on the 1st of September as usual.

202. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Sooruj-koond, 27th August, 1848.

My dear Sir,

I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter this morning of the 24th, and can easily understand your vexation and anxiety about the Huzara affair, which, if it goes any further, will, of course, embroil the whole country, for I cannot conceive the Huzara troops going regularly into rebellion, without their example being immediately followed at Peshawur and Bunnoo, and this would almost seem to be the general expectation. Altogether, a more untimely accident could not have happened. Dewan Moolraj, in his Durbar yesterday, is said to have read out a letter largely signed by Sikh officers, promising the immediate aid of six regiments and some guns from Huzara. An Akali present in the Durbar, after every paragraph of the letter shouted the *Futteh Wah-goor-roojee*, &c., &c., and the assembly echoed, *Akal! Akal!* It is by no means improbable that such a document may have arrived,

but, it is just as probable that it is forged to encourage Moolraj's troops. I have sent word to Misr Rulla Ram to give me early information of a move in Huzara; and, I think, if Misr Sahib Dyal's kardars were to exert themselves at all in Jhung, they would intercept some of these messengers that come and go. I fancy now that the siege train will not be up before the 3rd or 4th, a most lamentable delay at this crisis. Once the guns arrive, and Dewan Moolraj is shut up in his Fort, it would matter little what amount of Sikh troops may come to his assistance. Desertion is again going on pretty freely in Sher Sing's force, and the Raja complains that the other Sirdars do not report them to him; so I am going to request that a daily report may be furnished for your satisfaction; this, I trust, will be a check upon all parties. On the whole, when one comes to look north, east, south, and west, it must be owned that the Punjab is at this moment in a most unsatisfactory condition, and it makes one indignant to perceive also that this is not from any mal-administration of the country which has made the *people* discontented. Such a cry against us would be most just and righteous. But on the contrary, the people of the Punjab repose contentedly under the protection our courts of justice afford them against the great; and our only enemies are the Sikh army whom we spared in 1846. It is a long while ago now since I ventured to hint to you in one of my letters the propriety of drawing all our Frontier troops nearer to Lahore. Things have gone on so far with the Sikh troops that, in any event, their conduct should not, I think, be passed over without some strong mark of British disapprobation. If the Huzara force should march upon Mooltan tomorrow, you will be involved in a Punjab war. *Are you prepared for such an event?* If the Huzara disturbance be happily got over (as I am inclined to think it will be), an army will still be necessary to march to Lahore, and enable you to remodel the Khalsa Army, or modify the treaty in any other way the British Government may deem necessary. The example we have just had shows how unprepared the Military authorities are to bring an army into the field, if suddenly required.

203. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Sooruj-koond, 29th August, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I write a hasty note to acknowledge the receipt of yours of 26th.

The state of affairs you describe is indeed portentous and will I am afraid plunge us again into an extensive war, just as we thought peace was about to be ensured by the fall of Mooltan. You are doubtless preparing for the worst while hoping for the *best*; and in *any* event, peace or war, the assembly of an army on the Frontier would seem to be inevitable. The sooner it is done the better, that we may not be again reproached with being taken by surprise.

In the event of hostilities suddenly breaking out, I would remind you of the enormous and most efficient siege train which Sir Charles Napier has left in the fort of Bukker, and which steamers would bring up either to Bhawulpore or Ferozepore in a very few days. Apropos of the great King of Cashmere, I must tell you that Sirdar Shumshere Sing only this morning warned me that if Chuttur Sing rebels, he will be supported through thick and thin by Maharajah Golab Sing who *exchanged turbans* with him in days of yore. The Sindhanwallahs are enemies of Golab Sing's; but there is this to be said that it is only from an enemy you can get the truth when it is disagreeable.

How I wish the guns were up. Napier has arrived this morning in the General's camp, and I shall go over tomorrow to discuss this Huzara news, and the measures it will become us to take if any overt act takes place.

Look well to *the person of the Maharaja*, for Shumshere Sing says Chuttur Sing will try to get him carried off while out riding or at the Shalamar Gardens, and then *ask us to account for fighting against Dulleep Sing, with whom we made a treaty!* This communicativeness of Shumshere Sing looks as if he thought the affair was too far gone to be concealed. Never mind. We have one army in the field, and I trust will soon have another, when with "*Dien et mon droit*" as our motto, who can doubt we shall defeat all our enemies, if we are only true to ourselves, and act with *decision* and *vigour*.

204. *From Herbert Edwardes.*

The General's camp, before Mooltan,
30th August, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I received your note of 27th this morning. The news seems to me no better than yesterday, except that Abbott had doubled back on Chuttur Sing and so put him between himself and Nicholson.

The account given by the Sikh Regiment at Gujrat is plausible; but supposing M.G.S. to be siding with Chuttur Sing, he would certainly not have sent a Regiment with any excuse that was *not* plausible. I am afraid we are on the eve of very general disturbance; but I do not see any just cause for alarm in any quarter except Peshawur and Huzara where the lives of our political officers must certainly be at hazard. At Lahore you are just as strong as if no force had come to Mooltan, and have reserves in Julundur, the Hills, &c. All you have to do is to draw them together.

Here at Mooltan we have some little anxiety till Sher Sing's force take a decided line; but if enemies, we shall know what to do with them. As you say that your letter of terms would reach C.S. on 26th, the General and I think it better to wait for the result before we settle anything about Sher Sing's force. I propose cramming them at one of the city gates and giving all the traitors an opportunity to go over.

The big guns are to be here on 4th.

Napier goes over to my camp at Soorajkoond this evening and settles a new ground for me nearer the city tomorrow morning, which I shall take up next day while Napier and the General make simultaneously a reconnaissance north of the Fort.

All the Europeans are well and jolly—no sickness.

My hand is all wrong again but I have got the use of my *pen fingers*.

When you speak of my installing Cortlandt in the Nizamut of Mooltan, do you mean *immediately* or after the capture of Mooltan? In either case it had better come authoritatively from you.


You doubt Moolraj being so weak as I state, but I do not estimate his force above 7000 men at the most, 50 guns and 5 mortars.

205. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Byragee Bagh, before Mooltan,
1st September, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I write a hasty line (as I know you are anxious) to tell you that by the General's wish I changed my ground this morning as follows:—



The heavy guns of the town or fort now roll their balls just into our camp; so we are coming to close quarters.

We did not effect the move without sharp skirmishing with the enemy which lasted many hours, and sniping all day. Little loss.

Sheikh Emamooddeen has covered himself with glory; and Sher Sing without any orders from me brought his guns up on to the Nullah and enfiladed the enemy in style, suggesting however the unpleasant idea that he might just as easily enfilade us. For the sake of *friendship* however we must run the risk.

The General during our move made a reconnaissance to the northward.

Tommorrow more particulars.

I am afraid we shall be harrassed during the night, the ground between us and the city being very Moodkee-like! The üly old General has shoved me into the thick of it to cover his siege train.

P.S. Please write and butter the Sheikh and the Sher.

206. *From Herbert Edwardes*

3rd September, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

All going on well. I spoke very seriously to Shere Sing last night about his father, and he declared his father might raise the whole country if he liked, but he and Golab Sing would be the first to pitch into him.

This minute I have news that Shere Sing has (untold) gone out and attacked Moolraj's troops at the Shivalla bridge and was gaining considerable advantage when the enemy opened the fort guns on him and drove back the *Sings*, who seem not to have shared very heartily in Sher Sing's appetite for loyal fighting.

This is capital. He has now committed himself with all the Sikhs inside and outside of Mooltan, and I trust will continue his hitherto admirable conduct. I will write about him publicly to you tomorrow, but I am now worried to death, and the fort guns are dropping it into our camp pretty accurately, though as yet no harm done. Big guns to-morrow, Tuesday day of grace, next day at it, I fancy.

207. *From Herbert Edwardes*

General's camp, Evening,
6th September, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

We have been all day since breakfast discussing a plan of attack on Mooltan in the General's tent.

Orators —

General Whish, Major Napier, Major Garbett,
Capt. Siddons, Capt. Garforth, Capt. Whish, Col.

Drummond, Major Becher, Lieut. Lake, General Cortlandt, Lieut. Erwardes.

Conceive the row! Being all men of independence, we each had our own opinion and scorned agreement with anybody else; but having thrown up an extensive parallel of ham sandwiches and opened a sharp fire of corks on the subject, we took it ultimately without much loss of temper.

To be serious—Napier offered two lines of proceeding, 1st to take Mooltan city by assault and 2ndly to attack the citadel and not the town.

The 1st was under supposition that political reasons rendered an immediate success necessary at any cost of life.

The General submitted it to me and I gave it as my opinion that it was too *late* with reference to Chuttur Sing to trust to a moral effect, and that the loss of life would tell against us in public opinion. Moreover I thought (now you have moved Dena Nath) that nothing will be done by Chuttur Sing or the Peshawur troops till the interview has taken place between D.N. and C.S. If D.N. thinks rebellion safe, C.S. will rebel, if D.N. thinks loyalty requisite, C.S. will be suddenly loyal.

This being the case, "assault" was given up as running an unnecessary risk, and Napier laid before the General his plan for attacking the citadel from the north.

This he said was the most *military* proceeding; but then many things were to be considered against it, viz., the apparent change of plan and consequent reports of *defeat* which would be set about, the communications endangered with Bhawulpore, the want of water, &c., &c.

Ultimately this was given up and a plan adopted for taking the city by regular approach and breach which will occupy about 7 or 8 days. Myself, I quite think the safest and surest plan has been chosen, and however valuable a "moral effect" might be at this moment, a *failure* would be ruin.

We open our first parallel tomorrow at sunrise. The General changing his right to his left, and I my left to my right, so as to bring us nearly together.

I have not time to write much now but may say that Napier and I have had much conversation about Punjab

affairs, and are mutually agreed that the times require the *immediate* assembly of an army able to reconquer the Punjab—I mean a British India Army and not a Bengal one, Bombay troops, Sukkur guns, &c., &c.

I will write a public letter as you desire about Bhaie Maharaj. My belief is that he was drowned and the Mooltan resuscitation, an imposture.

Mr. Commissioner Brown from Sindh has arrived in the Napier Steamer.

208. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Byragee Garden,
8th September, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Shumshere Sing sent me word this morning that the Charyaree Dera of Uttur Sing Kaneanwallah's force had a meeting last night at a garden near their own force and agreed to demand from Uttur Sing their 7 or 8 months' arrears of pay, or else demand their discharge that they might go where they liked.

I am anxious to see whether they will do so; and if so what poor old Uttur Sing will say to them. From all accounts the Raja's camp is once more all wrong in consequence of the Huzara row, and Sheikh Emamooddeen told me this morning that some of the Sirdars are now concerned with their men, *and that at last Sher Sing's fidelity is giving way*, after (he says) two months' temptation by his father, to whom hitherto he has replied only with reproaches.

I will write you an official account of my interview with the Sheikh, but at present have only time to say that his view is that Chuttur Sing looks to the support of the Barukzye Sirdars (on a promise of Peshawur!) he having changed turbans with Sooltan Muhommed years ago, and also the support of Maharajah Golab Sing, if he gets these he will not come in, if he is disappointed by the Rosy, and the uxorious too, he will come in with Dena Nath. The Sheikh says the Rosy will put C.S. up to mischief and then desert him without leaving a trace of his interference behind. Emamooddeen esteems Golab Sing Pohoovindeah, the Pehawur artil-

lery, and all the Mussulman regiments there, as true, and safe, also the Yoozoofzyes.

The times are strange, and seems, tending to Punjab annexation irresistibly. I hope the Governor General will listen to your representations and bring the resources of the Empire to bear as rapidly as possible north of the Sutlej. We cannot be reproached with having failed in our duty to the Maharajah, if it turns out that these schemes were prior to the Mooltan rebellion, and not engendered by its temporary success, and if it be ordered that the Punjab shall join the rest of India under Xtian dominion, it must not be wondered at that all our exertions for nearly 3 years have failed to prop up the Khalsa throne.

How poor Lawrence will grieve over all this!

209. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Byragee Garden,
10th September, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

With reference to your confidential note of 6th September (which I regret I have not sooner been able to acknowledge) I assure you I am sincerely obliged for the kind feeling which induced you to erase the objectionable expression of opinion from my letter No. 58, par: 2. I cannot either be otherwise than grateful for the consideration which prompted Lord Dalhousie to convey his displeasure through you privately, instead of officially. It is more than I had any reason to anticipate from that quarter.

In taxing me with indiscreet, unbecoming, and unnecessary conduct in describing as *breach of faith* a policy which the powers that be contemplated adopting, His Lordship presupposes that I was privy to their design, whereas I have had no more knowledge of Lord Dalhousie's opinions since his assumption of the Government, than of those of the Emperor of China.

It would be gross insolence indeed were I to animadvert upon any policy which the G.G. had openly espoused, and declared wise and honest. Whatever I might think of the integrity or nullity of the Treaty, I should certainly not be

so hardy as to say it was unbroken, should Lord D. assert it to be broken.

You may believe me when I say that my opinion came involuntarily from my heart to my pen, and that I expressed it with as little intention of offence as if I had been talking of the weather appearing to *me* hot or cold. The lesson is very proper to be learnt, and in future I will endeavour to prune my letters down into matter of fact reports, leaving the divine office of reasoning to those who have a right to it.

If I live long enough of course I shall realize the Hindoo's metempsychosis and pass from my present subordinate stage of dumb animal into the superior existence of an intelligent being, there is a time for all things.

You surprise me greatly by saying that Lord D. is kindly disposed towards me, and will "honor and reward me as Governor General to the utmost of his power." It surely was in his power to grant the favour you requested, of the two battles being acknowledged in the Government Gazette. When so simple a gratification as this is denied, to what other conclusion can I come than that my services are displeasing to the Governor General. Do not pray accuse me of self-praise if I venture to mention by way of *justification* that is *unprecedented* in our army for a young Lieutenant to have had the good fortune to command an army in two pitched battles, and though it is true the army was not a British one, yet the *cause* was that of my Government, and not that of any other Government, and it strikes me as a most ungenerous thing to disavow me.

I did not mean ever to have expressed my bitter disappointment to you, but it has been *thawed* out of me by the unexpected gleam of sunshine which glows in the sentence "honor and reward—utmost power &c., &c."

I am sorry to tell you Sher Sing's force is all going to the dogs; and I am now going over to the General to consult what to do with them. The Sirdars came to me in the evening for the same purpose. The men seem to have refused this morning to entrench themselves, and some went over to the enemy in open day.

210. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Napier's tent,
13th September, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

You will I am afraid blame me for not writing, but the fact is that the *physical* work (running about trenches, visiting posts, &c., &c.) is now so heavy in addition to current duties, that it is impossible to report to you as fully as I ought and could wish. I sieze a spare moment while waiting at Napier's tent for a conference with the General to tell you that the state of the Sikh force having reached so bad a pitch that they were likely to go over any day, I deemed it right to lay the facts before the General and take his orders. He advised that the Sikh force be ordered to Lahore forthwith, which could not of course be so easily done as said. In the course of two interviews however I got the three Sirdars to agree to the following plan:—

Sirdar Uttur Sing's division to be ordered to Toloombah to keep open the road, and stop the influx of Sikhs!

Sirdar Shumsher Sing's division to do the same at Kur-rumpore.

Raja Sher Sing's to fall back on the Ferry and protect that until the other 2 divisions have got far enough away when the Raja and his troops are to join me and share in the operations (as they have hitherto shown every willingness to do).

The Sirdars of course wished the Raja to be sent away also, but the Raja has really behaved so well, lost so much credit with his own nation from siding with us, and showed such strong repugnance to going back under a cloud to Lahore, that I agreed to keep him more particularly as Napier is very seriously calling out for more men, and the Raja has about 1500 Mussulmans who once in our camp will be safe. The Raja's 6 guns and 2 mortars were also objects desirable to secure.

It now remains to be seen whether the Sikhs will allow the Sirdars to carry this arrangements into effect. My own belief is that the *very* ill-disposed will go over to the enemy at once, and those who are only doubtful will be rather glad to get out of the scrape.

At any rate we shall ascertain our exact position with reference to them, and get the air cleared. It was a difficult negotiation, and I only succeeded in it from being previously on very friendly terms with all three chiefs, who consequently believed me when I assured them that I was quite satisfied with the part they have personally played and that both I, and you, will uphold them against any taunts which their enemies in the Durbar may think proper to indulge in at this untimely ending of their Mooltan expedition. Pray make good my promises in this respect, for they really deserve it. As for the Raja he has done all that a resolute, brave, but not over-wise man could effect.

Yesterday was a decisive one, much gained, and not with more loss than must ever be expected where the enemy is worth fighting. An extensive line of posts were seized, cleared and held bravely, by both Europeans and Sepoys, and a firm parallel has been the result almost if not quite within breaching distance of the city.

You will be sorry to hear that poor Lake has got a slight wound in his thigh, but it is quite trifling glory without danger.

He is a serious loss to *my* camp at this time. I cannot do justice to his recent zealous exertions, but am sure you will.

Napier too, poor fellow, has today got laid on his back with a graze from a cannon ball just over his knee, while out reconnoitering (as usual as ever in the *horrid*est of places!!).

He has got leeches to it, and is in much pain, I should think, though he will not own it.

The enemy has lost severely but is not driven in to the city yet.

Here comes the General, so good bye.

211. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp before Mooltan,

10 o'clock P.M., 13th Sept., 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I am almost worn out with "conferences" and "private interviews", yet must I perforce sit up to communicate to

you (for which I have stopped the dawk) the startling intelligence which comes from certain quarters.

In my letter from Napier's tent this evening, I told you that Shumsher Sing and Uttur Sing were to march tomorrow morning. On my return from the General's camp I found both those Sirdars at my tent waiting to say "more last words."

Uttur Sing and Shumsher Sing I must promise are angry at the Raja remaining here through the circumstance of his hardly faithful troops, and they seem to be acting on the principle of poisoning my mind against him before their departure.

The former (old Kaleanwalleah) is a timid talker, and contented himself with asking me confidentially whether I thought the three or four hundred Sikhs who are with the Raja will stop along with him?

Shumsher Sing, not being so cautious, warned me that before three days are over the Raja's Sikhs will all be off to *Chuttur Sing!—that it is settled.*

Next came Sheikh Emamooddeen and boldly declared that the Raja had this day collected *all his officers* and taken oaths from *them to join him in rebellion and accompany him to Huzara!* The Sheikh did not mince his words, but positively, and solemnly, insisted that this had taken place to-day in the Raja's camp; and he again named Soorut Sing Majeetea as the head conspirator. He named Kripal Sing Mulwaie, as his informant, that Sirdar having refused to join the conspiracy.

I still adhere to my view of the Raja's conduct, and my mind retains unshaken its confidence in his present loyalty. (As I said before the future will be difficult to him if his father openly rebels.)

If there *was* any swearing in of the Raja's officers today, I should say it was exactly the other way, and that the Raja, beholding himself about to be left alone, had for his own "Khatir jummaie" taken a writing from his chief people that they would give him no cause to repent the reliance he is placing in them.

This I deliberately give as my opinion, and time alone can show whether I am right or Sheikh Emamooddeen. It

is right however that I should inform you of both views, and of what is said against the Raja. I will try to write more fully in an official form tomorrow, meanwhile believe that I will still do all that honest dealing with the Raja *can* do to inspire confidence, and leave treason without excuse. If he *does* go wrong, all I can do is to quote the psalmist and say that the heart of man is desperately wicked.

212. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp, 15th Sept., 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I write a hurried line to tell you that I effected the change of my own encampment once more to Soorujkoond this morning, though it obliged me to have the men out in battle array all day to cover the move. The General and the heavy train march tomorrow in same direction and assume the position I occupied for about 2 months, viz., at Tibba covering the ferry. I must say I feel gratified that the position is found to be the most commanding which the neighbourhood of Mooltan affords.

Shumshere Sing, you will be glad to hear, has made his escape from the Raja's clutches and came in to me on foot this morning, after shooting a robber who stopped him on the road. The Sikhs are much disconcerted at his desertion. The Raja has written to the Sheikh to join him, and announces in it that his father is in rebellion. I will send you the letter with an official tomorrow. Moolraj distrusts the Raja and it is said they cannot agree long. We pounded 1000 of his Ghorcharrahs this morning handsomely and made them bolt like thieves. The Colonel of the Poorbeah Regiment (Ajoodia Parshad) and 3 comps. are trying to get away from the Raja, and the commandant *did* bolt but has never reached our camp and was probably killed under some bush or other. Please see that Shumsher Sing's family and house at Raja Sansee are not annoyed. He expects the Raja has written to a party to seize his (Shumsher Sing's) wives, &c.! The Raja himself is going the entire animal but I really feel his revolt a relief and am far from regretting the *decided* aspect which the crisis has now assumed.

Write me your views please fully—and what the Govt. preparations are, as I am all in the dark.

213. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Sooruj-koond,
19th September, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I have of course not heard from you for two or three days, Sher Sing's sowars having cut off the dawks.

Just before the row broke out you sent off 2½ lakhs of Rs. for the Regular force here, and as soon as Sher Sing went over to Moolraj, I sent off 50 sowars to stop the money and take it back to Lahore, but the sowars were surprised at Sirdarpore and they had only time to slip off, one of their number with the Purwannah. I trust this may succeed, but doubt it much; and at any rate I write now to tell you that I have not got one rupee in the Treasury, that the Rubbee revenues of all my districts are exhausted, those of the Khurreef not yet ready, nor will they be available for a month, even if *the districts remain in our possession*. The irregular army I have can only be kept together by regular pay, and I have considered myself fortunate to be able to maintain them so long, almost unassisted by you, on the resources of the enemy.

I consider however that the matter is no longer one that concerns the Lahore Durbar alone, that it is the affair of our own Government, and, therefore, I have had no hesitation in drawing a bill on Robinson of Sirsa for Rs. 50000 and asking the Commisst. Officer at Bhawulpoor for a loan of Rs. 2,00,000, until you can make arrangements for me.

The fact is that we ought not to *calculate* on the revenues of the country of Mooltan, though I *hope* we may secure them, for the Leiah country in particular is quite in Moolraj's interest, and the fort of Munkeyrah is held by Ram Sing, brother of Khizan Sing Ghorchurrah who has gone over to Moolraj along with Sher Sing. I have sent Moostupha Khan Khazhwanee with 1000 foot and 5 Zumboorahs to Rungpore, opposite Sirdarpore, to prevent Sher Sing from crossing troops there. Also I have ordered the "Cornet" steamer to cruise

off Rungpore for the same purpose, and to collect boats. The Raja is sending his Purwannahs in every direction, to seize my kardars and knock up my hukoomut, as is also Moolraj. The game in short is just thrown back to where it was some months ago. If I had 2 or 3 lakhs *certain*, in hand, I should feel quite comfortable, for the first crash is all we have to apprehend. You will, I hope, approve of my applying to both Robinson and the Nawab, for there is no alternative between getting money immediately and losing my army which latter would leave the small British force now here in a bad way until reinforcements can arrive.

We are anxious to know what are your plans for meeting the present Military crisis? Do you reinforce us at once with all in your power, or wait till another army can be assembled under Lord Gough? Again does your information lead you to suppose that Mooltan or Huzara and Peshawur, will be made the scene of contention by the Sikhs, or both simultaneously? I observe that in all Sher Sing's letters he gives out that his father is going to *Lahore*, but there may be two reasons for his doing this—1st to satisfy his Sings concerning the safety of their homes, and 2ndly. because it sounds grand and strong to lay claim to the capital, and "beard the lion in his den." Sheikh Emamooddeen says Chuttur Sing's orders to his son were to come to him if he could, if he could *not*, then to join Moolraj.

In my public letter I told you that I had desired Taylor to come away from Dera Ishmael Khan; but since then I have thought it possible still to secure that district, and have detailed my plan to Taylor, leaving him the option of adopting it or not.

Fatteh Khan will do his best to keep the Sikhs in Bunnoo but he may not succeed, in which case it would be better for the Sikhs to escape at Esaukheyl ferry, and come down to Mooltan than to go down to Dera and put their own kardars all down the frontier, for in that case all my army would go off to take care of their homes. This is a stake worth playing for, and I hope I will think my plan feasible, though I cannot blame him if he be less sanguine.

The difficulties which present themselves on every side are great; and there is no escape from them but for the British

Government to rise up in arms and go steadily through with the war from point to point, province to province, annexing as they go. There was not in our Residency a stauncher advocate for clinging to the last shadow of the Treaty than myself, yet I own it would be affectation not to consider the present simultaneous risings as an expression of national hostility.

Our Treaty was not alone with Maharajah Dulleep Sing, it was with the whole Sikh people, and for the whole Sikh people. The Commons have as much power to break the Treaty as the Throne.

Should Maha. Golab Sing openly assist the Sikhs, or even you have reasonable suspicions of him, do you not mean to let slip at him all the Kohistan—Raja Fukeeroollah of Rajahoree, who is a pensioner at Kangra, and his bitterest enemy, the Kukka Bumba Chiefs, &c., &c. Sheik Emamooddeen might be used successfully against him until we have time to come ourselves, and be rewarded with a Cachmere Jageer.

The General here is improving the position of his camp as he becomes little acquainted with the ground. I have strengthened Shoojabad to 500 men, as a good point for our depot, and Napier is sending an Engineer officer to fortify it better.

I hope you are confiscating Jageers as hard as you can, and estates also. This is what the Sikhs fear and cannot stand. Every man who went over with Sher Sing has much to lose. Look sharp after the *Morareah* property. Perhaps you are not aware that all the plunder of Buddoowal is deposited in the house of Lal Sing, whose brother Khooshal Sing has already joined the enemy, and who will join himself soon if he has not yet. It is the advantage of our past mercy and almost too great forbearance that we can now avenge bitterly and unsparingly with *justice*.

Lake is in pain, and nervous, but doing very well—no danger. He is a great loss to us all.

Lumsden has had a long turn of dysentery, but is getting better, and works everlastingly.

214. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Sooruj-koond, 21st September, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I was in hopes to hear from you to-day by the Ferozepore and Bhawulpore route in reply to mine of the 14th conveying news of Sher Sing's defection, but daresay I shall hear to-morrow.

Things are much in the same attitude as they were when I wrote last. The General, and the Quarter Master General's Department have been looking about them for new ground, nearer to Soorujkoond, and further from the city, for the double object of cooperation with us, and obliging the enemy to come out, if he comes at all, sufficiently far to be followed up some way after he has got beaten.

Sher Sing *talks* of coming and encamping near the Fez Bagh, i.e., about 1½ koss north of the General; and Moolraj is trying to urge him on to fight, *as a proof of his not being in our interest.*

It is much to be hoped that Sher Sing will come out into the plain and fight, but I much doubt it.

There was a strong report yesterday that Chuttur Singh had been killed by Futteh Khan Gheybeh.

Malee Sing and Bhoor Sing have both joined the rebels, and though they carefully spread the report that they were inveigled, &c., &c., *actions* alone can be judged of in these days of lies and treachery.

So convinced am I that every Sikh in the country is either acting or plotting against us that I have removed Sirdar Chunda Sing from the Naib Nizamut of Dera Ishmael Khan, and put Sheikh Shuhaboodeen the Thannadar of Ukalgurh (at Dera) in his place, handing over at the same time Ukalgurh to the Nawab of Dera, nominally but in reality to his friends and relations, the Mooltanee Puthans better known to you as the Tank Khans, and all that party, who have throughout this business been my staunchest instruments. The actual Thannadaree of Ukalgurh I have given to Nubbee Khan, brother of Foujdar Khan, my Adjutt.-General. Taylor, I fancy, acted at once on my suggestion to come away from Dera Ishmael Khan, and, therefore, I am obliged to trust entirely to native agents, and my local knowledge, for securing

Dera. But perhaps it is better, for Taylor himself was of opinion that he could do nothing by remaining.

My arrangements for securing Dera are these.

First Mulluk Futteh Khan is to do his best to keep the Sikhs from escaping from Bunnoo, but should he fail, there are three roads they might pursue—one by Esaukheyl to the Cis-Indus, one by Punniallah, and one by the Peyzoo Pass, to Dera.

I am afraid Sher Sing will have told them if possible to strike at Dera, for the sake of troubling what is at present the quietest frontier of the Punjab, and I have sought to prevent their doing so by ordering Shah Niwaz Khan of Tank and Ali Khan of Tukwarah and Kolachee to be responsible for the Peyzoo pass, and not let a Sikh cross it. To stop the Punniallah pass, I have dispatched the Tank Khans (Hyat-oollah, Hussun Khan, Sumoondur Khan, &c.) and am certain of their doing their best as it is the door of their own homes in Dera, and their wives may expect small courtesy from a Sikh army. The brotherhood of Mooltanee Puthans in Dera and the Nuwab's personal followers will make a very good stand, particularly with Ukalgurh to fall back on.

Esaukheyl ferry therefore is the only road which I think remains for the Sikhs in Bunnoo, and if Futteh Khan puts the boats out of the way, that will be stopped also.

Taylor wrote me on 17th that he should start, if possible, in boats, next morning, in which case he will be at Ooch tomorrow, and can come up here in the *Meanee* steamer which is bringing treasure from Ferozepore.

Napier and Maxwell go to-night to Shoojabad, to inspect its capabilities as a Depot. Its position is admirable. Maxwell is in favour of a floating depot behind a *tete du pont*, but it would occupy so many boats.

Lake's wound is going on very well; but he is not in good spirits, and does not make a good patient. Poor Christopher is not doing at all well, and we are all very sorry for him. It is odd how volunteers always suffer.

As usual in these cases there is much *croaking* in our force; but the General does not want courage, and quite agrees with me that we both *can*, and *must*, hold our position here until you have time to reinforce us. Let us stand or fall,

say I, though the whole Punjab collect against us. Of all manoeuvres the most impracticable to a British Indian Army, and most disheartening to a British soldier, is *retreat*.

Do you not think it would be a good move at Lahore to throw down the majority of the city wall into the ditch? It would give you some 4000 more soldiers and improve your position.

Have we Govindgurh, or shall we have to take it?

I enclose you the latest Ukhbars.

215. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Sooruj-koond, 22nd September, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I received yours of 17th this morning via Bhawulpore, and am glad to see you were in time to trap the youngest viper together with Jhunda Sing and Nahur Sing, who are both supposed to be deeply concerned.

I hope ere this you have also got justifiable grounds for treating Maharajah Golab Sing as the enemy which he assuredly is. The very advice, which Sher Sing gives to his brother to carry off the women to Jummoo, is of itself strong presumptive evidence of complicity. M. Golab Sing once considered a declared enemy, his case I might think be very summarily disposed of by merely calling on the Hill Rajas, Kukka Bumbas, &c., to rise up against a sovereign they detest. Their principalities so dearly loved by them, would be next to valueless to us, and living on them on the terms of the Simla Rajahs under Erskine, they would be contented and useful subjects. Cachmere would pay better without them. You need not, therefore (I should think), scruple to give away the mountain principalities on condition of blockading Golab Sing in Cachmere, and I would resort to it as soon as ever honesty would allow.

Pray give my public letter of to-day your earliest and most favourable consideration. We are under the greatest obligations to Cortlandt, and his Regiments and artillery, and may yet be more so. Of course, the Punjab Raj is gone; and for the next two years we shall be reducing the country into shape and order. Will not these experienced soldiers be in-

valuable to us during that time, and, afterwards, as locals, if thought unworthy of the line?

You will, I am in hopes, have long ere this ordered H. M.'s 29th down from Ferozepore. My letter to Mr. Pringle calling for reinforcements must have preceeded yours by a day or two only, but it will have been useful. We cannot expect the Sindh troops before 27th October.

I feel sincerely for the anxiety and care you have at this time upon you, but we have the great consolation that the evil is not of our working and that our cause is just as our course is clear. All will go on well, though now the clouds look black enough. Rely on my doing all that one man can do to inspire a spirit of confidence in our Force here; and do you do all you can to reinforce us speedily. I have no fears, thank God, for the result of a struggle between a few honest men and a nation of perfidious and ungrateful blackguards.

216. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Sooruj-koond, 26th September, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Very glad to receive yours of 21st this morning, and learn that you have put a British garrison in Govindgurh. It is a great point gained, and the moral effect on the Sikhs will be depressing.

I trust the troops moving on Ferozepore are coming on down the left bank of the Sutlej to Mooltan, and not going to assemble first at Lahore. Much valuable time will be saved, and lives too.

I suppose the C. in C. will take the field himself. Our General here is a brave man, and well acquainted with the economy of camps, artillery matters, &c., but he wants energy, and the ability to lead the opinions of his officers; and the consequence is the army feels as if it had no head on its shoulders. Personally I like him much, and think one could not have a nicer old gentleman at a cantonment.

Enclosed I send you some very interesting papers criminalizing Maharajah Golab Sing in the present disturbances. The source from which they emanate is the Rajaoree family, and therefore suspicious; but it is only from an enemy that you hear awkward truths. Myself I quite believe that G. S.

is actively engaged against us, and the sooner he is unveiled, the better.

The Mooltan Ukhbars will also amuse you. The letter from me to Sher Sing which is alluded so as having caused such a sensation in Mooltan was purposely written by me, to fall into Moolraj's hands, to this effect "My dear Rajah—what you say about the prey falling into the net, has pleased me much. In fact it is the best joke I have met with for some time. I expected no less from your discretion and management. I must mention to you that I have been obliged for the sake of appearances to issue a proclamation calling you a "Nimuk haram," which among friends will I trust be excused. Let me know often how you get on."

This has added much to the distrust existing between the two; and Moolraj talks of sending Sher Sing about his business. S. S. came out yesterday to fight us and then went back again, which has confirmed the impression that he is acting by my orders. I think this satisfactorily proves the known influence I had over him, how little the Sikhs expected from him, and that his desertion at last was the work of a moment.

All well in camp—weather rather close, but improving. More to-morrow.

217. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Sooruj-koond, 29th September, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

No Bunno dawh in yet—and most contradictory accounts. From Futteh Khan himself Taylor has a Roobukaree of 9th Asooj saying that he had actually put Zorakhan Sing's Regt. and Cortlandt's 6 guns on board boats at Esaukheyl and sent them off agreeable to my order, to join us here.

Now the urzee I sent you from the Lukkee news-writer was dated 11th Asooj, and no news has come since, though report goes so far as to-day. The Mullick is killed.

The only way of conciling the 2 accounts, is that Futteh Khan may have *started* the 6 guns and Zorakhan Sing's Regt. from Duleepgurh on the 9th and then wrote out of Kheir-khwahee to say they were actually *shipped* at Esaukheyl, and that the Sikhs on the 10th Asooj seized the guns from

Zorakhan Sing on the road, and then turned them against Futteh Khan.

I have information, however, that several days before the row broke out, Futteh Khan had sent messengers into the Vizeeree hills to summon Swahu Khan; and if Swahu only had time to come down with his Vizeerees, I have no fear for the Mullick. Esaukheyl is also up in Futteh Khan's favour; but the non-arrival of Lukkee dawk looks ill.

I sent you to-day copies of Sindh replies about reinforcements—most kind and satisfactory.

I expect the Jacob's Horse and 9th Bombay N.I. about 15th October if they come by Bhawulpore. If they had come by Mittonkote they would have been a week sooner.

Reports are rife of reinforcements from Chuch Huzara to Sher Sing, but I think Sher Sing more likely to go to Chuch Huzara, for he and the Dewan don't hit it off at all. Indeed it is most extraordinary the bad reception Moolraj has given the Sikh rebels after all his promises. I fancy, it is true, after all that he had got no money in the Fort.

You will see by the Dera Ukhbars that Sirdar Chunda Sing is inclined to kick up a row but the Tank Khans have arrived there, and will soon settle him.

Please to send Lake's and my Sutlej medals in your next despatch. I hope we shall soon be entitled to Mooltan medals. Your confiscations are beginning to work. I hear 300 sowars and 12 Zumboorahs have got away from Sher Sing and bolted towards Lahore.

I am glad Dena Nath has arrived in Lahore. It would have been awkward had Chuttur Sing got hold of him and made him do the *business* of the rebel secretariat.

While I think of it let me mention that Rajah Fuzul-dad Khan of Rhotas and his son have both gone off to Rhotas to kick up a disturbance in favour of Chuttur Sing. So pray confiscate their Jageers sharp.

218. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Sooruj-koond, 1st October, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I do not know who it is who writes the desponding letters you speak of from this camp. Certainly it is not me, for I see

no reason for any despondence whatever. Encamped in an open plain we are as safe as a castle from any attacking enemy; and the only thing that should annoy us is the inability of ourselves to attack others. Croakers, however, always abound in every force; and the pen, or press, is the natural vent for their weak fears. I cannot imagine where you got the idea that we meditate *retreat* on Shoojabad. I never heard retreat proposed by anyone, and should oppose any such proposition with all my power. Indeed, I think, it would be patriotic to plunder the first camp that was struck. Shoojabad is to be our *depot*, not our city of refuge; and there is nothing undignified in sending there any military stores which are not wanted here.

Enclosed I send for your perusal a letter from Robinson of rather startling character. I am making enquiries on the road about it, and think you might ascertain the truth at Lahore, for the Zunana was all at Buttalah if I remember.

At this moment when such an opening appears in Kukka Bhumba for our little friend to do good service against his old enemy, I cannot believe that he would turn against us; but the times are strange.

Let me know as quick as you can whether his family are "at home" or not.

While writing, an express from Sindh to you has been brought in by mistake; and I thought it best to open it to set the General's mind at rest about reinforcements; and I now take the opportunity of sending this on to you.

P.S. Please send me back Robinson's letter after you have read it.

219. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Sooruj Koond, 3rd October, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Raja Sher Sing has got the Rs. 1,80,000. My Purwannah was in plenty of time with the Kardar of Cheechawutnee, Ganda Mull, but he sent back the messenger with an evasive reply, and then put the Raja's sowars on the track. One kossid indeed says he detained the boats until the sowars could arrive. This is a pity; but what are 2 lakhs in an account of a crore per annum?

Many thanks for your confirmation of my promises to Cortlandt's Regiments, and the flattering mention you make of them. They are good troops beyond doubt.

Enclosed I send you the letters you wanted from the Sheikh. One to all the Chiefs comprehensively and separate ones to them individually.

I am happy to tell you that I have discovered the Robinson alarm to be a regular "Mare's nest." There is at Pak Puttun one of the Sheikh's numerous wives, no less an one indeed than my old flame Mrs. Kukka Bhumba, but she has been there a long while and came down with the Sheikh from Lahore, and is now *on the wing again* to some more secure place in consequence of the Raja sending sowars to disturb the Pak Puttun district.

This information I have from disinterested parties in the Camp, and not from the Sheikh, to whom I was careful not to show any suspicion. It tallies also with the fact that the Sheikh had sent off the very day before I heard from Robinson, a Motbir with 3 or 400 men on pretence of putting the Pak Puttun district in order—in reality to conduct Mrs. Kukka Bhumba to a place of safety. I have assured myself also by very long and confidential conversations about Cachmere affairs of the Sheikh's consciousness that his interests lie on our side. It is now too late this evening to enter fully into all he said, but the pith of it was that Cachmere is either a fort or a prison according as the Hill Chiefs side with or against the King or Soobahdar; that all the Peer Punjal chiefs are ready to rise against Golab Sing, and that the Sheikh himself desires nothing more than to have the conduct of a campaign against his ancient enemy.

I may say the same of myself, but at present am fully employed!

You talk of attaching the Kukka Bhumbas to your cause by assuring them of the same privileges they enjoyed in Runjeet's time. This will not do. You remember, I daresay, that in the Afghan dynasty days, the Hill Chiefs round Cachmere enjoyed (what with one bribe and another from rebellious Soobahdars) not only perfect immunity from revenue, but also many Jageers in the heart of the valley.

When the Sikhs came, these pleasant things faded one by one away until they were actually reversed, and revenue first small, then great, came to be exacted. The Nuzzurana of the Hill Chiefs now is 47,000 Rs. The Sheikh says this should be cut down to half at once, if any great service is wanted of them.

Bear this in mind.

Enclosed I send you another letter from Fukeeroollah who is perhaps with you himself by this time.

Futteh Khan is holding out strictly in Bunnoo, and I have made great exertions to help him.

There is a report in the Derajat that Kandaharees are coming down in great force which I totally disbelieve.

In Dera Ishmael Khan all has been hushed by the removal of Chunda Singh and the arrival of Tank Khans.

In Dera Ghazee Khan a Sikh company is talking big and I have given the Kardar authority to disarm them.

Have you yet [not] recalled George Lawrence? He is not the man to move without permission, even if his reason told him it was right. Pray think of this and do not leave him there where he can do no good. If the Sikhs turn Peshawur inside out what matters it; it is only for a month or two till we come and take it.

Tell him at all events to *use his own discretion*.

P.S. I have given the draft for Myah Dass (Misr Sahib Dyal's motbir) to Lumsden who has taken the Rohillas under his wing.

220. *From Lieutt. Herbert B. Edwardes.*

Official No. 83.

Camp Sooruj Koond, 3rd October, 1848.

Sir,

It being probable that the Depot of Commissariat and other stores at Bhawulpore will daily increase in extent and importance, and last for many months I should suggest that Lieutenant Robertson, the Commissariat officer in charge of the Depot, be forthwith invested with such magisterial powers as will enable him to restrain the excesses of camp followers, and protect the people, which at present he complains of his inability to do.

2. Moonshee Sher Ali, Assistant to Peer Ibrahim Khan Buhadoor, might be attached to him with such establishment as Lieutenant Robertson may deem necessary and you sanction.

3. Unless some such arrangement is made, our Depot will I fear soon become a source of very great annoyance to His Highness the Nuwab and the Zamindars round about.

221. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Sooruj-koond, 4th October, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Lal Sing, son of Sirdar Uttur Sing Kaneanwallah, made his escape this morning from Raja Sher Sing's camp and came in here to me, highly rejoiced at getting away.

He says Moolraj and Sher Sing can never agree together and that the older Sikhs in the Raja's camp all advise that the national effort be made at the capital for 2 reasons—1st that if the Sikh soldiers houses in the Manjha are confiscated, they will not stop at Mooltan to please any one; 2ndly, that if they did stop, and beat us at Mooltan, the capital would still remain, whereas if they beat us at Lahore, Mooltan would go too.

There is no doubt about the Raja having got the treasure.

The Commisst. here are beginning already to think they will not be able to provide supplies—this after telling me not to bring any in from the country, when they first arrived! Mullick Futteh Khan could have sent me any quantity, but he is now in a critical position himself.

Would it not be well if you were to direct Robinson at Sirsa to send up *as much as he can* to Bhawulpore? It will all be wanted for one or other division of our Punjab army. Brigadier Young at Ferozepore seems to think we were not in earnest when we asked for reinforcements. It is quite shameful the delay that has occurred in the starting of those regiments. The General tells me their march has been again put off till the 4th to wait for somebody's carpet-bag or toothbrush left behind at Lahore. The Sindh authorities have acted nobly on this occasion. Like Englishmen they strive who shall assist us first, and I will wager all my prize money for the campaign that troops arrive from Sindh before the Ferozepore Brigade.

All Cortlandt ammunition was along with the treasure. Pray send us some more from the Lahore Durbar Magazine, by the Sutlej route. I enclose a copy of the old indent.

Captn. Powell of Indian Navy writes me that he expects the steamers with 2 Europn. regiments to be opposite Subzulkote on 25th Octr.

222. *From Herbert Edwardes*

My dear Sir Frederick,

The enclosed express will acquaint you that Brigadier Dundas has halted the 3rd N.I. and 500 of Jacob's Horse, which were across the Indus on their way to us, in order to escort mortars!

I think *the reinforcing Brigadiers* will pass into a familiar proverb.

General Whish has written to say that the mortars he wants will come from Ferozepore, not Sukhur, but it would be well if you would also write and urge them to send on the troops. Everybody, in whose hands the reinforcements are, seems not to understand our position.

There are two things to be done—1st, to put General Whish's army beyond the possibility of disaster; 2ndly, to resume the siege of Mooltan.

For the first we want men; for the other, mortars. Yet Brigr. Dundas makes the primary matter subservient to the secondary, an error which could scarcely have been expected from an officer in such a post.

Most happily we have a very unenterprising enemy, but should any reinforcement from Bunnoo or Huzara raise their confidence, and induce them to send a large body against Shoojabad, General Whish *would be unable to detach a flying brigade against them*, and this I call not only an unsatisfactory but a very anxious position. Yet the Brigadiers at both ends of the line from which we expect assistance are halting the reinforcements, for objects of comparatively *no importance whatever*.

I can scarcely restrain my indignation when I think of the Ferozepore Brigade being halted *two days* at such a moment as this to wait for some men of the 10th Foot at Lahore.

Everybody looks to the rear instead of fixing their attention on Mooltan and meeting the crisis. Do not think I am croaking, for I have no turn that way. But it does seem to me that there is a perfect *lull* in the preparations to strengthen the General, as if the emergency had passed, when it was ascertained that we had *not retreated*.

We are standing here on the faith of reinforcements coming *quickly*, and they seem to be taking it easy.

As for the General here I cannot get him to entrench his train so as to make his men available, and if we are attacked any how, but exactly in our front, there will be great confusion, I am afraid. Again there is no cavalry coming down from Ferozepore—because we want that arm more than any another. The reason given is “We wait to see if you can give us forage at Mooltan.” A moment’s consideration would have furnished the reply that if there is forage for Moolraj’s and Sher Sing’s large cavalry force, there must be plenty for the British, or if not, then lick the Ghorchurras and drive them off. There is Bhoosa and Bajrah enough on the right bank of the Chenab to feed all the cavalry for the winter.

It would have been, I must say, a much more manly proceeding to have sent down the cavalry at once, and let them return *when the forage failed*. Had even Jacob’s 500 horse come on, we might have managed, and now Dundas has anchored them. I fancy the dodge is that all these senior officers want to come marching up themselves at the head of Brigades and Divisions, and don’t care two brass farthings whether Whish is able or unable to maintain his position.

Again and again I repeat that when it was known that the seige was raised for want of men, and that the Punjab was in a flame, *single Regiments should have come down as they were ready*, and had the Queen’s 29th marched at once, they would now have been nearly at Bhawulpore.

You will be glad to hear that Oomrao Sing, the fugitive Lahore conspirator, was siezed this morning in my camp, among the Fukeers at the Sooruj-koond tank. The General means to try him and hang him.

Moolraj intends, they say, to keep the Dusseyrah in General Whish’s camp.

223. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Sooruj-koond, 6th October, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I return you George Lawrence's letter and Nicholson's and in return send for your perusal one from my late friend the Adjut.-Genl. of the Army. It is in reply to an open and friendly letter descriptive of our position here, written on the terms which I *thought* existed between us. Having no words to express what I feel about it, I drop the subject, but think it right you should get this peep behind the curtain at the opinions entertained apparently at Headquarters.

Please return me the document that I may bind it up carefully with my other records of the Mooltan campaign.

P. S. I hope it is true that Mrs. G. Lawrence has reached Lahore in safety.

The Sikhs now say they cannot break their fast on the Dusserah till evening, and therefore they cannot eat us up in the morning, and have put us by in the cupboard till Sunday.

224. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Sooruj-koond, 7th October, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

A long while ago I sent you a Roobukaree about clothing (new uniforms) for all Cortlandt's troops, which it is the custom to give them at the Dusserah. You ordered the uniform to be made but it has never reached us, nor do we hear any tidings of it, so I write this to remind you, in case it may have been set aside by the Durbar.

Sirdar Lal Sing Kaleanwallah left my camp for Lahore this morning; and Sirdar Nidhan Sing Sindhanwallah came over from the enemy last night with about 25 sowars.

There is some great movement going on in the rebel camp today, but up to 3 P.M., when I am writing this, I cannot make out whether we are to be attacked or whether Sher Sing has bolted to his dad.

6 P.M. All Moolraj's and all Sher Sing's force hold the Dusserah at Kutha Byragee Garden (my old camp) with 17 guns. I turned out my line to be ready if they should come on, but they spoilt their gunpowder and retired.

General opinion says Sher Sing is on the wing and will

leave in a day or two. Soorut Sing Mujetea has gone ahead with some 2000 men to clear the road.

If Sher Sing goes, $\frac{1}{2}$ Moolraj's will desert. Atta in Mooltan 7 seers the rupee.

P. S. Kossids have reached me from Bunnoo. Futteh Khan has dug down to water in the Fort and is consequently all right. Fancy the Moolkeiahs sending all this way to ask which side they really were to pitch into? Not surprising when the Sirkaree Ukhbar Nuvees reports Futteh Khan as being "Yagee" in the Fort.

Muhommud Ali Khan, the Thannadar of Lukkee, seems to me a shirk, and prepared to give in to Ram Sing Chapah, which I don't think he will do, for the Vizeerees have ere this come to his assistance.

225. *From Herbert Edwardes*

9th October, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Raja Sher Sing with all the force that he had, not previously slipped off, bolted this morning from Mooltan, and some say he halted at Gaggeran, others that he has gone on to Sirdarpor.

It is supposed he is off to his father via Jhung.

The General is not for "surprising" him to-night, and I have written very strongly to advise him to try no such wild goose chase. Fancy a 10 or 20 koss run, to surprize a Sikh.

You have heard of poor Futteh Khan's death. It is confirmed from all quarters, I am sorry to say.

Poor Christopher of the Indian Navy died last night, and we are now going to bury him in my camp. A fine fellow gone.

This reminds of a Bible for Mrs. Montigambert, which Dr. McBeth asked me to send her. It is enclosed in the letter bag with this, and as I have no other means of sending it to her quickly, and doubtless it will be a comfort to the poor lady. What pages of human misery must be recorded against this miscreant Moolraj?

Moolraj's soldiers will be much disheartened at this 2nd defection of Sher Sing; and it is supposed that one of the chief reasons of the move was the intention of many of the Sikh soldiers of both Moolraj's and Sher Sing's army to go

off to the Manjha to save their houses, &c., the confiscation of which has caused a greater sensation than any defeat. Sher Sing himself was advised by Nidhan Sing Sundhunwallah to do one of 3 things:

- 1st., to cut off Moolraj's head and come in;
- 2nd, to come in with or without the head;
- 3rdly, to go off to his father and *Maharajah Golab Sing*, and see if any practicable scheme of rebellion could be concocted, as this Mooltan work was all humbug.

Of these three, therefore, we may suppose he has chosen the last.

226. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Sooruj-koond, 11th October, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I am sorry you think me to blame in not marching with my whole force to Sirdarpore to prevent the treasure from falling into Sher Sing's hands, but you must remember I am not my own master; and I feel quite certain General Whish would not have allowed me so far to throw open his position, even had I asked him, which I did not because it did not seem to me advisable.

Had Sher Sing and Moolraj fallen on the General's force during the absence of mine, I may say, without any reflection on the prowess of British soldiers and sepoys, the General, with a large siege train to protect, would have been in a very embarrassing position. The enemy's cavalry would have cantered round him.

Sher Sing I find only took his cavalry on to Sirdarpore yesterday, the infantry and guns halting at Ameergurh, half way between Gaggran and Sirdarpoor.

He has not crossed today, but waited for the infantry and guns.

To-morrow we shall see if he crosses, which will, I consider, decide the scene of the campaign. For if Sher Sing joins his father they will probably take their stand on the line between Pind Dadun Khan and Rhotas. Sher Sing's departure has been a severe blow to Moolraj, who has sent vakeels after him twice to beg him humbly to return. Moolraj in this instance has shown less foresight than usual, for he

first drove the Raja away, and now repents it too late, when he sees his Sikhs in parties of five hundred going after the Khalsa Camp. *This feeling of nationality is certainly very strong in the Sikhs.* Sher Sing is poorer than Moolraj, yet the very Sikhs from Malwa, who flocked to Mooltan when the cry of "Dhurum" was raised by Moolraj, are now leaving the latter to throw in their lot with the rest of the Khalsa, "to win or die all together" as they say.

It is reported today that *all* Moolraj's Sikh cavalry have gone, and that the Sikh infantry is dissolving.

This sudden change of circumstances has quite turned the heads of the General and Napier, and they are both proposing to resume the siege again. So soon down—so soon up—is not well. Having once raised the siege on severe experience of the strength of the place, and the inadequacy of our own force to carry on the mere manual operations, I say it matters nothing, how long we are before we resume the siege, but when it is resumed it should be with a force sufficient to continue its operations should Sher Sing and Chuttur Sing and all the other Sings come to Mooltan.

I could not however venture to mention these things to the C.C. after the unjustifiable letter Grant wrote me. Yet I feel sure that unless some one interposes, the siege will be resumed without reinforcements.

Captain Powell writes me that General Auchtermuchty is coming round to command the Bombay division, and that it would be *possible* for that division to reach the Sutlej by 10th November, which means, I fancy, that it will be here sometime before December.

The General is still very angry at his expedition against Sher Sing's camp at Goggeran having been baulked, and attributes it to *imperfect information*, i.e., my information of the Raja having fled prevented him from going after him! One comfort, he and Napier enjoy their opinion alone, and every one else in camp (particularly those who were told off for the chase!) are thankful that it was knocked on the head.

I mention Brigr. Markham as taking my view, because all esteem him one of the best soldiers in our force.

The days are shortening, but they are still close, the nights very cold.

P.S. The Sheikh is much concerned at the suspicion about his wives, and wants me to put a sentry over Mrs. Kukka Bumba, but I decline such a fiery and combustible charge. He thinks some enemy in the Durbar has spread the report, and I did not think it necessary to say Robinson was the author, though I told him it came to you through a Sahib in ignorance of the truth.

As the matter has gone too far and the Sheikh's conduct in this war has really been meritorious, I should be glad if you would write and assure him of your undiminished confidence.

227. *From Herbert Edwardes*

12th October, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

As yet no intelligence of Shere Sing having crossed at Sirdarpoor. Moolraj making frantic efforts to bring him back. If M. would give the fort, S.S. would probably come, but I do not expect this.

I send you 2 interesting letters from Sindh, and authentic accounts of poor Futteh Khan's death.

I wish you would kindly set Misr Sahib Dyal to work to remodel, or rather ameliorate, the custom dues taken from the Povindahs. The Kafilahs are beginning to arrive, and it would be well to razee-kur the merchants who were heavy losers last year.

228. *From Herbert Edwardes*

13th October, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Many thanks for the order on Mily. Chest for Rs. 1,00,000.

I had begun paying Cortlandt's Regular troops out of the money I borrowed from Nuwab Bhawul Khan, as they were dreadfully hard up. This will put all straight until I can get in the Khurreef.

I had previously borrowed 10,000 Rs. from the Military Chest, and have now taken 90,000 to make up the Lakh.

I am glad to be able to send you a letter which may prove of very great importance to the Commr.-in-Chief, for to know the designs of one's enemy is of all things most valuable to a

General. The letter I allude to is one from Raja Sher Sing while at Mooltan, to Sirdar Soorut Sing Mujetea, who was encamped at Sirdarpoor to secure the Raja's retreat. After giving him directions about boats, &c., the letter informs Soorut Sing that Sirdar Chuttur Sing has summoned them all to meet him at *Goojrat*! This is a game, and I hope the British army will be beforehand with them. *Goojrat* is just about the best point for us to take up, with reference either to Chuttur Sing or Goolab Sing, or *both*, better even than Vizeerabad which I mentioned yesterday.

Raja Sher Sing crossed the Ravee at Ram Chountera yesterday—so he is fairly off.

229. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Sooruj-koond, 15th October, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Enclosed I send you another intercepted Purwannah of Raja Sher Sing's addressed to the troops in Bunnoo, calling on them "to join him either by the Pind Dadun Khan route, or *that of Saheewal*."

Putting this Purwannah together with the one I sent you before, I understand it to be a settled thing that Chuttur Sing and all the Sings are to muster at or about Goojurat, and that if the Bunnoo Sikhs are not in time to join C.S. on the Jheylum, they are to take the lower road by Saheewal to Goojurat.

It remains to be seen whether Religion or avarice will influence the Bunnoo force. In the first case they will join Chuttur Sing, in the latter Moolraj.*

I send you a correspondence I have had today with the General by which you will see that alarmed at the prospect of supercession by General Auchtermuchty, he is determined to plunge again into siege operations without any reinforcement. As a point of duty I have given him privately my opinion, at the risk of being told that *politicals are wet-blankets on everything* like energy.

* They joined Sirdar Chutter Sing.

230. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Sooruj-koond, 16th October, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I will not give, nor have given, any guarantees for life and property—even on terms of “Justice and a fair trial before condemnation.”

The burnt child *ought* to dread the fire.

This proverb reminds me of one of the Sheikh's. He says none of the Sikh Sirdars can expect to preserve their Jageers even if they come in and submit, for “he who spits at the moon, always catches it again in his own face!” If this is not elegant it is at least expressive.

Sher Sing was at Kumlana 32 koss from Jhung on 14th October, and is probably now at Jhung. Sahib Khan Towannah, whom I sent to Jhung after the Peythee, has brought it away as well as an iron gun, but I fear the treasure chest has little in it. We hear from Sindh that a Major of Engineers, Senior to Napier, is coming up. This will be unfair, as well as Genl. Auchtermuchty's supercession of Whish.

P.S. The reports of Afghans coming down from Cabul are continually being repeated, but on enquiry all prove false, and I think do not so much originate in Moolraj's friends, as the avarice of the Hill tribes bordering on the Derajat who think to extract money and ammunition from the Kardars for the purpose of blocking up the passes and keeping out the fancied foe.

231. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Sooruj-koond, 17th October, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

The 3rd Bombay N.I., Captn. Turnbull's Field Batty., and Merewether's detachment of Sindh Horse were at Subzulkote on 15th October and ordered on to Mooltan, where they expect to arrive about 8th November.

General Auchmuchty (I hear from Mr. Pringle) is not likely now to come. Dundas comes in his stead—a fine soldier, they say. H.M.'s 60th Rifles marched from Korachee on 7th October; the Bombay 1st E. Fuziliers were about to follow on 10th with Col. Dundas and staff.

Pringle detained the Sesostris steam Frigate (which was to take the English Mail of 15th October) in order to send one wing of the Fusiliers to the mouth of river, and thus the Commissioner hopes to have both the European regiments on the Indus by 14th October, they then embark on the small river steamers.

You always speak of our Irregr. force as 20,000 men. The enclosed returns will show you what we really are. We could turn out to fight about 12,000 strong. I send you also two returns of Moolraj's Forces, from different sources,—both, I think, exaggerated. I should say after all the fluctuations which Moolraj's army has undergone lately, of exultation and depression, there may be still 9,000 or 10,000 left. We are all very glad to hear that Nicholson is approaching Lahore. He is one of the bravest spirits, I think, and I should be sorry that he fell into the clutches of either Sher Sing or his father.

Nothing going on but reconnoitering parties, the Engineers perfecting their map of the country.

P.S. An urzee is just in from Mustapha Khan who says that a traveller from Bhukkur assured him 2 days ago that Chuttur Sing's force is at Peepulan (not far from opposite Esaukheyl). This is impossible, but probably the Bunnoo force has crossed over and caused the rumour.

232. *From Herbert Edwardes*

17th October, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,


I am sorry you think me inactive. If I saw any opportunity of doing anything I should be very glad, I assure you, to avail myself of it, as I have endeavoured to do throughout the rebellion.

As for Sher Sing getting away, I confess I cannot see how he was to be stopped or followed, without either exposing one of our forces to both Sher Sing's and Moolraj's at once or else leaving the heavy train to be looted. We all of us thought over it a good deal but nobody could solve the problem except the General and Napier, who when S.S. was 10 koss off from Mooltan and 15 from our camp, proposed sending 900 cavalry and 8 H.A. guns after him! It is of course, open to

doubt whether such an expedition could have succeeded as it was never tried, information coming in of S.S.'s march to Sirdarpoor, but my own opinion is that we were saved from a disgraceful thrashing, and loss of artillery.

You say "people seem to come to and go from Mooltan as if there was no force within 50 miles of the place."

Until Mooltan is *invested*, any person of course can come and go without that segment of the circle which our force is



able to look after, e.g., supposing our force is only able to patrol from a to b, there is nothing to prevent people coming and going on the lines c, d, e, f, &c., &c.

General Whish's force has quite enough to do to look after its train, and suppose, therefore, that my available 10,000 men were to keep everlastingly marching round Mooltan on the circular line I have drawn, it would obviously not stop a single Baniyah's donkey, if the Buniyah were wise enough to wait till we had passed, or pass before we came.

The long inactivity of this force is certainly not creditable to our arms, but with deference I really think the reflection is on the Military Powers at Headquarters, who *a month after the raising of the siege of Mooltan, have not moved a regiment to reinforce us.*

I am sorry to hear Genl. Whish should ever have expressed such an opinion as that my force is an encumbrance to him. If so, I wonder he did not on 20th September give me

leave to go and destroy the revolted Sikh force in Bunnoo—a service which I offered to perform *if he was strong enough to do without me.*

In reply he said I had done all (by my Purwannahs) which it was at present in my power to do, i.e., without exactly owning his inability to do without me, he detained me here along with him.

Again in his plan of future operations, he calls on me to take charge of his communications with Bhawulpore, and intends that I should hold a chain of redoubts several miles long! If indeed then I am “an encumbrance” to him, he deserves credit for turning an encumbrance to the best use possible.

For my own part I say candidly that I should be very much pleased if it were deemed convenient to disband my unfortunate levies, for I like not the position in which they are placed, getting no share of the credit of success and bearing all the blame of any failure.

It is clear that their day is gone. When no regular troops were to be exposed to the hot winds these excellent ragamuffins fought our battles so well as to drive in the enemy from the Indus to Mooltan, captured 10 of his guns and released many lakhs of country from his grasp. With this credit I should have been glad had they been able to retire. They were only used *stop-gaps* to the rebellion, and I for one should never put them into competition with regular troops if *the latter are available.*

Indeed if there be regulars enough it would be positively wrong of me not to *recommend* the disbanding of my force, for it is a heavy expense of course. I have been led into saying more on this head than perhaps is necessary, but I should be sorry if it were to seem that I had raised an army for my own vanity and could not sacrifice it.

All authorities (*now* that we have had painful experience of the strength of Mooltan) agree in thinking 30,000 men necessary to *invest* Mooltan as it ought to be during the siege and therefore I have not proposed to the General to break up my army, but as soon as ever the siege is over you may rely on my doing so for the same public reasons which induced me at first to raise it. I may here add that when the

revenues of those districts in which Bhawul Khan was allowed to put his kardars, are thrown into the account, it will appear that our forces have sustained themselves on the country which they took, on revenues which otherwise would have gone into Moolraj's treasury.

233. *From Herbert Edwardes*

19th October, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Lungur Khan and Sahib Khan Towannah, naturally, wish to go to their homes, and perform "Khidmut" comfortably round their own Sugar-Kheyts. But they could do nothing at such a distance from support, and here one squeezes some little perspiration out of them.

For instance I sent Sahib Khan Towannah to Jhung to bring away the Treasure Chest, and thus saved Rs. 9000 from Sher Sing's hands. Out of the money I will pay up Lungur Khan and Sahib Khan's sowars, and thus relieve Misr Megraj who can carry it to Sahib Dyal's credit.

I have not yet heard of the march of the Bunnoo troops, but the Muhoorut fixed for them was 30th Asooj, which seems an unlikely day (the last of a month) for Sikhs to begin a journey on. Probably they will pray (the sinners!) and sacrifice on the 1st Kathik and march on 2nd, i.e., three days ago. It matters little which way they go, so that they leave Dera Ishmael Khan alone, for it would be very inconvenient to have that Frontier disturbed.

The son of one Bunnoo Mullick, and brother of another (whose respective relations sided with the Sikhs in the late row), deserted my camp last night, and bolted off to Bunnoo—*the only desertions I have had in six months!*

Taylor and I are quite melancholy about poor Bunnoo which he had mutually settled so happily. Now the Sikhs have gone, the Bunnoochees will probably combine *once for a day* to destroy Duleepgurh—the sign of their subjugation, and then return again to their faction fights and bloodshed.

I regret Futteh Khan's fate more than I can say. With all his sins, he served us well and faithfully. He has met at our hands with nothing but severe judgment and death.

It was very good of you to send a Purwannah of condo-

lence to his son. Some day I hope you will be able to secure him a Jageer.

No news here except that Sher Sing has sent 300 recruits to Moolraj. It is said however that whereas before the new recruits to Moolraj outnumbered greatly the deserters from him, so now the latter exceed the former.

234. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Sooruj-koond, 23rd October, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Thank you very much for your hearty congratulations in the letter just received from you dated 19th.

I knew you would be glad of this marked (and by me most unexpected) recognition of my services at home to which, I feel sure, you have contributed your warmest recommendation.

Very gladly would I believe that Lord Dalhousie has also befriended me, in order that I might feel grateful to him for it, but I cannot get over that suppression of Lake's and my dispatches, as a token of his Lordship's feelings.

Of one thing I am as certain as if I had seen them, that both Henry Lawrence and Lord Hardinge put in good words for me when asked, "who is this *Sepoy Subaltern*?" I send you a copy of a letter I got from Sir John Hobhouse, which you will be glad to read, as also will be Brigadier. He says nothing about the C.B. ship but of course the local majority was given in order that I should get the C.B. and perhaps it is not etiquette to communicate it until "Her Majesty's pleasure be known," i.e., till it is gazetted.

You will laugh when I tell you that I was more pleased with old Joe Hume's surly enthusiasm than anybody else's "butter."

I am in hopes that next mail will bring something for Lake who deserves it well; but I am afraid it will be difficult to reward Cortlandt though his claims are great, in my opinion, to anything our Government can do for him. Cortlandt before this "Muhim" was meditating retirement in 2 years time on the savings of his Nizamut and whatever pension the Sikh Durbar, agreeable to Lawrence rules, would have given him. (He has, I think, been nearly 20 years in the Sikh ser-

vice.) What his views *now* are I know not, but though our Govt. *ought* to be glad to secure his services in some such appointment as Frontier Brigadier, yet it would perhaps excite jealousies and Government like better to pension him at once. At any rate I sincerely hope he will not be forgotten after these troubles are over, for both he and his regiments have done, and are doing, us good service in time of need. He is a fat fellow, but into *your* lap, as member of Council, I throw him.

I am very glad the Brigadier confirms my views about renewing the siege. I have a hard time of it here and wish the General would never ask my advice.

235. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Sooruj-koond, 24th October, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

The only news is that the Afghan Povindahs have been at swords among themselves in the Hills. You will not have forgotten my old enemy Shahzad Khan Nassur. He seems to have proposed to the Mean Kheyls (whose home are in Draband, and who are a wealthy, industrious and peaceful tribe of traders) to take advantage of the present absence of troops from Dera to kick up a row in the Daman and for that purpose told them not to send on any of their Kafilahs. The Mean Kheyls, preferring profit to war, refused. Shahzad persisted and opposed the passage of the Mean Kheyl Kafilahs, a fight ensued and blood was spilt freely on both sides. Another account says the Nassur tribe have turned Shahzad Khan out from the chieftainship as an impracticable and pestiferous rebel, ever at war with the Governor of the Derajat, and bringing down vengeance and ill-repute on the whole tribe.

This is well, but if I hear that the Bunnoo Sikhs have gone off to Chuttur Sing, I am thinking it would be a good plan if Taylor were to run up to Dera Ishmael Khan, put the country a little to right, give some one or two small "Moofsids", and be on the spot to make customs arrangements with the Povindahs. In this idea we have a double object in view, and indeed, to say the truth, this second object is the primary one, viz., to assist in bringing away Mrs. George Lawrence. We think if she were to come down to Kaleh Bagh, Taylor

and the Tank Khans might meet her and either escort her by land or water to Ooch. This is however a plan quite "in ovo," and I will let you know what seems finally for the best. It would be a great thing to get poor Mrs. L. safely out of these troubles, and the more so that I see Chuttur Sing's attention is again turned towards Peshawur.

George Lawrence is a fine fellow certainly and has nobly sustained the character of his family in the arduous post entrusted to him. When I compare what I have done with what he has done, I think his has had the most difficult part to play and deserves better.

A letter reached me from Goldney today, of which the first sentence is "Train all stopped." This afternoon the General writes me that Abbott has no carriage to send the mortars from Ferozepore by land, and the authorities will not let them go by water, so (he adds), "now we look to Sukkur." This is becoming ludicrous.

I cannot but think the Commr.-in-Chief has spoilt the campaign by not beginning *here*. He should have thrown an over-powering force on Mooltan the moment Sher Sing's treachery was known, have reduced that fortress to which all the Sikhs were looking, and then, having put in his own garrison, have left it, and proceeded *victoriously* on his way to meet the Sikhs wherever they had assembled. As it is, 2 armies will be engaged in hostilities at once, one here, and one against Chuttur Sing, and neither of any use to the other.

Sher Sing is reported to have crossed the Chenab north of Jhung, and to have left Soorat Sing Mujetea in the latter place.

236. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Sooruj-koond, 25th October, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

The Sikhs have at last commenced their crossing at *Esaukheyl*, as you will see by the enclosed urzee (No. 3) from Hyatoollah Khan.

It remains to be seen whether they are coming to us, or to Sher Sing.

It seems poor Mrs. George Lawrence had a dreadful time of it on her late unsuccessful journey, half starved, and quite

frightened (that Khwajah Muhommed Khan I always thought a beast), and G. L. is not at all inclined to let her try a second trip alone, or in a country boat on the Indus.

With the General's consent, therefore, I intend sending the "Meanee" steamer up the Indus to Dera Ishmael Khan or perhaps Esaukheyl, and Taylor will go by land straight to the former place, advising G. L. of his coming, and begging him to send Mrs. G. down to Esaukheyl or Kaleh Bagh, where Taylor will probably go to meet her. They will then both get into the Steamer and come down the Indus again, Taylor leaving the Steamer opposite Ghazee Khan and returning to be useful here during the siege, Mrs. G. going on to Ooch, and thence down to Ferozepore. We think this a brilliant tujveez, and hope you will approve.

The General has indented on the Bukkur arsenal for the additional heavy guns, he seems so little likely to get from Ferozepoor, viz.,

8	..	..	18 or 24 Prs.
8	..	..	8 inch Mor.
10	..	..	5½ do.

1000 rounds of ammn., to 2 first, and 300 to the last—also 5000 lbs of powder.

I have heard nothing lately of resuming the siege, and conclude, the General thought better of it and has wisely resolved to wait till reinforcements come and enable him to defy Sher Sing, should he return with Bunnoo force.

Have you any news of Henry Lawrence by last mail? Lady Edwardes's account is so contradictory, I cannot make out if he is coming or not by the 20th September packet. She says he looks very delicate but declares his health is renovated. Lady L. confined to the sofa.

The weather is already wintry, and I have got a bad cold. I hope you are well in the midst of the "Moofsids" of the Manjha. What a shortsighted race it is, and how they will repent all this in dust and ashes this time next year, when Jageer-less and service-less, they "drive the lingering plough."

You should get a good haul out of Morarea, for there lies buried the plunder of Buddowal, together with the treasure sent by the Durbar to pay the troops under Runjoor Sing, which Lal Sing sent off to his home and returned as "lost."

Dewan Dena Nath has a list of it all furnished him by *Joala Nath* who is here with Cortlandt. J. N. was Dufteree in the Aliwal force.

237. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Sooruj-koond, 31st October, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Lumsden took the hint in your letter to me, suggesting his coming to join Lord Gough, and left us yesterday morning for Shoojabad. Taylor also started this morning on his chivalrous expedition to rescue the "distressed damsels" at Kohat, and I doubt not he will be as successful as ever was St. George of Merry England or Don Quixote himself. These two are a great loss to both our society and force, for they are as good soldiers as they are good fellows. I rejoice, however, at Lumsden having an opening to win honors with his excellent "guides."

General Auchmuty has ordered not a man to move until he can reach Roree and join them; even those at Subzulkote which were coming on are stopped; and the troop of H. A. has gone back (8 marches) to change its ordnance!

General A. will be at Kotree on the 20th and at Roree on 7th November; and it is supposed the force will be ready shortly after: say 15th November, which will make it 15th December before we see them!

You have accused me so often lately of inactivity that I thought this delay would be a good opportunity of recovering Bunnoo, Murwut and Esaukheyl. It is only a fortnight's march to Duleepgurh, a fortnight there and a fortnight coming back. This would have brought me to Mooltan again at the same time as the Bombay troops and it would have given us some more revenue, besides having a good effect in the country, but on thinking it over, I could not make *sure* of Meer Alum Khan not resisting in Duleerp Gurh; and in that case I could not come away without reducing the place, and thus be behind my time. Moreover another consideration presented itself. If so large a body moved away, (though) I meant to leave Lake and his army to secure the position at Sooruj-koond, it was thought probable Moolraj would call Sher Sing back again, and that S. S. under such temptation

might bring the Bunnoo force with him, nay that Chuttur Sing himself might move down on Mooltan and help Moolraj to engage Whish's small division in the field. I, therefore, did not even ask the General's leave, and from what he said when I mentioned it to him today, believe, I should not have got it if I *had* asked.

This morning Moolraj's officers had a quarrel among themselves and to decide who *was* a coward and who *not*, they all jumped up, ran to their lines, turned out their men, and, advancing from Kuttee Byragee Gardens, crossed the Nullah through a breach, there is in it, and concealed themselves in a water cut or ravine, that runs up into Whish's camp, and in front of mine, at about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles from both. I turned out my line, and Cortlandt fired a shot or two at them, the General also gave them a rocket or two (his grand specific!), when they all took to their heels and retreated again through the hole in the Nullah.

The masses in Whish's force have taken to beef eating, and I was rather staggered to find a fat sirloin on the General's own table one day. Last night some Hindoo Sepoys in Courtlandt's regiments came to complain that beef had been killed in the Daodpotra camp. Taylor and I went and found the culprits making calves foot jelly! Of course I was obliged to repudiate such proceedings, and confine the offenders but I trembled every moment, lest they should say "they bought it in the British camp" or else "that it was hard that poor people should be punished for what the Sahibs do with impunity."

In fact it is evidently inconsistent to say nothing of the dishonesty of breaking the terms of a treaty while the Government has as yet not declared null and void.

This morning I laid it before the General quietly in conversation, and he owned it was "wrong, though pleasant," and promised to issue a private circular about it to commanding officers. Of course I shall be very much abused for depriving people of their steaks, but I thought it my duty, and daresay you will agree in this view.

It is a great pity that we are not at once publicly told what our position in the Punjab is to be for the future, as we know not how to act in many cases, or whether we are fighting

for Duleep or Victoria. There are disadvantages of course in cutting away at once the last hopes of those Sikhs who have abided by us, but this is not so bad as the loss of all that population who would actively side with us in the struggle, if assured that they were to be British ryots in future.

The *Meanee* steamer is now at the Sher Shah ferry in the rear of Whish's camp, on her way to Dera to fetch Mrs. G. Lawrence.

You speak of expecting a steamer at ferry upon to bring away the treasure, but there is not water to allow one to go above Bhawulpoor.

It is, as you say, very sad the great delay which has occurred in the assembling of the Punjab Army, but as for Cureton's proposed expedition, you need not grieve for Sher Sing never had any intention of going up the left bank of the Chenab, and Cureton would have had his trouble for nothing.

As the C.-in-C. still seems to think we shall be reinforced by the Duck troops in the first week of November, I enclose Captn. Powell's last letter which you can send for perusal.

238. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Sooruj-koond, 2nd November, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

This morning received yours of 29th October.

If you want officers to administer the districts as you take them, why not draft *one* from every station trans-and cis-Sutluj where there are *two*, and call on Thomason to replace them with new men. This will give you experienced civil officers, and yet not leave any old district without one.


Do you remember the mistake that was made with the cis-Sutluj? All the men sent to administer it were new and unexperienced, except the commissioner, who had to teach the officers sent to assist him! To occupy a new country the best officers in our old country should go, and new hands be brought up from the rear to the old country.

I am very glad Nicholson has joined you. You will soon have good old Lumsden.

I have to-day, in conjunction with Napier, persuaded the General to expel the enemy from the insulting position he has taken up in front of the 2 camps.

It is first to be tried with a concentrated fire from batteries to be thrown out by the General in front of his camp, and by me in front of my own; and if this fails we are to go at the post with infantry. The object is, of course, to save the expenditure of life which the latter process involves. The guns of Moolraj on the Nullah throw their shot nearly up to the General's 18 Pounder Battery and into my camp, where some men have been killed and wounded.

This is the Besiegers besieged with a vengeance, and should not have been allowed so long as it has been.



The above scratch will give you an idea of what is going on.

239. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp, 3rd November, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

It was agreed last evening that the General should construct a battery for 8 heavy guns within 800 yards of the enemy's guns, and be ready to open it this morning.

To facilitate this we constructed an 8-gun battery in front of our camp and drew off the enemy's fire from the General's workmen all night, yet this morning the Engineers discovered that the Battery would not be ready for 24 hours more !

So here we are still, being pounded, and the enemy strengthening his position in a most awkward place in front of our two camps. This is a great falling off from the anxiety Whish displayed for the enemy to show *themselves* in order that he might destroy them, and I am afraid it arises from that nasty jealousy of "politicals," and "Edwardes's Irregulars," of which you may have seen so much in the papers. It is an unforgiveable offence that we took 10 of Moolraj's guns, and that Whish has taken none and though he calls on us to co-operate with him on all occasions, even to covering his retirement on 16th September, he now considers that his honor is not at all concerned in my camp being ploughed up by the guns the rebels have put on the Nullah. He even talks of withdrawing the Battery he constructed last night. If he would only co-operate with us, i.e., attack the enemy on one side while we attacked on the other, the entrenchment could be carried with little loss of life to either of us. If we have to attempt it alone, I hope we shall succeed, but it will be at a sacrifice shameful to the *lookers on*.

On the 12th September when Whish advanced against the Dhurumsalah he made no [effort to] co-operate on his left, and our loss was very heavy indeed, among others Lake got wounded. Besides this I am keeping up all his communications with the rear, which takes upwards of 4000 men from our force. It is really too bad.

P.S. I send you news of the Bunnoo force, but am too tired to give you the abstract as I have been out all night in the advanced battery, and all day since in the sun.

240. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp, 6th November, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I send you important news if you have not received it sooner from other quarters. I thank God George Lawrence is safe, and his gallant little friend Bowie.

We fight the enemy tomorrow morning. Brigr. Markham with a column of all arms takes the eastern side of the Nullah, and my force takes the western, and we make a simultaneous attack on the 2 entrenchments as soon after light as possible.

I have no doubt we shall be victorious, and if Moolraj would only come out we might possibly terminate the Mooltan rebellion without a siege.

P.S. Need I say how gratified I have been with the high approbation of the Court of Directors, or how grieved at the strange and unjustifiable reproaches of my former friend and kind patron and master Lord Gough. If I survive to-morrow, perhaps he may forgive me, if I do not, pray let him know that I was grateful to him for my rise in life, whatever he might think.

241. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Sooruj-koond, 7th November, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Yesterday evening I think I told you that it was all settled at a Council of war in the General's tent that 2 British columns under Colonels Brooke and Franks and commanded by Brigadier Markham should move across the Sooruj-koond bridge at day-light and making a detour to the east from the flank of the enemy's entrenchment, and then walk up it from the rear, while our Irregular force was to make a simultaneous attack on the western entrenchment on the camp side of the Nullah.

Preliminary to this, my men were to receive charge of a large Battery of the General's, 1600 yards in front of the English camp, and 800 from the enemy's guns on the Nullah. About 11 P.M., Pollock with Cortlandt's Kuthar-Mookhee Regiment and 1000 other men occupied the said Battery, and shortly after the enemy, as by a preconcerted signal, made an attack upon the Battery and called to the Kuthar Mookhee

officers by name that, "now was the time to come over." Accordingly some 5 or 6 companies jumped over the entrenchment and joined the rebels, with whom they walked off. Pollock had a narrow escape of being carried off by them, as had also their Colonel Budrinath. This occurred at about 3 A.M. this morning, and it was about 4 A.M., before I could get the news and go to the General, when I found the British Columns of attack drawn out ready for the morning's work, but just returning to their tents again, the General having given up the project. You may conceive my feelings of mortification and shame (at the very time when the C.C.'s letter was under discussion) at any part of my force, preventing not only ourselves from earning distinction but others also. I felt like a sheep stricken and would as lief have been hanged. A 2nd Council was held in the General's tent (the General and his two sons in bed in three corners of it!), and my opinion was asked. I said it was a very insidious thing to give an opinion at such a moment, but being called on I had no hesitation in saying that an immediate victory over the enemy was necessary to make the force secure, as, if the fight was put off, probably Cortlandt's other 2 Regiments would follow the example of the Kuthar-Mookhee, and then the Irregulars do the same at the same time. I said it was Cortlandt's opinion that the Regular Regiments could not be trusted under such discouraging circumstances, and as they were the strength of my army, it would be absurd for me to undertake the proposed attack, and, in short, that the General's force *must* fight, fight *alone*, and *win*, unless we were prepared for the madness of retiring.

After some objections and discussion this view was coincided in; and at $\frac{1}{2}$ past 6 I left the General's tent to go home, when a smart musquetry fire opened in the Nullah on *our* advanced picket, and soon grew into a regular attack by the enemy on the Irregular Camp.

The picket was driven in after a hard struggle, reinforced, and again driven in, and at one time our advanced entrenchment was cleared of its defenders, and the flank of 8 *guns turned*, when the gunners nobly drew the guns from the embrasures, and turned them round on the enemy.

At this juncture we called on the two Regular Regiments

in camp to charge out of their entrenchment and into the Nullah which they did in such style that after a severe hand to hand fight in the bed of the Nullah, and another with muskets on the banks, lasting altogether not less than $\frac{1}{2}$ an hour, Moolraj's men were thoroughly repulsed, and followed back almost into their own trenches.

Meanwhile I had given General Whish notice that the issue was doubtful, and that he had better attack at once; and no sooner had the enemy retired in confusion than Markham's Brigade crossed the Nullah, made a detour, and came to a splendid deployment on their rear. You may judge the result. The British force walked through their position, and the cavalry drove the rebel sowars like sheep before them. At the same moment, as our men's courage was completely restored by having repulsed the attack on our camp, I ordered the line to turn out and attack on the west side of the nullah, the same as intended before the Kuthar-Mookhee Pultun went over.

Lake as usual headed his Daoodpotras most encouragingly and Pollock and James (two as gallant young fellows as ever I saw) led on portions of the Infantry along with him, and had driven the Sikhs' right out of their position by the time the British force came up to the other side of the Nullah, so that a pleasant greeting *would* have occurred as they both met on the opposite banks, had not the sepoy mistaken our men (as usual) for Moolraj's, and let drive into them, causing some loss; but a brave European soldier of the Queen's 32nd jumped down, put himself at the head of the "ragamuffins" and struck his Shacko on his bayonet, as a signal to cease firing!

I mean to reward this noble action handsomely.

Altogether either 5 or 6 guns were taken, with hardly any loss at all, and a very strong enemy turned skilfully out of a very strong position in the easiest and simplest manner I ever saw. Great credit is due to Markham and Franks whose manœuvring was elegant, and to whose management the slight loss is due. Moolraj's army must have suffered severely and this licking will do for a month at least.

We are all as happy as possible, and it was the Mussulman *Ead*.

242. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Sooruj-koond, 9th November, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I am glad to learn from your note of 5th that Herbert has got off from Attock. Lord Gough has nobody but himself to blame for the Peshawur defection. Such delay as has occurred must of course shake down everything that was at all rotten.

As for the paucity of troops, I trust you will find those the C.C. now has more than a match for all the Sikhs in the Punjab, though of course the more men the less loss.

Moolraj promises his men to bring out *more guns* (to prevent their running away). We shall see.

I send you one of Moolraj's new Rupees—a little fid of gold with "Sut Goor Suhaie" on it. He has no silver left.

To-morrow I will send you the reports of the action. Our Irregular force lost upwards of 200 killed and wounded in the attack on our own camp, and the attack on the enemy's in return. The British troops lost hardly any; their appearance frightened the Sikhs off.

The General and all men and officers are as pleased as Punch.

P.S. Tell Lumsden he has lost as pretty a charge as was ever witnessed.

243. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Sooraj-koond, 13th November, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

The General (to prove that he never before had command of the Irr. Force) has *now* ordered me to send a detachment to recover Sirdarpore and Tolumbah, though he told the C.C. my force admitted not of detachments.

I have therefore resolved to send Sheikh Emamooddeen with his 2000 men and 2 guns to put his own districts (of which Sirdarpore and Tolumbah are 2) to right; and as he cannot pursue the straight road to Sirdarpore, and must go round by Rungpoor, I propose that he should make a slight detour to Jhung and clear Moolraj's kardar out of that also. The Sheikh will then make Sirdarpore his headquarters. He

accepts the duty willingly, and thinks he can perform it with ease.

I would not have given it him else. The Bunnoo force must be far on its road to join Sher Singh, and when the latter gentleman is defeated, he will not retreat to Jhung or Mooltan, but to the Jheylum, so that I have no apprehensions about the Sheikh.

I think nevertheless the General is very wrong to weaken me before he is reinforced himself; but he is the person responsible.

Brigr. Dundas writes me that he "does not apprehend anything will arise to prevent the force marching from Roree after the 23rd November"!!!

I send you a return he sent me of the Sindh troops, as also a Mooltan Ukhbar.

The Dewan behaves very cleverly with his men, stimulating them with alternate reproaches for cowardice, and promises of giving them more guns. It is wonderful how the wretches hang together. Some were picked up wounded on 7th November who said "Famine drove them from the Malwa Sikh country, and they only arrived two or three days ago, all their families had died, why should not they also?"

An old Jummadar of the Qur.-Master General's Department named Ram Bux has gone into Mooltan on some errand of the General's, I believe to see about the captured European, and, getting into difficulties there, gave out he was sent as a Vukeel from the Sahib-log to offer to retire if Moolraj would give 6 annas in the Rupee. The General has himself been doing a very improper thing, writing a letter to Moolraj to offer the body of Hurree Singh (the Adjutant of Artillery who deserted poor Agnew, and who was killed by my men on 7th). Moolraj wrote back, as far as I can understand, a very impudent answer; but the General will not let anybody see it. He should surely not have done this without consulting me, else what am I here for? Verbally he *did* ask me whether there was any harm in letting Hurree Singh's friends know that they might come and take the body away, but I never thought he would go and write to Moolraj, particularly after knowing what a reprimand I got from the Governor-General.

I hear he addressed him as 'Kurrum firma-i-Mooshfikan Mookhlis Miherban, etc., etc.'

Taylor has passed Punnialah on his road to Esaukheyl, and I trust has got news of the Lawrences' coming to join him, but I own I am very anxious about their safety, for I hear Chuttur Singh has given Peshawur in Jageer to Sooltan Muhomed and the latter furnished 4000 sowars to Chuttur Sing. It is said also that Peer Muhomud Khan is along with C.S.

A report moreover prevails that 2 or 3 Sahibs and 1 or 2 Mem Sahibs have fallen into Chuttur Sing's hands, but this report naturally follows the news of the Peshawar revolt.

I must say the introduction of a Muhommedan party into the struggle is a most unfavourable symptom, and one for which the Chief is responsible. He has had from May till November to collect an army, and is still unprepared. How different Lord Hardinge's army in 1845!

There is a great difference of opinion, I hear, as to what our boundary should be on the west? It is too important a question to discuss fully now; but having lived for 2 years beyond the Indus in charge of districts I can assure you *that the Indus is no boundary whatever, but the Soolimannee range is a most complete one.* Nothing short of an ocean can be a more perfect barrier. From the salt range to the Sutluj, there is no intercourse between the people of the Derajat and the people of the mountains.

Pray lift your voice against giving up Peshawur or trying to make a boundary of a river which divides parishes in half merely, and re-unites them with a ferry boat.

244. *From Herbert Edwardes*

17th November, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I have been remiss in writing lately, but there is really nothing to relate.

That we are WAITING FOR REINFORCEMENT is, I fancy, no news to *you*, though it seems not to be known at Headquarters.

Has the C.-in-C., or has he not, any authority over General Auchmuty?

If he *has*, the sooner he exerts it the better. When you have read the enclosed letter you will agree with me that the Duke of Wellington would have put such a General of Division under arrest.

Moolraj and his troops are worse friends than ever lately. He has served out pay to the Fort garrison, but refuses to pay those outside unless they fight, which they decline.

The Mooltan Field Force has taken to horse racing in despair but even here we feel the want of a few more Cavalry!

245. *From——to Major Edwardes*

Camp, 15th November, 1848.

My dear Sir,

I have just received your kind note of the 13th, after my letter of yesterday you will be as surprised and disgusted as we are to hear that the 3rd and L.H. are again halted! Major Mallett received a letter this morning from the Assistant Adjutant General at Sukkur expressing General Auchmuty's "surprise that he should have presumed to act upon a requisition from Major General Whish C.B. commanding at Mooltan in defiance of positive orders given him to halt at Nuosherah and that in event of a recurrence of such conduct, the Major General would *supersede him in the command of the Regiment, and order him under arrest to Roree.*"! To such an extent can private interests be allowed to interfere with the public weal!

Perhaps it is the climate of Scinde which leads to this suspension of the mental faculties. The Dett. was directed to halt wherever the letter was received (at Chowderea) but I wrote to the Major declaring my inability to subsist him there for more than one day, the place being a kind of oasis in the desert, and have requested him to march to Chusmee Khan without delay, where he accordingly proceeds tomorrow morning, and where he must halt till the Scinde authorities are pleased to enact a 4th part of this Military farce: unless indeed a *greater* power, than they have been in the habit of contemplating save at a distance, takes the managements from them, and turns their little play into a tragedy as far as they

are concerned, and I am in great hopes that the Major, who has done all in his power to advance, will come off in triumph under the orders of Lord Gough. We have not heard lately from the Artillery. They must now be somewhere near Naosherah. I received a letter from the Nawab today promising me his aid and so I doubt not but that I shall succeed in getting the supplies. I am truly obliged to you for your kind aid in carrying out my views and from your recommendation I dare say Golding will get it done. I was sorry to hear from Bombay that Brown, the Secy., is nearly given over at Bombay, his appt. is done away with, and the Comr., alone in his glory.

I hope my Bhaee is getting on. Fever is an unpleasant companion on a campaign.

246. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Sooruj-koond, 18th November, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

You will get my letter No. 129 with this. I have purposely complied with the General's wish that I should refer the occupation of Sirdarpoor to you; although I *know* you wish it, not because there is any difficulty in doing it as I proposed, but because it is obvious that it will be an immense time yet before any reinforcements reach the General; and if this delay should act again on the enemy's spirits as it has already done 2 or 3 times before, it would be unwise either to add to that effect by sending away the men we have, or to weaken my own camp.

By the time you get my letter I hope some collision will have taken place on the Chenab, and Sher Sing be on his way to the Jheylum; also that the patriotic and disinterested Auchmuty will have moved his division from Roree, so that the Sikh cause may be looking still more down than it does already. You can therefore issue any orders you like about the occupation of Sirdarpoor and Tolumbah, Jhung, &c., leaving it open to me to send the Sheikh's or any other troops I think best, and I can by that time carry such orders out without the inconvenience which would attend them at this moment.

Moolraj is said to be doing all he can now to disgust his

supernumerary troops in the hope that they will leave him, and making up large quantities of *Mithaie* for the siege, it being the custom I understand for native chiefs when besieged to feed their soldiers on the walls once a day at least, so that they may have no excuse to leave their posts and cook their food.

Wherever Moolraj goes, he has 2 guns in "Orderly" attendance on him.

I have had no letter from Taylor for some days, but he was at Esaukheyl when last heard of; that place having been reoccupied by some sowars of mine.

The steamer on 15th had reached Kacheeree which is only a few Koss from Dera Ishmael Khan. I hear from Shahnawaz Khan of Tank that Mullick Ali Yar of Kaleh Bagh has been called on by G. Lawrence to assist him in getting away from Kohat, so that Taylor and his escort will have arrived most opportunely.

The Kuchee Khoshab and Mitteh Towanah districts being left empty by the retirement of the old kardars along with the Bunnoo force, I have made them over to poor Futteh Khan's son, and another Towanah named Sher Muhommed. They can do more than any one else in that country, and indeed I know no one else who would undertake them with the prospect of Pind Dadun Khan becoming a principal post of the rebels, and the salt range the seat of war.

247. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Mooltan, 28th November, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Thanks for your letter of 24th, though news very sad.

Cureton's loss alone is a calamity at the opening of a campaign. Long ere this I hope the stain has been wiped out by a smashing general action and the capture of all Sher Sing's artillery.

Moolraj has sent Mr. Narayun Sing to Jhung to help the Buniyahs, so I fancy I must slip the Sheikh at him at once. The Sheikh is quite game, and ready for anything.

P. S. The Roree force is made over to Dundas and

marches as follows—Cavalry 26th Novr., 1st Brig. Infy., and Horse Arty., on 27th., and 2nd Brigade on 29th.

248. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Mooltan, Night, 29th November, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

You have been so good as to make some provision, I believe, for the mother of the late Col. John Holmes, and she is grateful for the same I am sure, but I do not think you were aware at the time that there is a large family of children and grandchildren, all of whom, as well as the mother, were dependent on poor Holmes, and now find themselves in unexpected distress. In a piteous letter I have before me, Mrs. Holmes says the pension you have granted her "is barely sufficient to find food, leaving her nothing wherewith to clothe the children, or find the means of instruction for them." You have got so many things to occupy your time that I would not bring this forward now if I did not think the poor woman's story true, and that they are suffering all this time from poverty. John Holmes was a Christian and his family has therefore greater claims on us; but on the Durbar also, which is theoretically supposed to be loyal, more legitimate claims could not be urged than those of the children and grandchildren of one of their few servants who was faithful, and died doing his duty.

I fear the Durbar nevertheless would have sympathised more had he died on the other side.

Holmes served zealously under me for some time, and I quite feel it a duty to speak up for his little ones, now that he has gone; and as I am not often a *beggar* to bother you with petitions, I venture to hope you will be now persuaded by me to reconsider Mrs. Holmes's pension, and, until the children can be put out in life, to grant this family half the late Colonel's pay among them.

P. S. 30th Novr. 1848.

Nash's detachment with the treasure came in this morning and "Ruby" arrived all safe. Are you able to send pay for Cortlandt's Regular troops? I can manage the Irregulars, but the others are too heavy a pull, I fear, and they are very much in arrears.

249. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp, 29th Novr., 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Kindly send a Purwannah for the garrison of Lukee to deliver up the fort to me or Taylor, or any one we may appoint, sealed by the *Maharajah*, and *Dina Nath* and countersigned by *you*. (Be particular please about the seals as the blackguards have demanded this Purwannah.)

What is to be done with the Futteh Pultun? I am obliged to keep up 1000 men at Dera Ghazee Khan to watch them.

250. *From Herbert Edwardes*

3rd December, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I have taken the evidence of the General's Mootsuddy. The letter was to Moolraj, and the contents most indiscreet.

I will send it tomorrow.

The Durbar are showing their wishes to Cortlandt's 3 Regular Regts. in a very effectual and unmistakable manner, though quite *unostentatiously*.

I mean that they have sent them no pay; and they are more than 4 month's in arrears.

But this is not all. Their *clothing* which you ordered them to send on the first practicable opportunity (and which could have come very well with Col. Nash's detachment), is still detained and Cortlandt's Vukeel severely snubbed whenever he asks for it.

Meanwhile it is very cold and the men with no warm coats. Kindly give a *Sukht hookum* about these things, as also about the ammunition we have so often written for, round shot, &c., &c.

It would be well I think if you would give the C. C. a hint that unless he issues some stringent order about it, the "Kushish" so indiscretely begun by General Auchmuty will be continued by his successors, for I hear they "are anxious to have their force considered perfectly independant."

This is a joke. Every private will assert his independence next. There wants a good taut hand over the whole of our army to double-thong these notions out of them, and teach them that we are all soldiers of one Government and sons of

one Mother country, involved in one war against a common enemy.

251. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Mooltan, 13th December, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I have been obliged to borrow $\frac{1}{2}$ a lakh of Rs. from the General's Military Chest to pay Cortlandt's Regts. You express surprise that they are so much in arrears after the money you lent them before; but that is 2 months ago nearly; and it left them 2 months still in arrears, as Sikh soldiers always are; so that they are now more than 4 months in arrears. I assure you it is quite unpleasant to me to write and trouble you about money, and I squeeze my kardars on every side before I do so, but troops must either be paid, or disbanded; and I think the best thing that could be done would be to disband the Futteh Pultun at once for this very reason. Even while I write a Hurkara from Mooltan brings a report which shows how well the want of pay is known by the enemy, and what bad effects it has. I enclose the scrap.

I have called on Sheikh Emamooddeen as well as Jowahir Mull to pay in some money without delay, but expect little for some time. If you would, tell the Nuwab to assist me with money. *So long as my wants do not exceed his collections in the Mooltan country*, it would amount to the same thing in a civil way, as taking his accounts for which there is no leisure just now, even if it were advisable. Having got nearly 2 lakhs out of him I do not like pitching into him again, but *you* might with a good grace, and it is only for the present month or so that this exigency will press us. As soon as ever Mooltan falls, I will cut my force down from a three decker to a frigate.

Sheikh Emamooddeen has crossed into the Jhung territory, and Narayun Sing has, I believe, bolted. The Sheikh has sent me a seizure of most important letters from Moolraj to Dost Mohumed Khan, Sooltan Mohd. Khan, and Chuttur Sing. To-night I will sit up and translate them for you, and send them to-morrow. They hint that Dost Mod. has promised to send reinforcements through *Bunnoo*. If so, my hitherto quiet frontier will soon be disturbed.

Brigr. Cheape made another reconnaissance of the fort today.


Thanks for your kind congratulations on my C. B. ship. I have been indeed over-rewarded.

What by the way has become of poor Lumsden? I was in hopes he would be winning another C. B. ship for the Residency, in the van of Lord Gough's army, but he seems to have disappeared altogether from this sublunary world and is either in disgrace with you, or in love with some "Lahorina fair."

252. *From Reynell Taylor to Herbert Edwardes*

My dear Edwardes,

We have had a severe light infantry skirmish today. The garrison came out and lined a small nullah in front of the trenches and immediately under the face of their own guns. As their object was merely a distant fusillade, it was pity almost that the brave Mookceahs left their own entrenchments and pressed forward in light infantry fashion to make the Singhs get out of that. A brisk and well contested skir-



mish was the result in which we had one man killed and some 5 or six wounded and the *enemy lost six men killed and a number wounded*. The fight was prolonged by the circumstance of a Singh being shot dead in the open ground between the contending parties, and his friends wishing to carry off the body and our men wishing to prevent them doing so,

made the affair much longer. Two horses were killed and a peasant wounded by the round shot of the fort in camp. The Moockeahs behaved very gallantly.

People say that the garrison had half a mind to give in yesterday, but received an encouraging letter from Meer Alem Khan saying that the Dooranees would be with him immediately. I am in a great fix one of my own making, I suppose, but that does not improve the matter. I believe this force and guns, miserable as they are, are equal to the work in hand, supposing peace without, but as it is I am unable to distribute them about the place for fear of being all abroad, in case of external difficulty. I have been living on the hopes of the Singhs being licked on the Jelum and now Nicholson writing from the army, about 6 Koss from the Sikh army, tells me that the C.-in-C. is greatly recommended to postpone further operations till after the conclusion of the siege of Mooltan by which time the army of the rebels will probably be reinforced by the Siberian light infantry and 15th Cossack irregular horse. The consequence is, I hear to-day, that the Singhs are strong in Pind Dadun Khan, Meanee and &c. I shall soon begin to look for them this way. Surely it must be a great object in every point of view to defeat the half-self-defeated force under Shere Singh before the father arrives, supported by the troops or promises of Dost Muhomed Khan. Having thrashed them on the Jelum, I could understand the advisability of pressing, though I doubt if poor Herbert and Abbott could. Another week or less will settle Lukkee one way or the other. I hope and still hope to get back to Mooltan but my uncertainties are very great at present. I have heard from Herbert today, letter dated Decr. 11. The siege has been renewed and his garrison are very wavering. Good bye. *

253. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Sooruj-koond, 18th December, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Jowahir Mull has paid up 65,000 Rs. under the influence of the Roobukaree I wrote you, and I trust to squeeze him still harder.

* Enclosed with Edwardes' letter of December 12, 1848.

The Sheikh is, I honestly believe, a large *creditor* instead of *debtor* to the Durbar, and I send you a copy of a note just received from him on the subject.

The conquest of Jhung will probably pay up his soldiers.

I send you 2 Ukhbars received by Muhommed Alim Khan Barukzye (son of Sirdar Syud Muhommed Khan) who has returned to me from Taylor, and you will see that the Dost has at length actually arrived at Peshawur but in what capacity seems doubtful, as the Ukhbar represents him as abusing Sooltan Muhommed for delivering up Lawrence. This however is hard to believe. Syud Muhommed Khan was always *bullied* by Sooltan Muhommud, so it is not impossible he may have been as he tries to make out—"Kinarah-Kush" in this business; and the son who is with me has a mortal feud with Wullee Muhommud, his elder brother, who is hand and glove with Sooltan Muhommud (a pretty family history).

Enclosed is the last letter I have received from Taylor, as also a public one from him to you which has been forgotten on my table for a day or two, but is not urgent, containing only Sooltan Muhomud's justification of his conduct.

Taylor has got himself entangled in the Lukee business, which I wish rather he had avoided; but he wished it also, and has I fancy been forced into it by circumstances. He will find it awkward now to run away.

Pollock with the Bombay column is today one march on the south of Shoojabad; so they will all be in on 21st.

As Bhawul Khan's troops are to stay a little longer at Mooltan, it would be both good for the service and kind to Pearse, if Pearse were appointed to assist Lake, for at present P. is out of employ by the closing of the Survey. And when Siege commences, and we have to patrol daily *we* shall want European Officers at Sooruj-koond very badly. Napier also is anxious about this arrangement.

254. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Sooruj-koond, 21st December, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

The rear of the Bombay column came up this morning and finer troops were never seen. Europeans and *natives*,

all carry the Canteen for water, an advantage which would make any General prefer a Bombay to a Bengal Division.

The 4th Bombay N. I. Rifles is the best accoutred and set up Sepoy corps I ever saw.

We are all much pleased with them. The only fault is that the horses of the 1st Lancers are all out of condition.

The General has desired me to wait on him at 4 p.m. to receive my instructions, and to-morrow I shall be able to tell you his plans in extenso; for the present I can only say that I understand the idea of attacking the Citadel first has been rejected, partly for the sake of expedition, to put this force at the disposal of Lord G. as quickly as possible, and partly in order to drive the large force of Moolraj if possible into the fort or else disperse it.

The attack, therefore, would be made from the old direction, but the advanced posts of the Mundee-Ava and the Seedee Lal-ka-Bheyd would be occupied the first morning and batteries erected there; and, if opportunity offered, the city be escalated at the same time while our troops are hot and the enemy panic-stricken.

Our irregular force will have to make a false attack on the west to distract attention.

Pollock and I will write you daily. I have applied for Pearse to do duty with us. The letter from Lord Dalhousie to Lawrence I sent off yesterday in a boat to drop down the river until it meets the *Planet* Steamer.

By my calculation Lawrence cannot arrive here before New-Year's day.

Enclosed is an interesting dispatch from Taylor. Please write and "*Shahbash*" Gholam Hussun Khan Alizye, for giving up the Dost's Purwannah.

It is warmly reported that the Dost has seized Chuttur Sing. Has our Government addressed any letters to the Dost yet, asking his intentions, and informing him of our own decided views?

255. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Sooruj-koond, December 23rd, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I have received yours of 19th December and ordered a dawkh to be laid via Jhung to the C.C.'s camp as you wished,

Narayun Sing seems to have made offers of submission to the Sheikh.

The Sheikh's presence in Jhung is very useful, and I have told him if he likes to send a detachment of my men to settle Sirdarpoor and Toloombah, and stay in Jhung himself for a while.

When the dawk is laid I will communicate the progress of the siege direct to Mackeson.

I have heard today from H.M.L. who was at Hyderabad on 15th December, and expects to reach here by Xmas day, but will not probably do so till end of month.

If the letter from Lord D. you sent was to stop him, of course, he will not come on here at all, but go via Bhawulpoor.

The Bombayites are sweeping up their stores from the Ghat, and the Bengal Division marches round to its siege ground on Monday morning—Xmas day, the Ducks following according as carriage serves.

The General's youngest son (a very nice boy) is very ill indeed.

The whole force is eager to get at the fort and the rebels, and I doubt not that the siege will proceed with the more vigour from the generous rivalry which exists between the Divisions of the 2 Presidencies. I must tell you Brigadier Dundas is very like *you*, but pray tell Lady Currie that we agree he is not so good looking!

The Ducks flapped round the fort this morning, and quacked so that Moolraj was afraid to show himself. Rome was saved by geese. What if Mooltan be taken by Ducks?

256. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Mooltan, 25th December, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

The General marched away with the Bengal Division to Seetul-ke-Maree this morning, and sends back his carriage to the Ducks tonight to enable them to follow him tomorrow, so as to attack the city the day after. I think it will require one more day.

I have been receiving the Salaams of all my officers and the post hour has overtaken me, so more tomorrow.

Enclosed are interesting letters from Taylor. I must reinforce him at once, and perhaps send Cortlandt as soon as the city of Mooltan falls, as it will never do to have Dost Muhomed turning the flank of the Punjab by disturbing the Derajat.

257. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Sooruj-koond, 27th December, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

The General, as far as I can make out, has again changed his plan, i.e., having moved round to Seetul-ke-Maree for the sole purpose of taking the city first, it is now thought that the enemy have also shifted position to the same quarter and that an attack on the suburbs could not be made by surprise, or without loss, and accordingly Napier's *Regular* plan of attack seems adopted at the eleventh hour. At least so I judge from the fact that the General himself with the Bengal Division, at noon to-day, is to seize the 2 Brick Kilns on the N.E. of the Fort, which is the first step in Napier's attack.

Dundas, with the Ducks, is instructed, I understand, to make a demonstration on the Mundee Ava and Seedee Lal-ka-Bheyd, and we (the allies) are to reach the Seesh Muhal on the west of the city by noon, and make a division there till 1 P.M., advancing as far as we deem necessary for the object in hand, and then retiring.

We start accordingly at 10 o'clock, and the result I will communicate to you on my return.

6 P.M. Just returned from the Sheesh Mahal, which we reached about $\frac{1}{4}$ to 1 P.M. We opened fire at 1 and left off at $\frac{1}{2}$ past 3. The enemy showed on our first arrival but retired before our guns. I have no *exact* intelligence from the Regular Camps yet, but have heard generally that the Brick Kilns on N.E., the Mundee Ava, and the Seedee Lal-ka-Bheyd have all fallen into our hands. Probably large desertions will follow this tonight, and the city be attacked first and fall speedily.

P.S. Taylor has got his trenches 250 yards from the fort of Lukkee and I think he will now carry it.

258. *From Herbert Edwardes*

My dear Sir Frederick, 28th December, 1848, Night.

I have only time to tell you that Lawrence arrived this morning with Col. Bradshawe H.M.'s 60th Rifles, quite hearty and recovered. He came by land, the steamer being *too slow!!!* So missed *both* Lord Dalhousie's letters. Tell the Lord this or we shall all get into a scrape.

A brilliant day yesterday. Sawan Mull's tomb, Wuzeera-bad, the *Am Khas* and the suburbs near, all seized by Bengal Division, Mundee Ava and Seedee Lal, by the Ducks.

After all they have been obliged to call in *the useless* Irregulars to hold the Seedee Lal and the suburbs round it; so $\frac{1}{2}$ my force and Lake's is now on that duty and I am going down to sleep with the men, having come up to Soorujkoond for the young fellows' bedding, &c. Great blazing going on on our side. Enemy slack, Sikhs bolting rapidly, women screaming—prospect of the city being sacked tomorrow or next day.

259. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Beyghee Bagh, Evening, 29th December, 1848.
My dear Sir Frederick,

The siege is going on with tolerable vigour, and we have a battery within 150 yards of the city wall. Hard firing, gun and musketry, all day. This morning a sharp attack on our position here, but repulsed immediately by our "Abyssinians" who followed the enemy home. Mr. McMohon (a new volunteer whom I have just caught) killed a standard-bearer in single combat.

I fancy the city will be stormed tomorrow.

As yet no loss on the British side worth mentioning.

Lawrence is loth to have Mooltan till something is done decisive, but is laying his *dawk* to go on.

I send you Taylor's last letter. He deserves immense credit certainly and I hope will succeed.

260. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Beyghee Bagh, 1st January, 1849.
My dear Sir Frederick,

Lake joins me in wishing you a happy new year and many to revolve after it.

The storm again today—some unaccountable delay puts it off from one day to another, and I may fairly say

“Tomorrow—and tomorrow—and tomorrow
Creeps on this little space from day to day
And all our yesterdays have lighted forts
The way to dusky death.”

It is now said that owing to the breach at the Delhi gate being still impracticable, the assault is put off till 8 a.m. tomorrow, and Becher, who has just come in, says, with every prospect of success. Captn. Smyth of H.M.'s 32nd leads right assault, and senior Captn. of 1st Bombay Fusiliers, the left, Abercrombis of Bengal Engrs. leads the former, and Major Scott of Bombay Engrs. the latter.

Lawrence thinks 1 Sepoy Regiment, 500 Cavalry, 1 N.H.A. and 1 Reserve Coy. Arty. would be enough British troops to leave at Mooltan. The Sepoy Regt. in the Fort, also the Reserve Coy. Arty. knock down city walls, and keep 500 Cavy. and N.H.A. in lines outside—with any portion of my force available.

I will answer your question about steamers tomorrow.

P.S. Lawrence positively starts tomorrow evening. Moolraj is boiling hot oil to pour on the storming party.

261. *From Herbert Edwardes*

General's Tent, 5 P.M., 2nd January, 1849.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Huzza! The city is taken from end to end, and it is believed with little loss.

The right breach at Delhi Gate failed, though gallantly attempted. The left at Khoonee Boorj was carried like lightning.

The affair commenced at $\frac{1}{4}$ past 3 and was over at $\frac{1}{4}$ past 4. Congratulate you heartily.

262. *From Herbert Edwardes*

10th January, 1849.

My dear Sir Frederick,

No further communication from Moolraj, and a new Battery opened on him from the North East.

The General refused to let the city be plundered, though

the prize agents wanted to do so. I have a correspondence to send you on this point tomorrow.

I send you some more letters from Taylor from which you will see that the coming of the Dorranees to Bunnoo seems now impossible. Toloombah is reoccupied. Surfuraz Khan mistook your orders altogether and seems inclined to run *yagee* himself now to appropriate Toloombah for Misr Hurchurun Dass, whereas it is clear from your order that Kot Kumalia alone is the Misr's, and Surfuraz merely sent to Toloombah because Sheikh Emamooddeen was not able to go at that time.

I have written a Roobukaree about it. Have you settled whether Lake goes on with Whish, or who is to do so? No time to lose.

263. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Mooltan, 12th January, 1849.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Last night the enemy made a sort of sally on the head of our sap and upset a number of gabions, causing great confusion and hubbub, for the unarmed sappers were obliged to fall back on the supports, and a panic spread through the trenches; but the Queen's 10th had a company on support duty, which came up at once and drove back the bold intruders. There was great firing but little damage, only one man of ours killed, I believe.

The sap is said to be still 50 yards from the crest of the glacis, so the distance must be deceptive, for this was said some days ago. The mining of the ditch (an Engineer told me this morning) is to begin tomorrow.

When the siege is over and the General moves off, I should have authority to move one of the 3 Bombay regiments against Hurrund, and a couple of heavy guns, else the Military will make objections.

264. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Mooltan, 15th January, 1849.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I do not exactly understand the drift of your note of 10th January just received.

You say you "do not like this Derajat business and are afraid of my getting implicated in a difficult affair."

Again, "The Dost looks to the Derajat as well as Peshawur."

If this latter be the case, as seemed more likely some few days ago than now, and as is declared by himself I hear in a letter to Abbott, it follows that some precautions *must* be taken to *prevent* the Dost from getting into the Derajat, which would be turning the flank of all the C.C.'s operations. And if so, the question only remains who is to take those precautions? or in other words what troops are available for the duty?

The C.-in-C. certainly has none, and cannot advance *himself* apparently until reinforced by Whish's Division.

The only troops left therefore are Cortlandt's and my own, selections from which in the shape of horse, foot and artillery, I am accordingly supplying Taylor with. These rude materials will probably be more than a match for any force that the Dost is prepared to detach from himself; but if the Dost were to think it worth while to throw his *strength* into a Derajat expedition, it would then become a matter for the Commr.-in-Chief to provide against, and Taylor's small force would at any rate give him time.

The Bombay Brigade, left at Mooltan, should be ordered at once to complete its carriage, and two out of the 3 regiments remain ready to march at the shortest notice, till the war is at an end. These could reinforce Taylor if hard pressed and save the necessity of Lord Gough detaching men whom he can ill spare.

Mind, I do not contemplate such an emergency. I only make this reply to your apprehensions that the force with Taylor will not be adequate for the duty, and it is certainly right to take these precautions, when alone they *can* be taken, before the danger comes. If you agree with me, please move Government to issue the order to the Bombay Mooltan Brigade. But my belief is that *our deserting the Derajat* could alone tempt the Barakzyes into it, and that Taylor is now pursuing the course most likely to discourage aggression, by showing a determination to recover from the rebels every foot of ground they have alienated. The bold front

Taylor has shown to the at one time very portentous rumour of a Dorranee invasion, has been, I assure you, most beneficial to us in the Derajat; and though at the time that you ordered him to avoid entangling himself at Lukkee, it would have been awkward had he met with any reverse, the recommencement of the siege of Mooltan under auspicious circumstances very much altered the case, and Taylor felt that he would be turning his back on a service that he might now perform, and you will see that he will succeed in recovering Lukee, and reinstating our own thannah, whether he afterwards feels strong enough to go on to Bunnoo or not. This will be of itself a great thing gained and a limit set to the Barakzyes.

Our sap has reached the crest of the glacis, and mining is going on, as well as breaching. Yesterday Moolraj's soldiers could not fire their muskets for the rain, and our sappers walked coolly about the ditch and were pelted with brickbats! To-day our riflemen line the sap on the glacis, and not a man on the walls can show his face. We have now three batteries in the city also, 1st for 2 18 Prs. to silence "Long Tower" and other guns on that face, 2nd for 4 18 Prs. to breach the south wall of fort already shaken by Jumma Musjid explosion, 3rd for 2 Howitzers to throw shells into said breach.

P.S. Lukkee is ours! News just in. Pray write and comfort Taylor who regrets your view of the matter.

265. *From Herbert Edwardes*

Camp Mooltan, 23rd January, 1849.

My dear Sir Frederick,

General Whish has got his route (via Jhung, Chiniyote, and Ramnuggur) from Headquarters, and thinks to be off in a week. The Commist. say it will be 4 days before the camels can come in.

The C.C. says nothing about "forced marches" and, therefore, I fancy, the General will not make any, but I will show him your letter on the subject.

With reference to Cortlandt going to Lukkee, I have just been answering Lawrence on the same point, so will copy what I wrote.

"I have not sent C. to Lukkee because the work there is purely military and requiring the moral pluck to show a bold front at a time of difficulty, work which Taylor and Pollock well understand. The troops also, regular and irregular, now know them both and are accustomed to work with them, and Taylor knows the upper part of the Frontier where he is now just as well as I do, or Cortlandt. Previous to the C.C.'s victory of the 13th, I felt no anticipation whatever of Taylor being obliged to fall back, and I still hope and *believe* that it will not be necessary, but this alteration of Whish's route to the rear of the C.C.'s position is a serious one as far as moral influence is concerned.

I had hoped that he would have advanced up the right bank of the Jheylum, and have deterred either the Sikhs from extending to Pind Dadun Khan, or the Afghans from coming through Gheybee.

Now it is all left open to them, and all Taylor can do is to hang on as long as possible, prepared to fall back as soon as his position is either turned from the left side of the Indus or threatened seriously from the direction of Kohat.

I shall urge the Brigade left here to complete their carriage as soon as possible; for I fear they will not be left long in barracks, if Lord Gough wins many more victories.

There is an enormous deal to do here, and the military authorities throw all their squeezed oranges on the politicals. There are so many prisoners of high and low degree, that to look after them alone is an officer's work. *I could not spare Cortlandt at this time.* His services are much more valuable here just now than at Lukkee.

I am so tired that I cannot write more but may tell you that 39 guns and 4 mortars were taken in the Citadel.

I have asked the General to have the remains of Poor Agnew and Anderson taken up, and buried by the Clergyman with the Bombay Division, as a satisfaction to their friends in England, and a fitting close to our retributive mission at Mooltan.

We have got almost every one of Moolraj's *Moosahibs*, and great counsellors of evil, and I hope they will get their deserts.

(vii) LETTERS OF ROBERT NAPIER

266. *From Major Robert Napier*

27 July, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I arrived here early this morning, having been detained a great part of the night in getting across the River.

I had the pleasure to receive yours of the 26th. I feel very much gratified that you think I have been of any use to you.

I was very glad to hear such a good account of the camp. The siege train is nearly all on board.

Boats are scarce, but I think Browne will be able to reduce the indents which are on a long scale.

The train will be ready to start on the 29th, I think quite soon enough.

The 32nd cannot follow it so soon as was expected unless our economy in boats will give more than we venture to covet upon. The artillery demand is "Exigeant." Employing one which might escort the fleet of the 32nd, the other we will keep with the train.

The Bahawalpoor Motemid called today. I am already thinking of making him useful by the way.

I think, in the scarcity of boats, of sending the Engineer Park Stores to Bahawalpoor by the left bank on Browne's spare camels. They can't be long behind the column and will probably beat it under $\frac{1}{2}$ or $\frac{1}{3}$ loads.

Before coming up here I went to the Steamer and made acquaintance of Mr. Christopher, whom I like. His steamer is a pretty Cockle shell, big enough to carry its engines, and the chief mate, who looks some age between 9 years and 25. The boat of the former, the air and manners of the latter, such a precocious little shippey would have been a fortune to Dickens, and Marine "Master Bailey". Browne wishes to send the Commissariat officers down in one steamer with their money and I would put a couple of engineers with them. This would be a good way.

P.S. I hope Bowering is better.

267. *From Robert Napier*

30th July, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

The siege train is all on board and moves from the Ghat this evening so as to start tomorrow.

The boats did not carry the amount of tonnage that they were registered at and, consequently, nearly double the estimated number were required for the artillery, leaving none for the 32 or the Engineer Park.

I, therefore, arranged with Mr. Christopher to send 140 of 32 as an escort for the train to protect it at the Ghat at Bhawulpoor.

With the Sappers and Miners and the artillerymen, there will be a very good little guard.

It is expected that so numerous a fleet will not get down under ten or twelve days at the utmost under ordinary circumstances.

Mr. Christopher objected to the mode of loading the heavy guns on the Bombay boats, they having been put above the Thwarts on a level with the funnel instead of being laid at the bottom of the boat.

The officer commanding the artillery, however, was indignant at the interference and is quite satisfied that the boats are very safe. Should they not appear so, it will be necessary to stop and put them right. I trust however that they will all go on well.

The artillerymen are very comfortable in their boats.

I have sent a very intelligent man to examine the canal that Edwardes speaks of. It appears that the alteration of the route that he proposes will be attended with some difficulty. The loss of Bhawulpoor as a Depot will be inconvenient.

The change of the right column movements need not much affect the left one, but I will write further on that point tomorrow. In the meantime I will communicate with Col. Salter and cross, if possible, to see him at Pak Putun. All here in high spirits and anxious to be off.

The remaining portion of the 32 wing will be sent off about the 10th, possibly the whole regiment by the 15th.

268. *From Robert Napier*

31 July, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

A ride to the Ghat over five miles of very bad road, and a subsequent grilling at the magazine daily, until nine or ten o'clock, have prevented me from being regular in writing since I came here. I found my own arrangements getting into the background.

The train is, I believe, now fairly off from the ghats.

Wishing to leave as many boats as possible for the 32nd, I had arranged with Mr. Christopher to send 30 tons of stores by his steamer. After a day's detention at the steamer I was obliged to return the stores as they could not accommodate easily the quantity, and I have been obliged to get boats at least. This keeps me here today and tomorrow perhaps, but I shall soon overtake the fleet. Everything seems to be progressing very fairly. The men in the boats were comfortable, and the officers, generally, well accommodated. I hope the weather will continue fair.

In considering Edwardes' proposal for altering the route of the siege train, I am decidedly of opinion that we should cause delay and confusion by so doing. The land columns will of course alter their routes, but the train must proceed to the rendezvous of all the Cis-Sutluj carriage and supplies—Bahawulpoor. Our Punjaub carriage, indented on so heavily for other purposes, will not now transport the train and we cannot dispense with that from our own provinces. If we were to send and order it up to some obscure village opposite Lodhun and the mouth of the Canal, mistakes and confusion must arise.

However, great would have been the advantage of Edwardes' route, had it been originally provided for. We cannot now give up the point d'affair of Bahawulpoor and the known road from it to Moultan.

Let the land column make their junction where they like, and cover us, with the train, afterwards as proposed by Edwardes, but let us continue our original plan. The sappers which went down by water for the purpose of making pier heads, were seen making rapid progress and will probably

have half completed the preparations for disembarkation, before they could be recalled, and their carriage having gone to Bahawulpoor will not join them for a good many days.

If the Lahore company of sappers is still at Lahore and can be sent down the Ravee in boats even for 10 days hence, I should prefer it as they would get in fresh for work. Here they cannot for many days get boats and will have some extra marches.

If they have started from Lahore I will leave instructions to march them down the left bank to Bahawulpoor. The Bahawulpor Motemid was in attendance here and has been desirous of being useful. I had no boat for him and sent him on to Bahawulpoor, where I will call for him. Will you oblige me by sending my letters under cover to Browne.

P.S. I mentioned before that in consequence of a scarcity of boats I consulted Lt. Christopher as to his taking a part of the 32 on his steamers.

He has received on board of the two boats a detachment of 107 men with officers and camp followers and tents, to form the nucleus of an escort for the siege train. Browne will complete the wing as soon as possible by common boat.

If the men suffer in health, the steamers will move down to Bahawulpoor at once and deposit them there. They will have their own tents, and better shelter, the Motemid assures me. I will in that case send young Paton with them to interpret. He speaks the language and gets on well with natives.

269. *From Robert Napier*

Ganda-Sing-Wala, 1st August, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

The Govt. have taken the course that might have been expected. They made a sort of *grace* of approving of the not having taken the field in April and May. They will take none of the responsibility of moving now. Success will smooth all. The train is now off. One steamer has stuck in the Nulla, the river having fallen suddenly, but I have sent boats to lighten her, and the water is again rising. She will probably be off this afternoon again.

Instead of 30 tons which he agreed to carry for me he cannot take 7 and is obliged to return them. The men sent on

board the steamer made a beginning like the artillery. 3 were very much intoxicated, one delirious from drink, slipped from the men who led him and fell over board, one died of drink, third is expected to do. They had some rain yesterday. I have written to Mr. Christopher, if the men are exposed to much discomfort, to run down and deposit them at Bahawulpoor, when they will get Mackeson's bungalow at once; then thither Capt. Loyd will take care of them. I shall, I daresay, be there tomorrow morning. All my stores are now embarked and we are stowing away, to be ready to drop down at Gunpor tomorrow. We shall soon overtake the fleet and get in advance of it.

I have not heard from Salter's column for some days.

270. *From Robert Napier*

Ganda-Sing-Wala, 1st August, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Capt. Cooper still writes that he has received no camel bags for carrying shots. *Mool Sing* assured me he had sent 1600 bags for the loading of 800 camels for which he showed me the cattle Moonshi's receipt. He also sent subsequently 400 bags, for 200 camels, and was at my request preparing 500 more bags. I am not sure if he understood that he was to make 500 single bags, or 500 pairs.

I am quite sure we shall want every one of these that we can get.

Capt. Cooper on 31st writes that he could not use his camels, because he had no bags from which it would seem that he had not received any. I have requested him to write to you direct if he had not received them. In addition to the bags, there were ropes for loading 1000 camels sent by *Rae Mool Sing*.

May I beg you to cause any that may remain to be sent on camels by forced marches to overtake the column, and also to write to the Bahawulpoor Nawab to ensure those he was requested to make being ready.

The artillery have taken very few compared to their probable wants.

I shall be much obliged if you will let me know if Mr.

Oliver's 1000 camels with bags, and his hundred carts are yet sent.

P.S. Capt. Cooper says that his money is ebbing out. Mool Sing has the calculations and will know when more ought to be ready.

271. *From Robert Napier*

2 August, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I wished to run down in the steamer to see the Canal and to communicate with Br. Salter. But having taken in the troops, the steamer is bound to the fleet and cannot leave it. She cannot carry the supplies and etceteras of the soldiers, cannot carry any of the 30 Tons of park stores all of which I have today been obliged to take back, and she is aground, but expects to be off presently. Unless the vessels are much altered, they will never be of any use in these shallow Rivers.

I shall be able to go much quicker in my own boat when I have seen Oliphant's company on board.

Fortunately it came to the Ghat yesterday and I had ordered boats over in anticipation which brought them all over this morning and I am just going to get them into the boats and to get off.

I have just heard that the steamer is off and Captn. Balfour in command of the troops on board writes a favourable account, though they lost two drunken men at first.

P.S. Your letter sent to Browne will reach me by the dak to Bahawalpoor as we pass.

272. *From Robert Napier*

Kapurki, 7 August, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I reached Kapurki this evening, the Siege train, I believe, two days journey in rear of me. All well and prosperous, when I left them, under escort of a small steamer.

I overtook Lt. Christopher and the larger steamer on its way to Bahawalpoor and, finding that the Europeans were all well, I requested Christopher to examine the Lodhun canal which he seemed glad to be permitted to do. I shall follow

him after I have seen Salter at Gumlera. Every one assures me, the canal is not navigable.

I have not heard from you since the 31st as the Post Master with Salter's column ingeniously returned all my letters to Lahore, from which place he had just received them.

The Motemid Chunder Ban [Chundu Bax] takes his leave. He has been extremely civil and attentive whenever he has been able.

I will write to you from Gumlera.

P.S. If Genl. Whish should have ordered the Loodhun route, and it is practicable, the men of the 32 will be handed from the steamer to Col. Mackeson at once; if not, they will go on to Bahawulpoor.

It would have been a *misfortune* had we been obliged to send back the men of the steamer, but I was *tolerably sure* my alternative would have the effect of causing some way, of making the steamer useful, to be devised.

273. *From Robert Napier*

Off Kurrumpoor, 13th August, 1848, Sunday.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I write to you from Kurrumpoor. Salter arrived at the encamping ground 3 Koss from the River, this morning. The artillery train will, I hope, pass the place, on their way down the river, tomorrow morning. I parted from them all right at 1 o'clock today. I expect them to reach Bahawulpoor by the 16th.

Lt. Christopher examined the Canal and like most of his letters his report is somewhat contradictory. I will send you a copy. Col. Drummond carried off the fresh post. The general tenor was unfavourable. I visited the Canal myself. The Water fell 18 inches during the last 24 hours taking the mean depth of water at 6 ft., and, as the river is still falling, allow another 18 inches to fall and the deeply laden boats would be aground. Some parts are only 4 ft. deep. For the land plan from Kurrumpoor, we should have had to make some miles of road and there is some uncertainty as to the supply of water between Tibba and Jainpoor. With 16,000 head of cattle for the siege train it would not be prudent to join

Salter's column in doubt as to water. The other road is confidently reported to be abundantly supplied with water. The nullas vouch for the fact; and this added to the other reasons, that exist, quite satisfy me that we have decided for the best, for the train. We could not save Whish a flank march by going by Kurrumpoor. I daresay Moolraj will try at his rear camels if they are not taken care of. The Engr. Park has already reached Bahawulpoor. The Steamer *Cornet* is now a gun-shot off and I much fear is aground. She has this moment come down. The Det. of the 32 are on board and are reported all in excellent health. I think, as far as we have gone, everything is most encouraging.

I have not received a word from any quarters dated since the 31st, but hope to find letters at Bahawulpoor.

I saw Capt. Cooper in camp. The Durbar cattle bags, &c., are all right. He had apparently made a mistake, but he wrote you a letter he says on the subject; I daresay a long one. He is very painstaking and has managed very well, but the Banjareh Bullocks to the last are his torments as they *won't be counted*. I found him engaged in counting. Pray make my amends to Mool Sing, if, in consequence of my last letter, you called him to account for deficiency of bags, &c.

I saw Pollock and Loongden in excellent health.

My calculation of the minimum is siege train at Bahawulpoor 16, disembarked 20, arrived at Jainpoor 25, but that is the very shortest possible time and we may expect a few days more.

The River journey has proved very pleasant.

274. *From Robert Napier*

15th August, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Major Garbett and myself left the siege train a day's journey in the rear and came on in the *Meanee* to Bahawulpoor to prepare for the train's arrival. We arrived an hour ago and are now waiting for our letters.

The train had got on admirably.

The *Cornet* steamer with the Det. H.M. 32nd is *not yet up!*

Everything has gone on very well.

I have sent for a return of the carriages that has arrived here.

I can only hear of 900 camels of Sirsa District, but the return will be seen this evening.

No doubt we shall do very well.

Cocks' people reduced their credit and sent 1350 camels and 183 carts to Pak Patun for which I shall write to Cock's and make my amends for doubting their punctuality. I will not even suppose that his later perwana had anything to do with the fact of so many being here.

The weather is very pleasant and cool. The thermometer never above 100 and a fine cool breeze at night. As you are of course all pitying us for the great hardships we are enduring, it will not do to destroy the illusion.

The Europeans with the Fleet are all doing admirably.

All my Engineers with Sappers and the Park are here. Preparations for the disembarkation have been made, and an officer has been sent as far as is safe to examine the road.

I am in every way well satisfied with the adherence to our original route.

Should it be desired to take back the European regiments by water, when the siege is over, the whole of the Flotilla might be employed.

There are regular flats attached to the steamers for conveyance of troops and with proper arrangements and under an officer not hampered by absurd notions of his dignity, they may be made *most useful*. I will write further on this subject. The *Napier* is the best boat for transport of troops and a little care and experience of the navigation will enable the steamers to run up without fear of accident.

Nothing could exceed the attention of the master of the little steamer the *Meanee* with the train boats and I shall bring his conduct to your notice officially.

I shall report to you officially tomorrow.

275. *From Robert Napier*

Bindraghat, off Bahawulpoor, 20th August, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

The Siege train is nearly all on, I hear.

Col. Cooper arrived this evening.

600 carts are now at the Ghat for the train and are being laden. Of the Sirsa carriage, 118 good carts are here; also 139 of all Browne's. The rest will, I fear, be late. But I hope that the supply, we have, may enable the artillery to move off.

The Commissariat officers have imagined the laden camels, which came in without proper instructions, to have been intended for them, and we have some trouble in recovering them, but I have sent an officer over to the other side for the purpose.

I hear that Genl. Whish is at Moultan and that he had a skirmish with some of Moolraj's people, but from the camp we have not heard.

Salter must have joined him. I fear some of my letters written to you from the river have miscarried. I find one to Br. Campbell, asking him to let Maxwell come, has not reached.

All are in excellent spirits and are only anxious to get on, yet I cannot tell you on what day we shall be able to march. As soon as I have put into Major Garbett's Park sufficient carriage for his wants, I shall immediately proceed to join Genl. Whish. I fear to go until that is done, lest any delay should take place.

I hear that a party are stopping the canal above Moultan. What a relief it will be to Edwardes to have the force encamped at Moultan and to hear the first *jalao* from our guns.

Shere Ali, Agent of Peer Ibrahim, is very attentive, but he has received no orders for the 2000 bags and ropes and none were ready; but he has made great exertions to supply them.

276. *From Robert Napier*

22nd August, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

The train is now being rapidly loaded on the carts, Garbett talks of 25 or 26.

I have just received a note from the General. He is in high spirits at the repulse of Moolraj's Chappoo. I do not know how the latter was permitted to recover his men who were sent out so far.

The change of the route of the 32nd, with our proposed escort via Kurrumpoor, seems to be inconvenient, but I conclude war for some urgent necessity.

The train requires a N.I. escort—there is such a long train of carriages.

All here are in excellent health and spirits.

I was disposed to let my brother-in-law remain and get strong at Simla in order to work out his salary in the cold weather and therefore I did not forward to him the letter you were so good as to have sent to me, as I considered that a move from Simla to Moultan not likely to be taken without a fever. However my first intimation is that Lt. Peade is at Ferozepoor and probably has, ere this, proceeded to join me. May I beg your permission to use his services here and will you accept my sincere thanks for your kindness in nominating him?

I fear from my not having heard from Lahore for some days that there is some truth in the Huzara rumours and that you have had an addition to your anxieties. Please God we will soon clear off all in this quarter.

I had a visit from Lt. Christopher today and explained to him how much wiser it would be to perform the commonest offices with his steamers than to run the risk of being thrown out on account of his disobliging way of doing business. He promises to do everything we want in future, and, as he is personally desirous of doing anything he can himself, I have no doubt he will get rid of his foolish notions of the dignity of his service and we shall get on well if we have anything to do in future. I thought it much better than to let any differences between the services creep into further correspondence.

We must try and make the expedition, like a circle, complete and unbroken in all its parts, without flaw for the captious to cavil at.

277. *From Robert Napier*

25 August, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I was extremely glad to receive yours of the 20th. I had heard something of the Huzara affairs, but knowing the fallacy of rumours, I did not attempt to make a guess even at the real state of affairs.

How very unfortunate that Abbott was so precipitate. It is what I have all along apprehended and it was so clear that Chuttur Sing stood every chance of being provoked into rebellion, that I am not the least surprised at it.

I trust you will be able to adjust the business without further bloodshed. That is a dangerous knowledge of their power we are giving the Huzarahs, which will one day cost us some trouble, yet in the present state of affairs we cannot help making use of it. It is to be hoped that Abbott will be able to produce the clearest proofs of the grounds on which he has acted towards both the troops and the Sirdar.

We must not delay over our affairs here. The disembarkation of the train has taken but four days, but the reloading has taken more than I could have anticipated. This is owing to the inexperience of the people. Instead of commencing with separate parties to reload the contents of each boat, as they were put on shore, they kept the whole work in one set of hands. It was in vain we offered our services. That sort of interference from another department is not palatable, but the day before yesterday the river gave them a sudden alarm by cutting into the bank, and that so rapidly that for some time there was great danger of many of the stores falling into the river. Then we were called in, and the sappers quickly removed the stores that were in danger. After this my pressing offer of aid was accepted and notwithstanding a dust storm which made my eyes ache, Lt. E. Taylor of the Engrs. in charge of my park (which has long been ready) and 200 coolies, bagged and sewed up 10,000 (8 inch) shells in one day which Christy tells me has saved him one day at least. Accustomed as we Engineers are to be hewers of wood and drawers of water for the rest of the army, the division of labour and simultaneous employment of large parties is easy and it was scarcely possible patiently to see piles of

shot on the ground for four days, before any attempt was made to reload them, although a dozen young officers and 3 or 400 men were idle in their tents 100 yards off.

However they are now nearly ready. The personal exertions of Christy were very great. He wanted method and experience.

I mention this to you in explanation of the unexpected delay, but should be sorry if my criticisms on another department *were to go beyond yourself*.

I must take care that no such flaws are perceptible in my work.

The artillery promise to march at 1 A.M., 29th, and will reach Moultan in six marches. I have made over an ample supply of carriage. Your last providential supply of bags just came in time. Bahawulpoor produced none of the 2000 ordered by you. No one acknowledged to have received the order. Shere Ali, Peer Ibrahim's Vaqueel, quickly got me nearly the number of good bags, with which we might have managed, though not so good for the purpose. Robinson's and Oliver's bags were even less to the purpose, and had got amongst the Commissariat Goomashtas and I only got them by marching up an officer and party of sappers to meet them out. The part of Browne's carriage which first started has been most useful, the remainder will come in very seasonably for the Commissariat purposes, but too late for us. The left road has proved, after all, not so good as that on the Punjaub side.

I march to-night, having done everything that I can for the artillery and for Lieut. Robertson regarding his supplies. I sent him 24 boats for the collection of supplies and transport to Moultan from Khanpoor.

The steamer *Comet* goes to Moultan, the *Meanee* to Ferozepoor to bring down any treasure, &c., that you may desire to send to the army. We shall want some.

The force with the train is all in excellent health.

Glover seems to have had much trouble in stopping the canal. Had he been a good Canal officer, he would have commenced his work at the mouth, instead of lower down the nulla. He seems to have made a good band in the end, but Moolraj is reported to have let in the water to the ditch and to have done an injury to his (?) . . . tments which his utmost

efforts have failed to repair. The passage of a wet ditch will interest us all.

Captn. Cooper has managed to bring down his cattle well and I have got him put in orders for Commissariat duties. If he does them satisfactorily he will have earned a title to some more pay and his duty will be much increased. A Commissariat appointment will satisfy his ambition when all is successfully finished.

Abercombee of the Engineers is steadily going over the road, proving the bridges by loading them with the weight of a 24 pr. I do not think anything has been left to chance.

My next letter will be from Camp Moulton. The agent Shere Ali is desired to live on this side till the artillery march. An agent of the Bahawalpore Nawab accompanies the artillery.

278. *From Robert Napier*

Seetul-ka-Maree, 29 August, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I came in here this morning from Peer Tunnoo, about 18 miles, I think, from camp.

I left the Sapper Park at Peer Tunnoo and the siege train at Bindra Ghat from which place it is reported to have marched on the 28th evening. It is expected here on the 4th.

General Whish is at Seetul-ka-Maree and Edwardes at Sooruj-koond.

There is an awkward gap, which makes communication rather troublesome, for small parties, but this will doubtless be remedied.

I will write to you a few lines daily at least and direct the assistants to do so. Ruttun Chund came here to take his leave today. He says that he has just heard from Lahore that two regiments of Sikhs, deserters from Raja Goolab Sing, were at Jellalpoor on the Chenab, and a third regiment from Aknoor on their way to join Moolraj. This he heard from Raja Shere Sing who got the intelligence from his news-writer at Lahore. You will of course know whether it is true or not. I do not give much credit to the story.

Ruttun Chund spoke of the Huzara business and said Shere Sing was distressed. I told him that I knew few of the

details of the affair, but I knew that you had always spoken well of Chuttur Sing, had refused to entertain any stories or reports against him and that you looked on the affair of Canora as an accident on which he was not to blame. This I said was my impression from your conversation and your short account of the business. I also said that you spoke well of Shere Sing's conduct and of Goolab Sing.

He said that Shere Sing would be very much pleased and comforted by hearing this from me. I do not know if it was improper to enter on the subject but I thought it was the truth and that could do no great harm.

The force here seems to be in good health and spirits, and so was that which I left. Of course I have not yet seen the place. Little reconnoitering has been made.

P.S. I have found the climate very pleasant, cool nights, not such warm days as we had at Lahore. My health and strength are much improved from that at Lahore.

279. *From Robert Napier*

Sooruj-koond, 31 August, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I did not write to you yesterday having been out till late reconnoitering, and there I rode over to Edwardes' camp—from whence I write—in order to settle with him the details of a move of the allied camp to the east side of the Nulla.

I hear centre will rest on the Khutta Byrage; and the Jogh Maia, a strong building, will be an advanced post on their front. This will bring them much nearer to us and enable them to co-operate with us. In a day or two they may make a move still nearer to the fort and occupy some offensive posts, and will be ready, in case Mool Raj should make an attack on Shere Sing, to take him in the rear and cut off his retreat.

I return this evening, and tomorrow morning make a reconnaissance in strength to the north side of the Fort, which will have considerable influence on our plans.

The south side of the city is so hidden by trees that it is difficult to see it, but that will be managed after our reconnaissance proposed for the morning.

The guns will be here by the 4th and we shall be prepared for them by the time their ammunition is ready.

I like very much what I have seen of Edwardes' levies and Lake's too, though they are rough looking. As for the Khans of Tank, I had 50 of their party and should not have interrupted my reconnaissance for 3 times their number of Mool Raj's.

280. *From Robert Napier*

1st September, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

The Train will be here on the 5th.

Edwardes moved this morning to this side of the Nulla and encamped at Khutta Byragee. He was warmly engaged and has established himself with trifling loss and he thinks the enemy must have lost 40 or 50.

Still there is a good deal of firing going on and I am sending down a company of sappers with intrenching tools to enable him to cover his pickets.

I am going down myself to see his position this evening.

This morning we made a reconnaissance and went to and upon the Eadh-gah and had a beautiful view. The enemy were very civil until a number of amateur red-jackets attracted their attention when they gave us a few shots. All well. Our information of the circuit of the city is nearly complete.

The quantities of suburbs and trees make it very difficult to see our way, but have good information and shall be ready for the train when it comes.

281. *From Robert Napier*

[3rd September, 1848.]

My dear Sir Frederick,

Your letter of the 1 September has just come in, announcing that all hope of an adjustment with Chuttur Sing was at an end.

Edwardes had an hour before sent your letter, of which I did not notice the date, announcing great hopes of an adjustment. I have sent your letter to the General and shall be with him to consult as to what is to be done.

The Siege train is to be here tomorrow morning. The time for the dak has arrived, so I will not keep my letter last. Will write by Express when we have settled what to do.

P.S. Shere Sing had been making an apparently severe attack on the enemy all the morning.

282. *From Robert Napier*

Moultan, 5th September, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

The Siege train came in yesterday, and we are preparing ammunition for an attack on the city in combination with Edwardes.

Its details are being considered by the General who is to consult Edwardes on it in the morning.

It must be admitted that the Huzara affairs have very much embarrassed us, as Moolraj has, by all accounts, at least 10,000 men inside the town and city; and Shere Sing's fidelity is doubtful. I have been informed that his Sikhs have entered into an understanding with Moolraj and will no longer act against him.

The city is very much stronger than it was described to be. It is so surrounded by Nullas, mounds and trees which form a net work of natural fortifications that renders the complete investment by our forces, united even, not possible.

We have either to make the attack on the city, which is under consideration, or to unite our forces and make a regular attack on the citadel. The question of supplies is involved in this point and it will be decided on in the morning, when I will write you early intelligence.

We are all well in camp and have plenty of supplies.

283. *From Robert Napier*

7 September, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

We are busy in our first parallel, our object being to attain some high mounds which command the city. All hands are hard at work and the Sikhs are intrenching themselves just under us. It is said their numbers are 11,000. I hope a few salutes from our batteries will turn them out. Our task is a much more different one than we anticipated and I almost

feel inclined to think we were somewhat mislead. However Moolraj has been busy strengthening ever since he heard of the expedition, and what would have been comparatively easy, when possessed by 3 or 4000 men, is by no means so when defended by 11,000 entrenching themselves outside of the walls.

The general resemblance of Moultan, to the description given me and plans is perfect, yet it is certainly more formidable than I imagined.

The height of the citadel over the plain is very great indeed. I should say near 100 ft. and the best plan of taking the citadel would be to bring 100 mortars to serve upon it for a few days.

Sir Charles Napier would never have taken it in the time, or with the means he proposed, with the present garrison.

In a day or two our batteries will open and we shall silence the few guns that open on us, which have caused some casualties because the men will not put themselves under cover.

In a day or two I shall speak more decidedly, I think, considering the certainty for Punjaub war, it would be wise to move up a division of the Bombay army with some 50 mortars to extinguish the place in case we have any difficulty in success.

I will write further tomorrow. All hands are in excellent health and spirits and work with right good will. I find that Edwardes and Salter forces will work on the trenches, but not very cheerfully. I have been very much occupied about our arrangements and seldom in camp these last five days. So pray excuse the anxiety I have caused you by not writing.

I am just going down to the trenches and must say good bye. I will write at length tomorrow.

284. *From Robert Napier*

9 September, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I promised to write to you yesterday.

You may well imagine the anxiety that I have to effect the object of the expedition, but, as I before mentioned, the

difficulties are much greater than I imagined for the following circumstances:-

Instead of being reduced to 3 or 4000 men, Moolraj has by every account 10,000.

They are entrenched outside of the city, and behind a Nulla and Ghat.

We have a good command of artillery over them—they are backed by heights and the guns of the city, and are behind very difficult ground from which it would be difficult to withdraw our artillery in case of check and our present would take us under a heavy fire.

If we had a force equal to conduct the siege of the Citadel and to preserve the communication of the Bahawulpoor road, we could settle the Nulla quickly. It would be advisable to have the means of a heavy bombardment in case the breach should not be practicable, and I should say that 50 or 60 mortars should be brought to bear upon it, to be certain. If so many are not procurable, half the number for double the time would be almost as effective.

I shall see what has been the effect....on the army encamped this evening under the walls. We take an advanced post this evening which will give us an insight into matters, and into the spirit of the enemy.

P.S. I send you a return of the Scinde troops.

285. *From Robert Napier*

10 September, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

We had an outpost affair with the enemy yesterday.

The Europeans covered the place and drove off the enemy but were stopped by a partially concealed building and suffered heavy loss.

They are in excellent spirits and anxious to have another opportunity.

They behaved most gallantly but I drew them off to prevent any more loss. I took two of Cortlandt's guns and fired grape at 30 yards from the building at the openings until the guns were nearly disabled.

We are getting on as fast as we can, but I am more of

opinion than before that a very large force should be moved up from Bombay and as soon as possible.

On this point I will write you my views officially tomorrow.

All in excellent spirits and (await?) our attack pushing on to the second parallel.

286. *From Robert Napier*

Moultan, 12th September, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I was not able to write to you yesterday as I promised you.

The check, which we received in the attack on the Sikh outpost, was causing so great a feeling of elation in Mool Raj's forces that it became absolutely necessary to take it without more delay to save ourselves from being attacked.

We took the post this morning. I regret to say the loss has been very severe, and amongst the sufferers is poor Montigambert.

He was alive when I heard, but there was no hope for him. His poor little wife, I hope, you will be able to comfort her.

I will give you further details in the morning. I have been most busy in seeing the ground we have gained, and have not had a moment to spare.

Edwardes promised to write to you today.

The General was highly pleased with his success and will also write to you.

The troops behaved with the utmost gallantry, but their numbers are very few and it will be quite necessary to get reinforcements. The return of Scinde troops will enable you to see what you can call from that quarter.

I am sorry to say that Lake also has received a slight wound, but is doing very well.

Pray excuse a hasty note. I hope a couple of days will give us the city; when we can shell Moolraj at leisure.

Kurrachee

60th Rifles—1000 Strong in capital order, as Major Gordon can testify.

1st. Fusiliers—900 Bayonets, inured to exposure from Aden, Karrack, &c., in first rate marching discipline (Adj. Loquitur!)

4th Rifles—N.I. 1000 strong.

2nd Belooch Battn., 600.

Troop Horse Brigade (Europeans).

Native Battery.

Some Sappers—not many.

Hydrabad.

11th N.I., strength unknown, perhaps 1000.

19th N.I. strong.

Native Battery.

I am not able to state positively, but I am inclined to think there is a 12-Siege Train here likewise.

Sukkur.

9th N.I. strong.

Two Batteries, 18 and 12.

Shikarpore.

3rd Regt. N.I. strong.

2 Irregular Horse Regts., between this and Shikarpore on out-station.

1 Belooch Battalion.

In addition, Scinde possesses a large Police Force, Horse and Foot, distributed at all the cantonments. I believe Scinde to be as tranquil as any part of India; Captain Browne can afford every information thereon.

P.S. The Steamers could come up in 10 days from Sukkur.

287. *From Robert Napier*

17th September, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I received today your letter of the 13th September.

You say that you do not understand, from the way in which I write, for what purpose I think an army from Bombay will be required on the Frontier.

For the reduction of Moultan alone an army of Bengal might be sent down to co-operate with us, but judging from all the signs of the times, it seems most probable that we are on the eve of a war with the Punjaub.

Shere Sing's people give out openly their alliance with Goolab Sing, and letters lately found by Edwardes seem to leave little doubt that Shere Sing has been playing a game of deception for a long time. I have no doubt that every Sikh will be in the field against us. I therefore look to Bombay for our support rather than to Bengal where you will probably require all your forces or the greater part of them.

For the force required to reduce Moultan, it is not easy to decide. When Moolraj's numbers were reduced to a low state, a small force was sufficient. The place as a fortification is weak with a small garrison, but its strength increased greatly with the numbers of the enemy, and their number has grown before us to more than double its original amount. Hence the inability to state exactly the force required.

The force of Moolraj and Shere Sing now amount to 15000 men by all accounts, and to beat that army out of the suburbs and intrenchments round the city would require at least an equal force. Prudence would fix the number at not less than 20,000 men. With these the citadel would be attacked in spite of the army which occupies the town.

The attack which I proposed on the citadel would have been made without attacking the entrenched army, only protecting the flanks of the attack by strong batteries.

The forces of Shere Sing may increase still more and the battle of the Punjaub be fought here. It is however still more likely that if opportunity is offered at Lahore that place will be the scene of the principal struggle, that there will be one, I believe, though I may be wrong, seeing only in a small circle here.

I requested the General an application for increased forces but he declined and it appeared improper that I should write to you requesting reinforcements.

Edwardes has, I believe, written now fully on the subject to you.

Our allies may form very useful bodies to cover communications, or to complete an investment, but immediate co-operation I see from experience is inadvisable.

The one force impedes the other; their modes of action are so different.

We are now encamped on the west side of Moultan, hav-

ing changed ground from our last position yesterday, and now occupy ground a mile in advance of Edwardes' old camp.

The move of position was fixed by the General in consultation with Edwardes and myself and other staff officers. I was much against crossing the Nulla, but there was no water on our left for Edwardes troops, and the defection of Shere Sing laid open the Ghat and road to Shoojabad.

These were arguments which I could not oppose and as our steamers are at the Ghat and the opportunity of sending back some sick is desired, there is much in favour of the move. The position fixed is bad, being so near that we may be subject to annoyance, and I have, therefore, had the country examined with a view to shift our camp so as to be out of shot and to have a fair field to fight in.

Our siege stores and train are such an incumbrance to us that we are unable to make any rapid movements.

I fear our suspension of the attack will bring matters in Huzara to a crisis. We have done our best but our troops were exhausted for fatigue, and we could not have carried on operations any longer with our train to guard and communications to preserve open. I am sure you will feel the disappointment deeply. God knows we do, but it is the fate of war and we must shortly recover our position.

288. *From Robert Napier*

18/19 September, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I was much knocked up when I wrote to you yesterday morning, that we had withdrawn from the trenches in consequence of Shere Sing having joined Moolraj with his whole force. We had before as much as we could do to drive the enemy from our front, and the accession of so numerous a body, whilst we were fully engaged in the trenches, placed it in their power to attack us in rear where our large part was very weakly guarded.

We could not have held our front had Shere Sing even sent his force to threaten the road to Bahawulpoor, as from his defection, the road to the Ghats on the Chenab became unsafe.

The nature of the attack, which we were obliged to make,

rendered a wide embrace of trenches necessary so that our whole force was occupied. I am therefore quite satisfied that the resolution to withdraw from the attack was a wise one, as its continuation only engaged us still to advance from our camp and magazines, requiring more men to keep up our communications, whilst our enemy was daily increasing in numbers.

It was extremely mortifying to withdraw when we had almost the city in our grasp, but we might have found ourselves in the town and our enemy in possession of our camp.

The whole of our front was contested step by step with considerable temerity which shewed that the enemy's force must have been much greater than we believed.

In my letter of yesterday I mentioned that two brigades from Bombay should be sent up. On further consideration of the probability that a very great collection of Sikhs will take place under Shere Sing's standard, and that most probably a battle must be fought before we again recommence operations, I feel hardly competent to fix the amount that may be required. I think the Govr. Gl. should at once order a large Bombay force into the field, and push on to join us such parts of it as may be soonest available to join us. We require more artillerymen and officers, more Field batteries for the movable troops, and more cavalry. The mistakes which arise between our allies and enemies render it difficult to act in immediate concert with them.

As the General has written to the Commander-in-Chief, he will probably make these arrangements. For the present we only desire that the troops under Moolraj should come out and give us an opportunity of beating them. We gave them lesson which they will not easily forget. I will give you a full account of our operations the moment I have completed my report. I should have written to you oftener but, you may imagine, I have been without an instant's relief from great labour and anxiety. I am sorry to say that our camp moves tomorrow morning towards Raj Ghat. The siege train is so great an encumbrance that it requires our whole division to protect it when on the move. We must look on this as the fortune of war. We have all done our best and not spared pains or persons, God knows. I had hoped to have settled all

your difficulties ere this, but I consider now that the war is clearly with the Sikh nation, that Goolab Sing will certainly be found implicated, if not openly joining in the rebellion.

289. *From Robert Napier*

22 September, 1848, 1 A.M.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I send you a few lines to tell you that I am about to proceed to examine Shoojabad myself and also Secunderabad and I return by the river to the camp.

The General is preparing a new camp which will be connected by a good road with Edwardes' camp, and he will move into it in a day or two.

The sick are wonderfully few; the wounded are rapidly recovering; all in good spirits.

I need not tell you how deeply I feel the disappointment of our failure. I dare scarcely think of the disappointment it will be to you, and of the effect it may have on the affairs in the Punjaub.

I think however that the time of Shere Sing's defection must have been decided by some important intelligence he may have received from the north.

I hope poor Mrs. Montigambert has found support in her affliction. I mentioned in one of my letters, immediately after the action, the death of her poor husband on the attack of the 12th. I was not able to see him as I was immediately engaged in the trenches in getting the troops under cover.

Edwardes tells me he has written you a long letter today detailing the state of affairs.

P.S. The steamer was sent to Ferozepoor to be ready to bring down treasure. Lt. Toombs sent down what he had, 3 lakhs, and requested me to cover him with an application which I did and sent you a copy by today's dak.

290. *From Robert Napier*

25 September, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I received yours of the 20th today. I was out all day when we shifted camp, and was quite knocked up.

Our present position was convenient to cover the line by

Shoojabad. Edwardes could not continue to draw his supplies if he let go his hold of Sooruj-koond, and we did not like to leave so great a space between him and us, with the Nulla between us as we could not move to his support. We, therefore, left Seetul ka Maree and crossed to a position not so good as his (E.'s) old one. The move has had a bad effect in many ways, particularly on the people of the country who look upon it as a retreat. The superior force of the enemy in cavalry enables him to move more freely about than we can with our encumbrance of the train, and our cavalry is all engaged in camp duties.

Edwardes' force is estimated by him to be about 20,000. Somehow or other it is not so available as it would seem capable of being made, but that must be owing to the nature of the force. All escorts are supplied by Edwardes and he is now going to keep the line to Bahawalpoor open. For Siege duties Edwardes' force is of little use. We found we could not with safety bring them in contact with our troops without imminent danger of their being taken for the enemy and shot, a danger amounting almost to a certainty in moments of excitement.

Lake's Daodpootras refused to work in working parties. They reluctantly dug their own trenches in which they lived. They are not like our disciplined troops who will hold detached posts. If much separated in the trenches, they would give way.

These are disadvantages which experience has taught me.

I am quite satisfied, with you, that we could not do otherwise than send a force to support Edwardes. What would have become of his force without us, and of our ally, Bahawal Khan?

I fear that the news of our suspension of the attack will have hastened the Peshawur affairs to a crisis, but hope for the best.

Our force here should be such as will put all risk out of the question, and I hope that a considerable part of the reinforcement is coming from the Bombay Presidency and Scinde that you may not be weakened too much at Lahore.

I visited Secunderabad and Shoojabad. Neither would

answer as a Depot. The latter might have an intrenched position under its walls.

Shere Sing has made one or two abortive attempts to attack us but does not complete the matter; perhaps, he may in a day or two. I wish we had Sir C. Napier here just now. It is said that Shere Sing is not quite trusted by Mool Raj yet, and that they do not agree.

Lake is getting better; his wound got irritated, but is now doing well. I am limping about, but I rode without much inconvenience.

291. *From Robert Napier*

Moultan, 26th September, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Everything is quiet here. Yesterday Shere Sing came out to the ground we had just left with some cavalry and guns. It was said they would attack with the whole force, but it proved to be a false alarm.

All of Edwardes' and part of our troops were turned out. It seemed as if the cavalry might have made a dash at Shere Sing but they did not do so; probably he would have got in before they could have reached him.

I do not remember if I mentioned to you in my letter of yesterday that I visited Shoojabad and Secunderabad. Neither would answer for a Depot. In case of stores from Scinde preceeding troops, a place for depositing them would be required, but Shoojabad would only answer for grain depot for small stores. The train must therefore remain quietly in camp and we be anchored to it until reinforcements arrive.

It is said that Shere Sing's Mussulman sipahis are leaving him. I dare say some may, but these reports are generally made to please the hearers.

I have told you that Babur Ali was killed during the attack of the Sikh outpost. He received five balls in his body. I have begged them not to come with me, as my Moonshi, in following me the night of the previous attack, got shot through the neck. The ball came out at his mouth.

I shall take care on the next occasion that no one shall

come with me. I do not know how they missed me. The Moonshi is getting well again.

I hear that Shere Sing expects a considerable accession of numbers shortly and has put off fighting until the Dusse-rah. I have no doubt we shall give a good account of them all. It is only a pity they have the town to run to so near at hand. As there are only three bridges, they must be much cut up, if defeated, before they could get back.

I am sending the Sappers to Shoojabad to make gabions. We want labour sadly. More sappers and pioneers, if Govt. is raising more regiments, I hope they will raise some pioneers. There should be 3 or 4 regiments of theirs and they might be made to do line duty in peace. Our Sipahis will not work in the trenches beyond bare cover for themselves. All the labour falls on the Europeans.

292. *From Robert Napier*

27 September, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

We are all quiet today and getting settled in our new camp.

If the Sikhs come out within shot we shall be able to get at them before they can reach the town.

It is said that dissensions are arising amongst them, but people always bring these stories. I believe they wish to get reinforcements before attempting anything against us which would be hopeless and they will play a better game if they try and disturb the country.

The sappers go to Shoojabad to cut wood for gabions and fascines immediately.

We look for news from Peshawur with much anxiety. The troops are very healthy, and the wounded are recovering.

I requested Pollock to write to you daily.

Price told me that he constantly wrote.

Moolraj is trying to get some boats out into the river but the intention is not known. It is said in Moultan that he wishes to send away his family; that he wishes to send a party to attack Leia, that Shere Sing intends going off to join Chut-tur Sing.

293. *From Robert Napier*

1 October, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I have been several days without writing to you or rather without sending my letter, for I have had an unfinished letter each day, but the dak closes at such an inconvenient hour that it is *always shut*, our Post Master having many other duties.

We are here in our camp very quiet. The Hurkarehs have even cooled to announce the coming attack of Shere Sing for the morrow. He is either concocting some stroke of policy or is really by no means comfortable. It is said his troops are clamorous for pay, that Mool Raj only gives small sums, and that men are deserting him in disgust.

Other reports are that Chuttur Sing has written to him to join him quickly in Huzara and that he is going off there.

The Sappers go on Tuesday to Shoojabad to make Gabions and fascines. If made and collected here, they would be lost in case of our moving.

Moolraj's sowars are beginning to poke at our camels, the Sikh camel drivers not being loth. There seems to be some patent reason why our cavalry should not make any excursions for checking these matters, except a patrol for a few miles every Tuesday and Friday, (as the wits facetiously say on the Mofussilite days) and, of course, on those days the Singhs will stay at home, or take some other direction.

Our supplies are plentiful. Moolraj has sent to Jhung to get hold of a gun and some men of Edwardes, but I hope the latter will be able to send up the steamer in time to prevent it.

On our left and between us and the river, rather in our rear, are two fine villages—one four miles, the other six from camp. They are on the line of the Ghat, Shere Shah ka Putton. They are friendly to us, and are pillaged by our camp followers in danger of Moolraj's sowars chappooing them. The General won't detach any men for their protection. I suggested to Edwardes to send a young man named James, who is in his camp, and to raise a couple of hundred mounted police to protect these villages and to secure the line to the Ghat. Edwardes says he has no more sowars whom he can

safely detach. Unless something of the kind is done, the General will find some day that his Commissariat supplies will be walked off to Moultan. When Jacob's Horse arrive, I hope they will enable us to punish our adventurous friends. Yesterday they made a bold move to cut off some money coming from Edwardes, but they only got a few camels, and had 3 men killed. The guides attacked them, not our cavalry which were on the opposite direction.

294. *From Robert Napier*

Moultan, 3 October, 1948.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I send you a line to say that we are all well; men healthy and all in good spirits.

Shere Sing very quiet sending out parties to Tolumba and Lodhun and talking of fighting us on the day of the Dusserah; others say that his army declare that they will not attack our *Topes* but turn our flanks and try at Shoojabad.

I do not know at all what decision the General has come to, what opinion he has formed of the state of affairs or what he proposes to do except to "*Lacssey faire Les evenemens.*"

I fear Shere Sing will get that money; and steamer has been sent up to prevent it.

It appears to me that Chuttur Sing's game should be to threaten you and keep as large a force occupied at Lahore as possible but to suddenly bring down as large an avalanche upon us as possible before reinforcements arrive. Yet he must resign a great deal of influence if he leaves his own country. Shere Sing's Mussalmans are tied because their homes are in his power.

I believe Goolab Sing must be guilty. It is very inconvenient to have him on our flank. He knows so well what his best moves would be, yet his army would not, I think, work well very far from home, at least the Hill portion of them. I think we ought, if we take the Punjaub, to reduce entirely the aristocracy. The people without heads are nothing. It is clear that the aristocracy have been the movers of this revolt.

Here it is amusing, Edwardes is powerful, he puts in his kardars, and draws the revenue. Moolraj gets out and puts

back his own kardars and then he gets the revenue. The people seem nothing.

The force which is here, and which is coming, require a man of military talent. The best men in the country ought to be chosen. Everything depends on the General.

The Sikhs know the character of their opponents very well, and soon find out when they can act with boldness and have little chance of punishment.

The siege train is very great incumbrance, yet the note of retreat in India is so bad. It is better perhaps to remain quiet here and to be prepared to hold the position under all circumstances than to purchase freedom of movement at the price of our movements being misunderstood.

With an active European enemy we should have been driven out of this position many days ago without firing a shot. However, I fancy we shall be little disturbed until reinforcements arrive. The numbers of the enemy are reported to me 17,000; Cortlandt says 20,000.

Futteh Khan is, as you will have heard, besieged in Edwardes' fort, and likely to be obliged, for want of water, to surrender.

295. *From Robert Napier*

My dear Sir Frederick,

6 October, 1848.

There is little news to be sent to you from hence. To-morrow has been for sometime fixed on for the battle which Moolraj and Shere Sing are to offer us. Today I hear that Shere Sing and Mool Raj have so much distrust of each other that they cannot act in concert.

It is said that Shere Sing will go to join Chuttur Sing after the Dusserah.

We are all very quiet in camp. The dissensions of the enemy probably prevent any attempt at annoyance except a few plundering parties that annoy the rear of Edwardes' position from which they carried off some camels, the ownership of which was for some time a matter of doubts, but I believe they were willing captives—Punjaub camels that had been given to the Sps.

I hear Shere Sing has got the treasure. He has taken some boat-loads of property.

We hear that the Bombay Regiment and Jacob's Horse, which were on their way here, were detained to escort the siege train. I have not heard this from the General but from others. The General, who thinks more artillery unnecessary, does not like the delay, but I believe will not make any alteration.

I recommended the General to apply for the mortars remaining at Ferozepoor, and for 10 more guns that are there with ammunition—1000 rounds.

He declines but as usual takes half measures and calls for half the number. However, as the requisition goes to the Chief, I have no doubt the additional pieces will be ordered, from Sukkur, if there is any prospect of the Ferozepoor ones being wanted on the Frontier.

There is plenty of time to get them.

I have no doubt that the increased force will put the command into some other hand.

The point which offended the General, I believe, was that you had written for the mortars without his being consulted. I explained to him how it happened, that you acted on my private letter anxious [to] anticipate the possible want of them. I looked to the capture of the city and that our Troops would be able to undertake the reduction of the citadel immediately, that to prevent delay we should have the means of a heavy bombardment. However, that is a past history now. The proper game was to have assaulted the city at first. That missed, much of our chance of success was thrown away.

I hear rumours of excitement in the Protected States and of Pattiala, but hope they are not true. The fort of Bahadurgurh may be a temptation as every fort is to an oriental, but one would hardly think the Puttiala Raja so foolish as to entertain treasonable designs, when he found loyalty so profitable.

I hope you are all quite well and that poor Mrs. Montigambert is better. Poor thing, her loss grieved me more than anything.

296. *From Robert Napier*

9 October, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Shere Sing marched this morning to a place called Bohur, 7 Koss from Moultan, in the direction of Sirdarpoor.

It is reported that he took with him two of Mool Raj's Regiments against the free will of Mool Raj and that he has gone off ill-satisfied, finding himself not trusted.

It is impossible to say how far these reports are true. The Herkarehs whom I employ can report actual events and movements but can only put up the talk of the Moonshis and soldiery.

Having one siege train we cannot follow him.

Shoojabad itself is too small to be converted into a Depot. It is quite full of houses. An intrenchment might be made outside, but there being extensive suburbs, they ought for complete security to be taken in too and that would occupy too large a detachment.

The importance which the natives attach to anything like the appearance of retreat, and the idea they have that our enquiries about Shoojabad are preliminary to a retrograde movement, make it desirable on that account to keep the train here. Taking also into account our enemy, there is however no doubt that if, instead of Shere Sing going off, he had been joined by large reinforcement here, we, with our train so near Moultan and without ample supplies laid in camp, would be in a very unfavourable position—with our force movable. However weak Shoojabad might be, down to the point of being secure against Cavalry, we could always insure the security of our Depot by falling back. Now we could not move without considerable delay and difficulty.

It seems absurd that with so large a force as ours actually is—even taking Edwardes and Lake at half their estimated numbers and I don't think they would muster many more—we should remain idle whilst Mool Raj moves at pleasure. It is all this horrible corner—and is a proof of the strength of the position of Moultan.

It would take another army to invest it. I was sorry to hear of the death of poor Christopher last night. Never was

a man's life so needlessly thrown away! Poor fellow, I carried him out of the fire and sent him in. I did not think his wound would be so fatal. He seems not to have been well treated in the first instance and being an irritable subject, he had little chance of recovery.

I hear that Futteh Khan has been overpowered and slain. It is unfortunate that the first man of consequence amongst his people has suffered from joining us, but out of evil comes good. His death will doubtless raise many enemies against the Sikhs.

297. *From Robert Napier*

13 October, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Shere Sing is reported to be going to Jhung. He left, as you know, unmolested.

Our siege train being neither at Shoojabad in an intrenchment, nor intrenched here, we have not such a facility of moving as we should have had in other case above mentioned.

It is a thousand pities he was allowed to go so quietly.

I fear he will, en passant, pay off some of our friends at Jhung for their share of Bhai Maharaj's business and we shall lose credit thereby.

Moolraj's people are said to be deserting to Shere Sing, about 1,500 men are reported to have gone on with him, and Mool Raj to be in despair.

Our reconnoitering party this morning went to the intrenchment that we left and found them untouched and unoccupied.

Tomorrow we go and examine the country around the Sooruj Meeanee and the Sheesh Mahul to get a view of the north side of the citadel. A strong force moves out with us. The sappers are making gabions at Shoojabad.

Lloyd is buying up supplies for the reinforcements, I believe, to be laid in at Shoojabad and that causes a rise in the camp buyers. We get attah at 10 seers, Moolraj at 8.

I conclude that Shere Sing will fill his treasure chest by the way as much as possible. I would give a good deal to see him on the maidan before a British force. Whish had

one opportunity. However, people say he would have got into the town.

We begin to hear that we shall merely act as durwans here and that the battle with the Sikhs fought up above will decide all.

The people in the town are said to be in great alarm and Mool Raj much depressed. These are the reports of spies. I depend on them only for actual movements or facts of which they can see and not for reports.

I am very glad to hear poor Mrs. Montigambert is better. If I live to see Moultan captured, my first task shall be to build a tomb over his grave.

P.S. Edwardes seems in very low spirits and not well, all the rest of the force extremely well and anxious to be doing something. The troops were brigaded today and looked admirably and in excellent spirits.

298. *From Robert Napier*

My dear Sir Frederick,

The news brought by a Hirkareh from the camp of Shere Sing at Shorkote was that he was to be at Jhung tomorrow to stay there 3 days and thence to go towards Pindi Buttean and eventually to join Chuttur Sing at Wuzeerabad. When their force had accumulated sufficiently, they were to go together to Lahore. Such is the report.

The General's force is quite sufficient to take care of the siege train and Edwardes might move anywhere that would be useful. We have so small a body of cavalry that we cannot cover a large extent of country, but we can hold our own very well. We went round the west side and gave Mool Raj a full opportunity of bringing his whole force out to our two Regiments of infantry—with 8 guns and some cavalry, it must be added!

The difficulty of Edwardes' moving would be his supplies. The Commissariat arrangements of the force, I conclude, are not being movable ones and if supplies following them had to pass Moultan, a very large escort would be required. It is so easy to steal out parties from the city, through the mounds, before any intimation is gained. It is often too late to send to counteract it.

Unless in a good substantial field work, it would not be prudent to leave our train with a small force. Still a great deal might be done by means of good intelligence and activity.

We hear from Scinde that 120 guns of the train—big pieces of ordnance are coming! We have indented on Ferrozepore for mortars—4 more guns and 18 mortars are coming down.

When it was an object to prevent the outbreak by the capture of the citadel and town, a very large train for bombardment was desirable. Now the time is passed and there will not be artillerymen to work half the train they talk of in addition to our own.

The Scinde authorities ordered back the Scinde Horse when they had come half way in spite of the young officers' remonstrances.

I hope the Dussera has gone off completely without giving you any trouble and that your anxieties have become less.

299. *From Robert Napier*

19 October, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I send you some papers received from Lungar Khan who left the General's camp with his Pathans to join Mustapha Khan. I daresay the information has already reached you.

It is reported that Mool Raj has sent Jewahir Mull with 900 foot and 400 cavalry to join Soorut Sing, who has a regiment and two guns, in order to attack Mustapha Khan and get possession of Rungpoor.

Mool Raj is also reported to have ordered a levy of Sowars and infantry to be made at Sirdarpoor.

I must say I should like to see Edwardes' force march there and clear off the disaffected people there and cut off the party sent after Mustapha Khan.

For the latter purpose alone they might cross here, and move up the right bank of the Chenab. But Edwardes' force has lost its camels and cannot move.

Our force, having the siege train here in the open plain is also not very movable.

I think Edwardes has lost some of his enterprise, very naturally, from finding himself blamed in several quarters for the best of his measures and exertions. I do not know at all what the Gr. General says to him but in the army there is, in many quarters, a very unjust degree of blame attached to him, as if he had brought in, instead of having for several months warded off, the Sikh insurrection.

I have advised Edwardes to try and complete his carriage so that he may move.

We should not be quite so much at ease without his force on our flank as we have so few cavalry, but we could doubtless still keep open our communications perfectly well.

The troops of Moolraj are rather increasing than diminishing, and the defection of Shere Sing has opened more resources to him in the way of supplies.

The soldier of the 72 N.I., who was taken wounded on the 9th, was released yesterday and returned to camp. He has not resisted the native propensity to romance I believe. I have not yet seen him.

The European, whom they have, is well treated, and it is said will be sent in. The natives say he and the other had passed the attacked post and were near the city gates when taken.

The collection of all the Sikh troops with Chuttur Sing at Wuzeerabad cannot take place during this month, I fancy, if the Bunnoo troops are to join them.

In the news-letter of today from Lahore is mentioned that our friend Ruttun Chund had been made a kardar. He behaved very well as the Commissariat officer with the column. Is his brother still with Shere Sing? I think there were some very curious letters taken in the Dhurrumsala, which Edwardes thought to shew that Shere Sing's Ruttun Chund had been playing false!! I will ask Edwardes about that tomorrow and let you know.

I have little news to give you. Mool Raj gives out daily stories of desertions from our troops, and of his expected succour from Afghans, &c.

It is a pity that we have to wait so long. I am more than ever convinced that an attack upon the rebel army would have been, and would even now, be successful, though of course at considerable loss.

It is a thousand pities that we did not attack at once as was proposed. Sir C. Napier would have done so; and so would the C.-in-Chief but a General requires a "position" and military experience and reputation to enable him to run risks.

Now there has been some mistake about the mortars and guns from Ferozepoor.

What a state our establishment are in, when we cannot find artillerymen for the siege of a second class fortress compared to European fortresses. This cannot be considered more though the army makes it formidable. I hear that 200 fresh men have come in from the Manjha today.

The doctors still speak in the highest terms of the climate.

I hear you will have a very anxious time at Lahore until the time comes for the meeting between our troops and the Khalsa.

300. *From Robert Napier*

My dear Sir Frederick,

I will do everything I can to send off carriage.

The General would, I conclude, not like to send the carriage, which is necessary to enable him to move, without an "order." As we are not, I suppose, to move our artillery from hence until the place falls, he may well store $\frac{1}{3}$ of his carriage.

I do not expect any from Bahawulpoor. From Bikanere we may get some. I will send immediately.

If the Commissariat here are made to use Bunjareh bullocks—dreadful pests they are—it will release some carriage.

The guns from Ferozepoor cannot, I conclude, come for want of carriage. They have also been countermanded because the Sukkur ones "are coming." But the General was so indignant about the Sukkur train and the Ferozepoor one having been ordered, that also was countermanded.

The General has now yielded to my request to send for *both* at once. I tell him if we take Moultan, Govt. will not quarrel with his means. It is well I did so, as I think nothing by land will come from Ferozepoor.

In a former part of my letter I said $\frac{1}{3}$ of the General's carriage because when we move to take up our ground to attack we should not be long in moving, but $\frac{1}{3}$ of the carriages would fall great way in moving troops. I fear it would not arrive in time to be of service to you. I hear that Cureton's Brigade is gone after Shere Sing. He ought never to have left this unmolested. I hear he has committed great atrocities at Jhung but the account may be exaggerated.

Mool Raj has some 1,200 rascals at Sirdarpoor who help him to get in supplies. It seems a great pity they should be allowed to do so.

I hear that the General has written to Calcutta to say that he only suspended the siege against his own opinion.

In fact he thought himself strong enough to force Moolraj's army and Shere Sing's of 15,000 men out of their intrenchments and of the city; yet Shere Sing alone presented himself in front of our camp, not much above a mile off, certainly more than half way, and was permitted to cannonade us unmolested!

It would be certainly unreasonable to condemn as rash the proposal to assault on the 7th with the enemy unaware of our point of attack and our own forces all in hand and available, and to think that we might have assaulted on the 14th with only half our force that could possibly have been used—the enemy all prepared to offence whilst our troops were knocked up with a week's work.

Peer Ibrahim thinks we only had to walk into the city on the 15th. He did not see much of the enemy and judges for the tales of Hirkarehs who bring in daily stories of the desertion of Mool Raj's army, &c., just as they think they will please most.

I hope these ducks will not be long in coming but let us get to work again. Major Scott does not supersede me, but if he did I would see Moultan fall as a private soldier if nothing else.

301. *From Robert Napier*

My dear Sir Frederick,

The funds for the expenses of the Durbar cattle have been for some time exhausted. The Commissariat Officer in charge of the Military Chest advanced 54,250 rupees for which I gave a draft on you as I have informed you in my Official letter. There are still considerable arrears due, for which I have not funds. The Commissariat are equally destitute, but they can manage the daily food of the cattle and I have got an order for them to take charge of the whole from the 1st November. When the money comes I must give another order on you for the arrears. I fear the Durbar will not have much revenue with the country in the state it is now in. In consequence of the delay and the change in destination of the Ferozepoor Brigade the Military Chest here has become exhausted and there will be some difficulty in managing until the Treasure arrives.

I have been able to borrow 10,000 Rs. from Edwardes on a promise of repayment, and merchants will give me money in sums of 1000 also up to 10 or 15000 rupees in exchange for drafts on Lahore at a discount of 1 per cent which is reasonable.

I hope you will not disapprove of my making use of their means of raising money as the men are in considerable distress and the cattle will suffer, if funds are not supplied.

The transfer of the cattle to the care of the Commissariat Department will render unnecessary Capt. Cooper's appointment after he has closed and submitted his account.

I hope the greater part of the Durbar carriage, their own property, will be sent back as soon as they are paid; they cannot move until then. I have requested the General to return everything that can be spared. I fear that nothing will reach you in time. I have sent to Dera Ghaze Khan and Bahawalpoor, but can get only mules and small number of camels from the former, and the latter place is declared destitute.

From Bikanere the Political Agent could send up some, they say.

I have ordered up the Bunjareh Bullocks; they have done nothing and on the only occasion when I ordered them

to have 2000 in readiness, they failed and were discharged from that date. They will not, I think, be of any service.

It appears that great losses in the cattle have taken place from desertions and casualties, and the artillery park was unable to move until their carriage had been completed, so that there is not much acknowledged to be over and above the actual wants of the force. If the case is so urgent the General might be ordered to send $\frac{1}{3}$ of his siege train cattle but it would not be desirable unless a measure of necessity.

Today Mool Raj's people turned out and made demonstration of crossing the Nulla (as if they dared to come between our two camps) and turned out Edwardes—our cavalry were also, I believe, out and exchanged some shots with the enemy (by the Hurkarehs report)! In the meantime, all eyes and telescopes being directed towards them, a party from the opposite quarter came close to the camp and carried off a number of sheep civilly releasing the shepherds. That was in return for the cartloads of salt that the General took on a former occasion. I hope the approach of the troops to Lahore will keep the country down.

If Moultan was taken we could clear up the country as we moved northwards, but it will be long before any thing can reach us. Considering that six weeks must elapse before we can recommence, I have set to work to have the country towards Ooch surveyed. I send Longden, Young and Pearse.

(viii) LETTERS OF EDWARD LAKE

302. *From Edward Lake*

Tibbey, 2 cos from Mooltan, July 8, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Edwardes is too ill to write today in reply to your letter dated July 4th. He has, therefore, commissioned me to write for him and begs me to say that after all his anxiety and all his endeavours to crush Moolraj, he is very much grieved to find himself charged with "*turning offensive into defensive operations.*"

The question is whether the last move made was a good one or not. You would have preferred our crossing the Nullah and moving direct upon Mooltan. I can only say that we thought well over both plans, before we took the step, we actually did, in favour of which we decided for the following reasons.

In the first place we could not be certain that, if we crossed the Nullah, Dewan Moolraj would fight a general action. On the contrary we learnt that the ground in that direction was of such a nature that a small force might defy a large one merely by posting itself behind the garden walls and natural cover with which that entrance to Mooltan abounds. That when one position was carried all that the enemy would have to do would be to fall back upon another equally strong. The consequence, therefore, of crossing the Nullah would have been a difficult passage attended with loss of life and a series of harassing conflicts leading to no decisive result and probably entailing great loss upon ourselves.

Secondly, if all these obstacles were overcome and the city walls reached, it is very questionable whether we had means to take the city, for if the enemy fought behind walls only half as well as they did at Suddoosam, success would be very doubtful and could only be attained after a *long* struggle, for which we had no ammunition, and for which our irregular troops would be very ill adapted, for the moment the town was entered, they would begin to plunder, thereby exposing us to subsequent defeat.

Thirdly, supposing however that all these obstacles were overcome and the city in our possession, what then? Why we should be exposed to the fire of fifty pieces of ordnance not to one of which we could reply.

It appeared, therefore, that by moving on a direct line success was very doubtful; and even if attained, its results questionable. On the other hand by moving where we did we commanded the whole of our new districts Cis and Trans Indus, we blocked up the direct line from Mooltan to Soojabad and from Mooltan to all our districts on the other side of the Chenab. We covered the advance of the Kuttar Mookhee regiment, Jewaheer Dutt's new levies, and the supplies on

their way to join us. We commanded the ferries of Rajghat and Humanpoor at which troops, coming to us from Lahore by the way of the Chenab, will find it more convenient to disembark. From all I can learn, troops moving along the right bank of the Chenab need be under no apprehension of Moolraj on the left, for the river at this season of the year is about two cos wide. Besides were Moolraj to attempt to send any considerable detachment either towards the Sutledge or the Chenab, a corresponding movement on our part would cut them off from the Fort, for we are now within two cos of the city and have deprived him of all his movable guns except six which are now in position commanding pukka bridge which communicates between our camp and the city. This is a position he is not likely to abandon.

With reference to Doctor Cole and his assistant, I may as well mention that he has been provided with an escort of fifty sepoy and been directed to keep along the right bank of the Chenab where a party of sawars has also been sent to meet him. I trust therefore that there is no cause of anxiety on this account.

It now only remains for me to show why Shere Sing is in his present position. He had advanced without orders to Gaggrah where he was exposed to defeat whenever Moolraj thought proper to attack him. To leave him there, we agreed, was imprudent. To direct him to make a backward movement we thought was worse. We had, therefore, no choice for it but to bring him to a point where he and we could mutually assist each other. We, therefore, brought him to Sooraj-koond. This is not only conveniently near to our position, but it is the best point with reference to the operations we shall have eventually to undertake against the city.

In conclusion, I would recapitulate much of what I have said above, and answer your objections one by one. First, as to our acting on the defensive, the battle of Suddoosam is the best answer, and secondly as to the safety of Sher Sing, his present position at Sooraj-koond is the best reply. Thirdly, if any evils are to be anticipated from the road to Lahore being open, Raja Sher Sing must be blamed for coming so near Mooltan without orders. If I mistake not, the rebel Dewan will rather lose deserters than gain recruits by the

road to the Manjha being opened. Fourthly, the districts occupied by the Shaikh Emamooddeen are much more effectually protected by us now than they were by the Shaikh. Alone he could not have stood against a quarter of Moolraj's force. His protection was therefore nominal. Any move made now by the rebels towards the Sutledge would be followed by a corresponding move of ours. Fifthly, for all practical purposes, I think, the Chenab is in our hands. The principal ghats of all the boats are in our possession. Each day brings over either supplies or troops on their way to join us. If the doctor is in any danger, Rajah Sher Sing is to blame and not Edwardes. When Sher Sing came so near Mooltan Edwardes was obliged to bring him to some safe point, otherwise not only the Doctor might have been sacrificed but the whole of Raja Sher Sing's army. Sixthly, any move made to Kummurkot by Moolraj would be followed up by us besides which Edwardes, long ago, sent a hundred Rohillas for the protection of the Pathan families. Seventhly, we are in a position to support British troops whichever way they come. If by the Chenab, they will disembark at Humanpoor, which is only three cos in our rear, and if by the Sutledge, at Bahawalpoor, which is also well covered by our present position.

I hope I have said enough to prove that the movement we made was a good one. Our European troops coming down the Chenab will be as safe as they would have been with our army encamped under the walls of the city of Mooltan. I feel certain that nothing we have done renders the presence of a larger force necessary than was originally contemplated. I hope, therefore, that there may be no delay on this score. Edwardes thinks it was a pity to have delayed the despatch of Cortlandt's ammunition. All the boatmen have to do is to keep well on the right bank of the Chenab, where the only danger is from thieves against whom an escort would be sufficient protection.

I will try in a day or two to send you an accurate plan of the positions in which we all are.

I am sorry to have taken up so much of your time by the length of this communication, but the subject necessarily entailed rather a long letter.

Everything today is in status-quo, the weather warmer than it was a day or two ago, but the evenings cool; Moolraj losing a good number of men by desertions, and all parties under him anxious to treat with us and make terms for themselves before it is too late. The Dewan is fortifying the city as well as he can and turning his attention particularly to that part of the fort which is nearest our present position.

We are going to begin tomorrow making gabions.

303. *From Edward Lake*

Camp Tibbay, July 9, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Edwardes' pay bills arrived yesterday for his signature. There is a distinction made in them between his travelling allowance Cis-Attock, and Trans-Attock, that is, from the day, he crossed the Indus in pursuit of the rebel Dewan, he would, by the present arrangement, lose five rupees a day; he therefore has begged me to bring the matter to your notice. And as the troops with him are also deprived by the present arrangement of the extra allowance they received on the other side of Attock, he begs me to take the opportunity of bringing their claims also to your favourable consideration. They have been exposed at a very trying season of the year and their expenses are, from the dearness of provisions, greater than they would be at Dera Ghazzee Khan or Bannoo. He hopes, therefore, that the Trans-Attock allowance may be made good to them.

I have nothing to communicate of any importance. Edwardes' wound is still very painful and makes me anxious for the Doctor's arrival. He has not reported progress; we are therefore ignorant of his whereabouts. We have sent off a third party to bring him down the Chenab. I trust therefore that there is no cause of alarm for his safety. Sher Sing, Sumsher Sing and Uttur Sing all came over this morning to visit Edwardes. They were all in high spirits, and not at all the worse for their march. Mooltan, though certainly hot, appears healthy, if we may judge from the absence of sickness in our camp as well as theirs. We are very anxious to hear that the battering train has started for Mooltan.

304. *From Edward Lake*

Camp Tibbay, July 13, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I write to say that all is quiet today. Moolraj, they say, has put a stop to the work of fortifying the city, and has moved his men from the Bhor gate spreading them along the face of the Nullah in the direction of Sooraj Koond. The report of the morning is that a deputation of Mooltannees waited upon him and asked permission to leave the city. He told them in reply to keep quiet for three or four days, as the affair will then be settled one way or the other. From this and other reports we infer that Moolraj meditates another attack. We have heard from the first that Moolraj wished to try another battle in the plains but that the soldiers said the "Odds were too much against them." I myself do not think that Moolraj's soldiers will ever pluck up courage to attack us. At Suddoo-sam, however, they acted upon the offensive when they were not expected to do so. They may therefore perhaps do so again. It will be the very best thing in the world for us, and about the worst for Moolraj.

305. *From Edward Lake*

Camp Tibbay, July 15, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

The day before yesterday we heard that a suspicious party of Sikhs had been stopped on the further bank of the Chenab. Last night Moolraj sent a reinforcement to bring this party off which he succeeded in doing. The only opposition on our side was that offered by a party of sixty sawars who had in the first instance stopped the Sikhs, but also were unable to prevent them getting away when reinforced from Mooltan. The people sent by Edwardes to assist our sawars did not arrive in time to be of any use. The officer who commanded our party estimates the Sikhs, who then got away, at two hundred. This must be false. When would two hundred Sikhs allow themselves to be stopped by sixty Pathan horsemen? The boats sent by Moolraj were only five in number, and these were sufficient to bring off both the Sikhs and the reinforcement. They would not therefore have been very numerous. A party of Sikhs on their way to join Shaikh Ema-

moodeen and eight Mussulmen have also gone over to Moolraj. All this shows the importance of striking a decisive blow at once. If offers of high pay can induce Mussulmen to join Moolraj at this particular juncture, is it likely that the Sikhs will give up a cause which they consider identified with their religion and their nationality? No, the memory of the last defeat will be soon effaced, and Moolraj will gain strength from the ranks of the Khalsa army. In this case to act quickly will be to act with double effect.

306. *From Edward Lake*

Camp Tibbay, July 17, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

The Durbar dauk has hitherto answered well and brought in letters regularly and quickly. I received your letter dated July 14th. I shall always send a line therefore by the Durbar dauk as requested by you. At the same time for public letters, I should prefer the Bahawalpoor route.

When I heard that you considered it desirable to move a British force at once on Mooltan, I told Peer Ibraheem and the Nawab to collect camels for the use of the troops. I wish you would let me know if these will be wanted and if so make arrangements by which the camels may be made over to some responsible officer who will see that they are cared for and paid for. Already the Peer is asking me for money to pay for some two hundred camels he has collected, and I have no funds to meet his demands. The Nawab has sent for Futteh Mohommed Ghorree, but has sent no Military Commander to succeed him. He has written to all his officers to say that they are to look upon me as their general officer. He has moreover despatched one Dewan Chokunda Mull to act as Commissary General to his troops. I went with Cortlandt this morning and mustered Jewaheer Dutt's levies. They are not very fine looking men. Some of the horsemen were mounted on tattoos which a grass-cutter would scarcely acknowledge. Some again were very well mounted, being I fancy Jagheerdars from Huzara and elsewhere. We only counted 656 Infantry and 180 Cavalry in parade, the remainder of his force being, he said, on command. I am afraid, all these people, employed in raising troops, think more of the money

they can make by false musters and other devices than of the interests of Govt.

307. *From Edward Lake*

Camp Tibbay, July 18, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Yours of the 15th just arrived. For some days past, I have written to you by the Durbar Dauk, and will continue to do so until the Mooltan affair is settled.

Edwardes' wound is getting on famously, his recovery is necessarily an affair of time. Eventually, however, I hope he will regain perfect use of all his fingers.

I think the several brigades, moving on Mooltan, should let us know on what points they are moving. Where for instance does the Ravee column propose to disembark? Is the Pauk Puttun column going to move down alone upon Mooltan? If it expects to be joined or supported by any portion of our force, it is important that some point of junction should be determined upon, and that arrangements should be made for ourselves and them communicating daily with each other. The better acquainted we are with the plans and proposed movements of each column of troops, the better able we shall be to assist them.

No news from the rebel camp. Moolraj in a fever of excitement. One day posts his guns at the bridge, the next day removes them, at one time he thinks of nothing but of adding to the fortifications of the city, at another he discontinues them altogether. By way of raising the spirits of his people, he says that we are anxious to make terms with him, to retain him in the Govt. of Mooltan, reserving to ourselves a six anna share of the revenue. That these terms are too high for him hence the delay in the negotiation. This is not bad for a man who would give his *all* to save his neck!

308. *From Edward Lake*

Camp Tibbay, July 19th, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I have just returned from the vicinity of Mooltan where we have all been the whole day under the idea that Moolraj was coming again to attack us.

We drew up our line on the old battle-field and waited patiently for some hours in the hope that the rebels would advance. They took care, however, to keep always sufficiently near the bridge in their rear to run away before anything like a decisive action could be fought like the King of the French. Therefore, we marched our forces up a little and then marched back again. A spy, who is just come in, says that not more than three thousand of their men crossed the Nullah this morning, and that they had no intention of fighting a general action.

The heat was more intense than anything I have ever felt—the ground was positively burning, and everything seemed on fire when we came home. I hope the next time we are called out in the middle of day, it may be to do something. Barring the heat which has affected us all, more or less, we are quite well.

309. *From Edward Lake*

Camp Tibbay, July 20, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Edwardes is writing to you today. I shall, therefore, trouble you with only a few lines. All is quiet. Two men of Moolraj's were wounded yesterday by our pickets. This seems to have cooled their ardour a little, and I hear of no skirmishing this morning with our outposts.

Two light guns, in the making of which Moolraj was busily employed, were completed yesterday and are ready for work. Two more guns of large calibre are in hand and will be finished shortly. I forgot to say that when we moved out yesterday, Rajah Sher Sing was directed by Edwardes to cross the Nullah and co-operate with us by threatening the city, if a battle was really fought. The people of our camp who were sent with this order speak most favourably of the alacrity with which Rajah Sher Sing's troops crossed the Nullah. They say moreover that they looked all ready for fighting. This however is contradicted by the general good feeling which appears to exist between Rajah Sher Sing's troops and those of Moolraj. It is notorious that Rajah Sher Singh's men go to Mooltan whenever they please and that they are in no way molested. I am, therefore, very glad that the British

force, now on its way to Mooltan, is sufficiently strong to be independent of such questionable allies.

310. *From Edward Lake*

Camp Tibbay, July 23rd, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

The day before yesterday Lumsden wrote to you, and yesterday I was so tired after accompanying Rajah Sher Sing to the steamer that I allowed the day to pass without writing; as however nothing of importance has occurred. My silence for two days is of little moment. Moolraj with the view of keeping up the spirits of his followers spreads the most improbable stories as to the reinforcements which are on their way to join him. He pretends now that messengers have waited upon him from one of the Kandahar Surdars who has despatched, he says, ten thousand men to his assistance. He had better say next that the Emperor of China has started for Mooltan.

Report has it that Moolraj has brought his five new guns outside the Fort. He has therefore now eleven movable guns at his disposal. Most of his golundazes however have been killed or taken prisoners. He is now obliged to man his guns with soldiers selected from the line. He seems to keep all his soldiers two months in arrears, and only gives them money enough to carry on with. His men seemed to have gained a little more confidence, and we no longer hear of the whole sale desertions which took place at the beginning of the month. When however the British troops draw near, we shall, if I am not much mistaken, see a general defection. Moolraj, however, will fight to the last, and with him a garrison of fifteen hundred or two thousand men. A few days' battering will probably settle the affair and place the garrison at our mercy.

You ask if Bhawal Khan has any troops at the Ghat opposite Mooltan. I presume you mean Raj Ghat which is the great Ghat used by the Mooltan people whether proceeding to Dhera Ghazzee Khan or to Leia. This ghat is about three cos to our left and is covered in a measure by the whole of our army. We consider it safer however to bring all supplies and

troops by the Humanpoor Ghat which is about three cos lower down than Raj Ghat, and in the rear of our position.

Cortlandt requires ten Pettees or tumbrils for the captured guns and wanted you to be kind enough to give the necessary orders on the subject. I mentioned this in a former letter, but as my words were obliterated I repeat the request.

I am sorry to hear the Govr. Genl. does not concur in the propriety of moving British troops. I cannot help hoping that the battle of Suddoosam may alter his views on this subject. Whatever may be the opinion of people *at a distance*, I am quite sure that *no one on the spot* could arrive at a different conclusion from that come to by yourself. Even *already* Moolraj's troops have gained confidence, *already* does he find himself joined by fresh adventurers, and if Rajah Sher Sing's troops do not go over to Moolraj, it is not from want of will, but merely because they consider his game a desperate one, and because they know that the British troops now on their way to Mooltan will speedily bring the affair to a conclusion. Four months' inactivity would not only endanger the present commanding position we hold at Mooltan, but the peace of the whole of the Punjab.

Bhawal Khan's troops are getting into better order than they were, and the vigilance of their picquets is really such as to call forth commendation. Hardly a night passes without their bringing in some suspicious character or other. The Daoodpootras who form the large body of the army fell in formerly without rule or order. I have now classified them into divisions of three hundred and four hundred each, assigning to each division a fixed place both in camp and in line.

311. *From Edward Lake*

Camp Tibbay, July 24, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

A few days ago the report was that Moolraj had once again consulted the astrologers who told him that the 13th of Sawun was the day for him to make a third venture. Now however it is said that any day after the 13th of Sawun will be favourable to his cause, and that it would be fatal for him to fight before that date. All these reports are too absurd to be repeated, and are only propagated by Moolraj in the hope

that some courage may be thus infused among the remnants of his followers. On the whole, I find the Mooltan campaign a more agreeable affair than I expected.

P.S. Atta is selling at thirteen seers the rupee in Mooltan and scarcity is already felt there. They say that many of the soldiers are waiting only for their pay, after which they will abscond.

312. *From Edward Lake*

July 28, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

If I were to repeat all the rumours which are flying about camp, I should tell you first that we were to be attacked tomorrow and secondly that Rajah Sher Sing's force was prepared to go over to Moolraj. I think one event is just as unlikely to happen as the others. I question first whether Moolraj has courage enough to wish to attack us, and if he has, I am certain his soldiers have not. As for Sher Sing's force, there can be no doubt that the sympathy of every Sikh is enlisted in favour of Moolraj. They would all join him if they thought his chance was a good one. On their march to Mooltan they took no pains to conceal their disposition, and if they are silent now, it is not because their disposition has undergone any change, but because circumstances have altered. From the first however they have contented themselves with *talking* and have shown a general disinclination to act. They are not, therefore, likely, I think, to act *now* that a British force is on its way to Mooltan. If they hesitated about joining Moolraj, when everything was in his favour, they are not likely to join him now, when everything is against him. I think it is a pity some of the disaffected do not go over at once, for just now we are strong enough to defy them all; and a *declared* enemy is always easier to deal with than a *covert* one. That many of them are our enemies, I have no doubt, but that they will declare themselves so, I have every doubt. At the same time I agree with Edwardes in thinking that the *sooner* the British force arrives before Mooltan, the better. Edwardes begs me to say that he hopes Brigadier Salter will on his own responsibility order the heavy guns to join us by the direct route, and thereby save some days' delay. Mool-

raj takes care not to let his followers know that a British force is on their way to Mooltan. They must be seen before the people believe that they are coming.

I myself do not anticipate that Moolraj will give in before his fort is regularly invested. To calculate, however, upon what a man in Moolraj's position may do is absurd. I think, however, it would be as well if the fort were regularly taken. It would add to our military reputation, discourage those who are disaffected to our rule and perhaps save us a great deal of work hereafter. The Punjab wants an example, and I hope it will have one in Mooltan.

313. *From Edward Lake*

July 29, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Edwardes is writing to you today. I shall therefore only say that all is well. Yesterday one of Moolraj's soldiers was killed and another wounded by one of Edwardes' boys. A couple of hundred of the enemy's sawars are said to have started for Khannan-walla. Why and wherefore is not known. I imagine it is to give colour to some new lie he is about to invent regarding the accession he is expecting from all quarters of the Punjab. He tries to make his followers believe that he is on the point of being joined by half the Sardars in the Punjab and the whole of the Chiefs of Central Asia.

314. *From Edward Lake*

Camp, July 29, 1848, 7 P.M.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I have just returned from visiting the piquets and sit down to write you a line before dinner. Moolraj's soldiery are becoming turbulent. Atta is selling at thirteen seers a rupee in Mooltan. Hunger does not improve a man's temper, neither does it fit him for fighting. This with other causes must tend to weaken Moolraj and deprive him of many of his followers. I still however adhere to the opinion that Moolraj will not give in until his fort is regularly invested. The care with which he husbands his supplies in the fort is a proof of this. Notwithstanding the ill humour of his soldiers in consequence of the present scarcity, he has not indented upon his stock in

the fort for a single seer of Atta; and he is still occupied in adding to that stock in every way in his power.

I wrote to Sher Ullee, the Moonshee at Bhawalpoor, forbidding him in future to send you Mooltan news. His story about Sumsher Sing intriguing with the Dewan and four hundred Sowars deserting Rajah Sher Sing was very ill-timed and calculated to produce great disgust in the Khalsa Camp.

315. *From Edward Lake*

Camp near Mooltan, July 30, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Edwardes begs me to say he has not written for some days simply because he had nothing of importance to communicate.

In reply to your letter of the 27th regarding a force at the Ghat opposite Bhawalpoor I would make the following remarks: Moolraj would never be rash enough to move out to any distance from Mooltan, even with such a prize as the siege train before him. Take for granted, however, that he has some intention on the train. Why should he wait till it had got to Bhawalpoor, the point farthest from Mooltan instead of attacking it at Kurrempoor or some point higher up? Suppose, however, that he is rash enough to attack, and fool enough to attack at the most disadvantageous point, still the train is in no danger, for when the rebel party got to the Ghat opposite Bhawalpoor they would still have to collect boats and make other arrangements before they could venture to cross the river on the opposite bank of which our fleet would be anchored. In the meanwhile our troops would come up, but even if they did not, and the worse came to the worst, all that the fleet would have to do would be drop down the river. One steamer with the siege train would more effectually protect it than the whole of the Bhawalpoor army, and it is safer to anchor the fleet on the opposite bank, escorted though it may be by a few artillerymen than to bring it upon this bank and cover it with four thousand men. Under these circumstances, I have determined not to detach any party to Bhawalpoor, as I should only weaken myself without affording any effectual protection to the heavy guns. In my opinion there is no danger, when if Rajah Sher Sing's whole force

meditate treachery, while I do not think they do. If it is thought necessary, the officer comg. the fleet can take the precaution of keeping all the boats of the country (with the exception of three or four) on his side of the river.

The treachery of Rajah Sher Sing's force would endanger not the heavy guns, but the detachments which are moving down by land to Mooltan. This, however, is an argument for bringing the Ferozepore Column in one compact body via Kurrempoor as already proposed by Edwardes and for halting the Lahore left column at Surdarpoor, until the Ferozepore Column had got pretty well forward. It is also an argument for moving our present position, so that we might cover in some measure the advance of both columns instead of having (as now) Rajah Sher Sing's troops between us and them. By taking up a position ourselves in the vicinity of the Kutha Bhairaggee Bagh (a point about half a mile to the south of Mooltan) and by posting Rajah Sher Sing where we are now, we should, I think, in every respect be more advantageously posted than we are now. We should cover in a measure both roads by which British columns are now moving, and we should contract to a very considerable degree the circle from which Moolraj now draws both plunder and supplies. We should not at the same time lose any of the advantages we enjoy now. Edwardes is, I think, also in favour of a move, but not until the British troops come nearer. As, however, I shall read this letter to him before I send it, he will doubtless give you his own views on the subject. I have heard no news this morning from Mooltan. The Peer Ibraheem will doubtless communicate anything that we may hear during the course of the day. I shall, therefore, close my letter at once.

316. *From Edward Lake*

Camp near Mooltan, August 1, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

The Sikh nation have evidently a great passion for intrigue. Notwithstanding that the march of British troops seems to render Moolraj's cause almost hopeless, desertions still take place from the Rajah's force. The night before last, two men in Ajoodyea Purshad's regiment bolted, and two more were caught in the act of bolting. Last night a Jemadar and eleven

men deserted from the Raja's new levies; and, if I were to believe the reports brought to me from Mooltan, a great portion of Ajoodyea Purshad's regiment is prepared to fraternize and is only waiting for some dark night to carry its purpose into effect. The Mussulman Jagheerdars in Rajah Sher Sing's camp also confirm the report of the "entente cordiale" which exists between Raja Sher Sing's followers and the rebels. I however still adhere to my original opinion that there will not be *now* any very extensive desertion and I am even surprised at that which has already taken place. I can only account for it by supposing that the mass of the soldiery do not believe in the reported march of the British. A report has just come in that the Sikh regiment (sent to invest Hurrund) are on the point of fraternizing with the rebels. This cannot be wondered at, as the regiment was always disaffected. The general ill-feeling of the Sikh soldiery (which is now displaying itself in all quarters) only shows *the importance of immediate action and the danger of delay*. A suppressed outbreak in Bunnoo, the disaffection of a whole regiment at Hurrund, and the desertion of Rajah Sher Sing's followers are all so many proofs of the wisdom of your policy in moving a *British force at once* against Mooltan. I am very glad moreover that the force you are sending is a respectable one and one which may defy all comers.

Eighteen soldiers yesterday passed through our camp on their way to their homes, having been induced to leave Mooltan by your proclamation, copies of which we have sent to the city by numerous and various channels.

Moolraj has planted some of his guns on the bastions of his city wall. This looks as if he intended to hold the city, his real plans are, I believe, as follows: He does not wish to take into the fort with him more than fifteen hundred or two thousand of his staunchest followers, the remainder he will distribute over the city. If the latter fight well and resist us, his object will be gained; if, however, they give up at once, Moolraj will probably pay them off by turning the fort guns against them. Under no circumstances will he admit them into the fort. As he began with treachery against his lawful superiors so will he end with treachery against his blinded followers.

317. *From Edward Lake*

Camp near Mooltan, August 3rd, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I was too ill to write yesterday, and as I am not yet quite the thing I trust you will excuse a short note.

Moolraj has sent a tent across the Nala to try and persuade himself that he is going to attack us again, placing his forces under the command of Sham Sing, his younger brother. Last night a party of his sawars came very near our pickets. The Zemindars say that they came with the intention of trying to cut off Lumsden, or some of us. This seems very probable as we are in the habit of going down every evening to visit our pickets, and the smallness of our escort might have made them fancy that there was some chance of riding off with us. Fortunately Lumsden and Cortlandt were warned and Moolraj's party retired at night fall.

318. *From Edward Lake*

Camp Mooltan, August 4th, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Longa Mull of Dera Ghazee Khan this morning paid the penalty of his treason against the Maharajah, and of his fidelity to Moolraj. His execution at this particular juncture is calculated, I think, to produce a good effect. The adherents of Moolraj do not seem to be aware that in fighting with a rebellious master they are fighting against the state, on the contrary, they all seem to regard Moolraj, and not the Maharajah, as their legitimate master. The last words of Longa Mull were, "This is what I get for my nimak hallallee." I was not present at the scene of execution, but all say that he *died without the least mark of trepidation, adjusting with his own hands the fatal noose*. His death will I fancy have considerable effect upon the nerves of some of the Khuttreas, who are at present among Moolraj's warmest adherents.

Yesterday it was reported that Moolraj has sent a force and a couple of guns against the Khans of Tank at Surdarpoor. The detachment started, but only proceeded a mile when it halted hearing, I fancy, that the Khans had been joined by Baba Mallee Sing. Whether in earnest or not, I can not say, but Moolraj by consulting Bramins and making other prepara-

tion, pretends that he is anxious to fight again before the arrival of the British. The truth is, there are two parties in his camp, those that have arrived since the two actions have been fought, and those that were with him before. The former are all for fighting, the latter for waiting, the non-fighters being in a majority will, I fancy, carry the day.

From Rajah Sher Sing's camp I hear that another desertion of a body of five and twenty sawars has taken place. The Rajah will be here himself in the evening when I shall probably hear further particulars. The Rajah has just detected a real or fancied conspiracy the object of which was, he says, to poison himself. We have not yet been made acquainted with the details of the affair, but what little we have heard sounds strange and improbable.

Cortlandt has received the ammunition you sent him via the Ravee; he has heard also of the arrival of the remainder at Bhawalpoor and has sent the necessary orders for bringing it away.

Abbott's conspiracies are very amusing. His letter warning us against the last arrived on the "dies assignated." I never see Rajah Sher Sing's red pantaloons without thinking of Abbott's warning, "No Fide speciosa blandimenta Sher Sing." I think Abbott is so far right that they would all conspire against us if they thought they could do so with any prospect of success.

319. *From Edward Lake*

Camp near Mooltan, August 5th, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I quite agree with Napier upon the importance of stopping up the head of the Canal, and I think that when the General arrives at Surdarpoor, he ought to send off the steamer and a strong working party under an intelligent officer to perform this duty.

The last account from Mooltan is that Moolraj was much affected by the death of Longa Mull, and that he bestowed very handsome presents upon the sawars who had deserted from Raja Sher Sing's force. This generosity will probably have the effect of seducing other waverers from the Khalsa Camp.

A great number of Sardars were here last night and the evidence taken in the poisoning case was read over. I myself do not believe for an instant that any attempt was made to poison Rajah Sher Sing. What good would it do Moolraj to get rid of the Rajah? If the Dewan did really offer ten thousand rupees and a Jagheer of five thousand for the destruction of Sher Sing, who would be stupid enough to believe that he either could or would fulfil his promise? A man shut up in the city of Mooltan may offer the whole country in Jagheer, if he pleases, but his adherents must be very sanguine or very credulous if they attach any value to such offers. If however there was no attempt at poisoning, there was every attempt to corrupt and implicate all the Sardars in a conspiracy against us. Moolraj called upon them by all that was holy and sacred in their religion to assist him in effecting the following object:—

First to make Maharaja Dhulleep Sing a king indeed as well as in name;

2nd. To release his mother from captivity;

3rdly. To place in the ascendant the Hindu religion, and

4thly. To stop the slaughter of cows.

You will probably see the proclamation. It is, therefore, useless to allude further to the business than to say that Soojan Sing was evidently an active emissary in the service of Moolraj and that his capture at this crisis will be attended with good results.

The Sikh nation wants an example. Under their old rule, so little shame and such great advantages attached to those who betrayed their master that they no longer seem to look upon treachery as a crime. The death of a few of these traitors is required to give "nimak harrammee" its true reading.

320. *From Edward Lake*

August 6th, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

When Moolraj heard of the death of Longa Mull, they say, he sent for Kahn Sing, his son, and Vazeer Khan for the purpose of having them hanged, but that when they were brought before him, he relented.

There is one Narayan Sing, formerly a servant of Urjun Sing Rungur-nunglea, who seems to take an active part at present in all Moolraj's plans. He has joined him since the last fight and is very anxious to attack us. They still talk of a night attack being in contemplation, but I still adhere to my old opinion that the troops will not have the pluck to come out.

Moolraj has turned the Rohillas out of the fort at which they were much disgusted. This looks as if the Dewan was taking measures for the selection of the garrison he intends eventually for the fort.

The arrest of Soojan Sing in the Rajah's camp has, they say, done good. Those who talked treason openly before, now think it prudent to hold their tongues, and what is still more to the point a couple of days have passed without desertions.

321. *From Edward Lake*

Camp near Mooltan, August 8th, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I was very busy yesterday going through Soojan Sing's case. I had not, therefore, the time to write. You will have heard from other sources of the night attack upon Rajah Sher Sing. My informants in Mooltan tell me that it is probable that ere long another attack will be made in the same quarter. Moolraj fancies that his supporters on the Rajah's camp will take the opportunity of a general action to declare in his favour. It is, I fancy, on this account that he exhibits such great anxiety to bring his men to fighting point. Whether he will succeed, time alone can show. I must do him the credit to say that he shows some judgment in making his attack *at night*. For in the dark, it will be impossible for us to assist Rajah Sher Sing and the few staunch supporters he may have under cover of the darkness too—the traitors in his camp—may take an active part against him with impunity. If the Rajah is *really* interested in our success, the next week or ten days will be to him a very trying period and one which will call forth the display of great energy and fortitude. If he continues to show a bold front, his confidence and determination will probably deter the rebels from attacking him and bring him out of this crisis with safety. So long as Moolraj's soldiers

continue cowards, Raja Sher Sing's men will not prove traitors. The cowardice of one party cloaks the treachery of the other.

322. *From Edward Lake*

Camp near Mooltan, August 9th, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I have no news to give you. All is quiet. Even Sher Sing's camp seems to have settled down a little, and treason is less in fashion than it was. The Sardars however are anxious for the arrival of the British force. They feel that they are standing on the edge of a mine which the slightest accident may blow up. They are, therefore, naturally anxious to be relieved from their suspense. With reference to their feelings for us, and the preference they show for our cause, I think Sher Sing is quite in earnest, Uttur Sing indifferent and Sumsher Sing insincere. The march of British troops however has made them all equally loyal and equally active in our behalf. They all wish to get over the next nine or ten days without any very general defection. They feel that their own reputation is implicated more or less with their men.

323. *From Edward Lake*

August 11th, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

No news today of any kind. The papers found near the tent of Soojan Sing prove his guilt beyond all doubt. I shall send the case to you tomorrow for your final orders. I am not satisfied with the manner in which these papers were produced. I cannot help thinking that some of the worst papers have been suppressed and only those produced which tend to implicate insignificant people. In the fort of Mooltan I have no doubt some papers will be found which will throw light upon the present unsatisfactory state of Rajah Sher Sing's force. Moolraj is as usual talking about fighting.

324. *From Edward Lake*

Camp near Mooltan, August 13th, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

A man came to me this morning from Mooltan offering to

bring over a couple of regiments from Moolraj. I would have nothing to say to him. But I learnt from what he said that both regiments were in a state bordering upon mutiny and that they had refused to fight unless their pay was immediately raised. Moolraj refused to make any increase of any sort. Both parties are therefore dissatisfied with each other.

At the Chowkee this morning a couple of Moolraj's men were killed and one man taken prisoner. Three of our people were wounded slightly. The dispute arose about some water which our people were trying to turn off into our camp and which Moolraj's people resisted. A fight followed in which the rebel's Chowkee was speedily put to flight.

Moolraj is making arrangements for holding out the city against us adding to its defences in every way. The town's people are beginning to desert in large numbers. The sepoy, however, hold on longer than I expected. I have not heard lately of any considerable desertions from Moolraj.

This Hazara affair will probably produce some bad effect upon Sher Sing's force. I am happy to say that we are about to make a move which will render them less dangerous than they are now. The particulars of the move I will acquaint you with to-morrow. Today I have little time.

325. *From Edward Lake*


Camp near Mooltan, August 14th, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I alluded yesterday to our proposed move. I proceed to-day to give you the particulars.

It is unnecessary to tell you that the position, we at present occupy, was taken up with reference to the country across the Chenab, from which we have drawn our principal supplies, and upon which our army was dependent for food. Now however our relations are altered; the march of British troops from Lahore and Ferozepore has quite altered the aspect of affairs. The command of the Chenab becomes a secondary object; to co-operate actively with the British is a point of the highest importance, and a position must be selected not so much for its intrinsic advantages as for the facilities it offers for acting with the force under General Whish. In this latter respect our present position is exceed-

ingly faulty. We are now due west from Mooltan. When the General arrives due east of that city, he will be in greater



want of a supporting force than he ever will be afterwards. We ought, therefore, to be able to assist him, if called upon. But at present we could not do so. The direct line of communication is closed because it passes under the walls of the city, and the only other way open to us is through Raja Sher Singh's camp. Now in the present doubtful state of that Sardar's force we could not act with any confidence in that direction. It would be far from prudent to leave him between our force and the general's, commanding as he does the only bridge by which we could cross the nullah. We, therefore, propose that Sher Singh should take up the position we at present occupy, and that we should move to Sooraj-koond and crossing the nullah there, take up a position in front of it, with our left flank resting upon the nullah. In its new position Sher sing's army will not be useful, if inclined to be faithful, but it is robbed of the power of doing mischief, if inclined to be treacherous. This change, however, is not only advantageous with respect to Sher Singh's force, but also with respect to the General's and our own. We shall only be five or six cos from Hurree Singh's well, and on the day the General marches there we will threaten Mooltan and thereby direct

the enemy's attention. We have also proposed that the General should march to a place called Seetul kee Marree instead of Jainpoor. Seetul kee Marree is about two cos distant from Mooltan, and still nearer the new position we propose taking up. We shall therefore be ready to assist each other at a moment's notice. If on the other hand the General were to go to Jainpoor, the whole of the country in the direction of Surdarpoor would be thrown open to the enemy. No supplies or ammunition could come by that route, and Moolraj would say that the British were moving away from Mooltan. As the line from Lahore to Mooltan is shorter than that from any other of our Military stations, it is *the one* of all others which should be kept open. We have, therefore recommended, that the General should take up some position where he would be near Mooltan and where, at the same time, he would cover in some measure Surdarpoor. The position of Surdarpoor at the confluence of three rivers points it out as an admirable spot for a grain depot. Supplies from the more distant districts might be poured down by these rivers, and would reach us, I imagine, in short time than those sent from the Cis-Sutlege states.

Edwardes, I am sorry to say, is laid up with a bad cold. He begs me to say, however, that he is attending to your behests and that Raja Sher Sing is coming to him this evening when he will go through all necessary explanations.

I cannot help thinking that Chuttur Sing is playing us *false*. If he was afraid of an insurrection, why not report the matter to his own Government. Why not seek explanations from Abbott and why reward the murderers of a Feringee? Is it that others may go and do likewise? It is, however, premature to give an opinion with the uncertain data which have reached us. The very man whose account is before us is probably prejudiced either in favor of the Sardar or of Abbott and writes accordingly.

This outbreak is another argument in favor of the move you have made on Mooltan. As for the weather, nothing can be more agreeable and pleasant than it is now. The nights are really quite cold and the days are not disagreeable.

The mutiny, I spoke of in my last letter, actually broke out and the mutineers succeeded in getting a boodkee and ar-

rears of pay. This is of course preparatory to one of two things, either another general action, or a general dispersion. A few days ago I should have confidently said the *latter* and I say so now, but at the same time I am curious to see what effect the Huzara affair will have upon the Sikhs in the Raja's camp.

326. *From Edward Lake*

Sooraj-koond, August 16th, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

We have changed ground with Rajah Sher Sing and are now in a position to co-operate with both of the British columns. We are also now independent of Rajah Sher Sing's force, and, if they were to break out into open mutiny to-morrow, it would be a matter of no great consequence. Lumsden and myself were on rear guard. This morning and at one time we thought that the enemy would attack us. They moved out steadily to the old field of battle, but when they saw that we have posted our guns on the high ridge of ground (mentioned in my despatch), they came to a halt and about eleven o'clock retired. By this time Rajah Sher Sing had settled down comfortably into his new encampment and we came away. I am, however, as you may fancy, very tired. You must therefore excuse this short letter.

P.S. Edwardes is still suffering from cold or would have written himself. He has managed however to write a long letter to the General, a copy of which he will send you to-morrow.

327. *From Edward Lake*

Camp Sooraj-koond, August 17th, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

We are all very ill and we cannot help thinking that our food has been tampered with. Last night Cole, the Doctor, Lumsden and Edwardes were all seized with violent vomitings, and I myself have a bad attack of gripes this morning. This must either be Moolraj's devilry or the cook's carelessness. Moolraj would only be too glad to dispose of us all with poison, if he could, still I cannot help hoping that on the present occasion the cook is to blame. However on enquiry it turned out that Edwardes had two men from Mooltan as his

personal servants, one a Misaulchee, the other a Bheistee. Edwardes' Kansammah drank some water out of this Bheistee's Mussuk and has been sick ever since.

There is a report that Moolraj's people made a night attack upon the General's camp and that they were beaten off. As however we have not heard from the General himself on this subject, I look upon the story as a Mooltan fiction told probably with the view of diverting our attention from some point, when Moolraj purposes making an attack: the heads of the canal for instance.

There must have been some delay in executing the work at the head of the canal. Glover said it would be all finished by this morning. It cannot however be completed yet for there is as much water as ever in the canal. We propose moving to Mosum Khan's well tomorrow morning a couple of miles hence.

328. *From Edward Lake*

Camp Sooraj-koond, August 21st.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I went and met the General the day he reached his ground in the vicinity of Mooltan and very nearly got pitched into for my trouble. The guns were unlimbered and the Infantry were ready to fire a volley, supposing that we were a party of Moolraj's cavalry. To add to the absurdity of the mistake, two or three of the sawars, I had sent on in advance of my small party, brought me back word that Moolraj's army was in my front. So I began by considering the party hostile, which they very nearly proved themselves to be. All the General's force seem to be in good spirits, and anxious to meet Moolraj's troops again in the field. Three of our riflemen were yesterday taken prisoners by the Dewan's sawars, but subsequently released with presents. This is of course meant to corrupt the other sepoy and make them say that "after all Moolraj is not such a bad fellow." What a pity it is the guns are so much in rear. Still I hope that by this day week we may see them moved into position. A great number of Moolraj's soldiers are now deserting him, and those that stick by him only do so in the hope of getting their arrears of pay.

I am glad to hear that there is a probability of the Huzara affair being amicably settled. If no collision takes place before the arrival of Junda Sing, I do not see why the disturbance should not be suppressed. If on the other hand a fight takes place and Chuttur Sing meets with success, he will become intoxicated and fancy himself invincible.

329. *From Edward Lake*

Camp Sooraj-koond, August 22.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Glover has been for the last six days trying to make a bund across the two canals, but hitherto without success. Today the water has fallen four inches, so I hope his labours have at last begun to tell. I understand the General's camp is inconvenienced for want of water. Moolraj has cut off the supply he used to receive through a small canal. I am sorry also to say that Moolraj has succeeded in making off with one of the General's elephants. The followers in that camp seem to be very careless, and in search for plundering go wandering quite close to the enemy's pickets. It is a pity that Moolraj does not hang one or two of them—"pour encourager les autres."

Rajah Sher Sing went with Edwardes this morning to call upon the General. I am to take Sardar Uttur Sing tomorrow morning. Last night Edwardes and myself went and called on Rajah Sher Sing and the other Surdars. We got off without loss of either life or liberty. The Pathans we took with us were evidently apprehensive of some treachery and stuck very close to Edwardes and would not allow him to drink some Shurbat offered by the Rajah. I proffered the fatal draught but have not yet suffered any evil consequences. We have just heard from Glover, and he reports a *regular row* between the Rohillaes and Sikhs in his camp. This is very unfortunate and places Glover in a very trying position. We are going to send him a reinforcement.

330. *From Edward Lake*

Camp Sooraj-koond, August 23.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I went this morning with Surdar Uttur Sing to call upon the General. While there I heard that the Queen's 32nd had

suffered somewhat on its march from Tibba in this direction. I did not learn the particulars, but it appeared that four men had died from apoplexy in one march and that fifteen or twenty had gone into hospital. On the other hand the account of the General's force is more satisfactory. The Queen's 10th are all keeping well, and both officers and men of the whole force are in good health and good spirits.

The last letter received from Glover reports that one bund is completed and that the other one may be finished in three or four days. The water in the canal has fallen a foot since yesterday, so that Glover's labours are beginning to tell at last. The dispute which had arisen in his camp between the Sikhs and Mussulmen has been settled amicably and he has been reinforced with five hundred men from this army. Backed as he is, moreover, by the steamer, we need feel little anxiety on his account. There is no news of any sort. The heavy guns cannot reach before the end of the month until which time we are doomed to inactivity.

331. *From Edward Lake*

Camp Sooraj-koond, August 24th, 1848, Recd. 27th.

My dear Sir Frederick,

No news. Edwardes is gone to have a consultation with the General. We went this morning some two or three miles in the direction of Mooltan to reconnoitre but the dust prevented us from seeing much. The 32nd are to reach camp tomorrow morning. The General has sent for some 24-pounder rockets, which, I have no doubt, will astonish the Mooltannees. Rajah Sher Sing does not seem to like hanging Soojan Sing. He says, "the Punt will not be pleased," the very reason why he should be made to do it. It would estrange him from the disaffected.

332. *From Edward Lake*

Camp Sooraj-koond, August 27th, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

We had a heavy fall of rain last night, which will I hope tend to cool the weather. The bund still remains incomplete and the General has sent for Glover back again to camp. I hope however that before he returns, he will make one grand

effort to finish the work. The guns, I fear, will not be here before the 3rd or 4th of next month. Moolraj gives out that he is now making terms for himself, and that the delay shown by us in taking active measures is caused by our anxiety not to impede in any way the negotiations.

Soojan Sing was yesterday blown away from one of the Rajah's guns. When they wished to tie him, he begged them not to do so, as he was prepared to meet his fate. His last words were to prophesy the dissolution of the Khalsa Raj for the want of union they had shown on the present occasion.

333. *From Edward Lake*

Camp Sooraj-koond, August 27th, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I have no news to give you. Moolraj has made some changes in the disposition of his force consequent upon the arrival of the English Division. The troops which were formerly posted near the Shiwala have now been stationed in front of a large brick kiln which is quite close to the Khoonee Boorj. Hence they are able to watch the movements of the British troops. Our inactivity has put a stop to the desertions which were beginning to take place in Moolraj's army. He has been joined of late by some sawars who have deserted from Rajah Sher Sing's brigade. Napier with the Engineer park was to have started on the evening of the 25th. The guns, it was supposed, would not be ready before the 28th.

334. *From Edward Lake*

Camp Sooraj-koond, August 28th, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

The General inspected our troops this morning, and said it was a sight well worth seeing. The Daoodpootras got into what was a very good line for them, and looked as martial as it was possible for them to look. Altogether, I was well satisfied. They are vastly improved, since I first saw them, and I think the Nawab would be pleased if you were to write and say that you receive satisfactory accounts of the present state of his force. Their pickets are much more alert than they used to be. The men fall into line and obey orders with much more alacrity than they did formerly, and I hear of little or

no plundering on the whole. I am very well satisfied both with officers and men. Dewan Chokunda Mull sent by the Nawab to take the place of Futteh Mohommed Ghoree in giving out supplies to the Daoodpootras has also given me great satisfaction, and I should be happy if you would mention his name favourably in your letter to the Nawab. The cavalry are now coming into great play, escorting provisions from our camp to the General's, and from our camp to Bhawalpoor, &c. Tomorrow I am going to send off all the cavalry to escort the train on its progress towards the General's camp. The guns were to start from Bhawalpoor this day, the 28th. I should not be at all surprised to hear of their being delayed two or three days longer. What a pity it is that this delay should have taken place. If we had been in possession of the city of Mooltan, your order recalling Chuttur Sing would have a better chance of being obeyed than it has now. I cannot help thinking that the Sikh soldiery will not let Chuttur Sing go, even if he wishes it. Boodh Sing Man and one or two others are, I fancy, acting in this affair under instructions from Kan Sing in Mooltan. The latter, however, is still a prisoner and, ostensibly, not in the confidence of Moolraj. Chuttur Sing's move to Hussun Abdal looks suspicious. If he attempts to move down the Mooltan via Jelum, our two steamers will I hope be enough to arrest his progress. I trust, however, that the affair may be amicably adjusted and all parties relieved from their present anxiety.

Rajah Sher Sing has been trying to implicate Khoosyal Sing Morarreea in a secret correspondence with the enemy. I fancy Lall Sing's refusal to join Chuttur Sing is the real cause of this accusation against Khoosyal Sing.

Every one is calling out for Napier. I have, therefore, written to him, offering him horses, &c., so that he may hurry on. He ought to be here some days before the siege train. The reconnoissance of the ground, the selection of the point of attack and the preparation of two or three batteries will all take time, and all should be ready before the arrival of the heavy guns.

335. *From Edward Lake*

Sooraj-koond, August 30th.

My dear Sir Frederick,

The train at last is really under weigh and has, I fancy, made two short marches from Bindree Ghat. It will not reach the General's camp in less than seven or eight marches. Edwardes is gone over today to visit the General and have a consultation as to our future plans and movements. I hope Napier will come back with him this evening and look at the ground to the south of the city which is the side from which I should recommend the real attack to be made. If Abbott and Surdar Chuttur Sing come to a collision, it is very important that we should receive the news of it before the Sikhs in Rajah Sher Sing's camp. I hope, therefore, that an *express* may be sent with letters for our *camp only*. If the Huzara affair does not settle down, a direct dauk between Nicholson's camp and our own would be advantageous. The steamer *Cornet* has arrived and the *Napier* will be here shortly. If, therefore, any of the mutinous regiments take to the river and we get timely notice of it we ought to be able to cut them off. The Wazeerabad Kardar ought to send off a messenger direct to Mooltan if Gulab Sing's regiment takes to the river there. Nicholson will doubtless do the same if any of the troops opposed to him go down to the Jelum. I would recommend Col. King's party to come down the river to Humanpoor Ghat and will write accordingly.

336. *From Edward Lake*

Camp Sooraj-koond, August 31st, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I have been out with Napier this morning reconnoitering the ground in the vicinity of Sooraj-koond. He has, I am happy to say, recommended our making a forward move and we are to advance tomorrow morning to Kutha Barraggee, which is about a mile and three quarters from the town of Mooltan. This will contract Moolraj's will have a smaller field for plundering parties. We shall be nearer the General, nearer our work, and we shall cover the train. On the whole the move appeared to me so advisable that I recommended making it some days ago.

Edwardes, however, preferred waiting until he ascertained what Napier's views were on the subject. The train will be here probably about the 4th. ...

337. *From Edward Lake*

Camp Kutha-Barraggee, September 5th, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I hope you will excuse my not having written to you during the last few days, but really I have been so occupied and the enemy have given us so much trouble on our new ground, that I have not had a moment to spare. The skirmish on the 1st of September was a smart little affair. The Daood-pootras behaved very well; they formed line a little in rear of the Jog Mae, whence they kept up a good fire on Seedee Lall ka Bedh, preventing the enemy from showing himself there. One of the fort guns kept playing upon them all the morning, but the balls fortunately fell sometimes in front and sometimes in rear of their line, doing little or no mischief. During the whole affair I only lost one man killed and four men wounded. This was very trifling, considering the advanced position the Daoodpootras took up. After all the force had retired to camp, I made a charge with a couple of Cortlandt's companies and some of Edwardes' levies upon a blue mosque, in which the enemy had posted themselves. Cortlandt's men behaved splendidly, got possession of the mosque and might have retained it, had they been supported. As, however, Edwardes did not wish to keep so advanced a point, the companies were obliged to fall back when the mosque was again occupied by Moolraj's picquets. Hardly an hour of the day passes without the enemy sending a round shot through our camp. We, therefore, thought it advisable to make trenches all round our position, which we have done. I have also begun to make a few batteries from the cover of which my artillerymen can blaze away. The preparation of batteries, the silencing of the enemy's guns, and arrangements for meeting reported attacks of the enemy have all taken up so much time that I feel myself cheated out of my natural rest and have not, therefore, had a single *leisure* instant. The guns (heavy) arrived yesterday, a salute was fired this morning as a signal for those to leave who wished to retire from the town

before the siege. Napier was to have begun his first parallel last night. His batteries will be ready to open fire on the morning of the 8th, and on that or the following day we may expect to move to the assault. Napier will doubtless give you an account of his proposed plan of attack. We are to make our advance, I am happy to say from the right of our position. Some of Edwardes' Officers counsel an advance from the left, but my arguments in favour of the right are as follows. First, there is a Nullah between our camp and Rajah Sher Sing's. If the latter intends treachery, all that he has got to do is to mount his guns upon the high banks of this Nullah and rake the whole of our position. By moving from the left we shall be near this Nullah and Sher Sing can at any moment turn his guns against us. On the other hand by going to the right we shall put it out of his power to do us mischief. Secondly, the ground on our left is exceedingly strong, and might be easily defended by a small force against superior numbers. Thirdly, by being on the right we shall be near the General. We shall be able to support each other and thereby give an unity to the combined attack it could not have, were we separated at any distance. Another argument in favour of the right advance is that the enemy has posted considerable numbers of men (on *his own* right and *our* left) considerably in advance of his main body and the city. By moving down on the right we shall probably get between them and the city and thereby succeed in cutting them off. A few days, however, must decide the matter.

I fancy Chuttur Sing is prepared to go into open rebellion. If he does not so, it will not be from any good feeling, but merely because he does not obtain the support he expects, that is to say, if the Peshawur troops join him he will be a rebel, if they do not join him, he will return to his allegiance. Depend upon it all his emissaries are at work in the Manjha, at Bunnoo and at Peshawur. In gaining time he expects to gain strength, and if he thinks he can defy you with impunity, he will undoubtedly do so. I shall be very much surprised if Raja Deena Nath's negotiations lead to any result, the arrogance of the Sikhs will prevent them from acceding to any terms which are not forced upon them by the presence of a superior army. The sooner a force takes the field of sufficient

strength to resist the Peshawur, Bunnoo and Hazara brigades combined, the better. The earlier we are in taking the field, the less time we shall give the Sikh nation to show an active sympathy in favour of the Surdar. His present plan appears to me to get possession of Attock and make that the centre of future operations. Unless Nicholson is strengthened, his present garrison will probably be bought over and the fort placed at the disposal of the Surdar. I cannot help referring at this time to what appears to me a great military error, and which I mentioned first to Lawrence and subsequently to Cocks, viz., the occupation of a weak city wall four miles in circumference by our troops. If ever they have to act, it will not only be against external but also internal enemies. Detached as each gate is from the other it is impossible to expect any vigorous defence. I, therefore, recommend that we confine ourselves to the four gates nearest to Anarkullee, and throw down all the others or it would be better still when you have time to throw down the whole wall retaining only that portion of it which would be efficiently occupied by our own men. I hope you will forgive my having given an opinion on these matters, and that you will not consider me exceedingly presumptuous.

338. *From Edward Lake*

Camp Kutha-Barraggee, September 9, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

We are not so forward as I could wish. Napier, I think, gives credit to Moolraj's troops for more bravery and enterprise than they possess. Our advance is therefore a cautious one. Still in my opinion it is better than if we were to have attempted to storm the town by a coup de main which was the first idea. The artillery officers do not like using their ammunition. The consequence is the enemy becomes bold and gives our working party some trouble. To add to our difficulties, the Daoodpootras this morning declined digging trenches and it was only after considerable persuasion and trouble that I induced them to forget that they were brothers of the Nawab, and that siege operations ought to be conducted by soldiers and not beldars. They have consented at last to work Morchas; at the same time if they show any more of this spirit it will interfere sadly with our progress. Edwardes has been

out the greater part of the day and is too tired to write. He begs me to say he will answer your letter of the 6th tomorrow. We are both going to dine with the General this evening.

339. *From Edward Lake*

Camp Sooraj-koond, September 22nd, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I am sorry I have allowed so long a time to elapse without writing, but the truth is, while the siege of Mooltan lasted, I was continually looking after trenches, batteries, working parties, and reliefs, and, as you have doubtless heard, the day before the siege was raised, I received a wound which for some days caused me considerable pain, and which must account for my remaining silent. After all trench work was at an end. The defection of Rajah Sher Sing was the immediate cause of our operations being suspended, but even if this event had not taken place, I fancy the siege must still have been raised, for the view taken of affairs in the General's camp was a most desponding one. If, said they, so many lives have been lost in taking a few insignificant buildings, a thousand yards from the city, what shall we lose by the time we have worked our way through the crowded streets of the town; Napier, after the fighting on the 12th, distinctly said that unless Edwardes with the irregular force *alone* could take the suburbs and city, he could not see his way through the siege. Affairs were altogether on a most unsatisfactory state; for I call it unsatisfactory to have a large train in camp, and not to use it; to find yourself hourly annoyed by the enemy's guns, and not to make any attempt to silence them, to see that where batteries are made, they are of no use, and that where they would be of use, none are made, to meet officers, men and workmen all wandering about the trenches doing nothing merely because no one would give them instructions. All this, I say, was unsatisfactory, and enough to mar our prospects, even if Sher Sing had remained true, when therefore he went over to Mooltan, there was nothing left for it but to retire. On this point opinion appears to have been the same, the only question was when we should retire? After a great discussion, Sooraj-koond was selected for the irregulars; our old position at Tibba or that neighbourhood

for the regulars. I myself advocated a position which should in some measure cover Surdarpoor. My arguments were simply these: One of the great difficulties in carrying on our siege was caused by the great numerical strength of the enemy as compared with our own. This difficulty will not be removed by any reinforcements we may gain unless we take steps at the same time to prevent reinforcements from reaching the enemy; if we gain an accession of ten thousand men during the next month, the rebels will probably gain fifteen thousand, so long as the road to Surdarpoor is open. Moreover Surdarpoor is the point at which the Ravvee unites with the Chenab, and whoever holds that point can call into play for his own use the resources of the whole of the Punjab. In short I thought that by putting ourselves between Mooltan and the country favourable to Sikh ascendancy, we should do more to weaken the Mooltan party than if we put ourselves between them and a Mohomedan country, from the whole breadth of which they could not expect to get a single recruit. As for supplies, they might have been carried as easily to a ghat above Mooltan as they are now to one below it. The river to all intents and purposes was closed to Moolraj, for the only Nullah by which he could communicate with it in boats was closed and in our hands. As, however, it would not have done to expose our old friend the Nawab and his territory, I would have so managed it that our extreme left should cover the high road to Bhawalpoor, and our extreme right the line to Surdarpoor. But even then, as it is now, our great difficulty would be the siege train. If you keep it with you it acts like a drag to the wheel of your army, and prevents your ever moving with efficiency, and four miles a day is the greatest march you can expect to make. If on the other hand you send your train away, you are in constant anxiety regarding it. I confess that I should prefer the latter alternative and that I would sooner relieve myself of the train than by retaining it render my army useless for active operations in the field. There would, I imagine, be no difficulty in equipping six or eight heavy guns in such a manner that they might accompany us upon the longest march. Having done this, I would put the remainder on boats and send them down to Bukree or some other point in Bhawal Khan's dominions. If the diffi-

culties of doing this are insuperable, or if great delay would occur, I should propose constructing a field entrenchment on the spot capable of receiving all the magazine and which we might defend with the guns themselves. Unless something of this sort is done, the British army will be useless for all offensive operations, its movements cramped, and, when required to move, its energies wasted in protecting the arsenal within instead of being directed against the enemy without. If the British army were required to act this evening at a point two miles distant from its own right flank, it could not do so without leaving the whole of the siege train in an exposed situation. The British force is now like a tethered horse. It can't move in any direction without finding itself pulled back again by the train. But because all the remedies proposed for this state of things are open to certain objections, the difficulty is met by *doing nothing*. The guns all remain huddled together in the centre of the line, and, I daresay, if an action were fought tomorrow, it would be decided before the heavy guns could be brought into play, and I have no doubt the question will remain under agitation until the news of reinforcements being on their way to join us will make it too late to do anything. The stronger those reinforcements can be, the better, the British force which next begins operations against Mooltan ought, I think, to be quite independent of our own irregular troops, for there is no concealing the fact that Regulars repose no confidence in irregulars and never can act cordially with them. However much we may therefore exert ourselves, we cannot aid materially an army which distrusts us except by carrying on a separate attack and thereby engaging the enemy's attention. In calculating, therefore, the amount of reinforcements, I think the irregular troops ought not to be taken into account. Thirty thousand British troops at least appear to me required before Mooltan; and even then they will find themselves as hard worked as did seven thousand on a late occasion, for the garrison of Mooltan will have more than quadrupled itself; and thirty thousand will find it as difficult to besiege thirty thousand as seven thousand did to besiege seven thousand. The sooner even a portion of these reinforcements could be despatched, the better it would be, as it is possible that the Sikhs on being strengthened might

determine to fight a general action in the plains. In such a case every additional man would be useful.

340. *From Edward Lake*

Camp Sooraj-koond, September 23rd.

My dear Sir Frederick,

The Sikhs agreed in solemn conclave yesterday to attack the British force this morning. They took the customary oaths to conquer or die. They accordingly moved across the Nullah this morning with sixteen guns drawn out in hostile array. When, however, they got to a point sufficiently distant from the British camp for the heaviest guns not to tell, they thought they would try how their own light guns sounded. They, therefore, opened a cannonade from this point, which they continued for an hour or two. When, however, they found that their balls fell short, they left off and have continued inactive up to this hour (3 p.m.). *John Singh* will require considerable persuasion before he consents to fight an action in the open plain, still it is not improbable that Moolraj's distrust of Sher Sing may force the latter to fight a general engagement. It will be greatly in our favour, I think, if *they* fight *now*, instead of waiting for the large reinforcements which must shortly reach them. Starvation must force many of the present occupants of Mooltan to start off into the Punjab as plunderers, on their own account. In this way they will do more harm than they can do here, and it will give us some trouble hereafter to put down these hordes of plunderers. I thought you would find the Mumdot horsemen useful in looking after parties of this description. I, therefore, gave Jellalooddeen Khan leave to return to his home. In this, I hope, I have done right and that you will be satisfied.

A number of Daoodpootras ran off to their homes when they found the siege was raised. The Nawab, however, has taken measures to send them all back again.

341. *From Edward Lake*

Official No. 28

Camp Sooraj-koond, October 1, 1848.

Hon'ble Sir,

I beg herewith to submit an account of the receipts and

Receipts

Detail of Nuzzurana, etc.	Specification of Currency								
	Number of pieces in all	Bhawulpoor Rupee	Ahmedpoor Rupee	Nanakshahi Kuldar, etc.	Sun 26	Kashmeeree	Yukashahi		
From the Nawab of Bhawulpoor ..	1000 0 0	1000	—	—	—	—	—		
Futteh Mahommed Ghorree ..	255 0 0	—	255	—	—	—	—		
From the followers of the Nawab of Bhawulpoor on my visit to Ahmedpoor ..	371 0 0	—	371	—	—	—	—		
Chukunda Mull ..	125 0 0	57	5	—	63	—	—		
Rajah Sher Sing, Surdars Sumsher Sing and Uttur Sing ..	326 0 0	—	—	326 0 0	—	—	—		
Jellallooddeen Khan ..	101 0 0	—	—	101 0 0	—	—	—		
Daoodpootra Jemadars and others on the occasion of my escaping with a slight wound ..	101 0 0	—	10	89 0 0	1	—	1		
Jellallooddeen Khan ..	101 0 0	—	—	101 0 0	—	—	—		
Nawab Bhawul Khan ..	125 0 0	—	125	—	—	—	—		
Shaikh Emamooddeen—Refunds ..	51 0 0	—	—	—	—	51	—		
Money advanced for Camels ..	352 4 0	—	—	352 4 0	—	—	—		
Medicine bought by me—afterwards made over to Genl. Cortlandt. ..	16 1 6	—	—	16 1 6	—	—	—		
Total ..	2924 5 6	1057	766	985 5 6	64	51	1		

Abstract of Disbursements Account

Designation of Currency		Total received	Total expended on public account	Total appropriated on private account	Balance
Bhawulpoor Rupees	..	1057 0 0	835 4 3	114 0 0	107 11 9
Ahmedpoor Rupees	..	766 0 0	649 7 0	—	116 9 0
Nanakshahee Rupees	..	985 5 6	471 0 0	258 0 0	256 5 6
Sun 26 Rupees	..	64 0 0	—	—	64 0 0
Kashmeeree Rupees	..	51 0 0	—	—	51 0 0
Yakashahee Rupees	..	1 0 0	—	—	1 0 0
Total ..		2924 5 6	1955 11 3	372 0 0	596 10 3

disbursements of Nuzzurana funds received by me during the period, I have been employed on the Bhawalpoor frontier.

2. It appeared not only politic but merciful to make some slight donation to those who were wounded in the action of Suddoosam, as many of them were too poor to provide themselves with common necessities; to those, therefore, who had to undergo amputation, I gave ten rupees each, to those who were badly wounded, six rupees, and to those who were slightly wounded, three rupees. Many wounded men had been carried to their homes, and did not therefore receive this donation.

3. The only other items to which it appears necessary to call your attention are those appropriated by me on my private account in lieu of the three hundred and fifty-eight rupees thus received. I have made a deposit in the Lahore Treasury to the amount of three hundred and eighty-five rupees.

The 114 Bhawalpoor rupees are equal to one hundred Nanakshahee rupees—the sum therefore received on my private account is equal to three hundred and fifty eight Nanakshahee rupees, in lieu of which I have made a deposit in the Lahore Treasury.

(ix) LETTERS OF JAMES ABBOTT

342. *From Captain James Abbott, Asstt. Resident on Deputation, Hazara, to the Hon'ble Sir F. Currie, Bart., Resident at Lahore.*

Camp Srikot, Hazara, Oct. 20, 1848.

Sir,

I have the honour to detail the particulars of an affair between the army of Chuttur Singh and the levies under my command.

2. It may be remembered that last year I excluded the Simulkund Branch of the Tarkhaile clan from the mountain of Gundgarh and built a castle in their village to secure the peace of the mountain. The garrison of this castle consisting of one company of Rechpal Sing's Regiment and about 80 matchlocks, declared, like most others in Hazara, for Chuttur Singh. Chuttur Singh had sent me a deputation of the Za-

mindars of Huzara begging the release of the garrison, but he had by the same deputation written to the garrison to stand fast. This letter was opened and read. I had repeatedly offered the garrison safe conduct with arms and luggage, because it was impossible to prevent their relief, but they had declined moving.

3. On the morning of the 18, Chuttur Singh's Camp moved up to Ghazi upon the left bank of the Indus; it was evident that his object was Simulkund. But owing to his *veto* to the garrison the impression was general that he would by that route attack Srikot also.

4. Simulkund being sited at the very foot of the mountain, with a gun road from the plains, it was not possible for 1800 matchlocks (my whole disposable Force including the levies of the mountain) to prevent the relief of the fort by six Regiments with Artillery and Cavalry. But I deemed it important that the evacuation should not be effected with impunity and that no hope should be built upon it of ever ascending the mountain.

5. Long before day break of the 18th, the Sikh army was observed cooking their food. At about 8 a.m. the force advanced in two columns carrying 4 guns and 2 Howitzers upon elephants. Having excellent guides and having a secret understanding with the villagers of Koondi Umbar Khana who supply some of my best matchlocks, they were enabled to avoid the fire of about 800 matchlocks posted upon the Gun-road. Their right column under Chuttur Singh advanced without opposition at the back of the low hills and took up a position upon the most considerable eminence overlooking Simulkund from the south. But on pushing forward their detachments the fire became hot and close and they were eventually driven back.

6. The left column, about 3000 strong with two howitzers upon elephants, attacked my position upon the first undulation of the mountain's base northwards. I had at first only 200 matchlocks to oppose them. But as the contest warmed 400 more came up from Umbar Khana (the post avoided by the Sikhs) and dissected the hill from rock to rock, from bush to bush, so that by 2 or 3 p.m. they had won only the first inconsiderable ascent, having yet before them all the strong

ground of my position. Here they turned back retreating with much coalescing under the fire of my skirmishers, and could I have persuaded the Reserve with me to charge sword in hand, might perhaps have been routed, but my exhortations were received so coldly that I desisted.

7. Meanwhile the garrison had evacuated and fired the Fort which was beyond the reach of my matchlocks and soon afterwards the powder magazine exploded ruining about 20 feet of the western wall: a beautiful sight which caused a momentary pause in the skirmishing.

8. The Sikh army marched back in good order. Being strong in cavalry and artillery it was not possible to molest them in ground so open. They consumed 15 of the dead of their right column in a burning thatch and carried away, it is said, about 60 dead bodies and about 120 wounded. The reports however vary. Two officers of consequence were amongst the slain.

9. The whole affair was managed with skill and judgment which prove Chuttur Singh to be no contemptible soldier. The troops, if not very dashing, were cool and self-possessed. I only once saw them run. It was, I believe, when Ata Muhammad Khan and four of men charged them with sword in hand. Ata Muhammad Khan was one of the Simulkund Chiefs whom I released lately from prison and who by devotion to the Government has fully justified my confidence. He fell under a hundred rounds.

10. My own matchlockmen behaved well. The ground was not very strong, but they might sometime have maintained their posts longer. Owing to the large space to be covered by 1800 matchlocks, I could never bring more than one man to every ten of the enemy at any given point.

11. The number killed on our side does not exceed 9 and the wounded are scarcely more numerous. The slaughter on both sides would have been heavier, had I not resisted the gallant offer of the Simulkundies to oppose the right column upon level ground. The spot being manifestly untenable against superior numbers and discipline, I forbade the occupation by any post save such as might be maintained to the end.

12. The Sikhs, it is said, are dispirited by this affair in which they have placed *non de combat* as many men as they have rescued, and this, upon ground of no strength admitting of wheeled carriages. My own levies are elated and will I doubt behave with spirit in future. Three hundred of my best matchlockmen had a compact with Chuttur Singh not to fire provided their villages were spared—a circumstance which greatly crippled me in skirmishing with the left wing.

13. I received material assistance from Mr. James Ingram, Assistant Surgeon (son of the late Captain Ingram of this service). I had forbidden him to mix in the skirmishing from diffidence of men who had twice deserted me at need. But ardour led him into the field and he arrived in time to rally a considerable body of matchlockmen who were in full retreat. This young gentleman, who is the son, grandson and great grandson of soldiers, has not sufficient interest to procure for him a commission in the service.

14. Chuttur S. was occupied on the 19th in burning his dead. To-day he has marched two koss southward towards Attock. The number of wounded for whom he has no litters is said to be the cause of this short march. I have been the last three days on the hill-side without shelter and without chair and table, watching the enemy. I could not therefore write earlier, but deputed Mr. Ingram to inform Lt. Herbert and Major Lawrence of the result: the Lahore Dak being suspended.

15. Muhummud Khan, one of those who lately returned from Capt. Edwardes' Camp at Moultan, is I regret to mention amongst the slain.

16. I could not bring up any of the guns lately sent me by Mah. Gulab S. in time for action. The first is this moment arrived.

17. In the large reservoir built by me in the castle of Simulkund I found still $10\frac{1}{2}$ feet of pure water, after two months' blockade.

P.S. On the 21st Chuttur S. marched southward and encamped opposite to Aoud Ferry. He expects the Peshawar Force to join him after the receipt of their pay. Our secrets of the 22nd are not yet in. All was quiet in Peshawar on the

19th, at Atak on the 20th. But this push cannot last unless our troops are in motion.

343. *From James Abbott to John Nicholson*

Nara, Oct. 24, 1848.

My dear Nicholson,

I have just received your note of the 16th. Those of the 13th and 15th were received and answered. We so entirely lost sight of your movement that it has been difficult to address you. I had much anxiety on your account. I fired off two notes to you when Aotar S. started for the Pind and once wrote afterwards. I have given you an account of our affair at Simulkund. Chuttur got the worst of it. I knew from the first we could not prevent the relief of the Fort and therefore acceded to the proposition of dismissing the garrison. But he had once played a piece of treachery upon me and the garrison latterly would not believe him when he ordered them to quit. His loss is not less I think than 60 killed and 120 wounded. He was yesterday at Umroond, began to cross, but his sowars were driven back by the fire of Mullak's people with loss, so it is said. He confidently asserts that the Peshawar Force will march when paid—others say it will not move unless he crosses. All this seems to be known at Lahore and yet! All was quiet in Peshawar on the 19th, at Attak on the 20th. Report says that Sher S. was surrounded by our troops and the Tummundars of the country. But good news just now is to be suspected. We have a report that you have recrossed the Jelum. The Ports of Deuma, Kotli and Charian are evacuated. Chuttur wished to preserve them. The Deuma Garrison was destroyed by Peer Buhol who was murdered in the melee by a relative.

P.S. 26th. Whilst closing this a very disagreeable report has reached me—which Lt. Herbert fears is too true—of a mutiny at Peshawar.

344. *From James Abbott*

Suhote, Oct. 29, 1848.

My dear S. Frederick,

I received and answered your favours of the 10th and 11th instant by the messenger and by the M. Gulab Singh's

Vuqueel. I have since written frequently. You have doubtless heard of the mutiny of the Force at Peshawar. To this moment the particulars are uncertain. But there seems no doubt that the officers have been compelled to fly owing to the desertion of the Nujjees and that the whole force is moving to join Chuttur S. at the Bazar Ferry. Whether they will attack Attock or not is uncertain. They will probably try to root me out of Gundgurn ere they reach eastward. At present the impression is that they will march upon Lahore. The farther from that town they are met with by our army the better. *A timely advance would have prevented the mutiny at Peshawar which only our continued inaction induced.* The belief is general that the Barukzyes have joined the Sikhs and that the Urbabs are loyal. I have a letter of yesterday's date from Lt. Herbert at Attock. He speaks of holding the Fortress until the arrival of the British army. Its delay disheartens or rather has driven from us all our partizans and encouraged our enemies. I have a note from Mr. Thomson in Cashmere. His news-writer tells me that some of the mountain Chiefs have listened to Chuttur S.'s addresses. But this is highly improbable as they hate the Sikhs and hope everything from our influence as neighbours. The Maharaja has forwarded me your Roobukari respecting his aid at the present juncture. I will reperuse it more attentively ere I express a judgment. It seems to me however rather hazardous to bring forward his army just now: for even allowing the best intentions on the Maharaja's part the army itself may listen to offers of superior pay. Two Daks have arrived bringing only the Roobukari and Darbar Istahars. Our English letters might be sent by this route, if you approve. Our latest news is a note from Mr. Cocks to Lt. Herbert dated 19th.

345. *From James Abbott*

Nara, Nov. 17, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

The second instalment from Maharaja is not yet received nor have I as yet any letter by his Dak altho' I have been writing by it daily during the last 10 or 12 days. I desired the Viqueel to order that all boats in the neighbourhood or at Leban should be secured by the Jumboo force for our army. I

have not heard whether this has been done. I have also desired that the Dewan in charge of the Jumboo force place himself in communication with Genl. Cureton and with Capt. Nicholson and abide by any instructions received from that quarter. I trust you will approve of this arrangement.

Five Regiments each 500 strong could not cope with Chuttur Singh and his 15 Regiments, and had they approached Hazara no one had believed their mission friendly to us, but from fear most of our partizans had gone over to the enemy. They might indeed have undertaken the siege of Kullur—but having no breaching guns, the issue would have been doubtful and the approach of the Sikh army would have put them to flight. The prisoners were well on the 13th and treated with attention but under the closest restraint. Herbert and his gun-men on the 14th were in high spirits and doing much mischief with their shot. Chuttur S. must draw off his investing army immediately or we shall destroy him in this corner where all around are athirst for his blood. We hear that Sher S. was defeated and that Aotar S. was slain by Cureton's force on the 10th, and await authentic news with anxiety. Many of the Sikhs are deserting their Regiments in anticipation of the fate which hangs over their colors.

346. *From James Abbott*

Nara, Huzara, Nov. 2, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Your favours of the 24th and 21st have just come to hand. I cannot learn from them whether our army is actually advancing. I am advised of your instructions to Mah. Goolab S. to attack Chuttur S. previous to the advance of our forces and the Maharaja appeals to me for further advice upon the subject. He has sent 5 regts. each of 500 men to Meerpoor for this purpose, a total of 2500. But since your order was issued, Chuttur S. has been joined by the whole Peshawar force. I cannot therefore insist upon the Maharaja occupying with 2500 men the weak Margulla pass at a distance...pious aid to arrest the progress of 14 or 15 veteran Battalions with 45 Guns. The passage of Jelam might have been disputed had the Maharaja's force been double its present strength and were not Sher S. on the eastern side of the Jelum. He must

be beaten ere the Jamboo troops can take post to obstruct the passage. This perhaps the Jamboo troops might be equal to, for I suppose Sher S. has not more than 6000 men, half of which are Cavalry and will not fight. The alterations in the strength of Chuttur Singh's army since your order was issued has probably led to recall it. In the Jaghir of Chuttur S. the Jamboo force might burn and plunder, but every one would believe that they came in aid of Chuttur S., and the moral effect would be innocent Rajputs would be the immediate sufferers. His personal property and wives are to the best of my belief removed into the mountains. Were the force to beseige Kullur or any other post it must fly upon the approach of the Sikh army. But I think the Maharaja's army might rout Sher S. or the Bunoo Force before the arrival of our troops. It is so impossible to persuade the people of Huzara or of the Punjab in general that the Maharaja can be engaged in our interest against the Sikhs that the appearance of Jamboo force anywhere must be advantageous to the Sikhs and prejudicial to our cause. We have just heard that Chuttur S., who had advanced two marches towards Peshawar, has turned back abruptly either on suspicion of treachery from Peshawar army or owing to urgent calls upon him from Sher S. It is said there is in the Peshawar army an uncle of Peshawar Singh, his victim, who has designs upon C. S. In any case a prompt advance of our troops is desireable to save Attock, the possession of which is worth some sacrifice. The certainty of our advance would strengthen friends and confound enemies. I write daily by the Maharaja's Dak and have done so the last 8 or 9 days. But I receive only Durbar Purwanas by it which is a cause of some doubt to me as I can scarcely believe no letter has been sent.

347. *From James Abbott*

Nara, Nov. 2, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Your last favour is of the 24th. I have now a daily dak from Lahore via Cashmere but it brings only Durbar Purwanas, although I feel assured that letters must be sent for me by that channel. I write daily by it and have done so during the last week. The Sikh force has not crost the Indus.

Chuttur S. and part of his force have gone over towards Peshawar. It is said the Peshawar force will not move unless 4 months' pay are disbursed. Ursulla, Ummeer K., Kadir K. have gone over to the Sikhs. Khadi K. remains at present staunch and Byram K. has come hither professing loyalty. But these too will fall away unless an army speedily appears. Now much mischief has been saved by a little expedition. Attock on the 31st was still ours but treachery must be looked for there *ilpe tuppdivded w.o.*

The people have ceased to believe in the existence of a British army. Guns were heard in the direction of Peshawar on the 31st. I have written on the subject of instructions to M. Goolab S. to send his force to attack Chuttur S. in the Margulla pass and to ruin his Jagir. He appeals to me for further instructions on the subject. But as these orders were issued when Chuttur S. had only 6 Regts. and he has now 14 or 15 and as the Maharaja's force sent to oppose him consists of only 5 Regts. amounting to about 2500 matchlocks or muskets, I do not feel justified in insisting upon the fulfilment of the letter of the order as that would oblige the Maharaja in self-defence to join the Sikhs. I understand the policy of testing his sincerity previous to the advance of our troops but 2000 men could never in the weak Margulla pass arrest the march of 15 veteran Battalions and 45 Guns, and the appearance there of the Maharaja's army would be fatal to what remains to us of authority in Huzara. From the news received today I judge that the Sikhs may be detained some days longer at Peshawar and the Indus, and this will probably alter the plan of the campaign which appointed Goojrat for the rendezvous in the assurance of succour from Jamboo and of the assistance of all the Sikhs of the Manjha and Julundhur. It were easy to annihilate Sher S. and the Bunoo force by a prompt advance. I have just intercepted an Urzee to Genl. Richpal Singh from Sheo Churn Pandah Soobadar of Goorkhas and Adj. Jowahir S. of a Poorubia Battery offering their services to the rebels. I cannot learn from whence the Urzee came nor what Battalion's they refer to. But at Lahore it may be discovered and precautions may be taken. Chuttur S. has, I believe, assigned to the Barukzyes all the lands beyond Attock. But there is rumour that he

wishes to keep a Thanna at Peshawar which the Barukzyes object to. Our latest from Major Lawrence is of the 26th; he was then in Kohat. But report says he is now with Derriah Khan. It is Chuttur S.'s purpose to eject me from Huzara ere he marches eastward. Mr. Thomson writes me from Cashmere; he has received no instructions from you. A man professing to be a Vuqueel o Qra apaya Yu has arrived in the ... He has a purwana from Vyuaapaza which he will not exhibit until——.

I believe *Becraaga* would aid the rebel in every covert way but doubt his openly joining them. He has promised 15000 more Rs. The four guns arrived safely.

348. *From James Abbott*

Nara, Huzara, Nov. 6, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I received last evening your favour of the 25th. Our latest news from Lahore is of the 26th. Our latest from the Lawrences in Kohat, 29th. All quiet at Atak on the 4th. We have no very perfect intelligence from the Sikh army. Chuttur S., I believe, has met that force and the Barukzyes at Nowshera and is said to be meditating the siege of Attock. If so it is in the certainty of its surrender through treachery—a too probable contingency which only the rapid advance of our army can perhaps prevent. The people of the country have ceased to believe in the existence of our army. Those returned from Mooltan are actively engaged against me. He grew *ypeved wepe Tipenlpe do vopxdv iwte ju Perdlv it, wope Blvl dlc op two*.

Had the troops been in motion early in October they had saved Peshawar, Attock and Huzara and had met with not the tenth part of the difficulty they are likely now to encounter. I imagine it will be the system of the Rebels. Precautions should be taken, I humbly opine, to prevent this by means of our steamers. Had Nicholson's request been attended to he had saved us this difficulty. ... But all the precautions and exertions of the assistants have been utterly lost for want of prompt support. ... Of this the Rebels are very sensible and will grudge no exertions to secure them.

I have written during the ten days and write daily by the

Maharaja's Dak, but as yet it has brought me no letter, though occasionally Durbar parwanas come thereby. If my letters arrive safely I should feel much obliged by your ordering our post office letters, papers, etc., to be sent by that medium. If letters have not arrived, it is a certain proof of treachery on the part of the Maharaja. Sooltan M. K. had addressed several letters, which I possess, to the Hazara Chiefs urging them to join Chuttur Singh . . . and several others have complied. Your anxiety as to the result of my action with C. S. has, I trust, been relieved by my letter of the 20th sent in quadruplicate.

P.S. Will you kindly allow Mr. Skinner to forward the accompanying.

349. *From James Abbott*

Nara, Huzara, Nov., 8, 1848.

My dear Cocks,

Will you kindly send the enclosed under cover to the Post Office. I write daily by the Cashmere dak and have done so during the last ten or eleven days but I have no letter as yet by that medium. If my letters have reached the Residency, all our packets, papers, etc., might thus be transmitted to us. I have also written constantly by private messengers. Our latest from Lahore is of the 30th from Nicholson. It is not very cheering. We have been left to struggle against a whole army for more than 3 months without apparently any sympathy or attempt, not to succor us but to rescue the affairs we had in charge from utter ruin—a mere mutiny quite contemptible the first month has been allowed to ripen into a revolution. Nicholson in vain appealed for help to secure the passage of the Chenab. These rivers will cost us something. Our last from Lawrence party is of the first—all well, and well treated, liberty excepted. All as usual in Attok on the 6th. The whole garrison have sworn solemnly upon the Koran to stand by Herbert to the last so that his . . . Chuttur S., so far as we can learn, has not yet returned to the Indus. We know not what are his arrangements for Peshawar. Reports are very various. Some say that Attok is to be the boundry of the Sikh and Barukzye rule, others that the Barukzyes refuse to recognize Chuttur S.'s right to confer Peshawar upon them. I have

letters written by Sooltan M. K. to the chiefs of Huzara inviting them to join the rebellion. No cash yet received from Cashmere. Maharaja continues warm in professions. I hope he is wise enough to act in accordance. But we must be prepared for the contrary. There should be an army of reserve in Goojrat to keep all doing in the rear of our advance. No one will give us intelligence as to the progress of the Bengal and Bombay forces, not whether the siege of Mooltan has recommenced.

350. *From James Abbott to John Nicholson*

Nara, Nov. 11, 1848.

My dear Nicholson,

My last from you is of the 30th, and we have no later tidings from Lahore. Attok was attacked yesterday from the western side, the Khyrabad Garrison having revolted. I understand that the Nujjeebes are the besiegers. Batteries were to be established on this side yesterday. We know not exactly where C. S. is. Some say still at Peshawar, others that he is before Attok. Herbert excluded Futteh Kh. the day before the attack, and retained only such Artillerymen as remained from choice. The Lawrences were well on the 4th, but they are prisoners, though otherwise treated with attention. C. S. made a desperate effort to get them. Sooltan M. K. parried it by insisting upon taking Attok. At length a compromise was made. C. S. is to have Attok and Sooltan to retain his prisoner guests. Peshawar is made over to the Barukzyes, unreservedly I imagine, but some say in ijara. Reports here are rife that you have routed Sher S. But we are getting sick of these reports. No cash from our *Rosy Friend*, although his Vuqueel declares it was sent a fortnight ago. I write daily by his Dak and have done so the last 13 days. But as yet I have received no letter by it. Pray beg the Resident to urge his highness to supply me with whatever funds I require. I have some doubt of this reaching you.

351. *From James Abbott*

Nara, Huzara, Nov. 18, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I have written daily by the Maharaja's Dak but have

yet received no letter by it from Lahore, which surprises me as you mention your intention of corresponding through this medium. Chuttur S., so far as I can learn, is still at Peshawar waiting for Doast Muhmd. and his army. Report says that in order to alarm Sooltan M. K. into the surrender of his guests he invited the Doast upon a promise of 2 lacs of rupees, or more probably the surrender of Peshawar, and that on the surrender of Lawrence and his companions, he wrote begging the Umir not to come. But that the latter replied: 'I have made four marches upon your invitation, send me three lacs and I may think about returning.' Certainly his delay at this critical moment is remarkable. If we fight in Peshawar, Chuch or near Huzara, not a fugitive will escape. Herbert on the 16th and his garrison were in excellent spirits. The enemy cannot show a finger with impunity. The Lawrence party well on the 13th and well treated. Mrs. L. was to join on the 14th. They are very strictly guarded.

352. *From James Abbott*

Nara, Nov. 19, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

At length some Dak letters have arrived by the Maharaja's Dak but none from the Residency. I have written daily during 18 days past. I have not yet received the cash promised by the Maharaja. The siege of Attok continues but very languidly. The fire of the garrison beats down their batteries and dismount their guns. Their shells produce little of any effect. Only one fighting man has been killed inside. Chuttur is waiting still for Doast Muhmd. and his army. It will be convenient to crush both together. His ammunition is conveyed to Rawalpindi. The prisoners are treated with attention but under the closest arrest. Mrs. L. has joined them. I fired a salute last night in honour of the capture of Moolraj's guns mentioned by Nicholson. I hope we shall now daily receive our letters and papers by the Cashmere route.

353. *From James Abbott*

Nara, Nov. 20, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I continue to write daily by the Cashmere Dak although as yet I have no letters from the Residency by that channel;

a packet of Dak letters reached me however on Saturday and were very welcome after so long a cessation of intercourse. I gather from your letters that I am addrest daily through Cashmere and the non-receipt of letters causes me some doubt. I have not received the cash promised by the Maharaja. Chuttur S., it is said, left Peshawar on receiving from Doast Mohmd. a threat to fall upon him unless he should release the British officers. It is believed that he will reach Atok today. He has been lingering at Peshawar in the hope of forming some treaty, offensive and defensive with the Doast. Our officers and Mrs. L. are under a painful and rigorous arrest, I fear from what I have just heard. Herbert and his garrison continue in excellent spirits doing great execution amongst the Sikhs. On the 16th only one fighting man had been killed inside and the walls were not injured.

(x) *LETTERS OF JOHN NICHOLSON*

354. *From John Nicholson*

Jhung, in the Futteh Jung Tuppa of Khatur,
13th Sept., 1848.

My dear Sir,

Two hours before day-break on the morning of the 7th, Sirdar Chutter Sing marched with his whole regular force from Kala Serai and not halting on the road arrived at Hurripoor the same evening. Receiving immediate intelligence of the movement and guessing its object, I threw myself between the Sirdar and Pukli, by a 30 mile march, over very trying ground. On the 8th, the Sirdar halted at Hurripoor, and I at Lungra in Huzara, about 12 miles from the former place. On the morning of the 9th, I took up a position at Duntour, the most defensible part of the road, and the Sirdar advanced from Hurripoor to Huwelee within 7 miles of me.

Capt. Abbott arrived in the course of the day from Nara, and we agreed that he, with what force he could muster, should guard the Sulhud road, and we mutually render one another what assistance we could in the event of either being attacked. I was much disappointed at perceiving very little disposition on the part of the Jadaon population of this part of the country, to render myself or Capt. A. any assistance.

I had made the movement believing the people to be warmly attached to Capt. A. and our cause, but I could not, after two days' experience among them, fail to perceive that many were in the Sirdar's interests, and the best indifferent. At Dumtour, though a large and populous village, I was unable to procure supplies for 100 men. This evident indisposition of the people to assist us, much disheartened my force, the chiefs of which evidently thought that, under the circumstances, there was little chance of successfully opposing the Sirdar. On the morning of the 10th, the Sirdar advanced to Rajawia within 2 miles of the front of my position, and Capt. A. marching along his flank, joined me with about 400 men. My position, which covered two roads, extended over nearly two miles of very strong ground; to defend this, I had about 900 matchlocks: an ample force, in conjunction with Capt. A.'s for my purpose, had the material been good for anything.

About 8 A.M. on the 11th, the Sikh force advanced against the right of my position, which was defended by Futteh Khan of Gheb with 100 men. Unable to make any impression on this party, which behaved with admirable steadiness, they detached a body of about 500 against a steep hill in the centre, on which I had posted 200 Eusofzyes. This party, I regret to say (with the exception of about 20), actually abandoned their part, before the enemy came within fire. Such dastardly conduct I could not have conceived, had I not witnessed it. Threats and exhortations proving alike ineffective, to induce them to return, I fired on them, with a party from their flank. This brought them to a stand-still for a few seconds, but they soon began to run again and the battle was lost. Of Capt. A.'s 400, not more than 60 showed themselves in the fight at all.

My loss is about 15 killed and half the number wounded. My Cavalry had been employed for two days previously in keeping in check the Nawa Shahr garrison in my rear.

After our defeat, Capt. A. and myself retreated via Sulhud to Nao-Shera. We separated yesterday, he returning to Nara and I to Kuttar, whence I marched here this morning. Three fourths of my foot from across the Indus have deserted; they are no loss, and I did not intend to have kept them. I have no reason to complain of any of the men of my own district; those of Gheb exceeded my expectations.

I hear that two of M. Raja Gulab Sing's regiments have arrived at Rawalpindee and have joined Sirdar Aotar Sing. I also learn that Dewan Deena Nath has arrived there on a mission of negotiation. Negotiation would appear to me *impossible* now.

I have not heard from you for 10 days, and know not whether even now it is intended to despatch troops to restore order and our supremacy. Chutter Sing has now 6 Regr. Regts. exclusive of the two Dogra ones at Rawalpindee, and, all-powerful as he is at present, may increase his irregular force to any extent he pleases.

Lal Sing Morareea has sent me no intimation of the upward march of the Dogra Corps, nor indeed of anything that has occurred at his end of the district. I have some distinct charges against him, which I propose preferring at a more convenient opportunity.

355. *From John Nicholson*

No. 2. Eminabad, Evening, 4th Novr., 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I wrote you by the dak an hour ago, and I now merely send a duplicate to guard against accidents.

News (authentic) from Peshawur, 8 days old, is to the effect that the force there has "fraternized," and that Lawrence and Bowie have fled to Kohat. In the letter I sent you by post, I enclosed a note from Herbert of the 26th. The rebels have now nothing to gain by delay. Their game is evidently to concentrate and compel us to fight before our reserve can come up. We have no time to lose. Sher Sing, Ram Sing, Aotar Sing, Soorat Sing and all the small detached parties in the neighbourhood, can assemble at Gujerat in 3 days, and Chuttur Sing may be there in a week.

It would never do for us to fall back from this. We should, therefore, be supported. The C.-in-C. should come dauk to Lahore and march thence with all the available force. Brigr. Wheeler should likewise be ordered up without delay.

Jawahir Sing with 2 or 300 men possessed himself of the city of Goojranwala last night. We march tomorrow to knock him out. I have asked the general to beg Brigr. Campbell to start all the available infantry at Lahore, on his own respon-

sibility. Our force must be assembled somewhere in *this* neighbourhood, and the sooner the concentration takes place, the better.

Please send Sodi Nehal Sing, also Waris Khan who has disobeyed my order to accompany me.

356. *From John Nicholson*

Camp Eminabad, 4th Novr., 9 P.M.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I have already written twice today, and only do so again to give cover to duplicates of the General's letters.

Jawahir Sing is still at Goojranwala, but I should think would evacuate during the night.

Ram Sing, Kehar Sing and the other Sirdars have disappeared, whither is not yet known, but I can't think Ram Sing has gone over. The news from Peshawur, as might have been expected, has been productive of a very bad moral effect throughout the country. Nehal Chund's kardar here swore he could not give us more than 40 maunds of atta, but on my ordering a gallows, he managed to produce 300.

I am not sure that Cureton will go on to Wuzeerabad; he thinks it too far in advance.

Fancy, the Moonshee the Durbar have sent out to manage our dak, confesses that he is totally without experience.

Should Waris Khan not yet have obeyed my order to march, pray have him confined. The Shuter-Sawars have arrived.

357. *From John Nicholson*

No. 4, Goojranwala, 5th Novr.

My dear Sir Frederick,

We arrived here shortly after day-break this morning and found Jawahir Singh fled. Supplies are plentiful, I am happy to say, except grass which is not to be had.

Jawahir Mull was at Ramnugger yesterday. Shere Sing and Aotar Sing are very likely there today, or will be tomorrow. Lal Sing will probably either march to join them at Ramnugger, or they him at Wuzeerabad, tonight. The three together will have about 20000 men, I calculate, but 3/4th of them mere rabble.

I was of opinion that we should advance tomorrow on the

chances of coming up with Lal Sing before he had effected a junction, but the Brigr. will not take the responsibility on himself. He received a letter from the C.-in-C. today saying that "no declaration of war had yet been published and he won't, therefore, commence hostilities if he can help it. I have pointed out to him that if he does not attack the rebels, they will attack him, and that by advancing *now* he may take them in detail, but the dread of responsibility deters him.

Pray let me know if I may guarantee a free pardon to any rebels wishing to come in. Certain Jagheerdars are, I hear, anxious to do so.

I enclose a note of the 24th from Abbott. I have no further-intelligence from Peshawur. The whole of that force is no doubt on this side the Indus by this time and on its way to the rendezvous Cureton's determination to remain inactive, till they assemble in sufficient force to attack him, is much to be deplored, I think.

I enclose letters for the C.-in-C. and Inglis. Neither Sodi Nehal Sing nor Waris Khan have arrived. Sirdars Ram, Goordut and Kehr Sings are all with me.

P.S. I have confined Goordut Sing, but pray seize Lal Sing's Serishtadar also; his story is all a humbug. I know him to be in Lal Sing's confidence, and he no doubt has gone in to you to further some villainy or other.

358. *From John Nicholson*

Goojranwala, Novr. 5th, 8 P.M.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I wrote you by a Sawar 2 hours ago. This, I send by post. I have confined Goordut Sing; the letter was written by him; but considering that he has been in dread of his life, from his own men, for the last two months, I would rather not hang him. Lal Sing's Serishtadar has been very much in his master's confidence all along, and I feel sure Lal Sing has sent him in, for some villainy, and given him Goordut Sing's letters as a blind, and to enable him to ruin the latter, to whom he owes a grudge.

I have received yours of this morning. I think our halt here will embolden S.S. to bring his guns across, when joined by Ram Sing and Aotar Sing.

I feel very uneasy about poor Herbert. His men can scarcely be expected to hold out long.

359. *From John Nicholson*

Goojranwala, 6th Novr., 1848, Noon.

My dear Sir Frederick,

The party at Wuzeerabad halted last night. Lal Sing had wisely left himself, the previous night, under pretence of mulaquat-kurring with Shere Sing.

I enclose you a news-letter from the N. west, also Abbott's note, which I find I omitted to send yesterday.

P.S. I am sending my Patan horse on to Wuzeerabad. Kehr Sing, I have posted half way on the Ramnugger road as a look out.

360. *From John Nicholson*

Goojranwala, 6th Novr., 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I wrote you at noon by a sawar. I received yours of yesterday early this morning, and have not since heard from you.

I enclose a note from Herbert. The messenger, who brought it, says C.S., leaving his camp on this side of the river, had gone with a small party to Jangeera in Khuttuck to seize the treasury there. I don't think the Sings will waste their time on Attok unless they receive some encouragement from the garrison, and Herbert, I am glad to see, thinks it a staunch.

I have no positive information of the whereabouts of the Bunnoo force, but a man from that part of the world told me today that they were obliged to move very slowly owing to their great number of wounded.

Bukshee Jawahir Mull, and the late Wuzeerabad force are at Ramnugger and Shere Sing is said to be crossing. Mungul Sing has gone to his home at Serinwala, and writes me that he is coming in to me.

The Zufferwal Kardar informs me that some mufsid are collecting in his district. Wheeler might pay them a visit on his way.

I have sent Kehr Sing to patrol between this and Ramnugger, and my Pathans and Kurrum Ilahi, to occupy Wuzee-rabad.

I consider Ramnugger as our true position now. With no enemy on this side the river, we might be easy as to our communications till the arrival of our reserve enabled us to advance, and there would be no fear of our finding it necessary to fall back, for owing to Chutter Sing's unwise delay, we shall have concentrated before he can well cross the Jelum. I confess (at the risk of being set down as a "would be Clive") to a hankering after taking the rebel forces in detail, but Cureton agrees with the C.-in-C. in thinking they should be allowed to congregate. One would have thought that, as Micky Free said of the French, His Excy. had found it sufficiently "hard work *bating* them" the last time.

P.S. We halt tomorrow unless we hear from the C.-in-C. before morning.

361. *From John Nicholson*

Camp Deedar Sing-ka-Killa, 7th Novr., 9 P.M.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I wrote you at starting this morning. This place is half way between Eminabad and Ramnugger.

Lal Sing and the others at Ramnugger were preparing to fly across the river this morning at sunrise, when 4 guns arrived from Shere Sing's camp at Kadirabad. On the strength of this, they pitched their tents again. We have no later intelligence but doubtless shall have during the night.

We march towards Ramnugger at 4 A.M. Should we learn in the interim that Shere Sing has not crossed himself or sent over any considerable portion of his force, I fancy we shall go straight on, otherwise we shall encamp on this side 8 or 10 miles, and wait the arrival of Eckford's brigade, before going at them.

I have no further news from the N. west today. I don't think I *can* spare Misr Rulla at present. I am laying in supplies at both Goojranwala and Eminabad and he is useful in that way.

In the last para of your second letter of yesterday you write, "I will make the other troops go in 2 days." This has

puzzled us rather, as we were not aware that any more were under orders. There is no harm however in strengthening us, as we shall probably have the Bunnoo troops and Aotar Sing to deal with before very long.

There is no doubt of C.S.'s having crossed the Indus with 2 regiments. He is losing much (to him) precious time.

I enclose letters for Inglis and Brgr. Campbell. Sodi Nehal Sing joined me this morning. Pray send me out the Chukowal Dak Moonshee, Futteh Sing and Kurrum Ilahi's 25 sowars who went with Mrs. Montigambert to Byrowal.

P.S. Whichever of the Durbar people sent the Dak Moon-shee, now with me, deserves to catch it. He never managed a dak before, and is about as fit to manage one as my sweeper. I sent this by a sowar simply because there are no hurkaras.

362. *From John Nicholson*

Deedar Sing-ka-Killa, 8th Novr., 1848, Sunrise.
My dear Sir Frederick,

I wrote you at bed-time last night that we were to march this morning.

At midnight, however, arrived your express, with a letter from the C.-in-C. to Cureton informing him of the march of the troops and forbidding him to run any risks. The Genl., accordingly, proposes halting here till Campbell's arrival. Shere Sing and Aotar Sing were both opposite Ramnugger yesterday evening and probably crossed during the night. We shall be strong enough to swallow them, in 3 or 4 days, and before C.S. or the Peshawur force can come up. The Bunnoo force was said in Lal Sing's camp yesterday to be only 18 coss off, so that we shall most likely get their guns and S.S.'s together. It would be most unwise in us to delay active operations till the arrival of C.S. Cureton thinks with me in this head. I like C. very much.

The bearer has a letter from him for the C.-in-C.

363. *From John Nicholson*

Deedar Sing-ka-Killa, 8th. Novr., 4 P.M.
My dear Sir Frederick,

I have intelligence from Ramnugger up to 11 A.M. Up to that hour neither Shere Sing nor Aotar Sing had crossed,

though a considerable portion of the troops of the former were on this side, along with Sirdars Lal Sing, Shumshere Sing, Jawahir Mull, Urjun Sing and Soorut Sing.

Kurruum Narain fraternized yesterday. I expected as much from his not coming near me when I was at Ramnugger. You say you do not understand our having moved nearer Ramnugger. The Genl. and I both thought a backward move from Goojranwala objectionable, and that to secure our communications, it was necessary either to fall back a little, or move more to the westward so as to cover Eminabad. We also considered that if we drove the enemy across the river and established ourselves at Ramnugger, though we should be at a greater distance from our base, yet that with the river between, we need entertain no apprehension of any attempt being made on our communications.

By the 14th, I hope we shall have been joined by the Cavalry Brigade and Sir J. Thackwell's. By that date also the Bunnoo troops will no doubt have joined Shere Sing and Co. at Ramnugger.

I do not think we ought to delay a day in attacking them after Thackwell's arrival, or Wheeler's, should the latter join first. By waiting for the C.-in-C., we should certainly obtain an addition of 1/3rd to our strength, but the delay would enable C.S. to come up on the other side and more than *treble* their present regular force.

You do not mention when Campbell starts, or what portion of the Lahore force he brings with him. I am very glad indeed that he is to be employed.

Pray beg the C.-in-C. to sanction the hanging of camp followers, caught plundering or oppressing the people of the country. The wretches are worse than the Singhs. Bukshee Kuniah Lall gives me either false intelligence or none at all. I am under obligations to Ram Sing in that respect.

P.S. Please beg Bowring not to forget my clothes. Eckford is 5 miles off and joins us tomorrow. The bearer has a letter for Brigr. Campbell.

364. *From John Nicholson*

Deedar Sing-ka-Killa, 9th Novr., 8 A.M.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Your few lines of 5 P.M. yesterday evening reached me at daybreak.

Eckford marched in an hour ago. Neither Shere Sing nor Aotar Sing crossed yesterday.

I imagine, however, that they will do so on the arrival of the Bunnoo troops, if not before.

If we play our cards well, we shall be able to annihilate these gentlemen before Chuttur Sing and the Peshawur force can come up. Chuttur's going across the Indus is inexplicable. He is as great a blunderer as our Clive, or very nearly so.

Pray send out the Chukowal Dak Moonshee, and Futteh Sing.

I send you a note from Herbert of the 31st ulto.

P.S. I asked you last night to get an order issued, substituting hanging for flogging in aggravated cases of plundering. It will not be put a stop to otherwise, and the evil is very great.

365. *From John Nicholson*

Camp Deedar Sing-ka-Killa, Novr. 9th, 9 P.M.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I wrote you by a Shuter-sowar early this morning. No news since then. Shere Sing will not, I think, cross till joined by the Bunnoo troops, and perhaps not even then; but if he does not, I am of opinion that we should lose no time in pushing a brigade across to occupy the Ghaut opposite Wuzeera-bad. I have mentioned this to the General and he concurs with me.

I am sorry to say, the people suffer much from the depredations of troops and camp followers, and unless this be put a stop to we shall make enemies of the poor cultivators, the only class now really with us.

Not less than 200 sepoy of the 31st N.I. dispersed for plunder, when dismissed from parade after their arrival this morning. The wood work of no less than three persian wheels was carried bodily off and several kanals of sugar cane entirely destroyed. I have spoken most strongly to the General on

the subject and he certainly exerts himself to the utmost, but the evil will not be remedied till one or two are *hung*.

I feel the importance of maintaining a friendly understanding with the people so strongly, that I am paying them for the loss they have sustained, but as I said before, this conduct on the part of the troops and camp followers *must* be put a stop to; and the existing rules for its prevention having proved ineffectual, more stringent ones must be adopted. Pray bring this to the notice of the C.-in-C. and explain to him how very injurious to our interests such conduct on the part of the troops is. He must himself be aware how detrimental it is to their own discipline.

Bukshee Kuneiah Lall is of little or no use to me. I almost think he does not try to be. The Wuzeerabad dak Moon-shee has not arrived, nor the Chukwal one.

366. *From John Nicholson*

Deedar Sing-ka-Killa, 10th Novr., 10 A.M.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Yours of 5 P.M. yesterday has only now reached me, having been 17 hours coming 40 miles.

I have no news from Shere Sing's camp for you.

I send three letters from Herbert which arrived this morning, also letters from the Nizamoodowlah to his son, and from Syud Ainooddeen to his brother, both with me.

Chuttur Sing's delay is glorious. If we look sharp, we should have Shere Sing's and Ram Sing's guns, and be on the right bank of the Jelum before C.S. can come down, thus avoiding the passage of the river under his fire.

Pray, above all, troops of all arms along as quick as possible. Time is everything.

I have a Shuter Sowar of Wuzeer Chund's caught yesterday going into Akalgurh. He had left Lahore, the previous day.

367. *From John Nicholson*

Deedar Sing-ka-Killa, 11th Novr., Noon.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I have received both your letters of yesterday. I enclose two notes from Herbert and one from Lawrence. Shere Sing's

present intention is certainly to cross on being joined by the Bunnoo troops which are reported only 12 Coss off today. Pray make the Chief push on the European Infy., it is the only arm we are weak in, and we shall want it most if S.S. intrenches on crossing which he probably will do.

I also enclose an urzee from the Pusroor Kardar.

Pray tell me if there is any news from Mooltan. Report has it that operations have been recommended.

368. *From John Nicholson*

Camp Deedar Sing-ka-Killa, 12th Novr., 9 P.M.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I have both yours of yesterday and one of this morning by a Shuter-Sowar. I am very glad to hear that a dak of them has been laid.

Campbell came in this morning. I wish he had a better Staff. We have no direct news from Wheeler.

We certainly want infantry more than either of the arms, but as the Cavy. brigade has come on this side of Bahmi-neewala, I think it would encamp somewhere within one march of the river, so as to be able to go straight across at once, if required. I see no use in halting them at Akoree or Eminabad, 30 miles from the river. I fear you are right about Shere Sing's having no intention of crossing; however there is no reason why we should not cross by one of the fords higher up, and come down on his flank. The Bunnoo troops must be yet some distance off, as runners despatched by me 4 days ago have not yet returned.

Very many thanks for Edwardes' letter, which I return; I have shown it to Cureton, but not to Campbell, as the latter is so bitter against C.

Whish's irresolution is most glaring and very bad.

My Pathans sent a party across the river yesterday, from Wuzeerabad, and seized a customs moonshee of Shere Sing's who was levying duties.

No more intelligence today of C. S.'s movements.

I do not think that if joined by the whole of the Peshawur troops, he will leave a single man across the Indus. The district of Peshawur, he will, probably, for a consideration, make over to Sultan Mohd., or one of his brothers.

P.S. Some wiseacre have given the General "Pukka intelligence" of the junction of Ram Sing Chappa with Shere Sing. I think, however, you may rely on my information.

The General's Intelligence department have brought Shere Sing to this side and C. S. to Jelum half a dozen times.

369. *From John Nicholson*

Deedar Sing-ka-Killa, 13th Novr., 1 P.M.

My dear Sir Frederick,

The express which arrived early this morning brought a letter from you for Campbell, but none for me. The regular dak which came in 3 hours later brought me your note of 5 P.M.

I trust your suggestion, about making camp followers over to the Civil authorities, will be acted on. It'll soon put a stop to plundering, if it be.

Cureton has got an idea into his head that Chutter Sing means to fight at Peshawur, and I believe he has written as much to Clive. Peshawur is really the last place the Sikhs would think of making a stand against us at, for the reason that they know well, that if beaten, no mercy would be shown them by the people of the country.

I cannot prove any overt act against the Bukshee, but for all the assistance he is to me, he might as well be at Lahore. I think I told you, I had confiscated a quantity of grain of Goordut Sing's at Eminabad. I am selling it to the troops for the benefit of Govt.

370. *From John Nicholson*

Camp Deedar Sing-ka-Killa, 14th Novr., sunrise

My dear Sir Frederick,

I have yours of yesterday evening, and am glad to learn that the C. in C. is not going to let any more grass grow under his feet.

Dewan Hurree Chund has taken up a position in Manawur with 5 regiments of Infy., 1 of Cavalry and a few guns. Nehal Chund will no doubt have informed you of this move and its object.

Meean Pirthee Sing and Bichettur Sing (who I believe is a son of the late Rae Kisseree Sing) have joined Shere

Sing's camp from Kana ka Chuk. The Singhs with S. S. likewise give out that they have received promises of assistance from Meean Jawahir Sing. The Pusroor and Chukdel kardars write me that Goordut Sing and Chunda Sing Kulalwalas have increased their levies to 1000 men. I think a couple of Irgr. corps should be sent on a daur into that part of the country. Shere Sing, I am afraid, will be off on hearing of the C. in C. advance unless we do something *at once*.

371. *From John Nicholson*

Deedar Sing-ka-Killa, 14th. Novr.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I send you no less than 9 notes from the N. west; 2 brought by one man and 7 by another, these last of very old date.

Of even more consequence however are three intercepted Goormukhi letters, which I enclose, from Shere Sing, Lal Sing Morareea & Co., to the address respectively of Baba Bikrama Sing, the Anundpoor Sodis, and the Hooshyarpoor Sikh Regt. I am hanging the man on whom they were found, a Sikh of Lal Sing's. I look upon our commencing operations immediately as of great consequence. The intercepted letters show that the rebels are leaving nothing untried to corrupt our subjects and allies.

A victory over the rebels would confirm in their allegiance such as may be wavering and deter S. Md. Khan from interfering with our Peshawur friends.

I also send four letters from the Brgr. Genl.

P.S. Misr Rulla and Sirdar Ram Sing deserve the credit of the seizure of the Sikh messenger. I would suggest the sending on the Gurmukhi letters by some hoshyar fellow and getting the answers.

372. *From John Nicholson*

Camp Deedar Sing-ka-Killa, 15th Novr., 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Yours of yesterday by the Shuter Sowars only reached me this morning.

I have at last a man in from the Bunnoo force. It arrived at Bera, the day before yesterday and making regular marches, will join Shere Sing tomorrow.

The Singhs in S. S.'s camp vow that the whole will cross to this side on its arrival.

I hope one at least of the Infy. brigades marched from Lahore this morning.

A messenger of mine, who arrived yesterday evening from Dhunnee, tells me that Nehal Sing Deoreewala's relatives (who live in the village of Kaog in that district) have written to him, by Chutter Sing's desire to carry off Golab Sing and the M. Raja.

P.S. I prefer Cureton as a General very much to Campbell. The latter will not take the slightest degree of responsibility on himself, and his head is not clear as I expected to find it. Cocks tells me the C. in C. is again very angry at one of my letters which you have shewn him. Pray don't shew him any more.

373. *From John Nicholson*

Deedar Sing-ka-Killa, 15th Novr., 8 P.M.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I enclose a letter from Genl. Campbell for the C. in C. I have nothing new to communicate since this morning. The plundering on the part of camp followers still continues. Kindly let me know speedily with what extent of Civil authority I am vested? If you authorize me to entertain complaints preferred by the people of the country against camp followers, I will engage to make the latter as well behaved as could be desired, in a couple of days.

I cannot conceive what Clive found to take offence at in the letter Cocks alludes to?

I have confiscated all the property of Kishen Sing I could lay hands on—not much however.

There is a report in Shere Sing's camp that Sultan Mohd. Khan, also Peer Mohd., have openly joined the rebels.

374. *From John Nicholson*

Deedar Sing-ka-Killa, 16th Novr., 7 P.M.

My dear Sir Frederick,

We march at 4 in the morning towards Ramnugger, but the General does not appear to have made up his mind whether to go the whole way or not.

Not being a General, it is of course presumptuous in me to have any opinion *at all*, still it *does* strike me that had we moved a day earlier, we might have settled Shere Sing before the Chappa man came up, and that now that the junction *has* been effected, we would gain a strong corps of European Infy. (an arm in which we are miserably weak) by waiting a day. However, I suppose, it would be heresy to hint that Clive didn't know best.

Wheeler is halting tomorrow, doubtless, to let his army recover somewhat the fatigue of the 3 Coss march he made this morning.

Clive, in an official I have seen, styles him "Active and energetic." Being a General, Clive is no doubt the best judge; but the activity and energy have been under a bushel of late, as far as the eyes of common mortals, not Generals, are concerned.

375. *From John Nicholson*

Camp Saharun, 17th Novr., 1848, 8 P.M.

My dear Sir Frederick,

We encamped here this morning about 10 miles from our last ground, and 8 from Ramnugger.

Sher Sing accompanied part of his force to this side early this morning, but went back again shortly afterwards, leaving his guns in boats however, and part of his Infy.

It is reported that he and the Bunnoo troops will all cross to this side during the night. Lal Sing was very warlike to-day, serving out ammunition to his ragamuffins. I have no doubt the morning's dawn will see them all together, on one side or the other.

The General has sent off an express ordering Wheeler to join him, by tomorrow evening, with his Infantry and one troop of Arty. He has also sent an express to Clive, who for some unknown reason was making only 8 or 10 miles marches.

Badly as we have played our cards hitherto, we have still, owing to the want of skill displayed by our adversaries, an easy game in our hands.

A messenger in from Chuch assures me that the Barukzye brothers have openly joined C. S. I fear it is true, and that Poor Lawrence and his party are no better than prison-

ers. I am also afraid that this defection of Sultan Mohd. will have a bad effect on the garrison of Attok.

The rebel Arty. at Ramnugger is blazing away at a great rate, while I write—to keep the army's spirits up no doubt. I will send you the Sikh's deposition tomorrow.

I received both yours of yesterday this morning. I have no fear but that I shall get on well with Cocks. I know no one whom I would more willingly serve under.

376. *From John Nicholson*

Camp Saharun, 19th Novr., 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I have yours of yesterday. I am as anxious as any one possibly can be, but Clive will neither hasten on himself, nor allow Campbell to act without him. I am afraid that, as you say, Shere Sing will manage to walk off unscathed; you will be surprised to hear, however, that he still keeps a very strong picquet on this side, strong enough to prevent our availing ourselves of the supplies in Ramnugger without a resort to force; and that, we are forbid to employ. He and Lal Sing have quarrelled. I am credibly informed that Bhaee Maharaj, or some one who has assumed his name, has made his appearance in S.S.'s camp. I send you two notes from Abbott.

Mungul Sing came in to me this morning. His defection will cause much distrust in the rebel camp; indeed it was this consideration alone which induced me to receive him. I will send you Kehr Sing tomorrow; I have suspected him myself for some time. My query concerning the extent of my jurisdiction referred to the limits of camp. I have made repeated offers to the Eminabad kardar to release him on his furnishing security, but he declines doing so.

I believe the General has decided on driving the party at Ramnugger across tomorrow. By doing so however, I fear we shall lose Shere Sing. My opinion is that we should attack both parties simultaneously, crossing a brigade by a ford half-way between Ramnugger and Wuzeerabad, to take Shere Sing in flank.

I have not hung the Sikh messenger. I wrote you before I had had [no] time to investigate the case.

Mungul Sing has not come in to me. The blackguard is waiting the result of the first action.

P.S. Don't shew this to Clive.

377. *From John Nicholson*

Camp Saharun, 20th Novr.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I received this morning both your notes of yesterday.

I wrote you yesterday explaining that Campbell's inactivity hitherto has been owing to the way in which Clive's instructions have hampered him.

The enemy actually sent 3 regiments of Infy., 4 guns and 500 horse across last night, and they today erected batteries for 2 of the 4 guns.

I send you a note from Abbott of the 15th, also the copy of a letter received by me today from Shere Sing and Co., and of my reply to it. Their object is of course to gain time till C. S. can come up. My letter will, I hope, give them confidence and embolden them to remain where they are. Bhaee Maharaj is, I believe, really to the fore after all.

The enemy have 60 boats at Dadun Khan and only 12 at Jelum. This looks as if they had some idea of retreating on the former place.

Thackwell is within 3 miles of us today and Clive within 12. Cureton and Campbell rode over to see him today. His camp joins Thackwell's tomorrow. What his plans are (if he have any) is not yet known.

Lal Sing Morareea was in durance vile yesterday, and only got out today on taking a solemn oath not to betray the cause.

378. *From John Nicholson*

Camp Saharun, 21st, Novr., 9 P.M.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Cocks will send you 4 letters from the N. west which I left with him today.

We go at the fellows on this side tomorrow morning, and Clive moves up and encamps at Ramnugger. We shall go to Wuzeerabad the following day, I fancy.

They are very savage with me at Headquarters for taking on myself to reply to Shere Sing's letter. I thought at first of consulting Clive and Cocks, but, it appeared to me, after due consideration, that any delay might so dishearten the enemy as to make them walk off, and that I could not err in sending a reply, which, while it was calculated to give them confidence, would in no way compromise the C. in C. Cocks approves of what I have done. However, I shall write you more at length on this subject tomorrow. I am sorry to say, Campbell has behaved very disingenuously. Pray never again show him any letters from Assistants at outposts.

379. *From John Nicholson*

Ramnugger, 27th November, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I have received yours of the 25th.

Kehr Sing had started for Lahore agreeably to your first order, before your second desiring him to go to Deenanugger arrived.

The heavy guns will be in tomorrow and we shall then commence operations, I fancy.

Genl. Bishen Sing of the Bunnoo force having intimated a wish to come in, the C. in C. has assured him of forgiveness and promised him service, if he come over and bring his men with him. The promise also, of course, extends to his men.

The desertion to us, of any portion of the enemy's force, would weaken the whole considerably; it would so totally destroy all mutual confidence.

I enclose a note from Abbott of the 22nd.

380. *From John Nicholson*

Camp Ramnugger, 28th Novr., 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I have yours of yesterday. The heavy guns, after all, will not be in till tomorrow, but on their arrival, I have no doubt, we shall commence operations.

I enclose 2 notes from Abbott, and one, of old date, from Mrs. Lawrence. I think Dost Mohd. might do us good service now by attacking C.S.'s rear.

Cheytt Sing, a brother of Utter Sing Kalleewalas, came over from the enemy this evening at dark. He says Bishen Sing is coming tomorrow.

381. *From Reynell Taylor*

Esakhail, December, 5th

My dear Sir,

The accompanying is a copy of a letter received this day from Lt. Herbert. Its tenor is most distressing especially as I have no possible means of helping him in the way he hopes. The whole country between Kala Bagh and Attock is in the hands of the enemy, and at Attock itself is a regular force of 7000 men with 8 guns. It would therefore require a very larger force to effect a forcible entrance into the fort and so little probability is there of being able to smuggle in new hands there. Several Hurkarahts going to and coming from the place have been seized and confined by the besiegers and a whole scheme of mine for enabling Lt. Herbert to quit the fort and escape to Kala Bagh, for which purpose a party of men are sitting in a village 5 Koss from Kala Bagh, is yet unknown to Lieut. H. from the fact of the messenger having been unable to deliver my note. This party is sitting in a village full of Jaffeer Khan Khuttuck's people. This Jaffur Khan, who is chief of the Eastern Khuttucks, is one of the chief performers in the siege. That is to say the whole of his men are employed in it, he himself is, I believe, in Peshawur with Sirdar Sultan Muhomed Khan.

382. *From C. Herbert to Reynell Taylor*

Attock, November 28, 1848.

My dear Taylor,

I have heard two different reports regarding your movement, one that you are moving with a force via Kohat to Peshawur and the other that you have reached Pindie Gheb in progress to relieve me. I send letters both ways in the hope of finding you. I beg you will do your very utmost to push on troops to our aid. I have no great fears of the enemy (unless they alter their plans of operation, but serious symptoms of disaffection are exhibiting themselves amongst my men

occasioned by the long delay in the arrival of succour, and I cannot answer for holding them together much longer, every day increases my difficulties and each I am compelled to fear the worst). This is the 19th day that we have been blockaded. (It is only by the blessing of God that we have held out so long.)

383. *From John Nicholson*

Camp Neyla, Decr. 14th, 6 a.m.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I wrote you yesterday morning from Ramnugger, enclosing 3 notes from Lawrence.

I have no fresh news to communicate. The enemy are strengthening their position. When I left the C.-in-C. yesterday he did not appear to have decided on any plan. He will not, however, attack the enemy in their present position.

Shere Mohomed Tawana writes me that he is thinking of advancing from Saheewal on Ahmedabad.

The troops at Manawur were *talking* a little before the business of the 3rd. Since then, they have been "chup." But we let slip an opportunity then, which will never return to us.

Some of Sultan Mahomed's sawars, with me, naturally wish to rejoin their master in whose power their families are. It would be worse than useless keeping them against their consent, and their going will in no way strengthen the enemy.

The Sirdar now, who is on bad terms with his father, remains with me on his own accord, as do also a few of the horsemen.

I told you yesterday, that I had desired Kurrum Ilahi to entertain some more horsemen. They are much needed for the purpose of collecting revenue and supplies; they also serve as garrisons and safe-guards. I am now holding the forts of Goojrat, Julalpoore, Mugowal, Koonjah, Kaulanwala and Phalia with my men.

If I could get a sufficient number (500), I would propose locating them in the neighbourhood of Pusroor and Kalalwala, which, I fear, will require troops for some time.

I enclose an application from Cornet Loose and two notes from Abbott, one of them for his brother.

(xi) LETTERS OF ARTHUR H. COCKS

384. *From Cocks to Currie*

Camp Morewala, 21st Nov., 10 p.m.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I have been dining at the Chief's. He has determined to leave this at 1½ tonight and at 3 Campbell's force moves on Ramnugger, when we shall, I fancy, astonish its inhabitants. "We shall take Ramnugger," is H.E. expression. I am glad of this and shall have much pleasure in showing the road.

Lord Gough is quite satisfied with Col. Grant's version of the Nicholsonian controversy. I sincerely trust that Campbell and N. had an amicable discussion on the point.

385. *From Cocks*

December 21, 1848.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I have received yours of the 20th. Robinson starts tomorrow for Wuzeerabad, and from thence will make arrangements for punishing the gun-sputters of Nizamabad and Kotilee.

The chief has gone out but I know not for what purpose. I don't fancy the letter he has received exonerates him from the responsibility of an attack on Mong, and the enemy's position there is so much stronger than it was the first day, that the attack must be made by their flanks, and not from the front. The Robikarees with a list of Jaghiers which have been renewed and cut by the Durbar is a useless document. What we require is an actual return of all Jaghiers, whether rebels or friends, and then we shall be able to test their conduct and act accordingly. I will send you a proceeding about this tomorrow for the Durbar's perusal.

The Missur declines sending a Kardar on his own account to Jhung, but he recommends Missur Kunyalal, a friend of Adjoodhia Nath, a resident of Butala but formerly employed at Munawur. Will you also kindly issue orders for Saheewal. The Missur recommends Jumayut Raee, nephew of Jowahir Mul Dut.

I will send Robukaree about them—no news of any description today.

386. *From Cocks*

Ramnuggur, Decr. 7, 1848, 1 P.M.

My dear Sir Frederick,

I received your letter announcing Major Mackeson's arrival at 9 P.M. yesterday. I was, as you will have imagined, a good deal taken aback at the intelligence, as I had flattered myself that Nicholson and myself had been successful in our endeavours to obtain supplies and information and the Commander-in-Chief had expressed his satisfaction in the most hearty manner. The fact is Captn. Ramsay had felt very strongly the responsibility which attached to his position and had laid down the law to me in a most peremptory and dictatorial way. He begged me to come forward in an independent manner, and advise the C.-in-Chief to fall back on Lahore as the resources of the country were not sufficient to keep us. I replied that I would be independent, but that it was to the effect that I would hold myself personally responsible that there was no necessity for any fear on the ground of supplies and that to retire after the 22nd affair would be most ruinous. At any rate if you are satisfied with me, I shall be content and I consider the interests of the public service as everything, and a selfish opposition to another officer as prejudicial to their interests. You may depend on my co-operating with Major Mackeson to the utmost and I must beg of you to accept my thanks for the confidence you have hitherto placed in me and which, you may depend upon it, I shall do my utmost to retain. Major M. has got a great hankering after Huryana. Our supplies are getting on admirably, both in this and the adjoining Dooab.

The C.-in-C. has returned. So I fancy the rebels cannot have taken up a strong position of which I again hear from Nicholson. He writes, "The enemy are at Mong 4 coss from Julalpore on this side and swear they will not cross without another struggle." He will send you news from the north of course.

The Missur tells me that Dost Mahomed is at Aly Musjid and that Sooltan Mahomed has fled to Kohat on being taxed by his brother with his conduct to the Lawrences. That Chuttur Sing was on his way to have an interview with the Dost, but was persuaded not to attempt it and has fallen back on

Jehanghira, the fort near the river Loonda. Would it not be as well to send a letter of friendly intentions to the Dost? He might annoy C.S. terribly. I should fancy Peshawur would never be of any use to us. The people in this and the next Dooab are becoming quite satisfied with our will and power to protect them. There is a report that Kummurudeen is killed.

(xii) *FROM BRIGADIER SIR H. M. WHEELER TO
BRIGADIER SIR COLIN CAMPBELL*

387. *Brigadier Sir H. M. Wheeler to Brigadier Sir Colin Campbell*

Julundur, April 28th, 1848.

My dear Campbell,

Altho' I have not written you, believe me, that it is neither from forgetting either yourself or the cordial kindness which you have shown me. I consider you as a friend, I use the word advisedly, and my wish is to be considered in the same light.

I cannot tell you how grateful I felt for your clear and admirable account of the late melancholy events at Moultan, nor how proud I felt on reading your sentiments, to find that our opinion and ideas so entirely, nay so exactly, coincided for, between you and me, I had stated them to General Whish, in reply to a letter from him, giving as a reason, for offering them, the interest which I felt in his division, but the true reason was the deep interest which I felt in yourself and your reputation.

It is unfair placing you in a false position thereby jeopardising your hard and well earned reputation. A reputation cannot be built in a day, but alas it can be destroyed in one.

To go without an efficient force, as well in men as material, is an injustice to all concerned. I have seen the ill affects of moving without heavy guns. At Ghazni, had not Thompson blown open the gate with a powder bag, we were helpless, nay it is impossible to say what the consequences might have been. The heavy guns had been left at Candahar.

Under the most favourable circumstances (and the present are just the reverse), nothing should be left to chance, and he is but a poor soldier who is not alive to the advantage of being able to act with promptness and rapidity.

I have been fortunate, when employed, in being in a great measure permitted to choose my own means and to this, more than to any ability of mine, is my success to be attributed.

Confound the politicals, they *may* do to steer the vessel in smooth waters and calm weather, but they should be set aside the moment that the waves cast or the wind rises. They are my abhorrence, and Sir F. C.'s demonstration is of a piece with what I have experienced from them.

To suppose that any man who has so thrown away the scabbard, as Moolraj has done, should "come and be hanged," when backed by stout and willing hearts and in a notorious stronghold, is too absurd for discussion or comment.

How I should like to share this trip with you I will not say, but you will give me credit for what I feel on the occasion. I should not be surprised if the example be followed in other parts of the Punjab, for I *know* that great discontent prevails, and I keep myself ready for a move accordingly.

If you go in this weather let me entreat you to take a good double pole tent. If you cannot get one, one of mine is at your service. Do not hesitate to take it.

Remember me to Kuller whose kindness I have not forgotten, also to Strickland, the Montigamberts and Mockler and tell all and each of them that they will at any time find a hearty welcome at the crusty Brigadier's.

I have just imported the 61st Foot. It is a fine Corps and in excellent order and remarkably well behaved.

Mrs. Wheeler cannot recover her strength but is improving. She and my boys unite with me in every good wish.

(xiii) FROM SIR JOHN H. LITLER TO
LORD DALHOUSIE

388. *From Lt.-General Sir John Hunter Litler to the Governor General [Lord Dalhousie]. **

Demi Off., March 30th, 1849.

.... I am happy to learn that Sir W. Gilbert has advanced with such rapidity and recaptured Attok. The boats he found there will enable him to cross the Indus without difficulty. Dost Mahomed will not wait for him at Peshawar, I imagine, but push on with all speed to Cabool, if the Khyberees will permit him to go through the pass unmolested, which is not very likely.

How delighted they will be in England when they receive the glad tidings of the termination of the Campaign, and with its happy results.

389. *From Lt.-General Sir John H. Litler*

Calcutta, July 17, 1849.

My dear Lord Dalhousie,

I have the honour to enclose a letter from Lady Gomm to your Lordship's address, and I gladly avail myself of the opportunity to offer our sincere and most hearty congratulations to Lady Dalhousie and yourself on your elevation in the Peerage.

* From the Letter-book of Sir John Litler preserved under No. 19, Section 4 (English Mss.) in the Historical Museum, Satara, since transferred to the Deccan College Post-graduate and Research Institute, Poona.

APPENDIX A

EXTRACTS FROM LETTERS OF LORD ELLENBOROUGH TO THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON, THE SECRET COMMITTEE, THE QUEEN, ETC., 1841-44

1. *Lord Ellenborough to the Duke of Wellington*
Grosvenor Place, October 15, 1841.

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I shall probably have as one of my aides-de-camp Lieutenant Durand of the Bengal Engineers, one of those who blew open the gates of Ghuzni. He was recommended to me by Lord Fitzroy, and if he should accept the proposal I have made to him, I have requested Lord Fitzroy to employ him at once in obtaining all the information he can with respect to the Punjab, and making a military memorandum upon the country for your consideration. I am most anxious to have your opinion as to the general principles at least upon which a campaign against that country should be conducted.

2. *Lord Ellenborough to the Duke of Wellington*
India Board, October 22, 1841.

I send you Lieutenant Durand's memoir of the Panjab. If you would wish for further information and personal communication with him, he is entirely at your disposal, and will go down to Walmer by the mail one night and return by it the next.

3. *Lord Ellenborough to the Duke of Wellington*
Grosvenor Place, October 26, 1841.

... The Punjab has been in a very disturbed state since the death of Runjeet Singh. The real authority is no longer in the hands of the nominal sovereign. The country is, in fact, ruled by a very violent man, Rajah Dhian Singh; and his brother, Rajah Gholab Singh, has great influence on the side of Cashmere.

The immediate danger of collision arises from the necessity, annually recurring, of our exacting a passage through

the country for our regiments going to relieve others at Cabul, and for the convoys. Whenever Dhian Singh feels himself strong enough he will refuse permission for the passage of these regiments and convoys, or, what I most fear, he will attack and destroy some one of them on its march.

We might thus be obliged to act immediately. At present about 12,000 men are collected near Ferozepore to watch the Sikhs, and act if necessary.

What I desired, therefore, was your opinion, founded, as far as it could be upon the imperfect geographical information which can be given to you, as to the best mode of attacking the Punjab. The Sikh Army is generally collected about Lahore.

4. *The Duke of Wellington to Lord Ellenborough*

Strathfieldsaye, March 30, 1842.

....

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....

As far as it is possible to form any judgment from the perusal of the accounts hitherto received, it appears that but little reliance could be placed already in the efficiency of the irregular cavalry, and that the exertions of the cavalry of the Moslem persuasion in the service of the Sikh Government could be as little relied upon as those of the cavalry of the same class in the service of the East India Company or its dependent States.

....

....

....

Looking at our position in the North-West, I see upon the river Sutlej a short line of defence, covered by the Punjab and its rivers, with the Government of which country we are in alliance. It is true that the Sikh Government is in an unsettled state, and not what it was when governed by Runjeet Sing at the commencement of the war in Afghanistan. But the weakness of the government, or the absence of all government, in the Punjab, and the possibility of hostility in that part of the Sikh State, would be an additional inducement to the British Government to attend to the defences of our own weakest frontier, even if the consequences of the State of confusion in the Government of the Punjab should eventually require the active interference of the British Government in

order to settle the government of a country where tranquillity is so essential to its own protection and safety.

....

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....

It has been recommended to fortify the castle of Ferozepore on the Sutlej. But this measure was recommended principally with a view to render that town a commercial depot and bazaar in relation with the commercial navigation of the Indus. Whatever may be the views of the Government in that respect, I would recommend, as a measure of military precaution, the construction of a secure work on the site of the castle of Ferozepore. This, with a barrack or cantonment at Loodianah, secured by a good redoubt, would be all that would be necessary in the way of work on that part of the position.

Good lines of road should, however, be marked out, and bridges constructed over the rivers and rivulets crossing the same, from Allahabad and Agra to the Sutlej.

An army in this position might maintain itself. It might move forward into the Punjab, whether as an offensive movement, with a view to conquest, or as one defensive, with a view to attack its enemy, or to threaten the communications of an enemy advancing from the north-west.

The countries of the protected Sikh chieftains would be in the rear of the army; and, as they are highly cultivated and fertile, would afford supplies of provisions and forage during any length of time during which it might be necessary to detain the army in that position.

These Sikh chieftains, the Rajah of Pattialah and others, ought to be conciliated, and their light cavalry taken into the service of the army. They will thus feel an additional interest in the defence of that frontier.

Care must be taken to secure the island of Bukkar, on the Indus, near the junction of the Sutlej and Ghara, and on the communication with Shikarpore; and there should be a *tete-du-pont* on each bank of the Indus, so as to secure the bridges at that important point, and at all times the communication.

These measures once adopted, and the discipline, spirit, and confidence of the army restored, we might look with security to the defence of our North-West frontier against

any enemy, however formidable, from the westward. Our army upon the Sutlej, supported by the fortresses of Delhi, Agra, and Allahabad, and having the protected Sikh States behind it, could not be forced in its front or turned by its right.

5. *The Duke of Wellington to Lord Ellenborough*

Strathfieldsaye, April 2, 1842.

My dear Lord Ellenborough,

As I have another day, it appears to me that I may as well advert in more detail to the position of your army towards the Sutlej. My notion would be to place the right of your army at or about Sirhind, occupying with light troops the mountainous range, particularly on the Upper Sutlej, and on your right and your left extending towards or to Ferozepore. You should have posts in front of your army towards the Sutlej at Ranagepole, and other advantageous parts, to enable the general in command to know what is passing on the river in his front.

This position would be an excellent defensive one, from which you could with facility move on an offensive plan. I would recommend you to add to the equipment of the army pontoons for the formation of a bridge. I see that when the armies were lately on the Sutlej there was a difficulty in procuring boats, particularly for the formation of the bridges at the Island of Bukkur. It might be desirable to pass the river on a defensive plan of operations at short notice; and it would be very desirable to avoid the delay of collecting boats to form a bridge.

6. *From the Duke of Wellington to Lord Fitzgerald*

London, April 6, 1842, 10 A.M.

....

....

....

I am very glad to see such good accounts of state of the Sikh Government. It must be very desirable to maintain its existence in the Punjab. But this I must say, if we are to maintain our positions in Afghanistan, we ought to have Peshawur, the Khyber Pass, Jellalabad, and the passes between that post and Cabul.

But I would prefer to leave the Sikhs in possession of their Punjab. If we push to the west at all, it ought to be in the hills towards the sources of the rivers by which Punjab is watered and defended, that is to say Cashmere.

I have always entertained this opinion; but I would prefer to leave the Sikhs as they are, and if possible to maintain peace.

7. *Lord Ellenborough to the Queen*

Benares, April 21, 1842.

The Sikh army co-operated with that of India by advancing by a second pass leading to Ali Musjid, and there is no reason to doubt the good faith of the Sikh Government. The successes of your Majesty's arms will secure the fidelity of their troops

8. *Lord Ellenborough to the Duke of Wellington*

Allahabad, May 17, 1842.

The Sikhs have behaved beautifully hitherto. I mean to have an interview with the Maharajah in November, and I hope to be able to take him and the Jummoo Rajah with me in the policy of leaving the Afghans to their own divisions. ...

9. *Lord Ellenborough to the Duke of Wellington*

Allahabad, June 7, 1842.

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I have, after communicating with the Commander-in-Chief, issued an order for the assembling of an army of reserve in the division of Sirhind (that is, either at Kurnaul or Ferozepore) in November. It will consist of twelve regiments of infantry, of which four will be European, or five regiments of regular cavalry (including the 16th Lancers), and of two regiments of irregular cavalry. There will be four troops of horse artillery and three batteries of foot artillery. The total force will be 15,000 men.

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I have already, as you are aware, said what I could to dissuade the Sikhs (or rather Dhian Singh and Gholab Singh, the Jummoo Rajahs) from their wild views of conquest beyond the Himalayas. They appear to have been anticipated and

beaten there, which will teach them reason better than I could. I have at the same time not discouraged another folly of theirs—that of advancing their frontier towards Cabul. I have not objected to their moving forward on the left bank of the Cabul River, and I have acquiesced in their wish to occupy Jellalabad when we leave it. If they accede to this arrangement, and endeavour to carry it out, we shall have placed an irreconcilable enemy to the Afghans between them and us, and hold that enemy to the Afghans, occupied as he must be in defending himself against them, in entire subjection to us by our position upon the Sutlej, within a few marches of Umritsir and Lahore. Such I wish to make our position on our North-Western frontier. I have written for more information than I have as to the Island of Bukkur and the town of Sukkur.

10. *Lord Ellenborough to the Duke of Wellington*

Allahabad, August 16, 1842.

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The state of affairs in the Punjab is so uncertain that I should be sorry not to have that army at Ferozepore until the operations in Afghanistan are completed.

Mr. Clerk, the agent on the North-West frontier, evidently thinks the Maharajah will not be able to hold his ground long.

I could not consent to the amendments the Maharajah proposed to make in the declaration treaty of four articles I proposed to him. He rather fears taking Jellalabad when we retire, unless we will engage to support him there, which is out of the question, and he declines binding himself not to recognise any sovereign of Cabul whom we may not have previously recognised; so I have told Mr. Clerk I will not give up Jellalabad to the Maharajah in its present state, if he does not agree to this last condition, and I have further told him not to press the matter on the Sikhs.

I go towards Simlah on the 20th, to see Mr. Clerk, who is retiring from ill health. I want to gain from him a perfect knowledge of the Sikhs. He is all-powerful amongst them. There too I shall meet the Commander-in-Chief.

11. *Lord Ellenborough to the Queen*

October, 1842.

... Sukkur, with the island of Bukkur as its citadel, may be expected to become the great commercial emporium of the countries on both banks of the Indus. Lord Ellenborough looks forward to the Indus superseding the Ganges as the channel of communication with England, and to bringing European regiments and all military stores by that route to the North-Western frontier.

12. *Lord Ellenborough to the Duke of Wellington*

Simlah, October 18, 1842.

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... I agreed to permit the Sikhs to occupy Jellalabad on our retiring from it, they agreeing never to recognise any government in Cabul which we have not previously recognised. It was only to-day Sikh Minister came, who was at last authorised to make this arrangement. It is almost too late. You will see into what a false position their ambition leads them. They will be obliged to keep their principal force in that quarter, and Lahore and Umritsur will remain with insufficient garrison, within a few marches of the Sutlej, on which I shall, in twelve days, at any time, be able to assemble three European and eleven native battalions, one European regiment of cavalry, two regiments of native cavalry, and two of irregular cavalry, and twenty-four guns.

The state of the Punjab is therefore under my foot. I only desire, however, that it should be faithful and innocuous. The conflict of parties in the Punjab will render it more dependent every year and, indeed, he who knows it best does not think the Government can last a year. I intend to be most courteous and liberal to both parties, and to wait till I am called in.

13. *Lord Ellenborough to the Queen*

November 15, 1842.

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The Government of Lahore delayed too long in coming to a conclusion with respect to the occupation of Jellalabad, and the works of that place were destroyed before the letter,

announcing the terms upon which it was to be made over to them, with its works uninjured, was received. The Sikhs, however, persevere in their intention, notwithstanding this untoward event.

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... Dost Mahommed may recover his former authority, but he has suffered severely, and his whole object will be to maintain himself in Cabul. He may give trouble to the Sikhs at Jelalabad; but they think they can make arrangements with him which will lead to their quiet occupation of that place, and it is with their entire concurrence that Dost Mahomed is released.

14. *Lord Ellenborough to the Duke of Wellington*

Simlah, November 17, 1842.

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I shall remove all the available materials from the European barracks at Kurnaul to Umballa, applying to that purpose all the carriage of the returning armies. At Umballa there will be a regiment of European infantry, one of European cavalry, three regiments of native infantry, a regiment of native regular cavalry, one of the irregular cavalry, and two batteries of horse artillery. It is a beautiful place, and very healthy, and within a night's dak of Kassowly. I much regret that barracks for a European regiment have been nearly finished at Ferozepore.

15. *Lord Ellenborough to the Duke of Wellington*

Camp, Duthul, January 18, 1843.

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...I have every reason to think that the restoration of the gates of the Temple of Somnauth has conciliated and gratified the great mass of the Hindoo population. I have no reason to suppose that it has offended the Mussulmans; but I cannot close my eyes to the belief that that race is fundamentally hostile to us, and therefore our true policy is to conciliate the Hindoos, without doing anything which should in reason tend to create disaffection in the Mussalmans.

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I have written a letter to the Secret Committee as to the Punjab and the position of our troops between the Murkundah and the Sutlej, which I should wish you to have the goodness to read, and to give me your opinion upon.

16. *Lord Ellenborough to the Queen*

Camp, Duthul, January 18, 1843.

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The Ameers have, in words, assented to the propositions made to them, the object of which is to give to the British Government entire military possession of the Lower Indus, and to secure the freedom of commerce upon that river.

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17. *Lord Ellenborough to the Secret Committee No. 7 GG.*

Camp Kythul, 20th Jan., 1843.

10. I confess that I do not desire to see that state of things exist which would engage us in operations beyond the Sutlej, which could in my opinion be only safely terminated by so great an extension of dominion. I advisedly prefer the continuance of the relations which have existed for 40 years between the Government of India, and that of Lahore. Divided as the Sikhs must be before we can justifiably enter their country, still the contest could not be short, and must be expensive. It would be one in which decisive success would only be obtained by the exercise of military talents of a high order, which the Government of India cannot always command, and it would terminate in an acquisition of territory which it would require the highest political ability in the head of the Government peacefully and satisfactorily to administer and preserve.

11. With these impressions upon my mind your Honourable Committee may be assured that I shall be slow to engage in any operation beyond the Sutlej; but if compelled to do so, I shall bring to bear upon the Punjab the whole disposable force of the army, and I will not recross the river without having effected a settlement honourable to our arms, and conducive as far as it can be made to our future security.

18. *The Duke of Wellington to Lord Ellenborough*

London, February 4, 1843.

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The French Government have always had connections with the Sikhs. An Italian officer, who was heretofore in the service of Buonaparte, and has since been in the service of Runjeet Singh, but had returned to Europe, has within the last three months taken leave of Louis Philppe previous to his return to Lahore.

His course should be observed. The religion, the social state, and the politics of the Sikhs render them by far the most appropriate allies for the French of any in that part of Asia, and if once they could establish themselves on the Indus you would have them allied with the Sikhs, their officers in the Sikh army, the politics at Lahore under their direction.

I strongly recommend to you therefore to watch carefully the mouth of the Indus.

19. *Lord Ellenborough to the Duke of Wellington*

Camp, Delhi, February 18, 1843.

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...I am assured that a small battering train can be safely deposited in the old fort at Loodianah, and I should think it might be for such time as would suffice for bringing up troops to relieve the fort from Umballa and the Hills; and I have directed the few heavy guns now at Ferozepore (where there is no protection at all for them), and some which are coming up from Sukkur, to be sent to Loodianah; but I apprehend that a magazine as large as that of Delhi should be placed in the rear of the frontier, where the stores it contains may be easily supplied to troops advancing, without the risk of its being in any manner endangered by the advance of an enemy.

20. *Lord Ellenborough to the Queen*

Agra, April 20, 1843.

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The Chief of Khytul, one of the protected Sikh States within thirty miles of Kurnaul, having died without heirs, four-fifths of his territory lapsed to British Government, and

the remaining fifth became the property of a distant branch of the family. A political officer was sent with a small escort, afterwards increased to 300 men, to receive possession of Khytul, which belongs to the lapsed portion of the territory; but he was met by passive resistance on the part of the female relations and the ministers of the late chief. The military retainers of the State flocked to Khytul, and a most indiscreet disposition of a part of the small cavalry escort having been made, attack was invited, and the consequence was the repulse of the whole force with the political officer, with some loss, and its retirement to Kurnaul.

21. *Lord Ellenborough to the Duke of Wellington*

Agra, May 11, 1843.

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General Ventura is with the Maharajah Shere Singh, and it is clear to me that, relying on his support, the Maharajah will take the first occasion of cutting off his Minister, Dhian Singh. This Dhian Singh knows, and is prepared for. The break up in the Punjab will probably begin with murder. It is their way.

22. *Lord Ellenborough to the Duke of Wellington*

Calcutta, August 12, 1843.

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The affairs of the Punjab will probably receive their *denouement* from the death of Shere Singh. He commits excesses and is not strong. His son, an amiable boy, will be a puppet in the hands of Dhian Singh.

23. *Lord Ellenborough to the Duke of Wellington*

Barrackpore, September 20, 1843.

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The Maharajah of Lahore is pulling his house down upon his head; the catastrophe was very nearly taking place three weeks ago, but it is deferred. The increasing intemperance of the Maharajah must ultimately be fatal to him. There does not seem to be any feeling against us. They are only quarrelling amongst themselves apparently; nor do I see the least

show of hostility to us anywhere; but there are in many parts rumours of combinations to be declared in October. We shall be well prepared.

...The Commander-in-Chief seems to approve of my general view of the positions to be occupied on the North-West Frontier, and Umballa will become a great station. At Ferozepore and Loodianah we must have small forts.

24. *Lord Ellenborough to the Queen*

Calcutta, October 20, 1843.

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General Ventura appears to have been acting as the adviser of Heera Singh; but what General Ventura thinks of him, and what he thinks of the present and future state of the Punjab, your Majesty will learn from the general's letter, of which a copy is enclosed for your Majesty's information.

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The instructions given to the British agent upon the frontier are entirely in accordance with the policy which has been pursued towards the Sikh State for many years. Every desire is expressed to see that State maintained as it was under Runjeet Singh, and while we protect our own rights nothing will be done to impair the independence of our neighbours—but it is impossible not to perceive that the ultimate tendency of the late events at Lahore is, without any effort on our part, to bring the plains first, and at a somewhat later period the hills, under our direct protection or control.

25. *Lord Ellenborough to the Duke of Wellington*

Calcutta, October, 20, 1843.

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Every succeeding account gives a worse and a worse picture of the position of affairs at Lahore. The army is paramount. Everything is managed by the regimental committees, which correspond and act in concert. The donations and pay extorted can only be paid for a short time out of the accumulated treasures. When these fail all will be confusion. Heera Singh has no real authority. His best adviser has been Ventura, but he is threatened now. Gholab Singh remains in the

Hills, either in sickness, in grief, or in policy. He is securing himself there. Heera Singh will probably soon fly to Jummoo. Then a pure Sikh government will be formed in the plains and a Rajpoot Government in the Hills, and Mooltan may perhaps break loose from all connection with the Sikhs. Ventura anticipates a long anarchy, from which the only ultimate refuge will be in our protection; I agree with him. However, you will see that the instructions given to Colonel Richmond are of the most fair and friendly character towards the Sikh State. We adhere to the policy pursued for so many years; and for my own part I desire the continuance of a government in the Punjab like that of Runjeet Singh. The thing, however, will not be; and the time cannot be very distant when the Punjab will fall into our management, and the question will be what we shall do as respects the Hills. Probably the Hills will be very much divided under separate Governments, and I look to the protection of our Government being ultimately extended to the Sikhs of the Plains and the Rajpoots of the Hills, and the Mussulmans of Mooltan, precisely as it is now to the Sikh chiefs on the left of the Sutlej. The Khalsa lands are worth half a million, and the payments from the Jagheers may be as much. There would also be lapses of estates. I do not look to this state of things as likely to occur next year, but as being ultimately inevitable, if we do not bring on union against ourselves and indisposition to our rule by some precipitate interference. I should tell you however, that there is, as there long has been, a great disposition, even in quarters not military, to disturb the game.

26. *Lord Ellenborough to the Queen*

Barrackpore, November 20, 1843.

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... The Sikh army, intent only on obtaining more pay, has hitherto remained tranquil, and no indication has been given of the least desire to provoke the resentment of the British Government.

On our side, however, every prudent precaution is taken against the possible inroad of troops or plunderers from the Punjab.

27. *Lord Ellenborough to the Duke of Wellington*
Barrackpore, November 20, 1843.

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In the Punjab, affairs are tending to another change. Either Heera Singh will be murdered or he will retire. He has lost all authority, but he still holds the treasury, into which, however, nothing comes, and from which much must flow. The mother of the boy Dhuleep Singh seems to be a woman of determined courage, and she is the only person apparently at Lahore who has courage. The result will probably be the early separation of the Hills from the Plains, and, when Dost Mahomed can gather a little more strength, the annexation of Peshawur to his territories. There is no movement against us, nor is there any present prospect of any, unless a complete break up should send plunderers amongst us.

28. *Lord Ellenborough to the Duke of Wellington*
Camp Munneah (one march from Dholepore),
December 18, 1843.

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The territories of Runjeet Singh seem to be breaking into two parts, the Hills and the Plains, and the latter must soon experience a new revolution.

29. *Lord Ellenborough to the Queen*
Camp Dholepore,
on the Chumbul, 30 miles from Gwalior,
December 19, 1843.

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The existence of an army of such strength in that position must very seriously embarrass the disposition of troops we might be desirous of making to meet a coming danger from the Sutlej.

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The territories which formed the dominion of Runjeet Singh might be considered as already divided between the Sikhs of the plains and the Rajpoots of the hills. The whole army remains at Lahore, the real master of the Government.

Its inaction is only purchased by largesses, but these cannot always be given, nor can the promised rate of pay be disbursed. The revenues are no longer regularly paid, and they would in any case be insufficient. There must be some violent termination to this state of things.

30. *Lord Ellenborough to Secret Committee No. 12 G.G.*
Foreign Department

Camp Futtehpore, 11th of February, 1844.

No material change has taken place in the state of affairs in the Punjab. Rajah Golaub Singh has committed another act of ambitious violence for the purpose of extending his authority in the Hills, and it would appear that his conduct has created much resentment in the minds of those who regard the interests of the "Khalsa," but no movement has taken place.

7. We have removed at Gwalior an Army much less unscrupulous and we may be assured that the example has not been lost upon the Army at Lahore.

8. We must at least expect from that Army every act of hostility which it considers it can in prudence commit, and it is not in India that considerations of prudence always regulate the conduct either of Armies or of Chiefs. You may be assured that I am fully aware of the magnitude and of the protracted character of the military effort which would be required from us should we ever be forced into a war beyond the Sutlej. I feel too that the most decided success in such a war would be of very problematical advantage as compared with the continued maintenance in the Punjab of a Government directed by the just views of policy which animated Runjeet Singh and that [? those] of the Jummoo Rajahs with a mutinous Army are widely different in their character and in their bearing upon British interests. From the latter we can only expect constant hostility biding its time. Our position with respect to the Punjab can now be viewed only in the light of an armed truce—the contest, whenever it may take place, must be on both sides, not for Empire only, but for life, and I must frankly confess, that when I look at the whole condition of our Army I had rather, if the contest cannot be further postponed, that it were at least postponed to November, 1845.

9. Let our policy be what it may the contest must come at last, and the intervening time which may be given to us should be employed in unostentatious but vigilant preparation.

31. *Lord Ellenborough to the Duke of Wellington*
Camp, Futtehpoore, February 11, 1844.

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... If we are obliged to meet the Sikhs at any time we shall have a very powerful artillery to encounter, and it is very necessary that every possible measure should be previously taken to make our artillery most efficient.

32. *Lord Ellenborough to the Duke of Wellington*
Allahabad, February 15, 1844.

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... There is no material change in the Punjab. Gholab Singh is strengthening himself, as he thinks, by new acts of violence in the Hills. Heera Sing has not increased his power over the army, and it seems doubtful whether the troops at Peshawur, deserting their post, may not let in the Afghans. One regiment is already at Lahore, against orders, and Heera Singh is not strong enough to punish it.

I earnestly hope that we may not be obliged to cross the Sutlej in December next. We shall not be ready so soon. The army requires a great deal of setting up after five years of war. I am quietly doing what I can to strengthen and equip it. I am fully aware of the great magnitude of the operation in which we should embark if we ever should cross the Sutlej. I know it would be of a protracted character. I should be obliged to remain at Lahore myself more than a year, and I should have all India to keep quiet behind me with very few troops, for we could not send any back till we relieved them.

Depend upon it I will not engage in such an operation hastily or unnecessarily, and I will do all I can beforehand to secure certain success if I ever should be obliged to undertake it.

33. *Lord Ellenborough to the Queen*

Allahabad, February 16, 1844.

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In the hills, Rajah Gholab Singh is extending his power with his usual unscrupulous disregard of the rights of others and of the supremacy of the State he pretends to serve. This conduct, however, makes him very odious to the Sikhs at Lahore.

34. *Lord Ellenborough to the Duke of Wellington*

Calcutta, March 20, 1844.

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These neighbours of ours are doing all they can to induce our men to be disaffected as well as mutinous. They are moving troops towards Ferozepore and Loodianah, and the Durbar may under any circumstances be unable to restrain their troops. Under circumstances affording fair hopes of success they would lead the movement.

35. *Lord Ellenborough to the Duke of Wellington*

Calcutta, April 20, 1844.

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I earnestly hope nothing may compel us to cross the Sutlej, and that we may have no attack to repel till November 1845. I shall then be prepared for anything. In the meantime we do all we can in a quiet way to strengthen ourselves.

I ought not to conceal from you that the anxiety I feel not to be called too suddenly into the field is much increased by a want of confidence in Sir Hugh Gough, who, with all his personal courage and many excellent qualities, certainly does not appear to possess the grasp of mind or the prudence which is essential to the successful conduct of great military operations. He would do admirably, I have no doubt, at the head of an advanced guard.

We are altogether very ill-provided with officers for the higher commands. The whole army requires a great deal of teaching, and I am satisfied the eighteen months I ask are not more than enough to make it what it ought to be.

36. *Lord Ellenborough to the Queen*

Calcutta, April 21, 1844.

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The example of successful mutiny in an army near our frontier is more perilous than would be its declared hostility. Lord Ellenborough cannot but feel that the termination of the present state of things in the Punjab is essential to the security of the British power in India; but he will wait, cautiously preparing our strength for a contest he would willingly defer, but which he considers inevitable.

37. *Lord Ellenborough to the Duke of Wellington*

Calcutta, May 9, 1844.

The destruction of Soocheyt Singh has had the effect of entirely separating the Hills, under Gholab Singh, from the Plains, still ruled in a manner by Heera Singh. Everything is going on there as we could desire, if we looked forward to the ultimate possession of the Punjab.

I expect that by the end of December there will be on the Sutlej seventy boats of about thirty-five tons each, all exactly similar and each containing everything necessary for its equipment as a pontoon. These will bridge the Sutlej anywhere, and when not so used they will convey our troops up and down, and save us an enormous charge for the hire of boats.

Besides these, fifty-six pontoons will be ready for use in Scinde. All these are in hand at Bombay. We shall besides have, by the end of this year, I hope, two steamers drawing very little water on the Sutlej.

We are very much in want of horses here; 1000 are required for the cavalry. We are going to give nine-pounders instead of sixes to five of our horse artillery batteries.

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Sir Charles Napier will endeavour to raise two local battalions in Scinde, and he thinks he shall succeed.

In November 1845 the army will be equal to any operation but I should be sorry to have it called into the field sooner.

38. *Lord Ellenborough to the Duke of Wellington*

Barrackpore, June 9, 1844.

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... We cannot prudently diminish our preparations for a contest which will some day take place, although it may be still deferred, and I have determined on sending to Sydney for 1000 horses we want for our cavalry and artillery. Everywhere we are trying to get things into order, and especially to strengthen and perfectly equip the artillery, with which the fight will be.

39. *Lord Ellenborough to the Duke of Wellington*

Barrackpore, July 2, 1844.

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...In the Punjab there is more of pacific appearance than at any time since the murder of Shere Singh.

40. *Lord Ellenborough to the Queen*

Barrackpore, July 14, 1844.

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There is much less apprehension than there has been at any time since the death of the Maharajah Shere Singh that this tranquillity will be disturbed on the side of the Punjab.

APPENDIX B
TREATIES, PROCLAMATIONS, ETC.

No. I

Treaty of Friendship and Amity between the Honorable East India Company and the Sirdars Runjeet Singh and Futteh Singh, 1st January, 1806

Sirdar Runjeet Singh and Sirdar Futteh Singh have consented to the following Articles of Agreement concluded by Lieutenant-Colonel John Malcolm, under the special authority of the Right Honorable Lord Lake, himself duly authorized by the Honorable Sir George Hilario Barlow, Baronet, Governor-General, and Sirdar Futteh Singh, as principal on the part of himself and plenipotentiary on the part of Runjeet Singh.

ARTICLE 1

Sirdar Runjeet Singh and Sirdar Futteh Singh Aloowalia hereby agree that they will cause Jeswunt Rao Holkar to remove with his army to the distance of 30 coss from Amritsur immediately, and will never hereafter hold any further connection with him, or aid or assist him with troops, or in any other manner whatever; and they further agree that they will not in any way molest such of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's followers or troops as are desirous of returning to their homes in the Deccan, but, on the contrary, will render them every assistance in their power for carrying such intention into execution.

ARTICLE 2

The British Government hereby agree that in case a pacification should not be effected between that Government and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, the British Army shall move from its present encampment on the banks of the River Beah as soon as Jeswunt Rao Holkar aforesaid shall have marched with his army to the distance of 30 coss from Amristur; and that in any Treaty which may hereafter be concluded between the British Government and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, it shall be stipulated that, immediately after the conclusion of the said Treaty, Holkar shall evacuate the territories of the Sikhs and

march towards his own, and that he shall in no way whatever injure or destroy such parts of the Sikh country as may lie in his route. The British Government further agrees that as long as the said Chieftains Runjeet Singh and Futteh Singh abstain from holding any friendly connection with the enemies of that Government, or from committing any act of hostility on their own parts against the said Government, the British Armies shall never enter the territories of the said Chieftains, nor will the British Government form any plans for the seizure or sequestration of their possessions or property. Dated 1st January 1806, corresponding with 10th Shawal, 1220 H.E.

Seal of Runjeet Singh

Seal of Futteh Singh

No. II

*Treaty between the British Government and the
Raja of Lahore, 25th April, 1809*

Whereas certain differences which had arisen between the British Government and the Rajah of Lahore have been happily and amicably adjusted, and both parties being anxious to maintain the relations of perfect amity and concord, the following Articles of Treaty, which shall be binding on the heirs and successors of the two parties, have been concluded by Rajah Runjeet Singh on his own part, and by the agency of Charles Theophilus Metcalfe, Esquire, on the part of the British Government.

ARTICLE 1

Perpetual friendship shall subsist between the British Government and the State of Lahore. The latter shall be considered, with respect to the former, to be on the footing of the most favoured powers; and the British Government will have no concern with the territories and subjects of the Rajah to the northward of the River Sutlej.

ARTICLE 2

The Raja will never maintain in the territory occupied by him and his dependants, on the left bank of the River Sutlej, more troops than are necessary for the internal duties of that territory, nor commit or suffer any encroachments on the possessions or rights of the Chiefs in its vicinity.

ARTICLE 3

In the event of a violation of any of the preceding Articles, or of a departure from the rules of friendship on the part of either State, this Treaty shall be considered to be null and void.

ARTICLE 4

This Treaty consisting of four Articles, having been settled and concluded at Amritsur, on the 25th day of April 1809, Mr. Charles Theophilus Metcalfe has delivered to the Rajah of Lahore a copy of the same, in English and Persian, under his seal and signature, and the said Rajah has delivered another copy of the same, under his seal and signature; and Mr. Charles Theophilus Metcalfe engages to procure, within the space of two months, a copy of the same duly ratified by the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council, on the receipt of which by the Rajah, the present Treaty shall be deemed complete and binding on both parties, and the copy of it now delivered to the Rajah shall be returned.

Seal and signature of

C. T. METCALFE

Company's seal

Signature and seal of

RAJAH RUNJEET SINGH

(Sd) MINTO

Ratified by the Governor-General in Council on the 30th May 1809.

No. III

Proclamation

Camp, Lushkuree Khan-ke-Serai, December 13, 1845.

The British Government has ever been on terms of friendship with that of the Punjab.

In the year 1809, a treaty of amity and concord was concluded between the British Government and the late Maharajah Runjeet Singh, the conditions of which have always been faithfully observed by the British Government, and were scrupulously fulfilled by the late Maharajah.

The same friendly relations have been maintained with the successors of Runjeet Singh by the British Government up to the present time.

Since the death of the late Maharajah Shere Singh, the disorganized state of the Lahore Government has made it

incumbent on the Governor-General in Council to adopt precautionary measures for the protection of the British frontier; the nature of these measures, and the cause of their adoption, were at the time fully explained to the Lahore Durbar.

Notwithstanding the disorganized state of the Lahore Government during the last two years, and many most unfriendly proceedings on the part of the Durbar, the Governor-General in Council has continued to evince his desire to maintain the relations of amity and concord which had so long existed between the two states, for the mutual interests and happiness of both. He has shown on every occasion the utmost forbearance from consideration to the helpless state of the infant Maharajah Dhuleep Singh, whom the British Government had recognized as the successor to the late Maharajah Shere Singh.

The Governor-General in Council sincerely desired to see a strong Sikh Government re-established in the Punjab, able to control its army and to protect its subjects. He had not, up to the present moment, abandoned the hope of seeing that important object effected by the patriotic efforts of the Sikhs and the people of that country.

The Sikh army recently marched from Lahore towards the British Frontier, as it was alleged by the orders of the Durbar, for the purpose of invading the British territory.

The Governor-General's agent, by direction of the Governor-General, demanded an explanation of this movement, and no reply being returned within a reasonable time, the demand was repeated. The Governor-General, unwilling to believe in the hostile intentions of the Sikh Government, to which no provocation had been given, refrained from taking any measures which might have a tendency to embarrass the Government of the Maharajah, or to induce collision between the two states.

When no reply was given to the repeated demand for explanation, and while active military preparations were continued at Lahore, the Governor-General considered it necessary to order the advance of troops towards the frontier, to reinforce the frontier posts.

The Sikh army has now, without a shadow of provocation invaded the British territories.

The Governor-General must, therefore, take measures for effectually protecting the British provinces, for vindicating the authority of the British Government, and for punishing the violators of treaties and the disturbers of public peace.

The Governor-General hereby declares the possessions of Maharajah Dhuleep Singh, on the left or British bank of the Sutlej, confiscated and annexed to the British territories.

The Governor-General will respect the existing rights of all jagheerdars, zamindars, and tenants in the said possessions, who, by the course they now pursue, evince their fidelity to the British Government.

The Governor-General hereby calls upon all the chiefs and sirdars in the protected territories to co-operate cordially with the British Government for the punishment of the common enemy, and for the maintenance of order in these states. Those of the chiefs who show alacrity and fidelity in the discharge of this duty, which they owe to the protecting power, will find their interests promoted thereby; and those who take a contrary course will be treated as enemies to the British Government, and will be punished accordingly.

The inhabitants of all the territories on the left bank of the Sutlej are hereby directed to abide peaceably in their respective villages, where they will receive efficient protection by the British Government. All parties of men found in armed bands, who can give no satisfactory account of their proceedings, will be treated as disturbers of the public peace.

All subjects of the British Government, and those who possess estates on both sides of the river Sutlej, who by their faithful adherence to the British Government may be liable to sustain loss, shall be indemnified and secured in all their just rights and privileges.

On the other hand, all subjects of the British Government who shall continue in the service of the Lahore state, and who disobey this proclamation by not immediately returning to their allegiance, will be liable to have their property on this side the Sutlej confiscated, and declared to be aliens and enemies of the British Government.

By order of the Right Hon. the Governor-General of India,

F. CURRIE,

Secretary to the Government of India,
with the Governor-General.

No. IV

Proclamation in Hindustani

"Whereas the English Government is anxious to reward the bravery and fidelity of the Poorbeas, by raising a Regiment of them—it is hereby proclaimed, that any non-commissioned officer or soldier of the Lahore Government who shall present himself before His Excellency the Governor-General, shall be immediately rewarded with the accustomed liberality, and shall have the benefit of invalid pension; and, if engaged in a law suit in a British Court of Justice, his case shall be immediately decided before any other. In fact, every opportunity of favour and cherishment shall at all times be kept in sight by the Government. However, it is reported that Tej Sing has given out, that if any sepoy of the Lahore army go over for service to the English Government, the officers of this Government will cut off their noses and ears and kill them. This is altogether an infamous falsehood—for the customs of this Government were never of such a description, and never will be—therefore let such a falsehood not enter their head; but let them feel assured that if they come here they will be well rewarded."

(A True Translation)

H. MARSH, Bt. Captain,
Interpreter and Quarter Master, 3rd Cavalry.

No. V

*Treaty between the British Government and the State of
Lahore, 9th March, 1846*

Whereas the treaty of amity and concord, which was concluded between the British Government and the late Maharajah Runjeet Singh, the Ruler of Lahore, in 1809, was broken by the unprovoked aggression, on the British Provinces, of the Sikh Army, in December last; and whereas, on that occasion, by the Proclamation, dated 13th December, the territories then in the occupation of the Maharajah of Lahore, on the left or

British bank of the River Sutlej, were confiscated and annexed to the British Provinces; and since that time hostile operations have been prosecuted by the two Governments, the one against the other, which have resulted in the occupation of Lahore by the British troops; and whereas it has been determined that, upon certain conditions, peace shall be re-established between the two Governments, the following treaty of peace between the Honourable English East India Company and Maharajah Dhuleep Singh Bahadoor, and his children, heirs and successors, has been concluded on the part of the Honourable Company by Frederick Currie, Esquire, and Brevet-Major Henry Montgomery Lawrence, by virtue of full powers to that effect vested in them by the Right Honorable Sir Henry Hardinge, G.C.B., one of Her Britannic Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, Governor-General, appointed by the Honorable Company to direct and control all their affairs in the East Indies, and on the part of His Highness Maharajah Dhuleep Singh by Bhaee Ram Singh, Rajah Lal Singh, Sirdar Tej Singh, Sirdar Chuttur Singh, Attareewalla, Sirdar Runjore Singh Majeethia, Dewan Deena Nath and Fakeer Noorooddeen, vested with full powers and authority on the part of His Highness.

ARTICLE 1

There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the British Government on the one part, and Maharajah Dhuleep Singh, his heirs and successors on the other.

ARTICLE 2

The Maharajah of Lahore renounces for himself, his heirs and successors, all claim to, or connection with, the territories lying to the south of the River Sutlej, and engages never to have any concern with those territories or inhabitants thereof.

ARTICLE 3

The Maharajah cedes to the Honorable Company, in perpetual sovereignty, all his forts, territories and rights in the Doab or country, hill and plain, situated between the Rivers Beas and Sutlej.

ARTICLE 4

The British Government having demanded from the Lahore State, as indemnification for the expenses of the war, in addition to the cession of territory described in Article 3,

payment of one and half crore of Rupees, and the Lahore Government, being unable to pay the whole of this sum at this time, or to give security satisfactory to the British Government for its eventual payment, the Maharajah cedes to the Honorable Company, in perpetual sovereignty, as equivalent for one crore of Rupees, all his forts, territories, rights and interests in the hill countries, which are situated between the Rivers Beas and Indus, including the Provinces of Cashmere and Hazarah.

ARTICLE 5

The Maharajah will pay to the British Government the sum of 50 lakhs of Rupees on or before the ratification of this Treaty.

ARTICLE 6

The Maharajah engages to disband the mutinous troops of the Lahore Army, taking from them their arms—and His Highness agrees to reorganize the Regular or Aeen Regiments of Infantry, upon the system, and according to the Regulations as to pay and allowances, observed in the time of the late Maharajah Runjeet Singh. The Maharajah further engages to pay up all arrears to the soldiers that are discharged, under the provisions of this Article.

ARTICLE 7

The Regular Army of the Lahore State shall henceforth be limited to 25 Battalions of Infantry, consisting of 800 bayonets each—with twelve thousand Cavalry—this number at no time to be exceeded without the concurrence of the British Government. Should it be necessary at any time—for any special cause—that this force should be increased, the cause shall be fully explained to the British Government, and when the special necessity shall have passed, the regular troops shall be again reduced to the standard specified in the former clause of this Article.

ARTICLE 8

The Maharajah will surrender to the British Government all the guns—thirty-six in number—which have been pointed against the British Troops—and which, having been placed on the right bank of the River Sutlej, were not captured at the battle of Subraon.

ARTICLE 9

The control of the Rivers Beas and Sutlej, with the continuations of the latter river, commonly called the Gurrah and the Punjnud, to the confluence of the Indus at Mithunkote—and the control of the Indus from Mithunkote to the borders of Beloochistan, shall, in respect to tolls and ferries, rest with the British Government. The provisions of this Article shall not interfere with the passage of boats belonging to the Lahore Government on the said rivers, for the purposes of traffic or the conveyance of passengers up and down their course. Regarding the ferries between the two countries respectively, at the several ghats of the said rivers, it is agreed that the British Government, after defraying all the expenses of management and establishments, shall account to the Lahore Government for one-half of the net profits of the ferry collections. The provisions of this Article have no reference to the ferries on that part of the River Sutlej which forms the boundary of Bhawulpore and Lahore respectively.

ARTICLE 10

If the British Government should, at any time, desire to pass troops through the territories of His Highness the Maharajah, for the protection of the British Territories, or those of their Allies, the British Troops shall, on such special occasion, due notice being given, be allowed to pass through the Lahore Territories. In such case the Officers of the Lahore State will afford facilities in providing supplies and boats for the passage of rivers, and the British Government will pay the full price of all such provisions and boats, and will make fair compensation for all private property that may be endamaged.

The British Government will, moreover, observe all due consideration to the religious feelings of the inhabitants of those tracts through which the army may pass.

ARTICLE 11

The Maharajah engages never to take or to retain in his service any British subject—nor the subject of any European or American State without the consent of the British Government.

ARTICLE 12

In consideration of the services rendered by Rajah Golab Singh, of Jummoo, to the Lahore State, towards procuring the

restoration of the relations of amity between the Lahore and British Governments, the Maharajah hereby agrees to recognize the Independent Sovereignty of Rajah Golab Singh in such territories and districts in the hills as may be made over to the said Rajah Golab Singh, by separate Agreement between himself and the British Government, with the dependencies thereof, which may have been in the Rajah's possession since the time of the late Maharajah Khurruck Singh, and the British Government, in consideration of the good conduct of Rajah Golab Singh, also agrees to recognize his independence in such territories, and to admit him to the privileges of a separate Treaty with the British Government.

ARTICLE 13

In the event of any dispute or difference arising between the Lahore State and Rajah Golab Singh, the same shall be referred to the arbitration of the British Government, and by its decision the Maharajah engages to abide.

ARTICLE 14

The limits of the Lahore Territories shall not be, at any time, changed without the concurrence of the British Government.

ARTICLE 15

The British Government will not exercise any interference in the internal administration of the Lahore State—but in all cases or questions which may be referred to the British Government, the Governor-General will give the aid of his advice and good offices for the furtherance of the interests of the Lahore Government.

ARTICLE 16

The subjects of either State shall, on visiting the territories of the other, be on the footing of the subjects of the most favoured nation.

This Treaty, consisting of sixteen articles, has been this day settled by Frederick Currie, Esquire, and Brevet-Major Henry Montgomery Lawrence acting under the directions of the Right Honourable Sir Henry Hardinge, G.C.B., Governor-General on the part of the British Government, and by Bhaee Ram Singh, Rajah Lal Singh, Sirdar Tej Singh, Sirdar Chuttur Singh Attareewalla, Sirdar Runjore Singh, Majeethia, Dewan Deena Nath, and Fuqueer Noorooddeen, on the part

of the Maharajah Dhuleep Singh, and the said Treaty has been this day ratified by the seal of the Right Honorable Sir Henry Hardinge, G.C.B., Governor-General, and by that of His Highness Maharajah Dhuleep Singh.

Done at Lahore, this ninth day of March, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and forty-six, corresponding with the tenth day of Rubee-ool-awul, 1262 Hijree, and ratified on the same date.

(Sd.) H. HARDINGE.

(Sd.) MAHARAJAH DHULEEP SINGH.

(") BHAE RAM SINGH.

(") RAJAH LAL SINGH.

(") SIRDAR TEJ SINGH.

(") SIRDAR CHUTTUR SINGH ATTAREEWALLA.

(") SIRDAR RUNJORE SINGH MAJEETHIA.

(") DEWAN DEENA NATH.

(") FUQEER NOOROODDEEN.

No. VI

Articles of Agreement concluded between the British Government and the Lahore Durbar on the 11th March, 1846

Whereas the Lahore Government has solicited the Governor-General to leave a British Force at Lahore, for the protection of the Maharajah's person and of the Capital, till the reorganization of the Lahore Army according to the provisions of Article 6 of the Treaty of Lahore, dated the 9th instant; and Whereas the Governor-General has, on certain conditions, consented to the measure; and Whereas it is expedient that certain matters concerning the territories ceded by Articles 3 and 4 of the aforesaid Treaty should be specifically determined, the following eight Articles of Agreement have this day been concluded between the aforementioned contracting parties.

ARTICLE 1

The British Government shall leave at Lahore, till the close of the current year, A.D. 1846, such force as shall seem to the Governor-General adequate for the purpose of protecting the person of the Maharajah and the inhabitants of the City of Lahore, during the reorganization of the Sikh Army,

in accordance with the provisions of Article 6 of the Treaty of Lahore. That force to be withdrawn at any convenient time before the expiration of the year, if the object to be fulfilled shall, in the opinion of the Durbar, have been attained—but the force shall not be detained at Lahore beyond the expiration of the current year.

ARTICLE 2

The Lahore Government agrees that the force left at Lahore for the purpose specified in the foregoing Article, shall be placed in full possession of the Fort and the City of Lahore, and that the Lahore troops shall be removed from within the City. The Lahore Government engages to furnish convenient quarters for the officers and men of the said force, and to pay to the British Government all the extra expenses in regard to the said force, which may be incurred by the British Government, in consequence of the troops being employed away from their own Cantonments and in a Foreign Territory.

ARTICLE 3

The Lahore Government engages to apply itself immediately and earnestly to the reorganization of its army according to the prescribed conditions, and to communicate fully with the British authorities left at Lahore, as to the progress of such reorganization, and as to the location of the troops.

ARTICLE 4

If the Lahore Government fails in the performance of the conditions of the foregoing Article, the British Government shall be at liberty to withdraw the force from Lahore at any time before the expiration of the period specified in Article 1.

ARTICLE 5

The British Government agrees to respect the bonafide rights of those jaghiredars, within the territories ceded by Articles 3 and 4 of the Treaty of Lahore, dated 9th instant, who were attached to the families of the late Maharajahs Runjeet Singh, Kurruk Singh and Shere Singh; and the British Government will maintain those jaghiredars in their bonafide possessions during their lives.

ARTICLE 6

The Lahore Government shall receive the assistance of the British Local Authorities in recovering the arrears of

revenue justly due to the Lahore Government from the kardars and managers in the territories ceded by the provisions of Articles 3 and 4 of the Treaty of Lahore, to the close of the Khureef harvest of the current year, viz., 1902 of the Sumbut Bikramajeet.

ARTICLE 7

The Lahore Government shall be at liberty to remove from the forts, in the territories specified in the foregoing Article, all treasure and State property, with the exception of guns. Should, however, the British Government desire to retain any part of the said property, they shall be at liberty to do so, paying for the same at a fair valuation, and the British officers shall give their assistance to the Lahore Government in disposing on the spot of such part of the aforesaid property as the Lahore Government may not wish to remove, and the British officers may not desire to retain.

ARTICLE 8

Commissioners shall be immediately appointed by the two Governments to settle and lay down the boundary between the two States, as defined by Article 4 of the Treaty of Lahore, dated March 9th, 1846.

(Sd.) H. HARDINGE.

(Sd.) MAHARAJAH DHULEEP SINGH.

(") BHAE RAM SINGH.

(") RAJAH LAL SINGH.

(") SIRDAR TEJ SINGH.

(") SIRDAR CHUTTUR SINGH ATTAREEWALLA.

(") SIRDAR RUNJORE SINGH MAJEETHIA.

(") DEWAN DEENA NATH.

(") FUQEER NOOROODDEEN.

No. VII

Articles of Agreement concluded between the British Government and the Lahore Durbar, 16th December 1846

Whereas the Lahore Durbar and the principal Chiefs and Sardars of the State have in express terms communicated to the British Government their anxious desire that the Governor-General should give his aid and assistance to maintain the administration of the Lahore State during the minority of

Maharajah Dulleep Singh, and have declared this measure to be indispensable for the maintenance of the Government; and whereas the Governor-General has, under certain conditions, consented to give the aid and assistance solicited, the following Articles of Agreement, in modification of the Articles of Agreement executed at Lahore on the 11th March last, have been concluded on the part of the British Government by Frederick Currie, Esquire, Secretary to Government of India, and Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Montgomery Lawrence, C. B., Agent to the Governor-General, North-West Frontier, by virtue of full powers to that effect vested in them by the Right Honorable Viscount Hardinge, G. C. B., Governor-General, and on the part of His Highness Maharajah Dulleep Singh, by Sirdar Tej Singh, Sirdar Shere Singh, Dewan Deena Nath, Fukeer Noorodeen, Rai Kishen Chund, Sirdar Runjore Singh Mujeetheea, Sirdar Uttar Singh Kaleewalla, Bhaee Nidhan Singh, Sirdar Khan Singh Mujeetheea, Sirdar Shumshere Singh, Sirdar Lall Singh Morarea, Sirdar Kher Singh Sindhanwalla, Sirdar Urjun Singh Rungurnungaleea; acting with the unanimous consent and concurrence of the Chiefs and Sirdars of the State assembled at Lahore.

ARTICLE 1

All and every part of the Treaty of peace between the British Government and the State of Lahore, bearing date the 9th day of March 1846, except in so far as it may be temporarily modified in respect to Clause 15 of the said Treaty by this engagement, shall remain binding upon the two Governments.

ARTICLE 2

A British Officer, with an efficient establishment of assistants, shall be appointed by the Governor-General to remain at Lahore, which officer shall have full authority to direct and control all matters in every Department of the State.

ARTICLE 3

Every attention shall be paid in conducting the administration to the feelings of the people, to preserving the national institutions and customs, and to maintaining the just rights of all classes.

ARTICLE 4

Changes in the mode and details of administration shall not be made, except when found necessary for effecting the objects set forth in the foregoing Clause, and for securing the just dues of the Lahore Government. These details shall be conducted by Natiye officers as at present, who shall be appointed and superintended by a Council of Regency composed of leading Chiefs and Sirdars acting under the control and guidance of the British Resident.

ARTICLE 5

The following persons shall in the first instance constitute the Council of Regency, viz., Sirdar Tej Singh, Sirdar Shere Singh Attareewalla, Dewan Dena Nath, Fukeer Nooroodeen, Sirdar Runjore Singh Majethea, Bhaee Nidhan Singh, Sirdar Utter Singh Kaleewalla, Sirdar Shumshere Singh Sindhanwalla, and no change shall be made in the persons thus nominated, without the consent of the British Resident, acting under the orders of the Governor-General.

ARTICLE 6

The administration of the country shall be conducted by this Council of Regency in such manner as may be determined on by themselves in consultation with the British Resident, who shall have full authority to direct and control the duties of every department.

ARTICLE 7

A British Force of such strength and numbers, and in such positions as the Governor-General may think fit, shall remain at Lahore for the protection of the Maharajah and the preservation of the peace of the country.

ARTICLE 8

The Governor-General shall be at liberty to occupy with British soldiers any fort or military post in the Lahore Territories, the occupation of which may be deemed necessary by the British Government, for the security of the capital or for maintaining the peace of the country.

ARTICLE 9

The Lahore state shall pay to the British Government twenty-two lakhs of new Nanuck Shae Rupees of full tale and weight per annum for the maintenance of this force, and to meet the expenses incurred by the British Government.

Such sum to be paid by two instalments, or 13,20,000 in May or June, and 8,80,000 in November or December of each year.

ARTICLE 10

Inasmuch as it is fitting that Her Highness the Maharanee, the mother of Maharajah Dulleep Singh, should have a proper provision made for the maintenance of herself and dependants, the sum of one lakh and fifty thousand rupees shall be set apart annually for that purpose, and shall be at her Highness' disposal.

ARTICLE 11

The provisions of this Engagement shall have effect during the minority of His Highness Maharajah Dulleep Singh, and shall cease and terminate on His Highness attaining the full age of sixteen years, or on the 4th September of the year 1854, but it shall be competent to the Governor-General to cause the arrangement to cease at any period prior to the coming of age of His Highness, at which the Governor-General and the Lahore Durbar may be satisfied that the interposition of the British Government is no longer necessary for maintaining the Government of His Highness the Maharajah.

This agreement, consisting of eleven Articles, was settled and executed at Lahore by the Officers and Chiefs and Sirdars above-named, on the 16th day of December 1846.

(Sd.) F. CURRIE.

(„) H. M. LAWRENCE.

(Sd.) SIRDAR TEJ SINGH.

(„) SIRDAR SHERE SINGH.

(„) DEWAN DENA NATH.

(„) FUKER NOOROODEEN.

(„) RAI KISHEN CHUND.

(„) SIRDAR RUNJORE SINGH MAJETHEA.

(„) SIRDAR UTTER SINGH KALEWALLA.

(„) BHAE NIDHAN SINGH.

(„) SIRDAR KHAN SINGH MAJETHEA.

(„) SIRDAR SHUMSHEER SINGH.

(„) SIRDAR LAL SINGH MORAREA.

(„) SIRDAR KHER SINGH SINDHANWALLA.

(„) SIRDAR URJUN SINGH RUNGURNUNGAELEA.

(Sd.) HARDINGE.

(Sd.) DULLEEP SINGH.

Ratified by the Right Honourable the Governor-General, at Bhyrowal Ghat on the left bank of the Beeas, the twenty-sixth day of December One Thousand Eight Hundred and Forty-six.

(Sd.) F. CURRIE,
Secy. to the Govt. of India.

No. VIII

Terms granted to, and accepted by, Maharajah Dulleep Singh—1849.

Terms granted to the Maharajah Dulleep Singh Bahadoor, on the part of the Honorable East India Company, by Henry Meirs Elliot, Esq., Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, and Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Henry Montgomery Lawrence, K. C. B., Resident, in virtue of full powers vested in them by the Right Honourable James, Earl of Dalhousie, Knight of the Most Ancient and Most Noble Order of the Thistle, one of Her Majesty's Most Honorable Privy Council, Governor-General appointed by the Honorable East India Company to direct and control all their affairs in the East Indies, and accepted on the part of His Highness the Maharajah, by Rajah Tej Singh, Rajah Deena Nath, Bhaee Nidhan Singh, Fukeer Noorooddeen, Gundur Singh, Agent of Sirdar Shere Singh Sindhanwalla, and Sirdar Lall Singh, Agent and son of Sirdar Uttur Singh Kaleanwalla, Members of the Council of Regency, invested with full power and authority on the part of His Highness.

1st.—His Highness the Maharajah Dulleep Singh shall resign for himself, his heirs, and his successors, all right, title, and claim to the sovereignty of the Punjab, or to any sovereign power whatever.

2nd.—All the property of the State, of whatever description and wheresoever found, shall be confiscated to the Honorable East India Company, in part payment of the debt due by the State of Lahore to the British Government, and of the expenses of the war.

3rd.—The Gem called the Koh-i-noor, which was taken from Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk by Maharajah Runjeet Singh, shall be surrendered by the Maharajah of Lahore to the Queen of England.

4th.—His Highness Dulleep Singh shall receive from the Honorable East India Company, for the support of himself, his relatives, and the servants of the State, a pension not less than four and not exceeding five lakhs of Company's Rupees per annum.

5th.—His Highness shall be treated with respect and honour. He shall retain the title of Maharajah Dulleep Singh Bahadoor, and he shall continue to receive, during his life, such portion of the above-named pension as may be allotted to himself personally, provided he shall remain obedient to the British Government, and shall reside at such place as the Governor-General of India may select.

Granted and accepted at Lahore, on the 29th of March 1849, and ratified by the Right Honorable the Governor-General on the 5th April 1849.

(Sd) DALHOUSIE, L. S.

(„) H. M. ELLIOT, L. S.

(„) H. M. LAWRENCE, L. S.

(Sd.) MAHARAJAH DULLEEP SINGH.

(„) RAJAH TEJ SINGH.

(„) DEENA NATH.

(„) BHAE NIDHAN SINGH.

(„) FUKER NOOROODDEEN.

(„) GUNDUR SINGH,
Agent of Sirdar
Shere Singh,
Sindhanwalla.

(„) SIRDAR LALL SINGH,
Agent and Son of
Sirdar Uttur Singh
Kaleanwalla.

APPENDIX C
THREE LETTERS OF MAHARANI JIND KAUR

FIRST LETTER

लिखतम बीबी साहिब, अलारन साहिब जोग रोबकारी ।

असां आपणा सिर तुहाडे हवाले कीता सी, तुसां निमकहरामां दे पैरां विच्च दे दिता सु । तुसां साडी मुनसबी ना पाई । तुहानूं जो चाहीदा सी जो दरयाफती कर के साडे जुम्मे लगदा सो लदि । निमकहरामां दे कहे नहीं सी लगणा । तुसां वडे महाराज दी दोस्ती बल भीनहीं डिठ्ठ । तुसां मेरी आबरू लोकां तों लुहाई ए । तुसां करारनामिआं ते अहिदनामित्रां उपर भी कुझ अमल नहीं कीता ।

राजा लाल सिंह मेरा मोहतबर ते खैरखाह ते निमकहलाल सी । सो तुसां तकसीरी कर के भेज दिता तां असां कुझ नहीं तुसा नूं आखिआ । साडे दिल विच एह गल्ल सी जो आप साहिब साडे पास ने, सानूं डर किस दा ए, सानूं इस गल्ल दी खबर नहीं सी झूठां गल्लां साडे जुम्मे ला के ते कैद चहा कीता ।

कोई साडी लिखत दस्सो वा कुझ साडे जुम्मे लाओ आ, फेर जो तुहाडी मरजी हुन्दी सो करदे । इक मैं ते महाराज ते बाई टहिलणां असीं सम्मन विच कैद बां । होर नौकर सभ कढ दिते ने । असीं बहुत लाचार होये आं । पाणी ते रोटी भी नहीं औण दिंदे । इस तरह जु सानूं तंग करदे हो इस गल्ल कोलों फांसी लगा दिआ ।

जे तुसां साडी अदालत कीती तां हच्छी गल्ल, नहीं तां नन्दन सतर विच फरयाद करांगे । होर जेहडा डूढ लक्ख लाया सी, ओह भी नहीं किसे दिता । होर जेहडा चार महीनिआं दे विच खरच कीता सी इकवंजा हजार सो भी गहिणे बेच के मिस्सर मेघराज नूं दे दिता । किसे कोलों कुझ मंगदे नहीं सां । आपणे गहिणे बेच के गुजरान करदे सां । बेनिहक्क साडी आबरू किओ लाही । मंगलां की तक्सीर कीतो उनू भी कढ दिता ।

अज महाराज साडे पास आ के बहुत रोंदे रहे ने, आखण लग्गे सानूं बिशन सिंह ते गुलाब सिंह डरांदे ने । जे तां महाराज नूं डर नाल कुझ होगया तां फिर मैं की करांगी । उन्हां नूं आखिआ ने तुहानूं साहिब दा हुकम है, जो शाला बाग जा के उतरो । ओह सुण के ते बहुत रोंदे रहे ।

एह जेहडीआं गल्लां साडे नाल करदे हो किसे रजवाडे विच नहीं होईआं । तुसीं गुल्ले राज किओ सांभदे हो । जाहरा हो के किओ नहीं करदे । नाले बिच दोसती दा हरफ रखदे ओ नाले कैद करदे ओ । मेरी अदालत करो नहीं तां नन्दन फरयाद करांगी । तिन्नां चहुं निमकहरामां नूं रख लओ, होर सारी पंजाब नूं कतल करा दिओ इन्हां दे आखे लग के ते ।

मोहर

अकाल सहाय, बीबी जिन्द कौर ।

Translated into English, it reads as under:—

Robkar

From Bibi [Jind Kaur] Sahib to Lawrence..

I had entrusted my head to your care. You have thrust it under the feet of traitors. You have not done justice to me. You ought to have instituted an enquiry, and then charged me with what you found against me. You ought not to have acted upon what the traitors told you.

You have kept no regard of the friendship of the great Maharaja. You have caused me to be disgraced by other people. You have not even remained true to treaties and agreements. Raja Lal Singh was true and faithful to me. He was loyal. Having levelled charges against him, you sent him away. Then we never said anything to you. We thought that as the Sahib himself was with us, we had no fear of anyone. We could never imagine that we would be put into prison with baseless charges concocted against us. Produce any writings of ours. Prove any charges against me. Then you could do anything you liked.

Myself, the Maharaja and twenty-two maid servants are imprisoned in the Samman [Burj]. All other servants have been dismissed. We are in a very helpless condition. Even water and food are not allowed to come in. Now that you persecute us in this way, it is better that you hang us instead of it.

If you administer justice to us, well and good; otherwise I shall appeal to London headquarters. Even the allowance of one lakh and fifty thousand that had been fixed has not been paid by anybody. The amount of fifty-one thousand that I had spent in four months, I have paid to Missar Megh Raj after having sold my ornaments. I never begged for anything from anyone. Having sold my ornaments I was managing to live on. Why should you have caused me to be disgraced without any fault? What was the fault of Manglan that she too has been turned out?

The Maharaja came to me today and wept bitterly for a long time. He said that Bishan Singh and Gulab Singh

had been frightening him. If something happened to the Maharajah through fright, then what shall I do? He was told that orders of the Sahib for him were to reside in the Shalimar. He wept very bitterly when he heard this. The treatment that is thus meted out to us has not been given to any ruling house.

Why do you take possession of the kingdom by under-hand means? Why don't you do it openly? On the one hand you make a show of friendship and on the other you have put us in prison. Do justice to me or I shall appeal to the London headquarters. Preserve three or four traitors, and put the whole of the Panjab to the sword at their bidding!

(SEAL)

Akal Sahai

Bibi Jind Kaur.

SECOND LETTER

सत् गुर प्रसाद

लिखतम बीबी साहिब जी लारन साहिब जोग ।

असीं राजी बाजी शेखुपुरे आन पहुंचे । तुसां साडा असबाब सांभ के भेजना । होर जैसे सम्मन विच्च बैठे से तेसे शेखुपुरे बैठे हां । दोवें थां इको जेहे सानूं हन । तुसां मेरे नाल बहुत जुलम कीता ए । मेरा पुत्र खोह लिया । दस महीने में ढिड विच्च रखिआ ते मन्न मन्न पालिआ ई । बिना गल्ल मेरे नालों विछोडिआ । मैनुं ते कैद रखदे, मेरे आदमी कढ दिदें मेरीआं टहिलणां कढ दिदें, जिस तरह वी तुहाडी मरजी चाहुंदी उस तरह मेरे नाल करदे, पर इक मेरे नाल पुत्र विशोडा ना करदे । वास्ता ई आपणे रब दा, वास्ता ई आपणो बादशाह दा जिस दा नमक खांदे हो मेरा पुत्र मैनुं मिले । इह दुख मेतों सहिआ नही जांदा, नहीं तां मैनुं मरवा दिदें ।

पुत्र मेरा बहुत अयाणा ए, कुल करने जोगा नहीं । मैं बादशाही छोडी । मैनुं बादशाही दी कोई लोड नहीं । वास्ते रब दे मेरी अरज मन्नो । एस वेले मेरा कोई नहीं । मैं अगे वी कोई उजर नहीं । जो आखोगे, सो मैं मन्नांगी । मेरे पुत्र कोल कोई नहीं । भैन भाई नहीं, कोई चाचा ताया नहीं, बाप इस दा नहीं । इस नूं कीहदे हवाले कीता जे मेरे नाल एडी जुलमी एवें जे । होर मैं शेखुपुरे रहांगी, मैं लाहौर नहीं जावांगी । मेरे पुत्र नूं मेरे कोल भेज देवो । मैं उन्हीं दिनों तुसां पास आवांगी जिस दिन दरबार लाउना होसी । उस दिन उस नूं मैं भेज दिआंगी । होर मेरे नाल वी बहुत सी होई है, ते मेरे पुत्र नाल वी बहुत सी होई है । ते लोकां दा किहा मन्त लिआ । हुण बस करो, बहुत होई हैगी ।

With the Grace of The Great Guru

From Bibi Sahib to Lawrence Sahib

We have arrived safely at Sheikhupura. You should send our luggage with care. As I was sitting in the Samman, in the same way I am in Sheikhupura. Both the places are same to me. You have been very cruel to me. You have snatched my son from me. For ten months I kept him in my womb. Then I brought him up with great difficulty. Without any fault you have separated my son from me. You could have kept me in prison. You could have dismissed my men. You could have turned out my maid servants. You could have treated me in any other way you liked. But you should not have separated my son from me.

In the name of God you worship, and in the name of the king whose salt you eat, restore my son to me. I cannot bear the pain of this separation. Instead of this you put me to death.

My son is very young. He is incapable of doing anything. I have left the kingdom. I have no need of kingdom. For God's sake, pay attention to my appeals. At this time I have no one to look to. I raise no objections. I will accept what you say. There is no one with my son. He has no sister, no brother. He has no uncle, senior or junior. His father he has lost. To whose care has he been entrusted? Without any fault why is so much cruelty being done to me?

I shall reside in Sheikhupura, I shall not go to Lahore. Send my son to me. I will come to you at Lahore only during the days when you hold darbar. On that day I will send him. A great deal [of injustice] has been done to me. A great deal [of injustice] has been done to my son also. You have accepted what other people have said. Put an end to it now. Too much has been done.

THIRD LETTER

सत् गुरु प्रसादि

लिखतम महारानी साहिबा ।

मुरासला आप का पहुंचा, बहुत खुशी हुई कि मैं तुम को याद हूँ । तुम ने जो लिखा है महाराज खुशी, सुन कर बहुत दिल खुशी हुवा है । जिस दिन से हम लाहौर से चले

आये है उस दिन से आज हम ने महाराज की खुशी की खबर सुनी है। जो तुम ने लिखा है सो सब सच होवेगा। और मेरा दिल गवाही नहीं देता कि महाराज राजी होंगे। जिन की मां बिछड़ गई होवे वह क्योंकर राजी होंगे। महाराज बना तो यह फल देते हो। एक तो नादान और एक कभी बिछड़े नहीं थे। आप स्याने हो, बुद्धवान हो, अपने दिल में समझो कि महाराज किस तरह राजी होंगे।

यह जो तुम ने लिखा है नजर ऊपर दोस्ती दोनों सरकार के बहुत ख्याल खुशी खातर महाराज का है। जो तुम ने महाराज की खुशी खातर रक्खी है वह सारे जमाने में मरहूर हुई है कि रोते हुये को छीन कर शाला बाग को ले गये और मां को बाल पकड़ कर बाहर निकाल दिया। तुम्हारे दिल में इतना दरेग न आया कि महाराज नादान है क्योंकर रहेगा।

तुम्हारे तई इसी इज्जत आबरू के तई रक्खा था सो नमकहरामों ने वह इज्जत आबरू भी नहीं रहने दी। एक अफसोस है कि तुम ने हमारे जुम्मे समझ कर तकसीर नहीं लगाई नमकहरामियों के कहने पर अमल कर कर देस निकाला दे दिया। जो किया सो सब आप की नेकनामी हुई है। मेरी इज्जत आबरू और तुम्हारा जबान का सुखन गया। और जो तुम ने मेरे साथ किया है ऐसा किसी खूनी के साथ भी नहीं गुजता है। मैं सब कुछ छोड़ कर फकीर हुई थी, सो तुम ने फकीर भी नहीं रहने दिये। और खरच से हम बहुत तंग है।

और बन्धूजीत को तुम्हारे पास भेजा है। इस को अपने पास रखना। और आधा अम्बाब हमारे पास पहुंच गया है, आधा नहीं देते। हम को दिलवादो, और खरच ले कर भेजो।

With The Grace of The Great Guru

From the Queen-mother to John Lawrence

Dated 16th Bhadon (August 30, 1847).

Your letter has been received. It is a matter of great pleasure that you remember me. I am very glad to learn from your letter that Maharaja is happy. Since the day I left Lahore, it is today that I have heard of the Maharaja being happy. Whatever you write may be true. But my mind does not believe that the Maharaja is happy. How can he, whose mother has been separated from him, be happy? You call him Maharaja and then treat him like this. On the one hand he is very young, on the other he had never separated [from his mother]. You are an intelligent and a wise man. Think over it in your mind how the Maharaja can be happy. You write to me that

on account of friendship between the two Governments you are very particular of the welfare of the Maharaja. How far you look to the welfare of the Maharaja is now well known all over the world. Weeping, he was torn away from his mother and taken to Shalamar Garden, while the mother was dragged out by her hair. Well has the friendship been repaid. You never thought in your mind how the Maharaja who was very young, could live [happily without his mother].

You had been kept for the protection of our honour and dignity. But the traitors have robbed us of these also. It is a matter of sorrow that you did not weigh things before accusing me. You have exiled me on the instigation of traitors. Whatever you have done has earned a good name for you! I have lost my dignity and you have lost regard for your word (*Meri izzat abru aur tumhara zaban ka sukhan gaya*). The treatment that you have given to me is not given even to murderers. Having renounced everything, I had become a faqir, but you have not allowed me to live even like a faqir. I am very much hard up for money.

I have sent Bandhujit to you. Keep him with you. Half of my luggage has been received by me. The other half, they do not give. Get that sent to me, and also get the allowance and have it sent to me.

To John Lawrence, Superintendent and Commissioner Jullundur Doab, and Acting Resident, Lahore.

APPENDIX D.

A FEW EXTRACTS FROM CONTEMPORARY WRITINGS

1. *Smyth, G. C.*

Regarding the Punjab war, I am neither of opinion that the Seiks made an unprovoked attack, nor that we have acted towards them with Great forbearance. . . . If the Seiks were to be considered entirely an independent state, in no way answerable to us, *we should not have provoked them.* . . . But if . . . the treaty of 1809 is said to have been binding between the two Governments, then, the simple question is, who first departed from the 'rules of friendship?' I am decidedly of the opinion that we did. . . . —*Reigning Family of Lahore*, (1847), xxi, xxii, xxiii.

2. *Mouton, Col.*

On the 12th December the Army forded the Sutlej at a distance of 7 miles from Ferozepore. Raja Lal Singh rushed up and damped the ardour of the Sikhs a great deal by assuring them of the defection of 4 Indian battalions in the English Army which would surely join them. Meanwhile he hastened to send an urgent message to Captain Nicholson, Charge d'affairs at Ferozepore, telling him that it was without the orders of his government that the army had crossed the river, and that the generals had been dragged against their wishes; that sixty thousand men were going to march on Ferozepore, which had not even six thousand men to defend itself, and ended by requesting the Captain to advise him in the matter. Nicholson replied suggesting to Raja Lal Singh to detach from the Army a corps of twenty-five thousand men which he should take to meet the Commander-in-Chief, who was arriving by route of Ambala, and that probably these twenty-five thousand men would be defeated, the rest of the army crossing river in disorder.

This treason saved the English from a sure defeat.—*Rapport Sur Les Derniers Evenments du Punjab*, (1846), 5.

3. *Cunningham, J. D.*

It was sufficiently certain and notorious at the time that Lall Singh was in communication with Captain Nicholson, the British Agent at Ferozepore, but owing to the untimely death of that officer the details of the overtures made, and expectations held out, cannot now be satisfactorily known.

Lall Singh headed the attack, but in accordance with his original design, he involved his followers in an engagement, and then left them to fight as their undirected valour might prompt.—*History of the Sikhs*, (1849), 304, 306.

4. *Cust, Robert N.*

December 22.

News came from the Governor-General that our attack of yesterday had failed, that affairs were desperate, that all the state-papers were to be destroyed, and that if the morning attack failed all would be over; this was kept secret by Mr. Currie, and we were concerting measures to make an unconditional surrender to save the wounded."—*Linguistic and Oriental Essays*, vi, 48.

5. *Ludlow, J. M.*

Lall Singh, the Vizier, . . . wrote to Captain Nicholson, the political agent: "I have crossed with the Sikh Army. You know my friendship for the British. Tell me what to do." Nicholson answered, "Do not attack Ferozepore. Halt as many days as you can, and then march towards the Governor-General." Lall Singh did so, and Ferozepur was saved. . . . So utterly unprepared were we, that even this treachery of one of our enemies scarcely sufficed to save us.—*British India* (1858), ii, 142.

6. *Griffin, L.*

"Ranjodh Singh . . . had no confidential agents in the British camp as Raja Lal Singh had, nor did he, like the Raja, pray for and labour for the triumph of the English."—*Punjab Chiefs* (1890), i, 272-73.

7. *Adams, A. L.*

. . . Much has been said of Aliwal, but candid witnesses give a far different account from that written at the time.

I wandered over the field with one who had been present at the engagement; he assured me, and his testimony has been corroborated by many others, that a fruitful imagination was at work when the official account was drawn up. His words were :—

“Aliwal was the battle of the despatch, for none of us knew we had fought a battle until the particulars appeared in a document which did more than justice to everyone concerned.”

But they gulped it down, and like many of our Indian battles and Indian blunders, the final issue of the struggle disarmed criticism.

An Irishman would say, “We gained a disadvantage at Budiwal,” by the baggage of the Army falling into the hands of the enemy; that no exaggeration could well turn it into victory; but shortly afterwards, a few shots and the charge of a squadron or two in pursuit of a host of retreating Sikhs were magnified into a grand combat, and thus the plain of Aliwal has been recorded as the scene of one of India’s Marathons.—*Wanderings of a Naturalist*, (1867), 60-1.

APPENDIX E

GLOSSARY OF ORIENTAL WORDS

A

Abadee, Abadi, settlement.

Ackbar, Akhbar, newspaper.

Adawlut, Adalat, court, administration of justice.

Aieen, Ain, law, custom.

Akal, timeless, deathless.

Alloowalie, Ahluwalia, resident of the village of Ahlu; technically applied to the descendants of Sardar Jassa Singh, founder of the Kapurthala family and wrongly adopted by some members of the Kalal caste (to which Jassa Singh belonged) irrespective of their places of residence.

Aram-tulub, aram-talab, easy-going, not given to hard work.

Atta, Aata, flour.

Attareewalas, Atariwala, residents of Atari in Amritsar district.

B

Bagh, garden.

Bajra, millet.

Banghy, Bahngi, a pole with slings at either end supporting portable baskets or boxes carried over one shoulder.

Band, bund, dam, embankment.

Baniyah, a Hindu trader.

Bannoochee, Bannuchi, resident of Bannu.

Baree (Bari) Doab, the tract between the rivers Beas and Ravi.

Barukzaie, Barukzie, Barukzye, Barakzei, an Afghan tribe.

Bhaee, Bhae, Bhaie, Bhai, a brother, title of respect among the Sikhs; at times refers in the text to Bhai Maharaj Singh.

Bheishtee, Bhishti, Bahishti, water-carrier.

Bhor, Bohr, Bar, *ficus Indica*, a large Indian tree of fig family.

Bhoosa, Bhusa, hay, chaff, the husk of corn or grain.

Bodkee, a round gold piece of a necklace, sometimes used as a gold coin.

Boora, Bura, saw-dust.

Braduree, Bradari, brotherhood, a clan, a section of a society or a tribe.

Burkundauze, Bark-andaz, gunner, artilleryman.

C

Chaj Doab, tract between the rivers Chanab and Jihlam (Jhelum).

Chappoo, Chapawal, Chapaul, a raid.

Charyaree Sowars, irregular cavalry troops contributed by the Jagirdars or other allies of the Lahore Darbar.

Chowkee, Chauki, post, generally octroi or police post.

Chup, quiet.

Chuprasee, Chaprasi, a peon.

Coss, koss, kos, an Indian measure of distance, approximately 1½ mile.

D

Dauk, dawk, Dak, post.

Dall, Dal, pulse.

Daman, the foot of a mountain.

Daoodpootra, Daudpotra, the family name of a tribe of Bahawalpur.

Daur, run, running tour, running excursion, running expedition.

Deerah, Dera, force, a division.

Dewan, Diwan, secretary, senior clerk.

Dhurum, Dharm, religion.

Dhurumsala, a building dedicated to religious use, a rest-house, an inn.

Doab, a tract of land between two rivers.

Dooly, a litter, sedan, palanquin.

Duftwaree, Daftari, record-keeper.

Durbar, Darbar, tech., Government.

Durwan, gate-keeper, watchman.

Dusserah, a Hindu festival, the tenth day or all the ten days of the light half of the month of Assuj when the festival in honour of Rama is celebrated.

E

Ead, Id, a Muslim festival.

Eadhgah, Idgah, place of Id prayers.

Eckhbar, Akhbar, newspaper, newsletter, news.

Fakeer, Fakir, a mendicant.

Feringees, Farangis, Franks, Europeans.

Futteh Wah-goorrooji, Fateh Wahiguru-ji ki, Victory to the Lord.

G

Ghat, a ferry.

Ghorchurrah, Goorcherra, Ghorcharrha, a horseman, a mounted soldier.

Golandaz, artilleryman.

Goomashtas, Gumashtas, agents.

H

Hoshyar, Hoshiar, clever.

Hukoomut, Hukumat, government, administration.

Hurkara, Harkara, messenger, postman.

I

Ijara, contract, farm of land or territory held at a definite rent or revenue.

Ihmuk, ehmak, ahmaq, a fool, an idiot.

Ilakah, ilaqa, territory.

Ispat, steel.

Istahar, Ishtihar, advertisement, notice, proclamation.

Istikhbal, Istiqbal, reception, welcome.

Iykadshee, Ikadashi, eleventh day.

Jageers, Jaghire, Jagir, grant of land or territory.

Jalao, Jalau, Jilau, brilliance, splendour, pomp.

Jawab, reply.

Jummadar, Jamadar, a troop leader, an officer in the army.

Juwan, Jawan, a youngman.

K

Kafilah, caravan.

Kanal, half a bigha of land, one-eighth of a *ghumaon*.

Kansamah, Khansaman, a bearer, household servant.

Kardar, administrator, an agent of the government, an official.

Kinarah kush, Kinara kash, disconnected, unconnected, drawn to a corner, set aside.

Khan, a chief.

Khatir Jummaie, satisfaction.

Kheir-Khwahee, loyalty.

Kheyr Khwah, Khair-khah, well-wisher, loyal, obedient.

Kheytt, khet, field.

Khidmut, khidmat, service.

Khillut, khillat, a robe of honour.

Khoonee-Boorj, khuni burj, bloody tower.

Khurreef, kharif, autumn harvest, called *Sauni* or *Sawani* in the Panjab.

Komedan, kumedan, commandant.

Koss, coss, kos, a measure of distance, approximately equal to a mile and a half.

Kossid, qasid, a messenger.

Kurram firma-i-mooshfikan Mookhlis, Miherban, the honourable, faithful and kind friend.

Kus-kus [khas-khas] tatties, a fragrant grass (*Andropogon muricatum*)—woven door or window screen kept wet to cool the air passing through it into the room or tent.

Kushish, koshish, attempt, effort.

Kuthar mookhee, Katar-mukhi, dagger-faced; the name of a Sikh regiment.

Kuthree, Khattri, the second Hindu caste, Sanskrit *Kshatri*.

M

Maidan, field, open ground.

Malik, master.

Manjha, the midland country, the districts of Amritsar and Lahore of the pre-partition Panjab.

Mujeethia, Mujheetia, Majethia, Majithia, resident of Majitha, in Amritsar district.

Mem Sahib, an European lady.

Mhendie, mehndi, hena (Lawsonia inernis) powder used for dyeing the hair, hands and feet.

Milac, Malik, a master, a chief.

Misaulchee, Masalchi, torch-bearer.

Misr, a Brahman sub-caste, used as surname.

Mithaie, sweetmeats.

Moofsid, *mufsid*, a trouble-maker.

Mohar, a gold coin, a gold sovereign.

Mohoorut, *mahurat*, auspicious time and day.

Moolkeiahs, *Mulkias*, men of the country, sons of the soil, countrymen.

Moonshee, *Munshi*, a clerk.

Moosahibs, *musahib*, a companion, an associate, an aide-de-camp.

Mootsuddy, *Mutsaddi*, a clerk, a writer, an accountant.

Moraria, a resident of the village *Murara*.

Moraslah, a letter, a message, the summons of a court.

Motemid, *mutamad*, a trust-worthy person, a confidant.

Mulaquat kurring, having interview with.

Munsoobuh, *Mansuba*, intrigue.

Mussuk, *mashak*, Water-skin.

N

Nazim, Officer in charge of a *Nizamat*, a governor.

Nawab, a Muslim chief.

Nizam, government, administration, constitution.

Nizam-ud-Doulah, governor of the state.

Nizamut, *Nizamat*, district government.

Nullah, *nala*, a creek.

Nuzzurana, *nazrana*, tribute.

P

Pawn, *pan*, betel leaf.

Peythee, *Peti*, chest, treasure-chest.

Poorbeah, *Purbia*, belonging to *Poorab*, easterner, a man of the U.P.

Povindah, *poinda*, a runner.

Pucka, *pakka*, ripe, first class, complete, mature.

Pultan, platoon, regiment.

Punt, *Panth*, the fraternity of the Sikhs.

Purwannahs, *perwanna*, *parwana*, a chit, a letter, a pass, a warrant.

R

Rahdari, a passage-permit, a passport.

Raj, kingdom.

Rasalah, *risala*, cavalry.

Razee-kur, *razi-kar*, to satisfy.

Roobocarry, *Roobukaree*, *robkari*, despatch, official letter.

Rookhsut, *rukhsat*, leave.

S

Sahib log, *Sahibs*, gentlemen, Europeans.

Sakht Jawan, hardy youngman.

Sarai, an inn.

Seikh, *Sikh*, a follower of Sikh religion founded by Guru Nanak.

Serishtadar, *sarishtadar*, a keeper of records, a clerk of a court.

Shahbash, well-done.

Shah pussund, *Shah-pasand*, a favourite of the king, a kind of mangoes.

Shuter-sawar, a camel rider.

Sings, *Singhs*, the baptised Sikhs.

Sirdars, *Sardar*, Sikh leaders.

Sirkar, *Sarkar*, the government, the king.

Sirkaree, *sarkari*, of government; belonging to government.

Soobahdar, *Subedar*, governor of a province.

Sowars, *Suwar*, *Sawar*, horsemen.

Sukht hookum, *sakht hukam*, urgent order, strict instructions.

Sut Goor Suhaie, *Sat-gur Sahai*—May the True Guru help us.

Suttee, *sati*, immolation of widows, a woman who burns herself on the funeral pyre of her husband.

T

Tannah, *Thana*, police station.

Tattoo, a pony.

Thanedar, *Thannadar*, Police officer, in charge of a police post.

Tuhuvour Punnah Shoojaut Dastgah, strong asylum of refugees, a brave defender and victorious friend.

Tujveez, proposal.

U

Ukbar, *akhbar*, newspaper.

Ukhbar Nuvees, news-writer.

Urzee, *arzi*, petition.

V

Vakeel, agent, representative.

Viqueel, *vakil*, agent, representative.

Vizer, minister.

Vizeeree, an Afghan tribe.

W

Wah Gooroo ke Futteh, *Wahiguru ki fateh*, Victory to God.

Y

Yagee, *yagi*, rebel.

Z

Zamindar, *Zumeendar*, land-lord, peasant proprietor, he who tills the land.

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